Anamnesis

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Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

Anamnesis (including medical history , Greek  ἀνάμνησις anamnesis "memory") is a central concept in Plato's theory of knowledge and psychology , according to all the knowledge in the immortal soul is already present always, but forgotten at birth. The metaphysical background is formed by the doctrine of pre-existence , which says that the soul already exists before the formation of the body and that it has mental abilities. According to this theory, the human intellect does not create new knowledge, but only remembers what has been forgotten. So every knowledge is based on memory. The knowledge is always potentially available to the soul , but it usually has no access to it. Access arises when the forgotten knowledge is called back into consciousness by external impulses. The learner's soul remembers something that it is already familiar with through the impulses that a teacher specifically gives. Plato discusses the concept of anamnesis in the dialogues Menon , Phaedo and Phaedo .

According to his theory of ideas, Plato located the origin of latent knowledge in the transcendent realm of ideas . With his anamnesis concept, he gave the impetus for a philosophical examination of the problem of an a priori knowledge - independent of sensory experience. In the early modern period , the debate revolved around the controversial adoption of innate ideas. The ancient doctrine of memory was rejected, but some thinkers defended the existence of ideas that belong to the original equipment of the human mind. The counter-concept is offered by sensualism , which traces all knowledge back to the passive recording of sensory data.

Anamnesis in Plato's theory of the soul

requirements

The conception of the soul, which Plato had his teacher Socrates explain and justify in his literary dialogues , can be equated with his own position. According to this view, the human soul is pre-existent and immortal, that is, it exists both before the creation of the body and after its death. According to the doctrine of the migration of souls , it is not naturally connected to a specific body, but inhabits and animates many bodies of different types one after the other, so it goes through numerous earthly lives. In the time between two earthly lives she is bodiless and stays in an otherworldly area.

Anamnesis as the regaining of "original knowledge"

In the time of its disembodiment, the soul has the opportunity to look at the ideas , the absolute, time-independent archetypes of all individual things in a “heavenly place” . Since this perception is directed towards the ideas themselves and not towards the objects of the sense organs that are merely similar to them, it is not afflicted with the uncertainty and the defects of the deceptive sensory perceptions. Rather, it is an immediate and error-free perception of the truly existent , the actual reality. The objects of this perception are exclusively unchangeable givens; contingent facts do not belong to this “very own knowledge” of the soul. In the course of its stays on earth and in the underworld , the soul has also acquired knowledge of many individual contingent things, and this knowledge also remains latently in it. The consideration of the contingent individual things can evoke memories in the soul of the ideas whose images the things are.

During an earthly life, the soul has no direct access to the knowledge of ideas that it had before this stay in a body. But it always remains latent in her, and she basically retains the ability to remember it. This ability is activated when the soul receives an impulse that prompts it to search for lost knowledge. The impetus can come from sensory impressions that require a conceptual interpretation, or from a discussion that stimulates research. Since nature forms a unified whole that is familiar to the soul in its entirety, every observation and every hint can give such an impetus and trigger a memory of a certain forgotten detail. From this memory access to other details and ultimately to all temporarily lost knowledge can be gained. The only requirement for this is the necessary perseverance. For the Platonic Socrates every knowledge, every learning is nothing but remembrance. The assumption that all learning is a rediscovery, a reactivation of already existing knowledge, should explain how one comes to looking for and finding something apparently completely unknown, even if at the beginning of the search one does not even seem to know what it is The goal is.

In particular, Plato wants to use the anamnesis concept to make it understandable how one can advance from the world of the senses to the knowledge of the non-sensual. He explains this using the example of equality. The aim is to explain how the concept of "the same" comes about, how equality, in Plato's phrase "the same itself", is grasped by the mind. The starting point of a related cognitive process is the perception of individual objects, such as woods or stones, which are similar to one another. Individual objects of the same kind are more or less similar to each other, but never absolutely the same, because there are always aspects under which they are different. So every sensually perceptible equality is relative, there is always a mixture of equality and inequality. The sense objects are therefore deficient in terms of equality, they always lack something in this regard. This deficiency distinguishes them from “the same itself”, the principle of equality, which as such is absolute and cannot have any inequality in itself. Absolute equality is a necessity of thought; it must be mentally present to the human being, because it forms the yardstick for determining relative equality. In the world of poorly identical things, however, it does not occur anywhere. This raises the question of how the knowledge of inadequacy is possible at all, because it presupposes the concept of a not inadequate equality. Since perfect sameness cannot be perceived sensually anywhere, Plato concludes that such a concept can only come into consciousness through remembrance. Recollection is therefore the prerequisite for the concept of equality to be formed in the human mind. It must relate to an area beyond the sense objects that is in principle free from defects and in which perfections such as perfect equality exist. This area is the world of ideas.

Dominic Scott's hypothesis is controversial, according to which Plato differentiates between two types of information processing through human thinking: the anamnesis, which is exclusively directed towards ideas, which is reserved for the philosopher alone, and the ordinary, non-philosophical evaluation of sensory impressions, which does not require recourse to anamnesis , but based on concepts that were only gained through sensory experience. This results in a striking discontinuity between philosophical and non-philosophical thinking. The opposite position is the traditional doctrine of the historians of philosophy defending Thomas Williams and Charles H. Kahn against Scott. According to her, for Plato there is continuity between philosophical and non-philosophical thinking, and anamnesis plays a more or less essential role in all thought processes.

The anamnesis in the context of a philosophical conversation is not a punctual event with which the step from ignorance to knowledge is carried out, but a discursive cognitive process based on arguments, whereby Plato's dialectic is applied. In doing so, a mere correct opinion turns into understanding, which can be accounted for. However, in another context, Plato describes the last step in a process of knowledge, the insight into the world of ideas, as "suddenly".

Anamnesis and the pre-existence and immortality of the soul

From the ability to anamnesis, insofar as it is actually present, only the existence of a knowledge subject before the emergence of the body results, but not the immortality of the soul. Plato derives immortality from other considerations. The assumption that the soul brought its knowledge with it from a prenatal existence is supplemented in the Phaedo to the effect that after death the soul returns to the disembodied mode of existence in which it was before its connection with the body. The entry into a body and death as leaving this body are movements in opposite directions that alternate cyclically. The anamnesis appears as part of an overall model of the doctrine of the soul, which is based on the idea of ​​immortality and rebirth.

In the Phaedo , Socrates argues against the opinion that the soul is a harmony or mood, a harmonious mixture of certain properties, on the correct combination of which the existence of the animate body is based. A soul conceived in this way would necessarily, like the body, with the death of which the mixing ratio of its properties ends, emerged and transient in time. Socrates points out that such an understanding of the soul is incompatible with the concept of anamnesis.

Demonstration of the anamnesis in the Menon dialogue

To demonstrate the anamnesis, Socrates in the Menon leads a slave who has no mathematical school knowledge to solve a geometrical problem (doubling the square). The philosopher attaches great importance to not teaching, but only stimulating the slave to his own thoughts by asking questions that ultimately lead to an understanding of the geometrical facts. With this, Socrates wants to prove his claim that the knowledge is based on a prenatal insight that the slave either always possessed or acquired at a certain point in time before his present life.

An alleged knowledge of the slave who believes that he can double the area by doubling one side of a square turns out to be wrong. The insight into this error shows him his ignorance. So he gets into an aporia (perplexity). However, through further questioning he arrives at the solution: The diagonal of the given square is the side of the one sought. Socrates interprets this as a memory process; the slave had only presented his own ideas and, despite his initial ignorance, was able to bring out the correct ideas that were in him from within himself. So it is not about teaching, but about memory. Through appropriate stimulation, a ignorant person can be made to find access to knowledge hidden in him that does not come from the world of experience of his present existence. - The demonstration in the Menon illustrates how Plato imagines the gain in knowledge through anamnesis. The approach of the Platonic Socrates aims to trigger the process of memory. Persistent questioning helps his interlocutor to give up preconceived notions and to remember what the truth is. In doing so, knowledge that is already available, but initially inaccessible to consciousness, is exposed. However, the path from an unchecked opinion to real knowledge cannot be covered with a single act of remembering; rather, sustained efforts are required to overcome forgetting.

Anamnesis and aporia

For Plato, the experiences that arise during the arduous search for knowledge already offer an indication that anamnesis is taking place. If one tries to fathom the philosophical truth, one first discovers the questionability of the formation of opinions due to unreliable sensory perceptions, unquestioned ideas and naive conclusions. So you come across your own ignorance and become perplexed, you get into aporia. Even then, according to Plato, the anamnesis is latently at work without becoming conscious as such. Processes such as understanding one's own ignorance and perceiving one's own perplexity are only possible because there is an unconscious reference to the realm of the absolute, where these deficiencies do not exist, and there is a confused memory of it. Without such a connection to the world of ideas there would be no impulse for a philosophical search. In the course of the cognitive effort triggered by this impulse, the philosopher then comes to the awareness of the anamnesis itself. By understanding that his knowledge is a remembering and that the contents of the memory are present in his mind and in principle accessible there, he creates the theoretical basis for science in the Platonic sense.

The question of the truth claim

Plato's reasoning concentrates on showing knowledge as something already established in the soul. How the soul got there in the prenatal state and where the beginning of this knowledge lies is not explained in detail. As a result, the anamnesis concept - the dialogues do not offer a fully developed anamnesis theory - comes close to the Platonic myths . Plato uses myths as didactic means in the dialogues without presenting their truth in the literal sense as certain. This raises the question of to what extent and in what sense Plato made a claim to truth for the consequences of the anamnesis thesis presented in the dialogues. Research views differ on this. A number of scholars believe that the tracing back of the cognitive ability to an independent prenatal existence of the soul is only an aid to argumentation, the truth of which remains open, or should only be understood metaphorically and not metaphysically at all . For this view it is asserted that Plato shows restraint in the philosophical evaluation of mythical statements; also in other contexts he evades the question of the truth of the myth and avoids a commitment to a literal understanding. It is also pointed out that the assumption of prenatal knowledge of the soul does not answer the question of its initial origin, but only shifts the problem in time so that an infinite regress threatens. Theodor Ebert thinks that Plato only allows participants to discuss the remembrance argument, but does not support it himself. He does not really see learning as a process of remembering, but rather a comparison between the process of remembering, in which you first have to recognize that you have forgotten something, and a learning process that assumes that you have understood that one is still in ignorance. Sang-In Lee sees the essence of the anamnesis concept in the epistemological principle that the knowledge of a single, complex issue is always gained through recourse to an already existing, more general insight.

Against such "demythologizing" interpretations, however, speaks the fact that in the Phaedo a conversation partner cites remembrance as an argument for a body-free existence of the soul, i.e. for a metaphysical position that corresponds to Plato's own conviction. If the anamnesis were understood as a mere metaphor or didactic aid, such an argument would make no sense. The anamnesis concept is in Phaidon also expressly described as the opinion of Socrates; therefore it can be assumed that Plato approves it.

Because of the close connection between the anamnesis hypothesis and the theory of ideas, a claim to truth could only be made for remembrance if the truth of the theory of ideas was assumed. The research debate on the question of whether Plato consistently represented a coherent view of the theory of ideas or whether he changed his position also concerns the importance of the anamnesis in his philosophy. If, as some researchers believe, he gave up the conception of ideas in his last creative period or at least saw a serious need for revision, this must also have an impact on his relationship to the anamnesis hypothesis.

reception

Antiquity

Non-Christian philosophy

When Aristotle was still a follower of Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul in his youth, he wrote the dialogue Eudemos or On the Soul , in which he defended the anamnesis theory. There he compared the entry of the soul into the body with an illness and pointed out that illness sometimes leads to memory loss. Since the body-free life of the soul is natural, while life in the body is contrary to nature and in this respect comparable to an illness, it is obvious that the soul loses its knowledge at birth. Even later, Aristotle stuck to the concept of knowing on the basis of an already given knowledge: in his Analytica posteriora , in which he presented his methodology and science, he began his remarks with the words: Every instruction and every sensible acquisition of knowledge arises from existing knowledge. This applies both to the mathematical sciences and to all others, both for deduction and for induction . Any argument must start from something already known. However, Aristotle did not relate the pre-existing knowledge to the ideas, since after his separation from the Platonic Academy he rejected the theory of ideas and the individual immortality of the soul.

The ancient Platonists followed Plato's view. In other schools of philosophy ( Peripatetics , Stoics , Epicureans ), on the other hand, the anamnesis concept did not find approval, since these directions neither represented the doctrine of ideas nor the immortality of the soul; alternative models for explaining learning processes were developed there.

In the 2nd century, the Middle Platonist Maximos von Tire wrote a lecture with the title Whether the findings are memories . In it he presented the Platonic concept of anamnesis, described the conditions and forms of memory and illustrated his explanations with examples from the history of philosophy and Homer's poems .

Christianity

In the early 3rd century, the Christian writer Tertullian fundamentally criticized the concept of anamnesis. In his work De anima (About the soul) he tried to discredit the Platonic theory of the soul by demonstrating logical flaws and thus to show the superiority of his own anthropology . His aim was to refute the " heretics ", whose ideas of the soul, according to his words, are based on the teaching of Plato. As heretics (false believers) he regarded the gnostically influenced Christian theologians, against whom he used to polemic. With his antiplatonic argumentation he wanted to pull the ground off them. Tertullian presented the theory of anamnesis in a simplified manner in order to be able to combat it more effectively. He used a terminologically misleading choice of words, and important aspects of the opposing position are hidden from him. His remarks on the matter begin with the words: "Above all, I will not admit that the soul is able to forget." What is meant here is the soul in the sense of the Platonic understanding rejected by Tertullian. Essentially three arguments are put forward against the anamnesis in De anima : First, Plato assigns the soul a high level of divinity by ascribing to it divine properties such as improbability, indestructibility, incorporeality, uniformity and reason. If she possessed all these qualities, she could not suddenly forget and be burdened with the arduous task of anamnesis for a whole life. Second, if it inherently possessed such knowledge, it could not lose its knowledge of the world of ideas. Thirdly, earthly laws such as time or physical properties could not affect forgetting if the soul were divine. - Tertullian opposed the Platonic model of the soul with his own. According to this, the soul is not a self-moving spiritual substance , as in Platonism , but physical. Her forgetfulness is an ailment from which she suffers because it is not immaterial and divine, but material. Although it is invisible because of its special physical structure, it has all the properties of a body and only comes into existence when it is transferred from father to child in a physical act of procreation ( Traducianism ).

Opinions were divided among the Christians of late antiquity . The writer Arnobius the Elder turned in his work Adversus nationes ("Against the Heiden") against the anamnesis theory, whereby he presented a cave history as a thought experiment , following on from Plato's allegory of the cave . He imagined an enclosed, habitable space in which a single person grows up and is provided with food by an always silent wet nurse. When the person who has grown up in complete loneliness has grown up, he comes out for the first time and is asked about his origins and life story and about things that were previously completely unknown to him. In doing so, he turns out to be helpless, especially since he cannot speak at all. With this thought experiment, Arnobius wanted to show that the soul by nature does not have any very own knowledge that is latent in it and that it can remember. However, Arnobius overlooked the fact that the "late antique Kaspar Hauser " cannot answer the questions put to him because he does not understand them at all, he does not even notice that these are questions that are being addressed to him and that answers are expected from him . Since, according to Plato's concept, language knowledge is not part of the pre-natal knowledge of ideas of the soul, the thought experiment with someone who is ignorant of the language cannot refute the anamnesis theory. Strongly Neoplatonic orientated Christians like Nemesios von Emesa and Boethius accepted the pre-existence of the soul and also the anamnesis.

Early modern age

In the early modern period , philosophers such as René Descartes , John Locke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as well as the “ Cambridge Platonists ” Henry More and Ralph Cudworth discussed the question of the extent to which knowledge is a priori possible. In doing so, they continued to deal with the question raised by Plato about knowledge that is not derived from sensory perception but rather that is inherent in the human mind. It was disputed whether there are “innate ideas” (Latin ideae innatae ), that is, ideas that are not acquired through experience and thus represent non- empirical elements of knowledge formation. In connection with the Platonic anamnesis theory, what was meant was a foreknowledge of the general, which is expressed in the “recognition” of the particular. Representatives of sensualistic models denied the existence of such consciousness contents.

Descartes rejected the anamnesis in its original Platonic form, but accepted innate truths in the soul that it could remember. In his view, there are innumerable details of shapes, numbers, movement and the like, the truth of which is so obvious and so closely related to my nature that when I discover them for the first time I don't think I'm getting to know anything new, just myself to remember what I already knew for a long time, or to become attentive for the first time to something that was already in me for a long time, even though I had not previously focused my mind on it.

Leibniz rejected the metaphysical notion of remembrance, since it led to an infinite regress , but accepted Plato's approach as the concept of the logical a priori. He preferred the anamnesis theory to the alternative sensualistic model of the tabula rasa , according to which there are no innate ideas and the sole basis of knowledge is the experience conveyed through the senses. For Leibniz, the non-deducible presence of basic concepts such as being, possibility and self as well as basic theorems such as the theorem of contradiction , without which neither pure nor empirical knowledge would be possible, belongs to the basic structure of the intellectual constitution of the human being before all sensory-empirically mediated data acquisition. It is inscribed in every spiritual soul. In these explanations Leibniz explicitly referred to Plato.

Kant replied in the negative to the question of whether there were innate ideas and only admitted that the ability to produce ideas are innate. Regarding the metaphysical aspect of the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis, he remarked that Plato had been amazed at pure reason and the mathematical insights it made possible, which carried him to the rapturous thought that all this knowledge was not for new acquisitions in our earthly life, but to be regarded as a mere awakening of far earlier ideas . This shows his philosophical spirit, for a mere mathematician would not have been so amazed.

Modern

In the modern age, anamnesis has aroused philosophical interest under the aspect of making the unconscious conscious; philosophically, it is no longer considered as a justification for the metaphysical assertion of a body-free existence of the soul.

Hegel rejected the anamnesis insofar as it was conceived as a reproduction of an idea that was already known. But he accepted it in the sense that the spirit that grasps the general (the species) does not take in something foreign, external, but goes into itself and comes to the consciousness of its inner being, of its own being. That is a “memory” in an etymological sense: getting inside, going into oneself; this is the deep thought sense of the word . Schelling, too, took up the Platonic concept and transformed it. In 1827 he wrote that it was the task of philosophy to let the ego of consciousness come to itself consciously. To this extent philosophy is nothing more than an anamnesis for the self, a reminder of what it has done and suffered in its general (pre-individual) being. This result of his considerations agrees in some respects with well-known Platonic views . Plato's theory, however, has partly a different meaning and is not without a certain addition of enthusiasm .

Karl Popper sees the anamnesis hypothesis as an overly optimistic epistemology. It is extremely optimistic because it encourages learning, research and discovery and also gives a slave access to knowledge. In this way she stands in opposition to the overly pessimistic epistemology of the allegory of the cave, according to which only a select few could achieve the state of true knowledge. The anamnesis theory led to the revolutionary and utopian rationalism of Descartes, while the theory of the allegory of the cave led to a belief in authority and tradition. Both do not correspond to the truth, but this lies between them. Although the assumption of innate knowledge is correct, the anamnesis theory is more erroneous than the pessimistic allegory of the cave, because there is no criterion of truth, only signs of error ( critical rationalism ).

literature

Overview representations

Investigations

  • Carlo E. Huber: Anamnesis in Plato . Max Hueber, Munich 1964
  • Sang-In Lee: anamnesis in the menon. Plato's reflections on the possibility and method of acquiring knowledge in accordance with the ideas . Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2001, ISBN 3-631-37376-7

reception

  • Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff : On the history of the impact of the Platonic theory of anamnesis . In: Collegium philosophicum. Studies for Joachim Ritter on his 60th birthday . Schwabe, Basel 1965, pp. 240-271

Remarks

  1. ↑ On Plato's doctrine of the soul and the migration of souls, see the overview by Michael Erler : Platon ( Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie . Die Philosophie der Antike , edited by Hellmut Flashar , Volume 2/2), Basel 2007, pp. 375-390 and Jörn Müller : Transmigration of souls . In: Christoph Horn u. a. (Ed.): Platon-Handbuch , Stuttgart 2009, pp. 324–328.
  2. ↑ Tópos hyperouránios according to Plato, Phaedrus 247c.
  3. ↑ Oikeía Episteme , according to Plato, Phaedo 75e.
  4. ^ Plato, Menon 81a – d.
  5. ↑ Hans Otto Seitschek: Recollection / Anamnesis . In: Christian Schäfer (Ed.): Platon-Lexikon , Darmstadt 2007, pp. 330–333, here: 330f.
  6. ↑ Plato, Meno 81c-d; Phaedo 72e-77a.
  7. ↑ Plato, Meno 80d-e.
  8. ↑ Thomas Jürgasch: Theoria versus practice? , Berlin 2013, pp. 96-102.
  9. ^ Dominic Scott: Recollection and Experience. Plato's theory of learning and its successors , Cambridge 1995, pp. 17-23, 53-85.
  10. ^ Thomas Williams: Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection . In: Apeiron 35, 2002, pp. 131-151; Charles H. Kahn: On the Philosophical Autonomy of a Platonic Dialogue: The Case of Recollection . In: Ann N. Michelini (Ed.): Plato as Author. The Rhetoric of Philosophy , Leiden 2003, pp. 299-312. In this sense, Bernd Manuwald also expresses himself: recollection / anamnesis . In: Christoph Horn u. a. (Ed.): Platon-Handbuch , Stuttgart 2009, pp. 352–354, here: 353.
  11. ↑ Peter Stemmer : Plato's Dialectic. The early and middle dialogues , Berlin 1992, p. 244f .; Michael Erler: Platon ( Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , edited by Hellmut Flashar, Volume 2/2), Basel 2007, p. 365f.
  12. ^ Plato, Seventh Letter 341c – d.
  13. ^ Theodor Ebert: Plato: Phaidon. Translation and commentary , Göttingen 2004, p. 199.
  14. ↑ See Filip Karfík: The argument from the opposites (69e – 72d). In: Jörn Müller (Ed.): Platon: Phaidon , Berlin 2011, pp. 47–62.
  15. ↑ Plato, Phaedo 91c-92e. See Bernd Manuwald: Which logo can you still trust? In: Jörn Müller (Ed.): Platon: Phaidon , Berlin 2011, pp. 111–126 and the literature cited there p. 126.
  16. ↑ Plato, Meno 82a-86b.
  17. ↑ See Jacob Klein : A Commentary on Plato 'Meno , Chapel Hill 1965, pp. 103-109, 166-182.
  18. ^ Carlo E. Huber: Anamnesis bei Plato , Munich 1964, pp. 538-540.
  19. ↑ Peter Stemmer: Plato's Dialectic. The early and middle dialogues , Berlin 1992, pp. 233–236; Bernhard Waldenfels : The Socratic Questions , Meisenheim am Glan 1961, p. 115f .; Sang-In Lee: Anamnesis im Menon , Frankfurt am Main 2001, pp. 148–152; Sang-In Lee: Plato's Anamnesis in the Early and Middle Dialogues . In: Antike und Abendland 46, 2000, pp. 93–115.
  20. ↑ Sang-In Lee: Anamnesis im Menon , Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 139; Theodor Ebert: Socrates as Pythagoreans and the anamnesis in Plato's Phaidon , Stuttgart 1994, p. 32.
  21. ^ Theodor Ebert: Sokrates als Pythagoreer and die Anamnesis in Platon's Phaidon , Stuttgart 1994, p. 20f .; Theodor Ebert: Plato: Phaidon. Translation and Commentary , Göttingen 2004, pp. 199–249. Roslyn Weiss also believe that Platonic Socrates does not stand behind the anamnesis theory: The Phaedo's Rejection of the Meno's Theory of Recollection . In: Scripta Classica Israelica 19, 2000, pp. 51–70 and William S. Cobb: Anamnesis: Platonic Doctrine or Sophistic Absurdity? In: Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review 12, 1973, pp. 604-628.
  22. ↑ Sang-In Lee: Plato's anamnesis in the early and middle dialogues . In: Antike und Abendland 46, 2000, pp. 93–115, here: 115.
  23. ↑ Plato, Phaedo 72e – 73b; see Michael Erler: Platon ( Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , edited by Hellmut Flashar, Volume 2/2), Basel 2007, p. 366. Ludwig CH Chen also criticize the “demythologizing” of anamnesis : Acquiring Knowledge of the Ideas in the Phaedo . In: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 133, 1990, pp. 52–70, here: 63–65; Bernd Manuwald: Recollection / Anamnesis . In: Christoph Horn u. a. (Ed.): Platon-Handbuch , Stuttgart 2009, pp. 352-354; Dominic Scott: Plato's Meno , Cambridge 2006, pp. 121f .; John Lloyd Ackrill : Essays on Plato and Aristotle , Oxford 1997, p. 13. Cf. Gregory Vlastos : Anamnesis in the Meno . In: Jane M. Day (ed.): Plato's Meno in focus , London 1994, pp. 88–111, here: 103–105.
  24. ↑ See the overview by Michael Erler: Platon (= Hellmut Flashar (Hrsg.): Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike , Volume 2/2), Basel 2007, p. 394f.
  25. ↑ Aristotle, Eudemos or About the Soul , Fragment 5, ed. William David Ross , Aristotelis fragmenta selecta , Oxford 1955, p. 18.
  26. ↑ Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 71a1–2.
  27. ^ Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 71a.
  28. ↑ Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff: On the history of the impact of the Platonic anamnesis theory . In: Collegium philosophicum. Studies of Joachim Ritter on his 60th birthday , Basel 1965, pp. 240–271, here: 244–247. See Dominic Scott: Recollection and Experience. Plato's theory of learning and its successors , Cambridge 1995, pp. 91-106; Sang-In Lee: Anamnesis im Menon , Frankfurt am Main 2001, pp. 175-185.
  29. ^ Dominic Scott: Recollection and Experience. Plato's theory of learning and its successors , Cambridge 1995, pp. 187-220.
  30. ↑ Critical Edition: George Leonidas Koniaris (Ed.): Maximus Tyrius, Philosophumena - ΔΙΑΛΕΧΕΙΣ , Berlin 1995, pp. 109–123; Translation: Otto Schönberger , Eva Schönberger: Maximos von Tyros: Philosophical lectures , Würzburg 2001, pp. 58–63. See Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : Der Platonismus in der Antike , Volume 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 308f.
  31. ↑ Stefanie Arend: "Above all, I will not admit that the soul is able to forget ...". Tertullian's criticism of Plato in De anima. In: Günter Butzer, Manuela Günter (Hrsg.): Kulturelles Vergessen: Medien - Rituale - Orte , Göttingen 2004, pp. 115–128, here: 115–121.
  32. ↑ Tertullian, De anima 24.1.
  33. ↑ Stefanie Arend: "Above all, I will not admit that the soul is able to forget ...". Tertullian's criticism of Plato in De anima. In: Günter Butzer, Manuela Günter (eds.): Kulturelles Vergessen: Medien - Rituale - Orte , Göttingen 2004, pp. 115–128, here: 115, 120–126.
  34. ↑ Arnobius, Adversus nationes 2: 20–24.
  35. ^ Hans Blumenberg : Höhlenausgangs , Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 327f.
  36. ↑ Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff: On the history of the impact of the Platonic anamnesis theory . In: Collegium philosophicum. Studies of Joachim Ritter on the occasion of his 60th birthday , Basel 1965, pp. 240–271, here: 253.
  37. ↑ Jürgen Mittelstraß : Idea, innate. In: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science , 2nd, revised edition, Volume 3, Stuttgart 2008, p. 523f .; Jürgen Mittelstraß: tabula rasa. In: Jürgen Mittelstraß (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science , 2nd, revised edition, Volume 7, Stuttgart 2018, p. 645.
  38. ↑ Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff: On the history of the impact of the Platonic anamnesis theory . In: Collegium philosophicum. Studies of Joachim Ritter on his 60th birthday , Basel 1965, pp. 240–271, here: 261–263.
  39. ↑ René Descartes: Meditationes de prima philosophia 5, ed. by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery : Œuvres de Descartes , Vol. 7, Paris 1983, pp. 63f.
  40. ↑ See Dominic Scott: Plato's Meno , Cambridge 2006, p. 116.
  41. ^ Thomas Leinkauf : Leibniz and Plato. In: Zeitsprge 13, 2009, pp. 23–45, here: p. 29 and note 22.
  42. ↑ Marcus Willaschek et al. (Ed.): Kant-Lexikon , Volume 1, Berlin 2015, p. 92f. (Lemma innate ).
  43. ↑ Immanuel Kant: What are the real advances that metaphysics has made in Germany since Leibniz's and Wolff's times? In: Immanuel Kant: Writings on Metaphysics and Logic ( Wilhelm Weischedel (Ed.): Immanuel Kant: Works in six volumes . Vol. 3), Darmstadt 1958, pp. 583–676, here: 665.
  44. ↑ Sang-In Lee: Plato's anamnesis in the early and middle dialogues . In: Antike und Abendland 46, 2000, pp. 93–115, here: 94f.
  45. ^ Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy II ( Eva Moldenhauer , Karl Markus Michel (Hrsg.): Hegel: Werke . Vol. 19), Frankfurt am Main 1971, p. 44.
  46. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: To the history of the modern philosophy . In: Schelling: Schriften von 1813-1830 , Darmstadt 1968, p. 377 (95).
  47. ^ Karl Popper: Assumptions and Refutations , Tübingen 2009, pp. 13–15.
  48. ↑ Karl Popper: Assumptions and Refutations , Tübingen 2009, pp. 41–43.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on April 3, 2013 .