Able Danger

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Able Danger was the code name for a secret computer program of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It should monitor possible members and helpers of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and their transactions and compare all available data with each other in order to detect terrorist cells at an early stage. It was created on the orders of Henry H. Shelton (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ) in October 1999 and was closed in January (according to other information in April) 2001.

The 9/11 Commission , which was supposed to investigate the causes of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , was informed of the program in 2003, but did not mention it in its final report (published July 2004). In June 2005 Congressman Curt Weldon announced the program and said that in 2000 it had discovered four members of al-Qaeda living in the United States who later carried out the attacks. Lawyers in the Department of Defense ( Department of Defense , DoD) had the passing on of information to the FBI prohibited. Five former employees of the Able Danger program confirmed his information. The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , the responsible control committee of Congress , checked possible previous knowledge of the DoD by the assassins and rejected it in December 2006 as unproven.

Proponents of conspiracy theories as of September 11, 2001 , with reference to Able Danger , claim that US government agencies knew about the attacks and knowingly allowed them ( let it happen on purpose , LIHOP) or even planned them together with some assassins ( make it happen on purpose , MIHOP).

The program

Able Danger essentially consisted of a complex computer program that was supposed to collect suspicions from the World Wide Web and all public sources and compare them with non-public data from US authorities. Using complex search parameters, it should identify members of al-Qaeda and recognize their actions and plans in order to be able to initiate countermeasures. The data collection was done at the Center for Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), which was located in Fort Belvoir (Virginia), from summer 2000 in Garland (Texas) . The 20-person expert group on the program was led by Naval Officer Scott Philpott . The lead analyst was Eileen Priesser .

By means of data mining , the program was supposed to uncover connections between individual members of terrorist groups. The aim was to find out whether data from open sources could be used to identify possible terrorist activities and quickly implement operational plans to eliminate and / or capture terrorists. For this purpose, the program created detailed lists of people and graphics showing the connections between the terror suspects.

The DoD announced on September 1, 2005 that Able Danger was a demonstration project to test the analytical and technological possibilities of data mining on large amounts of data. It was also supposed to uncover hidden connections of people suspected of terrorism, including US citizens, through link analysis, who ostensibly had no contact with one another. The program is reported to have collected a total of 2.5 terabytes of data. All personal data is said to have been deleted in April 2001 in accordance with US Army rules for expired or inactive projects. However, parts of the program are still classified as secret because it was part of comprehensive measures against al-Qaida in the US war on terror .

Publications

Becoming known (from June 2005)

The journalist Keith Phucas introduced Able Danger on June 19, 2005 with a report in the local newspaper Times Herald ( Norristown, Pennsylvania) . According to Curt Weldon, the 1999 program identified three al-Qaeda members who were then living in Brooklyn , including Mohammed Atta . When the team asked the FBI to inform, SOCOM legal advisors closed the program because the Arabs had green cards . This was the result of the unsuccessful Waco siege in 1993 with over 80 deaths, which SOCOM was charged with. If Atta had been imprisoned, the later attacks might have been prevented or at least their preparation would have been interrupted.

On June 21, 2005, Rep. Curt Weldon ( Republican and vice-chairman of the United States House Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security ) confirmed in a hearing of the Inter-Intelligence Service Committee on Terrorism Detection:

  • Since 1999, SOCOM has been using the secret program "Able Danger" to conduct data mining in publicly accessible sources for the early detection of terrorist threats.
  • At the time, the CIA rejected his proposal to merge data collections from 15 secret services as unnecessary.
  • Two weeks after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he received knowledge of a graphic that "Able Danger" had created. It had a photograph of Mohammed Atta and his connection to two other members of the Brooklyn cell.
  • Two military personnel could testify non-publicly that SOCOM wanted to disclose this cell to the FBI, but was prevented from doing so by lawyers from the Pentagon.
  • The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), founded in 2003, was unable to create such an overview chart because US intelligence agencies were still refusing to merge their databases.

Speaking to the United States House of Representatives on June 27, Weldon reiterated:

  • Able Danger identified four of the later 9/11 kidnappers, including Mohammed Atta,
  • SOCOM refused to share the data with the FBI,
  • Able Danger employees presented their knowledge to representatives of the 9/11 Commission , but the Commission ignored the information.

In his book Countdown to Terror , published July 25, 2005, Weldon stated that he showed Stephen Hadley , security advisor to George W. Bush, on September 25, 2011, a graphic that the Able Danger program developed in 1999. The connections between Mohammed Atta and the famous Brooklyn cell were recorded on it. Weldon wanted to underscore the urgency of a national anti-terror center that he had been calling for since 1999 and that Bush had set up in January 2003. On August 14, 2005, Weldon stated that he had given Hadley the only copy of that graphic and could therefore not prove whether Atta's photograph and name were recorded on it.

From August 2005 the first press reports appeared. The monthly trade magazine Government Security News reported in its August issue:

  • An employee of Able Danger, who wanted to remain anonymous, had confirmed Weldon's "little noticed" statements of June 27 to GSN. In 2000 he handed over documents to SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, with a photograph of Mohammed Atta from the US immigration service and a description of his relationship with Osama bin Laden and recommended immediate countermeasures by the FBI. SOCOM lawyers have decided that holders of a green card have the same civil rights as any US citizen and that information about this al-Qaida cell should therefore not be passed on to the FBI. They had instructed the Able Danger team to obscure the photographs of the cell members.
  • He had personally informed the head of the 9/11 Commission Philip Zelikow about it. For some "bizarre reason" Zelikow withheld this information from the Commission.
  • According to Weldon on August 1, 2005, former 9/11 commissioners Timothy J. Roemer and John Lehman were never informed of Able Danger's discovery of the Brooklyn cell.
  • Weldon had previously urged Pete Hoekstra , chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence , to investigate the failure to report Able Danger's findings to the FBI. For days Hoekstra found no one in the Pentagon who knew Able Danger or wanted to confirm its existence.

Declaration by the 9/11 Commission (August 12, 2005)

On August 8, 2005, Alvin S. Felzenberg , former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, confirmed that Able Danger employees had informed the Commission staff , including Philip Zelikow, about the program in October 2003. However, they did not mention either Mohammed Atta or a Brooklyn cell. Staff members who attended the meeting had assured him that they had not been told about it. Had they heard something so explosive, it would have got their attention. After the meeting, the staff requested documents from the Pentagon about the program, received them and passed them on to the commission.

Staff members planned to retrieve their notes from the October 2003 Able Danger briefing from the US National Archives. They wanted to check whether Able Danger actually discovered four future hijackers over a year before the attacks. Lee H. Hamilton , former Vice President of the 9/11 Commission, wanted to clarify whether officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) knew about these al-Qaeda activities in the US but failed to initiate their prosecution. US Congress and the Pentagon should investigate this thoroughly. The 9/11 Commission had not learned anything about any surveillance of Atta and his cell before the attacks. "Had we found out, it would obviously have been the main focus of our investigation."

On August 12, 2005, Thomas Kean and Hamilton, the two Chairs of the 9/11 Commission, issued a press release:

  • On October 21, 2003, Zelikow and two other staff members met three DoD employees in Bagram . One had informed her about Able Danger and urged her to request all Pentagon documents about it. He criticized the fact that the program was closed despite valuable findings. The notes taken the following day from this meeting did not mention Atta and other later assassins and did not refer to any previous knowledge of them in the DoD. None of the participants recalled any such thing being mentioned at the meeting.
  • On November 6 and 25, 2003, the Commission staff sent a letter requesting all Pentagon documents that had been drawn up since the beginning of 1998 on all al-Qaida-related plans and on Able Danger. In February 2004 the Pentagon sent some of these documents and released them for inspection.
  • None of the documents received, including graphics from terrorist networks, and no note from staff members about the documents viewed, contained the name of Atta or other assassins.
  • In response to inquiries from the Commission at the time, HPSCI and CIA had shown no knowledge of Able Danger.
  • Curt Weldon reported deficiencies in the US intelligence services to the commission in 2004, but did not claim that they had identified Atta and his cell before the attacks.
  • At the beginning of July 2004 a naval officer approached the commission: he wanted to be questioned about a data mining project that he was working on. On July 12, 2004, the officer reported to two staff members, including Dieter Snell, that in the spring of 2000 he had seen a card with Atta's name and photo drawn up by a now retired Able Danger employee. Atta was then listed as a member of an al-Qaeda cell in Brooklyn from February to April 2000. How this membership came about and how the Able Danger Program determined it, he did not explain. He did not provide any evidence for this. According to him, DoD lawyers ordered in 2000 information about people living in the USA to be removed from the graphic because they could violate the Posse Comitatus Act (no use of the US Army against citizens in the USA). He complained in vain to his superiors at SOCOM.
  • The Commission compared these statements with all other information about Atta: After that, he did not enter the USA until June 3, 2000 and lived only a short time in New York. Therefore, the officer's statements were classified as not reliable enough to revise the almost completed report or to investigate further.
  • No witness reported to the Commission that Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi had contacts with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi from 1999/2000. Rather, all the evidence showed that these two couples did not come into contact with each other until June 2001 at the earliest.
  • The Commission did not mention Able Danger in its report because the program was still classified at the time and did not turn out to be historically significant compared to other political and military measures against al-Qaeda. The knowledge about Able Danger was included in the description of the secret service activities before 9/11 in the commission report.

Curt Weldon rejected the explanation. The Commission reacted inconsistently and first denied having been informed about Able Danger, then confirmed that it had heard of both Able Danger and Atta. You have also received documents from the DoD. "The information was left out, primarily because they found it suspicious, despite the briefing by two different military officers on active duty." He will continue to investigate until it is understandable why the Able Danger DoD did not forward information to the FBI and why the 9/11 Commission failed to investigate the information on Able Danger.

Statements by Anthony Shaffer (August 15, 2005)

The reserve officer Anthony Shaffer was from 1999 to 2001 liaison of the Able Danger team to the DIA. On August 15, 2005, he appeared at a press conference called by Curt Weldon as the previously anonymous employee who had informed Weldon and some media about Able Danger since July. He stated that he had given up anonymity because of the 9/11 Commission's disappointing press release, confirming:

  • Able Danger had identified four future al-Qaeda hijackers by mid-2000.
  • Pentagon lawyers had forced the team to cancel three meetings agreed with the FBI at short notice in order to avoid feared allegations against the military surveillance of legally entered civilians.
  • He told some 9/11 commissioners at a private meeting in October 2003 that Able Danger had discovered Atta.
  • Because he was not an analyst, he did not know where the information about Atta and other al-Qaida members in the US came from. He knows, however, that Able Danger has evaluated publicly available entry and immigration data with search engines like LexisNexis.
  • The Commission should have investigated the non-disclosure of this information. The fact that she considered the military surveillance of al-Qaida members before 9/11 to be historically insignificant is not credible.

Shaffer's attorney Mark Zaid feared revenge actions by the DoD against Shaffer. Its security clearance was revoked in March 2004 with ridiculous pretexts; therefore he has no records of his statements.

Further testimony (from August 22, 2005)

Officer Scott Phillpott, the former leader of the Able Danger Team, testified before the 9/11 Commission in July 2004. On August 22, 2005, he confirmed to the US media: "Atta was identified by Able Danger in January-February 2000." He had informed his military superiors in the Army Office , in SOCOM, in the DIA and the 9/11 Commission in the same way . He could only uncover details of the program within the army's chain of command.

Two other employees of Able Danger publicly contradicted the denials of the DoD and the 9/11 Commission in August 2005. They shouldn't have recorded or copied results so that they could only show their memories. James D. Smith, a civilian contractor of the DoD, told Fox News on August 22, 2005 that he had reported to the government about Able Danger's project costs, coordinated the sources of information and produced some graphics for it. Among them was a global map to Al-Qaeda with Atta's name on it; he also saw a photograph of Atta at the time. Atta was known to the unit through the connections of Omar Abdul Rahman , a perpetrator of the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. On August 26, 2005, Smith reiterated at a press conference organized by Weldon: “I am absolutely certain that he [ Atta] on our map was, among other pictures and connections that we followed, mainly those of cells in New York City. ”There were 30 to 40 paid informants with strong contacts in the Middle East. Atta's photo was received from overseas.

On September 15, 2005, Weldon announced that he had located the employee who had received the order to destroy 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data. Army Officer Eric Kleinsmith was LIWA's head of intelligence until February 2001. He said at the Senate hearing on September 21, 2005: He had all classified and non-classified data and graphics from Able Danger on the orders of Tony Gentry in May and June 2000 deleted by the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command .

DoD statement (September 1, 2005)

On September 1, 2005, the DoD released the results of its three-week internal investigation into Able Danger.

  • The files of all organizations involved in Able Danger were searched intensively, not just the files sent to the 9/11 Commission in 2004, and 80 people directly or indirectly involved were questioned. Some of these interviews would continue.
  • In addition to Anthony Shaffer and then team leader Scott Phillpott, three of the witnesses interviewed stated that they saw a card with a photo or a mention of Atta among the Able Danger finds.
  • A card with the connections of al-Qaida members was found, but none with Atta's photo and name on it.
  • It is conceivable that the card was destroyed because of the strict rules for the protection of US citizens at the time. However, no indications of a legal instruction to destroy such data were found.
  • Able Danger existed from October 1999 to January 2001. It was neither set up for special data access, targeting of individuals, deception and camouflage nor as a special military unit. It was only supposed to identify weaknesses in the contacts in and between cells of al-Qaeda and never got beyond a planning stage. After submitting a plan to deal with the identified weaknesses to the General Staff, the program expired.

Andrew C. McCarthy (December 8, 2005)

On December 8, 2005, former U.S. Assistant Attorney Andrew C. McCarthy (Republican) issued a sharp criticism of the 9/11 Commission:

  • You have deliberately ignored Able Danger's information about Atta and perhaps other later hijackers. Your report does not mention a word of it and ignores its own failures.
  • She also played down the barrier to information disclosure that Commissioner Jamie Gorelick set up in 1995 as Attorney General. Although this "wall" was the single biggest obstacle to competent information analysis, the Commission dismissed it as irrelevant and only dealt with it on two pages of its report.
  • Lee Hamilton's contradicting statements that the Commission had been deprived of the findings of Able Danger, then that they had considered the program to be unimportant due to the lack of evidence for the graphic with Atta's photo and name, are untrustworthy because one of the parties involved was involved in the destruction of Able Danger's data meanwhile have sworn before the legal committee of the Senate. The reference to the absence of the graphic distracts from a credible memory of the information that the graphic was intended to illustrate.
  • In any case, the commission only questioned one percent of all witnesses about Able Danger and completely omitted their testimony. You have not even expressed dissent about the value of these statements.
  • By only presenting her own version of the events prior to 9/11, she had betrayed her mandate to report all, including the disputed facts, about these events.

It is time to ask for answers to the following questions, following former FBI director Louis Freeh:

  • What did Able Danger discover?
  • Why had the Pentagon suppressed information about the possible identification of foreigners as terrorists, even though its rules had expressly allowed such information to be preserved and passed on to relevant government agencies?
  • According to the affidavit of an Able Danger employee, did the DIA destroy copies of Able Danger data in the spring of 2004, long after the 9/11 investigation and the Commission's request for relevant documents had started?
  • If Able Danger primarily collected data from public sources, why did the Pentagon not allow the witnesses to testify publicly for the identification of Atta before 9/11?
  • If the Able Danger information is sensitive and secret enough to justify the prohibition to testify, where are the certificates required to destroy secret information?
  • Is there a connection between Shaffer's recent firing by the Pentagon and his public appearance as the first Able Danger employee?
  • Why did the 9/11 Commission withhold from the public the documents in its possession that contradicted its conclusion that Atta was unknown to US intelligence prior to 9/11?
  • What follow-up investigations has the Commission undertaken after the statements of two Able Danger witnesses before its staff?
  • Why didn't the Commission question any other Able Danger representatives, including the three who have now confirmed Atta's foreknowledge?

Investigations

Senate Judiciary Committee (September 21, 2005)

On September 21, 2005, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee , Arlen Specter , held a hearing to investigate the facts surrounding Able Danger. Lt. Col. Shaffer and four other members of the Able Danger Team were ordered by the Department of Defense not to testify. Senator Specter decided to go ahead with the hearings anyway.

Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act caused the Department of Defense lawyers to prohibit the disclosure of Able Danger data to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act protects the military from interference by law enforcement officials, including collecting information about US citizens even if the foreigners were not citizens of the United States. On behalf of Lt. Col. Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified: “Those inside Able Danger were certain they were not gathering any information about US persons. They were potential people who had connections to US citizens. "

Zaid assured, also on behalf of his clients:

“Let me underline two specific items for clarification because they have been distorted and received false criticism from some. At no time did Able Danger identify Mohammed Atta as having a physical presence in the United States. No information collected at the time could lead anyone to believe that criminal activity had taken place or that specific terrorist activities were planned. Again, the identification of the four 9/11 kidnappers was only possible through connecting activities. These connections could be completely harmless or ominous. It was impossible to say which non-secret work by Able Danger did not address this issue. "

He also added:

“Unfortunately, we are not aware of the existence of a diagram with Mohammed Atta's name or picture. The copies, which would have been in the possession of the US Army, were apparently destroyed by March 2001. The Kopen in Lt. Col. Shaffer's files were destroyed by the CIA until about February 2004. The destruction of these files is an important element of this story, and I encourage the committee to investigate further. It would show, especially as the Department of Defense today strictly refuses to testify to anyone involved in Able Danger, that there is a transgressive attitude. The question for this committee is to examine how far this position extends and why. "

Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, formerly head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department , testified at the hearing that he was instructed to destroy Able Danger-related data and documents in May and June 2000. When asked if the information could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attack, he replied that he would not have speculated, but that the information would have been useful.

Weldon repeated his previous allegations. In a speech to the House of Representatives in October 2005, he summarized and expanded them:

  • The Able Danger program discovered the Brooklyn cell of al-Qaeda with four of the later 9/11 kidnappers, including Mohammed Atta, in January and February 2000.
  • The Able Danger team tried three times in September 2000 to report this cell to the FBI. Pentagon lawyers had prohibited the disclosure of the information to the FBI.
  • In September 2000, officer Anthony Shaffer, a senior member of the Able Danger team, showed the head of the DIA a disk with photographs and other data from Atta and other members of the Brooklyn cell. The DIA leader refused to accept the information and broke off the meeting. He later denied the meeting, although there were witnesses for it.
  • In the summer of 2000, the Pentagon destroyed the data from the Able Danger program. This happened only a few days after SOCOM asked for this data in order not to grant SOCOM access to it. The official justification that data on US citizens should have been properly destroyed after 90 days is wrong. SOCOM General Hugh Shelton was informed about Able Danger for three hours in January 2001.
  • Louis Freeh , the current FBI director, has confirmed that the FBI could have prevented the 9/11 attacks with information from Able Danger.
  • The 9/11 commission ignored Able Danger and his discovery of the Brooklyn cell because someone on the commission staff decided, for reasons unknown, not to pursue this information.
  • In August and September 2005, several former Able Danger team members testified to this story for Weldon. The DIA then banned team members from talking to US MPs and the media about it.
  • The DIA has since tried to destroy Anthony Shaffer's career and reputation. They claim his records are not credible. She suspended him and withdrew his permission to testify the day before he was scheduled to testify before the House of Representatives judicial committee. Now she wants to withdraw his pension without dismissing him.
  • Another Able Danger senior team member testified that he saw the name of Mohammed Attas on January 2000 Pentagon documents. He knows that 20 federal agencies collected data on Able Danger in 1999 and 2000 that may still be available today. The Pentagon did not claim a 90-day period to keep this data.
  • The suppression of this information prompted the CIA to divert attention from its failure to prevent the attacks. This urgently needs to be cleared up without conspiracy theories.

Weldon called for a new investigation into the Able Danger incident and called the DoD's actions on Shaffer a "deliberate campaign of character assassination ."

Shaffer reported a defensive stance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against Able Danger, with the background that Able Danger interfered too much in the area of ​​the CIA. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I understand perfectly. We're after the leadership. You guys are after the body. But it doesn't matter. The bottom line is that the CIA never gives you the best information from the" Alec Station "or from somewhere else. The CIA will never give you that, because if you were successful in identifying al-Qaeda you would steal the show from us. That's why we won't let that happen."

Strategic Forces and Terrorism Committees (February 15, 2006)

Weldon confirmed at a press conference on February 14, 2006: He believed that Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta a total of 13 times before 9/11. The program also discovered a possible attack plan in Yemen , two weeks before the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000. Not all Able Danger data was destroyed. He is in contact with people from the government who still have the possibility of data mining. Able Danger found information in Pentagon files two weeks ago. A general was present when these files were taken from the filing cabinet.

On February 15, a meeting between the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces took place to discuss the Discuss Danger Program.

Inspector General's Report (September 18, 2006)

On September 18, 2006, the Assistant Inspector General's Office released a report stating that Shaffer had been released and that the crew responsible for the theft of any classified documents from his office wanted to prevent him from going with him took home, found that he had no Able Danger-related documents that he claimed to have. And apart from the fact that the Army cleared him of all wrongdoing in the allegations, "DIA officials would have taken action to withdraw LTC Shaffer's access and security clearance, regardless of his disclosures to the DIA Inspector General, members of the 9 / 11 commission, members of Congress or the media. "

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (December 2006)

In December 2006, an investigation by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that these allegations could not be confirmed. The Commission of Inquiry was said to have failed to find corroborating evidence regarding "one of the most disturbing allegations regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks". The report of the Senate Intelligence Committee is an almost verbatim version of the report published by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense on Able Danger in September 2006.

  • The anti-terrorist program, Able Danger, did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 terrorist prior to the 9/11 attacks.
  • Able Danger members were not prohibited from sharing intelligence with other law enforcement agencies or any other agency that might have acted on the information. In fact, Able Danger did not provide any trackable intelligence information.
  • The destruction of Able Danger documentation at LIWA and Garland was appropriate and in line with applicable regulations.
  • The Able Danger program did not end early. It was completed after achieving its goal. The results of his work were used in subsequent efforts to collect intelligence information at USSOCOM.

reception

"Two Attas" Theory

Slate.com's Mickey Kaus , referring to Tom Maguire's “Two Atta” theory, speculates that “the 'Atta' captured by Able Danger was actually the first 'Abu Nidal' Atta , rather than the second 9th / 11 'Al-Qaeda' Atta 'and that this could possibly help to solve this Able Danger problem. Snopes.com cleared a widespread email alleging the two attas were the same.

Another version of Kaus's "two-Atta" theory says that Umar Abd ar-Rahman had a co-worker by the name of Mohamed El-Amir (a name that was sometimes used by Atta), but that this was not the Mohamed Atta, who was involved in the 9/11 airplane hijacking, acted.

Broeckers / Hauss described in their book the existence of two Attas, two Jarrahs, two Hanjours and al-Shehhis.

The Department of Defense released a report regarding the problem of the two possible people with the last name 'Atta' and stated that it was a typo.

When we looked through the INS record, it appeared that there were two entries by Atta into the United States on January 10, 2001, which immediately raised the question of whether Atta entered twice on the same day, or someone who appeared to be Atta, also entered on January 10, 2001. The NIIS printout for the first entry shows that Atta entered the country with a residence permit from January 10, 2001 to September 8, 2001 (entry number 68653985708). The second recording shows a second entry on January 10, 2001, with a residence permit from January 10, 2001 to July 9, 2001 (entry number 10847166009). This happened because the inspector at the Miami District Office changing Atta's entry date was not following the proper procedure to ensure that the previous entry is corrected and that a new entry is made in the NIIS. The inspector sent the old I-94 and the corrected I-94 to the contractor, who enters the I-94 data for the INS. On May 2, 2001, Atta's data was entered and uploaded to the NIIS as if it were a new entry for Atta. This happened because the inspector issued a new I-94 with a new entry number. In order to prevent the occurrence of two entries in the NIIS, the inspector should have crossed out the entry number in the new I-94 and made a reference to the previous entry number, and noted that it was not a new entry.

It should be noted that the IG report at Lt. Col. Shaffer and other members of the Able Danger team, some of whom were never questioned by the IG bureau or the 9/11 Commission, is controversial. Rep. Weldon claims that the report was a hasty, botched investigation designed to close the files instead of reporting the actual facts.

For example, this approach was never taken: “Norms Pentolino, operations manager at the Hollywood store, said two cashiers told the FBI that they recognized Atta but were not sure. Sources within the store reported that Atta had had a BJs loyalty card for over two years. "

The timing

Kevin Drum, editor of The Washington Monthly , notes that reports on the exact date on which the information was allegedly leaked to the FBI have varied widely. It is very unlikely that Able Danger identified a terrorist by the name of "Mohamed Atta" before May 2000.

Since 9/11 we have of course collected every scrap of information about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information was available to the "Able Danger Data Mining Operation". And what we do know is that Mohamed Atta first emailed his friends in the United States in March 2000 and received his first US visa on May 18, 2000. In addition, this was the first time that he communicated under the name "Mohamed Atta". His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta" and before 2000 he was called "Mohamed el-Amir".

Follow-up project

Author Patience Wait reported that in 2005 a follow-up project, funded and implemented by the United States Intelligence Community , called Able Providence, may have started.

Movie

The 2008 independent film Able Danger (script: Paul Krik) is set in Brooklyn: a café owner receives a CD that proves a connection between the CIA and the 9/11 attacks.

See also

literature

  • Able Danger and intelligence information sharing: hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, September 21, 2005, Volume 4.Government Printing Office, 2006
  • Stephen E. Atkins: Able Danger. In: Jan Goldman: The War on Terror Encyclopedia: From the Rise of Al-Qaeda to 9/11 and Beyond. 2014, ISBN 978-1-61069-511-4 , pp. 3–5
  • Stephen E. Atkins: Able Danger. In: Stephen E. Atkins: The 9/11 Encyclopedia 2 Volume Set. 2011, ISBN 978-1-59884-921-9 , pp. 20-23
Military historical context
  • Peter Lance: Triple Cross. How bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI. Harper Collins, 2010, ISBN 0-06-201249-5 , chapter on Able Danger online
  • Anthony Shaffer: Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan - and The Path to Victory. Thomas Dunne Books, 2010, ISBN 0-312-61217-6 , Chapter 14: Able Danger. (Pp. 164–179)
novel

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Stephen E. Atkins: Able Danger. 2011, p. 20
  2. David Alan Jordan: US Intelligence Law: A Comprehensive Multimedia Introduction ( Memento from August 17, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) (IntelligenceLaw.com, 2010, PDF p. 167)
  3. Keith Phucas (Philadelphia Times Herald, June 19, 2005): Missed chance on way to 9/11 ( Memento of May 5, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (reprint)
  4. Barry Leonard (Ed.): Using Open-Source Information Effectively: Congressional Hearing. United States Government Printing Office , 2007, pp. 35-37
  5. Congress of the United States of America: US Intelligence. Congressional Record - House, H 5250, June 27, 2005. GOP, Washington, DC (PDF)
  6. Curt Weldon: Countwdown to Terror: The Top Secret Information that Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America… And How the CIA has Ignored it. Regnery Publishing, 2005, ISBN 0-89526-005-0 , p. 21
  7. ^ Brian Bennett, Timothy J. Burger, Douglas Waller ( Time , Aug. 14, 2005). "What Mohammed Atta Overlooked?"
  8. ^ Jacob Goodwin (Government Security News, August 2005): "Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta?" ( Memento from September 15, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  9. ^ Douglas Jehl (New York Times, August 9, 2005): Four in 9/11 Plot are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00.
  10. ^ Catherine Herridge, Liza Porteus (AP / Fox News, Aug. 11, 2005): Source: 9/11 Panel Staffers Probing Documents on 'Able Danger'. ( Memento of the original from September 5, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.foxnews.com
  11. Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER ( Memento from March 1, 2009 in the Internet Archive ), press release, August 12, 2005 (PDF)
  12. ^ 9/11 Citizens Watch (August 12, 2005). "Weldon Responds to Omission of ABLE DANGER From 9/11 Report". ( Memento of October 11, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Press release.
  13. Philip Shennon (New York Times, August 17, 2005): Officer Says Military Blocked Sharing of Files on Terrorists ; Fox News. August 18, 2005: Pentagon Investigates Able Danger Work. ( Memento of the original from May 23, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.foxnews.com
  14. a b Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims. ( Memento of the original from December 9, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Fox News, Aug 23, 2005. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.foxnews.com
  15. Third Source Backs 'Able Danger' Claims about Atta. ( Memento of the original from June 14, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Fox News, Aug. 28, 2005. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.foxnews.com
  16. ^ Donna De (September 19, 2005). "Weldon: Atta Papers Destroyed on Orders" ( Memento of September 22, 2005 in the Internet Archive ). Associated Press.
  17. Patience Wait (GCN, September 21, 2005): Senate panel takes on Pentagon over 'Able Danger' program.
  18. ^ Sara Wood (DoD, American Forces Press Service, September 1, 2005): DoD Discusses Able Danger Findings
  19. Andrew C. McCarthy (National Review, December 8, 2005): It's Time to Investigate Able Danger and The 9/11 Commission ( Memento of February 14, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
  20. a b Specter: Pentagon may be obstructing committee . CNN.
  21. ^ "Transcript of The Able Danger Senate Hearings" . PBS. September 21, 2005.
  22. ^ "Prepared Statement of Mark S. Zaid, Esq. Before the Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate " . (PDF; 43 kB). Federation of American Scientists website. September 21, 2005.
  23. ^ "'Able Danger' Will Get Second Hearing" ( Memento of the original from July 26, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Fox News. September 24, 2005. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.foxnews.com
  24. "The Honorable Curt Weldon's Testimony Regarding Able Danger and Intelligence Sharing" . Association of American Scientists website. September 21, 2005
  25. ^ Congressional Record, v. 151, PT. 17, October 7 to 26, 2005 , Government Printing Office, 2006, ISBN 978-0-16-084825-4 , pp. 134-138 ; Talk to C-Span
  26. ^ "Congressman wants new Able Danger probe" ( Memento of December 28, 2005 in the Internet Archive ). United Press International. December 28, 2005
  27. ^ Goodwin, Jacob (September 2005). "Inside Able Danger - The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Untimely Death of a US Military Intelligence Program" ( Memento from December 28, 2005 in the Internet Archive ). GSN: Government Security News. World Business Media, LLC.
  28. Kimberley Helfing: Weldon: 'Able Danger' ID'd 9/11 Ringleader. In: Associated Press February 14, 2006.
  29. Sherrie Gossett (Cybercast News Service, February 15, 2006): 'Able Danger' Identified 9/11 Hijacker 13 Times
  30. ^ The Federation of American Scientists: "Joint Hearing on the Able Danger Program" (PDF; 21 kB). Press release, February 15, 2006.
  31. Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officiales Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF; 9.5 MB). Page 10.
  32. Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officiales Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF; 9.5 MB). Page 11.
  33. ^ Miller, Greg (December 25, 2006). "Alarming 9/11 Claim is Baseless, Panel Says," Los Angeles Times
  34. Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officiales Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF; 9.5 MB). Page 69.
  35. "Able Danger - Muddying The Waters" Just One Minute Blog. August 18, 2005.
  36. Mickey Kaus (August 21, 2005). "The" Two Atta "Theory". Slate.com. ( Memento from August 23, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  37. "Atta Boy" . Snopes.com
  38. Mickey Kaus (August 29, 2005). “Able DAnger Mystery Solved?” ( Memento from May 26, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). Slate.com.
  39. medienanalyse-international.de
  40. ^ "The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS's Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States" . United States Office of the Inspector General website . May 20, 2002
  41. Jennifer Babson, Larry Lebowitz, Andres Viglucci (September 18, 2001) Broward library PCs yield clues " ( Memento of October 21, 2001 on the Internet Archive ). Miami Herald.
  42. Patience Wait (GCN Magazine, October 7, 2005): Data-Mining-Offensive in the Works
  43. ^ Review . Los Angeles Times . October 31, 2008.