Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922): Difference between revisions
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== Background == |
== Background == |
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There are three main positions, national, Venizelism and |
There are three main positions, national, Venizelism and geopolitica. |
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=== The nationalism === |
=== The nationalism === |
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The primary motivation for initiating the Greco-Turkish war was to realize the Megali Idea. After [[Greek War of Independence|Greek independence]] from the [[Ottoman Empire]] was achieved in 1830, the [[Megali Idea]] had a major role in Greek politics. It is a core concept of Greek nationalism. Ever since the [[Fall of Constantinople]] on [[May 29]], [[1453]] "the recovery of [[Hagia Sophia]] and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox." Ideas is seeded with the between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Greek people being remained outside the borders of boundaries of the new Greece, who had no intention that a large Greek state should replace the Ottoman Empire. [http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect14.htm] It is also supported with the religious motivation as ever since the [[Fall of Constantinople]] on [[May 29]], [[1453]] "the recovery of [[Hagia Sophia]] and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox." |
The primary motivation for initiating the Greco-Turkish war was to realize the Megali Idea. After [[Greek War of Independence|Greek independence]] from the [[Ottoman Empire]] was achieved in 1830, the [[Megali Idea]] had a major role in Greek politics. It is a core concept of Greek nationalism. Ever since the [[Fall of Constantinople]] on [[May 29]], [[1453]] "the recovery of [[Hagia Sophia]] and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox." Ideas is seeded with the between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Greek people being remained outside the borders of boundaries of the new Greece, who had no intention that a large Greek state should replace the Ottoman Empire. [http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect14.htm] It is also supported with the religious motivation as ever since the [[Fall of Constantinople]] on [[May 29]], [[1453]] "the recovery of [[Hagia Sophia]] and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox." |
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=== Venizelism === |
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{{Seealso|Venizelism}} |
{{Seealso|Venizelism}} |
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Revision as of 16:41, 28 November 2006
| Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922 | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Turkish War of Independence | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Greece | Turkish Revolutionaries | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Gen Leonidas Paraskevopoulos, Gen Anastasios Papoulas, Gen Georgios Hatzianestis | Ali Fethi Okyar, Ismet Inonu, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Fevzi Çakmak | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 200,000 men | 120,000 men (plus thousands more volunteers) | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 23,500 dead; 20,820 captured | 20,540 dead; 10,000 wounded | ||||||||
The Greco–Turkish War of 1919–1922, ("War in Asia Minor"), or the Greek campaign of the Turkish War of Independence, was military events during the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after the World War I between May 1919 - October 1922. The war was between Greece and Turkish revolutionaries who were part of Turkish National Movement that would establish the Republic of Turkey (29 October 1923). The collective failure of military campaigns of Greece, Turkish-Armenian War and Franco-Turkish War over the Turkish revolutionaries changed the Allies plans that found its representation that never came into effect Treaty of Sèvres and forced the allies to sign a new agreement, Treaty of Lausanne. The war (Greek campaign) was aroused because the western Allies, particularly British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, had promised Greece territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (Eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), and parts of western Anatolia around the city of Smyrna (İzmir)) ended with the pre-war borders of Greece, caused the population exchange between newly established state and Greece through the agreement of Treaty of Lausanne.
Background
There are three main positions, national, Venizelism and geopolitica.
The nationalism
The primary motivation for initiating the Greco-Turkish war was to realize the Megali Idea. After Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire was achieved in 1830, the Megali Idea had a major role in Greek politics. It is a core concept of Greek nationalism. Ever since the Fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453 "the recovery of Hagia Sophia and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox." Ideas is seeded with the between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Greek people being remained outside the borders of boundaries of the new Greece, who had no intention that a large Greek state should replace the Ottoman Empire. [1] It is also supported with the religious motivation as ever since the Fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453 "the recovery of Hagia Sophia and the city had been handed down from generation to generation as the destiny and aspiration of the Greek Orthodox."
Venizelism
Due to family ties and emotional attachments, Constantine I of Greece was in the difficult position of deciding to which side to support during World War I. Despite his blood relationship to the Dowager Queen of England, Constantine's personal sentiments and attachments lay with the German Empire. He had studied at the Prussian Army Staff College in Berlin. In addition, he was married since 1889 to Sophia of Prussia, a younger sister of William II, German Emperor. The British had hoped that this familial connection might pursuay Constantine to join the cause of the Allies of World War I. Although Constantine signalled his intention to join the Triple Entente and actually gave a tentative promise to that effect, he took no concrete steps towards doing so.
Though Constantine did remain decidedly neutral, the influence of Prime Minister of Greece Eleftherios Venizelos is evident in the way Queen Sophia wrote about her husband’s preoccupation with the Megali Idea: "[Constantine] is completely possessed by the specter of Byzantium." According to Queen Sophia, Constantine’s dream of "marching into the great city of Hagia Sophia at the head of the Greek army" was still "in his heart" and it appeared as if the King was ready to enter the war against Turkey. The conditions, however, were clear; the occupation of Constantinople had to be undertaken without incurring excessive risk. Constantine "went along with Venizelos’ plan of discussing the matter with the Allies on the conditions that Greece not spontaneously offer her cooperation to the Entente Powers..."
In May 1917, after the exile of Constantine, Venizélos returned to Athens and allied with the Entente. Greek military forces (though divided between supporters of the monarchy and supporters of "Venizelism") began to take part in military operations against the Bulgarian Army on the border.
The geopolitical context
The political context of this conflict is linked to secret agreements on sharing of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. At the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Venizelos lobbied hard for an expanded Hellas (the Megali Idea) that would include the large Greek communities in Northern Epirus, Thrace and Asia Minor.
The war arose because the western Allies, particularly British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, had promised Greece territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire if Greece entered the war on the Allied side. These included eastern Eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), and parts of western Anatolia around the city of İzmir.
Overview of military operations
The military aspect of the war begins with the Armistice of Mudros. The military operations of the Greco-Turkish war can be roughly divided into three main phases: The first phase, spanning the period from May 1919 to October 1920, encompasses the Greek Landings in Asia Minor and their consolidation along the Aegean Coast. The second phase lasted from October 1920 to June 1921, and was characterised by Greek offensive operations. The third and final phase lasted until August 1922, when the strategic initiative was held by the Turkish Army.
Occupation of Smyrna, May, 1919
On May 15 1919, twenty thousand[1] Greek soldiers landed in Smyrna and took control of the city and the surroundings under cover of the Greek, French, and British navy. The Greeks had already brought their forces in Eastern Thrace(apart from Constantinople and its region).
The Greeks of Smyrna (Izmir) and other Christians, (mainly Greeks and Armenians, who were forming a minority according to Turkish sources [2], a majority according to Greek sources [3]), greeted the Greek troops as liberators. By contrast, the Turkish population saw this as an invading force, as they resented the Greeks and presumably preferred to be under Turkish rule. The Greek landings were met by sporadic resistance, mainly by small groups of irregular Turkish troops in the suburbs [citation needed]. However, the majority of the Turkish forces in the region either surrendered peacefully to the Greek Army, or fled to the countryside [citation needed].
Whilst the Turkish army had been ordered not to open fire, a Turkish nationalist (Hasan Tahsin) among the crown fired a shot and killed the Greek standard bearer.[4] Greek soldiers then opened fire on the Turkish barracks as well as the government building. Between 300 to 400 Turks and 100 Greeks were killed on the first day.[4] The occupation proved a humiliation for many of the Turkish and Muslim inhabitants. Von Mikusch notes “The Christian crowd rages and yells… Many fall under the bayonet thrusts. The men are forced to tear the fezes from their heads and trample them underfoot – the worst outrage for a Mohammedan – all who refuse are cut down with the sword. The veils are torn from the womens faces. The mob begins to plunder the house of the Mohammedan”.[5]
Greek summer offensives, summer, 1920
During the summer of 1920, the Greek army launched a series of successful offensives in the directions of Meaneder (Menderes) Valley, Peramos and Philadelphia. The overall strategic objective of these operations, which were met by increasingly stiff Turkish resistance, was to provide strategic depth to the defence of Smyrna. To that end, the Greek zone of occupation was extended over all of Western and most of North Western Asia Minor.
Treaty of Sèvres, August, 1920
In return for the contribution of the Greek army on the side of the Allies, the Allies supported the assigned eastern Thrace and the millet of Smyrna to Greece. This treaty ended the First World War in Asia Minor and, at the same time, sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Henceforth, the Ottoman Empire would no longer be an European power.
On August 10, 1920, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres ceding to Greece Thrace, up to the Chatalja lines. More importantly, Turkey renounced to Greece all rights over Imbros and Tenedos, retaining the small territories of Constantinople, the islands of Marmara, and "a tiny strip of European territory." The Straits of Bosporus were placed under an International Commission, as they were now open to all.
Turkey was furthermore subjected to the indignity of transferring to Greece "the exercise of her rights of sovereignty" over Smyrna in addition to "a considerable Hinterland, merely retaining a ‘flag over an outer fort.’" Though Greece administered the Smyrna enclave, its sovereignty remained, nominally, with the Sultan. According to the provisions of the Treaty, Smyrna was to maintain a local parliament and, if within five years time she asked to be incorporated within the Kingdom of Greece, the provision was made that the League of Nations would hold a plébiscite to decide on such matters.
The treaty was never ratified by the Ottoman Empire. [6] [7]
Greek expansion, October, 1920
In October 1920, the Greek army advanced further east into Anatolia, with the encouragement of Lloyd George who intended to increase the pressure on the Turkish and Ottoman governments to sign the Treaty of Sevrès. This advance begun under the Liberal government of Eleftherios Venizelos, but soon after the offensive began Venizelos fell from power and was replaced by Dimitrios Gounaris, who appointed inexperienced monarchist officers to senior commands. King Constantine assumed personal command of the army at Smyrna (İzmir). The strategic objective of these operations was to defeat the Turkish Nationalists and force Kemal into peace negotiations. The advancing Greeks met little resistance, as the Turks managed to retreat in an orderly fashion and avoid encirclement.
Death of King Alexander and the ouster of Venizelos, October, 1920
In October of 1920 King Alexander was bitten by his favorite monkey and died. This incident has been characterized as the "monkey bite that changed the course of Greek history".[2] Venizelos's preference was to declare a Greek republic and thus end the monarchy. However, he was well aware that this would not be acceptable to the European powers. [citation needed]
After King Alexander died leaving no heirs, the general elections scheduled to be held on November 1, 1920 suddenly became the focus of a new conflict between the supporters of Venizelos and those of King Constantine. The war-weary Greek people opted for change. To the surprise of many, Venizelos won only 118 out of the total 369 seats. The crushing defeat obliged Venizelos and a number of his closest supporters to leave the country.
The new government prepared for a plebiscite on the return of King Constantine. Remembering his pro-German posture during the war, the allies warned the Greek government that if he should be returned to the throne they would cut off all aid to Greece.
A month later a plebiscite called for the return of King Constantine. The Greek Army which has secured Smyrna and the Asia Minor coast was purged of Venizelos supporters while it marches on Ankara.
First Battle of Inonu, December, 1920
{[Main|First Battle of Inonu}} In December, 1920 the Greeks had advanced to Eski Shehir. Finding stiff resistance they retired to their former positions. In early 1921 the Greeks resumed their advance in greater earnest, but again met stiff resitance from the entrenched Turkish Nationalists, who were increasingly better prepared and equipped like a regular army.
The Greek advance was halted for the first time at the First Battle of Inonu on January 11, 1921. This development led to Allied proposals to amend the Treaty of Sevrès at a conference in London where both the Turkish Revolutionary and Ottoman governments were represented.
Although some agreements were reached with Italy, France and Britain, the decisions were not agreed to by the Greek government, who believed that they still retained the strategic advantage and could negotiate from a stronger point. The Greeks initiated another attack on March 27th, the Second Battle of Inonu, which was resisted fiercely and finally defeated by the Kemalist troops on March 30th. The British favoured a Greek territorial expansion but refused to offer any military assistance in order to avoid provoking the French [citation needed]. The Turkish forces however received significant assistance from the Soviet Union.[8]
Battle of Sakarya, June 1921
{[Main|Battle of Sakarya}} In June 1921, a reinforced Greek army advanced afresh to the River Sakarya (Sangarios in Greek), less than 100 km (62 miles) west of Ankara. It was envisaged that the Turkish Revolutionaries, who had consistently avoided encirclement would be drawn into battle in defence of their capital and destroyed in a battle of attrition. Meanwhile, the new Turkish government at Ankara appointed Mustafa Kemal as the commander in chief. The advance of the Greek Army faced fierce resistance which culminated in the 21-day Battle of the Sakarya (or Sangarios in Greek) (August 23 – September 13, 1921). The ferocity of the battle exhausted both sides to such an extent that they were both contemplating a withdrawal, but the Greeks were the first to withdraw to their previous lines.
That was the furthest in Anatolia the Greeks would advance, and within few weeks they withdrew in an orderly manner back to the lines that they had held in June, intending at least to protect the Smyrna area.
Outcome of Greek offensive
Some claim that a major factor contributing to the defeat of the Greeks was the lack of whole-hearted Allied support. According to another view, the fact that British troops invaded richest and most populous part of Turkey (Istanbul and straits region) and French troops attacking to Turkish army from south and invading other important cities (including Adana) is as great a support could be in a war. Meanwhile, Turkish troops also had to fight with Armenian army on the third front (see Turkish War of Independence).
One reason for alleged lack of support was that King Constantine was reviled by the British for his pro-German policies during WWI (in contrast to former prime minister Venizelos). By contrast, the Kemalist Turks enjoyed significant Soviet support. A telegraph sent on August 4th Turkey's representative in Moscow, Riza Nur, sent a telegram saying that soon 60 Krupp artillery pieces, 30,000 shells, 700,000 grenades, 10,000 mines, 60,000 Romanian swords, 1.5 million captured Ottoman rifles from WWI, 1 million Russian rifles, 1 million Manlicher rifles, as well as some more older British Martini-Henry rifles and 25,000 bayonets would be delivered to the Kemalist forces. [8] The Turks also received significant military assistance from Italy and France [citation needed], who threw in their lot with the Kemalist against Greece which was seen as a British client [citation needed]. The Italians used their base in Antalya to arm and train Turkish troops to assist the Kemalists against the Greeks. [9]
However, the main reason for the Greek defeat was the poor strategic and operational planning of this ill-conceived advance in-depth. Although the Greek Army was not lacking in men, courage or enthusiasm, it was lacking in nearly everything else due to the poor Greek economy, which could not sustain long-term mobilisation and had been stretched beyond its limits. Very soon, the Greek Army exceeded the limits of its logistic structure and had no way of retaining such a large territory under constant attacks by regular and irregular Turkish troops fighting in their homeland.[citation needed]
On the other hand, Turkish troops had an exceptionally good strategic and tactical command. At the climax of Greek offensive, Mustafa Kemal commanded his troops
- "There is no such thing as a line of defense. Only a surface to defend. That surface consists of the entire Fatherland. Not one inch of our country can be abandoned unless drenched with the blood of its people." [3]
The main defence doctrine of the World War I was holding on a line, so this command was unorthodox for its time. However it proved successful. Turkish troops also had high morale since they were defending their homeland.
Stalemate
 | The neutrality of this article is disputed. |
Having failed to reach a military solution, Greece appealed to the Allies for help, but early in 1922 Britain, France and Italy decided that the Treaty of Sèvres could not be enforced and had to be revised. Parallel to their decision, with successive treaties, Italian and French troops evacuated their positions leaving the Greeks exposed.
In March 1922 the Allies proposed an armistice, but Mustafa Kemal feeling that now he had the strategic advantage, declined any settlement while the Greeks remained in Anatolia and intensified his efforts to re-organise the Turkish military for the final offensive against the Greeks. At the same time, the Greeks strengthened their defensive positions, but were increasingly demoralised by the inactivity of remaining on the defensive and the prolongation of the war.
Turkish counterattack, August, 1922
Turks launched an offensive on August 26th, defeating the Greeks decisively at the Battle of Dumlupınar near Afyon (August 30th, 1922). This date is celebrated as Victory Day, a national holiday in Turkey. Kemal then isolated and destroyed the segments of the Greek army, chasing the remnants back to İzmir. During the battles, Greek General Tricoupis was held captive by Turkish forces.
![[icon]](/wiki/File:Wiki_letter_w_cropped.svg){kind=small} | This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. |
Re-capture of Smyrna, September, 1922
With the possibility of social disorder once the Turkish Army occupied Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal was quick to issue a proclamation, sentencing any Turkish soldier to death who harmed non-combatants.[10] Few days before the Turkish invasion of the city, Kemal's messengers distributed leaflets with this order written in Greek. These orders were largely ignored by the Turkish army, and Nasruddin Pasha, the commander of Turkish forces in the Smyrna district gave orders contradicting Ataturk's. Nasruddin Pasha's orders were largely followed, and the Greek and Armenian civilian population of Smyrna suffered heavily at the hands of the Turkish army.[11]
During the confusion and anarchy that followed, a great proportion of the city was set ablaze, and the properties of the Greeks were pillaged. The cause of the fire is disputed, a number of sources implicate the Turkish army, while others attribute it to an accident. The Turkish Army massacred a significant part of the Christian population. This massacre include the lynching and brutal murder of the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Smyrna).[11]. This massacre is remembered by the Greeks as "the Catastrophe of Smyrna". However, the majority of the Greeks managed to seek refuge on Greek and Allied ships at the harbor of Izmir and other coastal towns.
Resolution
The Armistice of Mudanya was concluded on October 11 1922. The Allies (Britain, France, Italy) retained control of eastern Thrace and the Bosporus. The Greeks were to evacuate these areas. The agreement came into force starting October 15, one day after the Greek side agreed to sign it.
The Armistice of Mudanya was followed by the Treaty of Lausanne, a significant provision of which was an exchange of populations. Over one million Greek Orthodox Christians were displaced; most of them were resettled in Attica and the newly-incorporated Greek territories of Macedonia and Thrace.
Repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres
Mustafa Kemal, the leader of a group of Turkish revolutionaries, was forming the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia. The revolutionaries repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres and prepared for defense of what they believed was their national land given up by the weak Ottoman government to the enemy.
The Greeks set out to force Turks to accept the Sevres agreement by military force.
The Allies shift their support towards the Turks
The new government, under Gounares, replaced all the veteran officers and the leadership of the army was given to Anastasios Papoulas. The French and the Italians concluded private agreements with the Kemalists in recognition of their mounting strength. The Soviet Union also supported Kemal with money and ammunition.[citation needed] The British and French negotiated a separate peace with Kemal, realizing that the Ottoman empire was defunct and that Kemal's Nationalists were the new power to reckon with.
Claims of ethnic cleansing by both sides
According to a proclamation made in 2002 by New York governor George Pataki, Greeks of Asia Minor endured immeasurable cruelty during a Turkish Government-sanctioned systematic campaign to displace them; destroying Greek towns and villages and slaughtering additional hundreds of thousands of civilians in areas where Greeks composed a majority, as on the Black Sea coast, Pontus, and areas around Smyrna; those who survived were exiled from Turkey and today they and their descendants live throughout the Greek diaspora.[12]
In fact, Greeks in Anatolia were not exiled, but exchanged with Turks in Greece according to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne signed by both Greek and Turkish governments.
According to the British historian Patrick Kinross, the Greek retreat employed a scorched earth strategy that left large tracts of land and property ruined or destroyed and the inhabitants of Smyrna close to starvation. Kinross wrote "Already most of the towns in its path were in ruins. One third of Ushak no longer existed. Alashehir was no more than a dark scorched cavity, defacing the hillside. Village after village had been reduced to an ash-heap. Out of the eighteen thousand buildings in the historic holy city of Manisa, only five hundred remained"[13]. Referring of the Greek retreat, Kinross stated that "Everywhere the Greek troops, especially those from Anatolia, revenging themselves in desperation and in obedience to orders for generations of Ottoman oppresion and persecution, carried off Christian families that their quarters too might be burned and not a roof left for the advancing Turks. They tore up the railway between Smyrna and Aydin. They pillaged and destroyed and raped and butchered" [14]
See also
- Great Fire of Smyrna
- Greco-Turkish relations
- Aftermath of World War I
- Chanak Crisis
- Battle of Dumlupınar (Battle of Afyon-Karahisar)
- Pontian Greek Genocide
References
- ^ Lord Kinross, Ataturk. p.154
- ^ Yurt Ansiklopedisi, 1982, p.4273, 4274
- ^ Hellenic Army General Staff, 1957, Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός εις την Σμύρνην, p.56
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
two-one-sevenwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Von Mikusch, Mustafa Kemal, pp.192-193.
- ^ Sunga, Lyal S. (1992-01-01). Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 0792314530.
{{cite book}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ Bernhardsson, Magnus (2005-12-20). Reclaiming a Plundered Past: archaeology and nation building in modern Iraq. University of Texas Press. ISBN 0292709471.
{{cite book}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ a b Kapur, H Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927
- ^ Smith, Michael (1999-01-15). Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-4720-8569-7.
{{cite book}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ M. Glenny, The Balkans
- ^ a b Dobkin, Marjorie Smyrna: The Destruction of a City
- ^ Resolution of the State of New York, October 6th, 2002; NY State Governor George E. Pataki Proclaims October 6th, 2002 as the 80th Anniversary of the Persecution of Greeks of Asia Minor
- ^ Patrick Kinross 1964, Ataturk: Rebirth of a Nation p.318.
- ^ Ibid. p318.