Second battle on the Piave
Birago pontoon bridge on the Piave
| date | June 15 to June 22, 1918 |
|---|---|
| place | Piave |
| output | Defense victory of the Italians, retreat to the starting positions |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| 48 divisions | 44 Italian and 6 allied divisions |
| losses | |
|
11,643 dead |
8,030 dead |
1915
1st Isonzo - 2nd Isonzo - 3rd Isonzo - 4th Isonzo - Lavarone (1915-1916)
1916
5th Isonzo - South Tyrol offensive - 6th Isonzo - Doberdò - 7. Isonzo - 8. Isonzo - 9th Isonzo -
First Dolomites Offensive - Second Dolomites offensive -
Avalanche disaster
1917
10th Isonzo - Ortigara - 11th Isonzo - 12th Isonzo - Pozzuolo - Monte Grappa
1918
Piave - San Matteo - Vittorio Veneto
The second battle on the Piave from June 15 to 22, 1918 marked the last major attack by the Austro-Hungarian army and was also the last attempt by the Danube monarchy to victoriously end the war against Italy . However, the large-scale offensive, which was initially to be officially named the June Battle of Veneto , became a complete failure. After the battle, the Italian as well as the Austro-Hungarian troops were back in their original positions.
prehistory
The Kingdom of Italy had already fully recovered from its defeat in the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo by February 1918 . In March 1918 the Italian army had grown again to 54 divisions and was reinforced by several Allied units (3 British and 2 French divisions). The new front stretched from the Stilfser Joch through the high mountains to the south to Lake Garda , from Trentino to the east over the plateau of Folgaria to the Grappa massif near Belluno , from there to the Piave and along the river to its confluence with the Adriatic Sea. In the Austro-Hungarian General Staff there was a strong party which believed it had to continue the offensive that had stalled in November 1917 in order to achieve victory. After the war on the Eastern Front could be regarded as ended by the conclusion of peace with Russia , attempts were made to use the forces that had become free against Italy. At the start of the attack on the Italian front, the 48 Austro-Hungarian divisions faced 44 Italian, three English, two French and one Czech divisions. The Austrians were in short supply of ammunition, the soldiers had been malnourished for months and the clothing was insufficient.
Reorganization of the Italian army
Cadorna's successor , the new chief of staff, General Armando Diaz , had regained the troops' lost confidence through several smaller commandos. Meanwhile, Italian armaments production was doing tremendous things; at the beginning of the Austrian offensive, the army had a total of 6,294 guns available. With extensive additional supplies of material by the Entente , the well-nourished Italians, well-equipped with heavy haulage columns, were materially superior to the emaciated enemy. According to the plan of the western allies, Italy was to begin its offensive against the Austrians on May 30th in order to relieve the western front, threatened by the German spring offensive since the end of March . However, through his reconnaissance, Diaz had received certain news of a major Austrian attack and therefore decided to forego his own offensive and await the enemy well equipped on the Piave and on the Folgaria plateau.
In the winter of 1917/18 the Italians had reorganized their entire army organization; the defensive positions that had already been built up in November had been expanded into very strong, deep defensive zones. A dense communications network behind the lines allowed troops to move quickly, with reserves of almost any strength at all focal points on the front with the help of the existing motorcades. In this way, up to four divisions could be brought either to the mountain front in Belluno or to the Piave within four to eight hours. Ten divisions (main reserve) could be brought to each section of the front within four to six days with specially provided vehicles or by rail.
On June 1st, the Italian headquarters met in Abano . General Diaz and his deputy General Badoglio pointed out the recognized opposing offensive, and the army leaders were made aware of the need to maintain strong reserves in the rear. The main reserve (AOK 9) has now been brought closer to the identified main attack areas. The XXV marched in the Treviso - Mestre area . (7th and 33rd division) and the XXVI. Corps (11th and 13th Divisions) behind the 3rd Army. The XII. Corps (27th and 37th Divisions) stopped at Custoza , the XXII. Corps (57th and 60th Divisions) were moved forward to Castelfranco and Marostica . The XXX. Corps (47th and 50th Divisions) were deployed at Montebelluna behind the 8th Army deployed on the Montello sector. The Italian army command also had eight further divisions, which were assigned directly to the armies, but remained at the disposal of the high command.
Bad planning by the Austrians
Field Marshal Boroević von Bojna was realistically no longer counting on an attack victory. He saw the defensive front, which was shortened from 384 to 140 kilometers by the offensive in 1917, as the maximum that could be achieved and preferred to wait for the outcome of the decision on the western front in the defensive position . Only when the army high command in Baden near Vienna decided that the major attack would have to be carried out before summer, Boroević tried to enforce that the main focus of the attack on the Piave should be within his area of command. The head of the operations department in the kuk General Staff , Major General von Waldstätten , pleaded against him for an offensive with concentrated force between Brenta and Piave on Bassano . A collision was possible here without exceeding heavy contours. At the same time, Army Group Boroevic was to launch an attack on both sides of the Oderzo - Treviso railway .
In order to expand the plans even further, Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf , the commander of Army Group Tyrol , was invited to Baden on April 11 to discuss it with Emperor Karl I. Conrad was able to persuade the emperor to repeat the guidelines of the South Tyrol offensive of 1916 and also to launch a push over the South Tyrolean plateau. The weak-willed emperor, initially strictly against the repetition of the attacks over the plateau of seven communities , was nevertheless persuaded by Conrad to do so. On April 23, Field Marshal Boroević also presented his draft operation, which envisaged the main attack in the area of the Isonzo Army via Oderzo with an attack on Treviso. The need for forces provided for a total of 23 divisions in cooperation with the 6th Army adjoining on the right. Emperor Karl, who had already admitted Conrad's wishes, could not muster the courage to cancel the plans of the field marshal of the other army group, and approved both directions, an undertaking for which the attacking forces could no longer suffice. On May 5, the Army High Command under the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Arz von Straussenburg , confirmed the attack operations of both army groups, which accepted the fragmentation of the attacking power on 120 kilometers of the front.
The offensive set for June 15 was to be preceded by an additional diversionary attack on the Tonale Pass on June 13, and the corps of Field Marshal Lieutenant Metzger (Section AOK 10 ) was instructed to advance to the heights of Edolo. On June 15, both army groups had to start their planned large-scale operation at the same time.
The 11th Army was to attack between the Astico and the Piave with all six corps , the center of gravity was set southward, according to Conrad's will, over the heights of the Seven Parishes. The line Schio , Thiene , Breganze , Marostica, Bassano, Asolo to Cornuda was set as the target for the first two days of the attack. The forest zone south of the opponent's main battle line was to be overcome in one go until it emerged from the mountains into the lowlands, if one did not want to get stuck in the middle of the attack again, as in 1916.
The Army Group Boroevic should start together and break with its center at the Piavefront towards Treviso. The Isonzo Army was assigned the Postioma- Paese - Preganziol line . The right wing of the Army Group of the Austro-Hungarian 6th Army was initially only intended to accompany the attack against the Montello plateau, while the extreme left wing at San Donà was only supposed to demonstrate sporadically and had to limit itself to the defensive.
Involved troops of the enemy
Army Group Conrad
- 10th Army under Field Marshal Alexander von Krobatin
- Archduke Peter Ferdinand's group : 1st and 22nd Divisions, 163rd and 164th Brigade
- XX. Corps under Gen. Inf. Franz Kalser von Maasfeld : 49th Infantry Division and Schiesser group
- XXI. Corps under Gen. Inf. Kasimir von Lütgendorf : 19th and 56th divisions, 3rd cavalry division
- XIV. Corps under Gen. Inf. Ignaz Verdroß : Kaiserjäger Division , 159th Brigade, Edelweiss Division (the latter served on June 15 as a reserve of the VI Corps)
- 11th Army under Colonel General Viktor von Scheuchenstuel
- III. Corps under Colonel General Hugo Martiny : 6th, 28th and 52nd Divisions, 6th Cavalry Division
- XIII. Corps under Gen. Inf. Friedrich Csanády : 5th, 16th, 38th, 42nd, 74th division
- Reserves: 27th and 38th Divisions, 10th Cavalry Division
- VI. Corps under Gen. Inf. Ernst Kletter : 18th, 26th, 39th and 53rd Infantry Divisions
- XXVI. Corps under Gen. Inf. Ernst Horsetzky : 27th and 32nd Divisions, 4th Cavalry Division
- I. Corps under Gen. Inf. Ferdinand Kosak : 60th and 55th divisions
- XV. Corps under Gen. Inf. Karl Scotti : 20th, 48th and 50th divisions
Army Group Boroevic
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- 6th Army under Colonel General Archduke Joseph
- II Corps, Gen. the Inf. Rudolf Krauss : 8th and 11th Cavalry Division
- XXIV Corps under Gen. Inf. Goiginger : 13th, 17th, 31st Infantry Division
- 5th Isonzo Army under Colonel General Wenzel von Wurm
- XVI. Corps under Gen. Inf. Rudolf Králíček : 33rd, 56th and 58th Infantry Divisions
- IV. Corps under Gen. of the cavalry Prince Schönburg-Hartenstein : 29th, 64th and 80th divisions
- Reserve: 9th, 35th, 51st and 61st Divisions, 12th Rifle Cavalry Division
- VII. Corps under Gen. Inf. Georg Schariczer von Rény : 14th, 24th and 44th division, 9th cavalry division
- XXIII. Corps under Gen. of Inf. Maximilian Csicserics : 10th, 12th and 57th divisions, 1st cavalry division
Italian army groups
Commander in Chief: General Armando Diaz
- 6th Army under Lieutenant General Luca Montuori
- X Corps: General Giovanni Cattaneo (12th Division)
- XIV Corps: Lieutenant General Earl of Cavan (7th, 23rd and 48th Divisions)
- XII. (French) Corps: General Jean-César Graziani (23rd and 24th Divisions)
- XIII. Corps: General Ugo Sani (14th and 28th Divisions)
- XX. Corps: General Giuseppe Ferrari (2nd and 10th Divisions)
Reserve: 52nd and 54th divisions
- 4th Army Lieutenant General Gaetano Giardino
- IX. Corps: General Emilio De Bono (17th and 18th divisions)
- VI. Corps: General Luigi Lombardi (15th and 59th Divisions)
- XVIII. Corps: General Luigi Basso (1st and 56th Divisions)
- I. Corps: General Donato Etna (24th and 70th Divisions)
- Reserve: 65th, 67th and 68th divisions
- 8th Army Lieutenant General Giuseppe Pennella
- XXVII. Corps: General Antonino Di Giorgio (51st and 66th Divisions)
- XXX. Corps: General Umberto Montanari (47th and 50th Divisions)
- VIII Corps. General Asclepia Gandolfo (48th and 58th Divisions)
- Reserve: 13th and 64th divisions
- 3rd Army General Duke of Aosta
- XI. Corps: General Giuseppe Paolini (31st and 45th Divisions)
- XXVIII. Corps: General Giovanni Croce (25th and 53rd Divisions)
- XXIII. Corps: (4th and 61st Divisions)
- Kav. Corps. General Vittorio of Savoia-Aosta, Count of Turin (1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions)
Reserve: 23rd Division
Main reserve: 9th Army General de Vecchi
- Corpo d`Assalto: General Francesco Grazioli (Czech Division, Sturm-Division)
- XXII. Corps: General Giuseppe Vaccari (57th and 60th Divisions)
- XXV. Corps: General Eduardo Ravazza (7th and 33rd Divisions)
- XXVI. Corps: General Vittorio Luigi Alfieri (11th and 13th Divisions)
- XII. Corps: (27th and 37th Divisions)
The battle
On June 13, the Avalanche operation , the diversionary attack by the FML Metzger group on Passo Tonale , failed completely. The forces deployed were the 1st Infantry Division on the left wing towards Edolo and the 22nd Rifle Division on the right wing towards Bormio . The Austrians had to retreat to the starting position. But the bad omen did not prevent the planned implementation of the offensive on the Piave.
15th June
Attack on Folgaria and on Monte Grappa
On June 15, around 3:00 a.m., the Austrian artillery began preparatory fire on the entire attack front. While the opposing artillery could be suppressed in the section of the Isonzo Army, this did not succeed in the 11th Army. At 7:00 in the morning, the 11th Army with eight infantry divisions (around 95,000 men) began the assault on the Folgaria ; in the afternoon this attack got stuck everywhere and in the evening one had to fall back on the starting position. The attack of the XXVI. Corps under General Horsetzky infantry conquered Monte Mochin at short notice. However, the storm against Monte Asolone failed as well as that of the XV. Corps on Monte Spinuccia.
The breakthrough already feared by the army command through a push by the Italians did not materialize and would have turned the entire offensive into a disaster on the very first day. After the battle on the plateau of the Seven Municipalities and in the area east of it on the Grappa section, the large-scale “Battle in Veneto” was now only reduced to the breakthrough battle across the river, just reduced to the Battle of the Piave.
Attack over the Piave
Meanwhile, the Piave battle broke out at the hot spots Quero-Alano-Segusino-San Vito-Santa Luca-Falze di Piave-Mina-Priula-Tonon-Papadopoli-San Dona-Vecchio-Bressanin-Piave estuary near Cavarzuccherina. The used Birago - pontoons of the kuk Train troops were composed of three parts and had to be laboriously rowed to the other bank of the soldiers during the onset of artillery fire of the enemy. The middle corps (group Schönburg and Schariczer, which led the main thrust) were able to establish themselves on the right bank of the Piave, while the right wing corps (group Cicserics) initially got stuck in the defensive fire of the four-kilometer-deep defense system of the Italian 3rd Army after the transition. The IV and VII corps of the Isonzo Army (Colonel General von Wurm) were able to build a bridgehead at a distance of 15 kilometers on either side of the Ponte di Piave.
The right wing of the Isozo Army, the XVI. Corps under General Kralicek , meanwhile, could not cross the river. General of the Infantry Kralicek was supposed to reach the crossing from the southern part of Papadopoli Island and the smaller islands in front of it between the lines Salettuol - Maserada, but failed at Cimadolmo and further north at Nervesa. The designated 58th Division (FML von Zeidler ) and 33rd Division (FML von Iwanski ) failed when crossing the island of Papadopoli. The losses of the 58th Division alone amounted to 66 officers and 1,849 men.
The greatest success of the first day was achieved in the section of the 6th Army with XXIV Corps of FML Goiginger . The 13th and 17th divisions had already crossed the Piave under cover of darkness and had completely taken up the Italian bank positions by 6:15 in the morning. By the end of the day, the eastern and northern slopes of the plateau had also been stormed despite strong Italian resistance.
On June 15, only the Italian 48th Division was thrown into battle as reinforcement in the Montello area. The Italian 8th Army was assigned the 13th and 50th Divisions, while the 3rd Army received the 33rd Division. The 7th and 11th divisions went to the lower Piave, and the 22nd and 37th divisions were brought up between Treviso and Padua, which were delivered from the area of the 1st Army. The XXII. Corps and divisions 11th, 33rd and 47th were left in the rear in the event of an Austrian breakthrough.
On June 16, the 3rd Army was reinforced by three more divisions - 7th, 11th and Sturmdivision.
June 16
In the Austro-Hungarian 6th Army, a transition attempt by the 31st Division (FML Lieb ) at Falzè failed. The combat troops that had remained on the other side of the river the day before had already moved to the newly built war bridge at Villa Jacur. During the night of June 16, in the section of 17th Division, the war bridge, which was about to be completed, was torn apart by a sinking pontoon.
The kuk XXIII lying on the Adriatic. Corps under General Csicserics, which was actually only supposed to support as a wing corps, succeeded in expanding the bridgehead at Dona di Piave to 8 km wide and 4 km deep, several thousand prisoners and 37 guns were brought in.
The Italian army command rejected the XXII. Corps at Asolo on alert and even considered setting the storm division on the march against Rosà at Bassano in order to counter any opponents who might break through on the plain. The Italian 3rd Army was able to stop the enemy, but the high command deliberately did not take any counter-action through the reserve provided in order to weaken the opposing forces even further.
17th of June
On that day, the ten imperial and royal divisions crossed over on the south bank were compared to only eight and a half Italian divisions. The kuk XXIV Corps fought further to gain space on the Montello, but the Italian intervention divisions have not yet been deployed here.
18th of June
On the lower Piave the Austrians achieved a tactical success in that the two bridgeheads formed by the kuk IV and VII Corps at Ponte and San Dona were combined into a single one, which was now almost 20 kilometers wide and 4 kilometers deep.
Sudden nocturnal downpours in the mountains had meanwhile caused the Piave to swell, and the Italian artillery shot against the bridgehead also wore down. The supply of the transferred Kuk troops became more and more difficult because of the flood.
The Italians had again given up on the possible counterattack. Meanwhile, the Italian XII marched. Corps to the west of Treviso, the 21st, 27th and 29th divisions were moved by rail to the area north of Padua. In addition, the 8th Army was reinforced with artillery and the 3rd Army with a brigade. The Italian high command had eight more infantry and three cavalry divisions from the main reserve at their disposal.
June 19th
On this day the Italian high command finally launched a stronger counterattack by the 8th Army with seven divisions on Montello. The XXII. Corps, the 47th Division and three other assault battalions included. Even the heavy use of Italian bombers and attack pilots, which Austrian fighter pilots threw themselves against, could not force the defense on Montello back down from the slope.
In the Italian 3rd Army, the 22nd Division was introduced into the main battle line. In the hinterland, the 37th Division was moved to Treviso, the 54th Division to Campo San Pietro and the 52nd Division to Asolo .
Withdrawal order for the Austrians
On June 20, 14 Austrian and 28 Italian divisions fought on the south bank of the Piave. The kuk high command, shaken in the belief in the victorious outcome, stopped the attacks that had become pointless. Since the Italian counter-offensive the day before, it had become clear to the army command that the Italian defenses were not weakened anywhere. Boroević issued the necessary withdrawal order for all units crossing over, and the flood on the Piave also made it no longer possible to adequately supply the troops in the bridgeheads.
For the time being, the fighting continued only on the Montello Ridge. Since the beginning of the offensive, the XXIV Corps had brought in a total of 84 artillery pieces and taken 12,000 prisoners. Although the Italians were reinforced in this section with the 24th Division, they did not succeed in pushing in the opposing bridgehead.
June 21st
June 21 passed without any special fighting, the Austro-Hungarian troops were even given the time to cross the river when they were retreating. The evacuation of Montello was carried out by the Austrians on June 21, almost unnoticed from 7 p.m. Although the Italians assessed the situation correctly as a result of the opposing retreat, General Diaz made the decision to refrain from another attack. It was enough to inflict heavy losses on the inevitable retreat of the enemy by increasing the effective artillery fire and to spare one's own troops. In the Italian 3rd Army some divisions were even withdrawn from the front, so that on June 22nd there were only six divisions left in the main battle line.
consequences
With this defeat, the war was de facto lost for the Austrians, they waited hopefully for the events on the western front and in the meantime went on a complete defensive. The defeat brought such heavy losses that another offensive could not be thought of this year, one could be happy to be able to hold the positions. The losses of the seven-day Piave battle were almost 117,000 men, higher than those in the Eleventh Isonzo Battle , although it lasted twice as long, and amounted to 11,643 men killed, 80,852 wounded and 25,527 prisoners. In addition to these losses, there were around 24,500 sick people, so that the total loss should have been approximately 142,200 soldiers. The officer corps ' confidence in the higher command had suffered badly, and the troops' morale was bad. Charles I withdrew Field Marshal Conrad's command of the Army Group in Tyrol on July 14, which has now been transferred to Archduke Joseph. The leadership of the 6th Army was entrusted to Prince von Schönburg-Hartenstein on July 16 .
literature
- Anton Wagner: The First World War , Troop Service Pocket Book, Verlag Carl Ueberreuter, Vienna 1981, pp. 341–349
- Peter Fiala : The last offensive in Old Austria. Leadership problems and leadership responsibility in the Austro-Hungarian offensive in Veneto, June 1918 (= Defense Scientific Research / Department of Military History Studies . 3). Boldt, Boppard am Rhein 1967.
- Peter Fiala: The Battle of the Piave from Troop Service No. 3/1978 Austrian Military Journal, Federal Ministry for National Defense, Vienna 1978, pp. 251–255
- Austria-Hungary's Last War Volume VII, Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, Vienna 1938, pp. 235–300
- Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Oskar Regele : Use of reserves in the Battle of the Piave from Military Scientific Communications, Federal Ministry for Army, Vienna 1930, pp. 47–54
- Heinz von Lichem : War in the Alps 1915–1918. Volume 3, Weltbild Verlag, Augsburg 1993.
- Manfried Rauchsteiner: The death of the double-headed eagle , Austria-Hungary and the First World War. Styria, Graz, Vienna, Cologne 1993
Individual evidence
- ^ Anton Wagner: The First World War, Vienna 1981, p. 349