China Great Wall Industry Corporation

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China Great Wall Industry Corporation
中国 长城 工业 集团 有限公司
legal form State-owned GmbH
founding 1980
Seat Beijing
management Liu Qiang
Number of employees 113
sales $ 93.6 million
Branch Space travel
Website cgwic.com

The China Great Wall Industry Corporation ( Chinese  中國 長城 工業 集團 有限公司  /  中国 长城 工业 集团 有限公司 , short 长城 公司 or CGWIC ) is a subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation . In the case of commercial satellite launches, it acts as a broker between the customer, the manufacturers of the satellite and launch vehicle and the Strategic Combat Support Force of the People's Republic of China as the operator of the cosmodromes. The company is based in Beijing Municipality Xicheng .

The CGWIC is not responsible for international cooperation in scientific projects such as the lunar program of the People's Republic of China . These are organized by the National Space Administration of China (for unmanned missions) or the Bureau for Manned Spaceflight .

history

When the China Great Wall Industry Corporation was founded in 1980, right at the beginning of the reform and opening-up policy , the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation was still the “ Seventh Ministry of Mechanical Engineering ”. The concept for China's first communications satellite came from the then “Ministry of Post and Telecommunications ". One and a half years after Dong Fang Hong 2-2 reached its geostationary position at 125 ° east longitude above the equator on April 16, 1984, the Chinese government granted permission to offer commercial satellite launches on the international market on October 26, 1985.

The Seventh Ministry was renamed "Ministry of Space Industry" in May 1982. The development and construction of the launch vehicles and satellites were carried out by the so-called "academies" of this ministry. This is a historical name from the early days of Chinese space travel, when basic engineering research was actually carried out at these facilities. In the 1980s, however, the Chinese Academy for Launch Vehicle Technology or the Chinese Academy for Space Technology were de facto companies, although they did not have a defined legal form. The situation was made more complicated by the fact that the Chinese cosmodromes (then Jiuquan , Taiyuan and Xichang ) had been subordinate to the Science, Technology and Industry Commission for National Defense since July 1982 , which was chaired simultaneously by the Central Military Commission and the State Council of the People's Republic of China . For this reason, CGWIC GmbH has acted and continues to act as a general contractor with an international legal form with which the foreign customers conclude legally valid and enforceable contracts for an overall package. In order not to scare off foreign customers unnecessarily, satellite launches, orbit tracking and control (中国 卫星 发射 测控 系统 部), in which the units directly subordinate to the People's Liberation Army , i.e. the cosmodromes, the satellite control center Xi'an , the research institute for Track tracking and communication technology and the institute for special engineering projects are summarized, found in English the non-military term "China Satellite Launch and Telemetry, Tracking and Control General Company".

From September 23, 2004, the CGWIC was for two years under Section 3 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act , then from June 13, 2006 to June 19, 2008 on the basis of Decree No. 13382 of the American President George W. Bush for alleged sale of sanctioned components that are suitable for rocket construction and subject to the Missile Technology Control regime to Iran. With this decree, US citizens were prohibited from entering into business relationships with the CGWIC, which was already not possible due to the sanctions of 1998 (see below). So the new sanctions were only symbolic.

Company description

Since 1990, despite the sanctions imposed by the USA in 1998 on the pretext of two accidents on the Xichang Cosmodrome as part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations , the CGWIC has organized 30 satellite launches for foreign customers, plus six missions in which satellites are actually used as an additional payload Chinese starts were taken (as of March 2020). If the customer brings their own satellite, the cost of moving it to geostationary orbit is $ 70 million. For comparison: SpaceX charges between 58 and 65 million dollars for the same performance, depending on the weight.

However, it is often the case that the China Great Wall Industry Corporation arranges the development and construction of the satellite for customers who do not have their own capacities for this. The US sanctions, which are still in force today, are thus having an effect as a support program for Chinese satellite builders, especially the Chinese Academy for Space Technology and its suppliers. Developing countries no longer buy their satellites from Boeing or European companies that build American components, but have them manufactured on site. As an example of such an overall package, here is the Paksat 1R project :

  • April 17, 2007: Framework agreement between CNSA and SUPARCO on joint satellite projects
  • October 15, 2008: Contract between the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CGWIC to build Paksat 1R
  • March 16, 2009: Start of training for Pakistani technicians at Shenzhou Academy
  • September 18, 2009: Chinese government grants Pakistan a $ 200 million loan (the standard price for a DFH-4 satellite including launch)
  • October 15, 2009: Agreement between SUPARCO and CGWIC to build the ground segment for Paksat 1R
  • 10-12 August 2010: Negotiations between CGWIC and SUPARCO and Telesat Canada as your advisor on insurance issues
  • October 29, 2010: Agreement between the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce and China Exim Bank for a loan of $ 12.8 million for the ground segment
  • July 1, 2011: Signing of the insurance contract for the start and the first year of operation in London
  • August 11, 2011: Launch of the satellite from the Xichang Cosmodrome
  • September 11, 2011: Satellite reaches geostationary position, is extensively tested
  • November 30, 2011: CGWIC hands over satellite and two ground stations built by China in Karachi and Lahore to SUPARCO

Liu Qiang (刘强) has been CEO of CGWIC GmbH since 2018. The company generates annual sales of almost 100 million dollars with starts for domestic and foreign customers and has a little over 100 employees. In 2018, for example, 35 small satellites not subject to US ITAR sanctions were put into orbit, many of them as multiple payloads with a rocket. The income opportunities are not so limited by the launch facilities - commercial satellite launches are currently being carried out by three cosmodromes, plus the Langer Marsch 11 solid-state rockets , which are launched from trucks like medium-range rockets - but by the production capacity of the rocket manufacturer. For 2021, for example, the CGWIC is offering 11 take-off places, eight of them as flight opportunities, most of them for sun-synchronous orbits ( i.e. mainly weather and earth observation satellites) with payloads between 30 and 1188 kg.

competitor

CGWIC GmbH is the only company authorized by the Chinese government to arrange commercial launches for foreign customers. In addition to the primarily civilian China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation , its military sister company China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) is also entering the international market. By a subsidiary of CASIC, the China Sanjiang Space Group Corporation in Wuhan , which are another subsidiary, ExPace Technology GmbH , solid rocket the kuaizhou produced series, which competes directly Changzheng 11 are the CASC. An important competitive advantage of CASIC is that only eight and a half months pass from the signing of the contract by the customer to the launch of the rocket, while the CGWIC was able to offer April 2021 as the earliest launch date in February 2020, for example.

International customers can bypass the monopoly of CGWIC or CASC if they have mainly Chinese investors, such as KLEO Connect GmbH from Munich. So KLEO was on 17 November 2019 for two 70 kg or 90 kg Technology Experiment Satellite with a kuaizhou-1A in near-Earth orbits carry. In addition, the Sanjiang Group is currently developing the Kuaizhou 21 , a two-stage launcher that can carry a payload of 20 t into a near-earth orbit. A combination of solid and liquid rocket engines can reduce the cost per kilogram of payload to an estimated $ 10,000.

subsidiary company

The China Great Wall Industry Corporation has the following subsidiaries:

  • China Aerospace Science & Technology Consulting Co., Ltd. (中国 航天 工业 科学 技术 咨询 有限公司)
  • China Great Wall Industry Shanghai Co., Ltd. (中国 长城 工业 上海 有限公司)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Launch Services Management. In: cgwic.com. Retrieved March 24, 2020 .
  2. ^ Company Profile. In: cgwic.com. Retrieved March 24, 2020 .
  3. ↑ 李鸣生: 我国 首颗 通信 卫星 发射 内幕. In: hbgrb.net. December 23, 2013, accessed March 24, 2020 (Chinese).
  4. ↑ 历史 上 的 今天 10 月 26 日. In: china.com.cn. Retrieved March 24, 2020 (Chinese).
  5. ^ China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC). In: nti.org. January 31, 2013, accessed March 24, 2020 .
  6. ^ Shirley A. Kan: China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues. In: fas.org. January 5, 2015, accessed March 28, 2020 . CRS-65.
  7. ↑ George W. Bush: Executive Order 13382. In: 2001-2009.state.gov. June 29, 2005, accessed March 29, 2020 .
  8. ↑ Ryan Zelnio: A short history of export control policy. In: thespacereview.com. January 9, 2006, accessed March 25, 2020 .
  9. ^ Debra Werner and Andrew Jones: China could launch another Long March 5 by year's end. In: spacenews.com. September 11, 2019, accessed March 25, 2020 .
  10. ↑ Partners. In: cgwic.com. Retrieved March 24, 2020 .
  11. ↑ Peter B. de Selding: China Great Wall Reaffirms Commitment to $ 70 Million Long March Launches. In: spacenews.com. September 24, 2013, accessed March 25, 2020 .
  12. ↑ PakSat-1R. In: cn.cgwic.com. Retrieved March 25, 2020 (English).
  13. ↑ 长城 公司 签署 巴基斯坦 过渡 通信 卫星 合同. In: cn.cgwic.com. March 26, 2018, accessed March 25, 2020 (Chinese).
  14. ^ China Great Wall Industry Corporation Information. In: rocketreach.co. Retrieved March 25, 2020 (English).
  15. ^ Debra Werner and Andrew Jones: China could launch another Long March 5 by year's end. In: spacenews.com. September 11, 2019, accessed March 25, 2020 .
  16. ↑ Peter B. de Selding: China Great Wall Reaffirms Commitment to $ 70 Million Long March Launches. In: spacenews.com. September 24, 2013, accessed March 25, 2020 .
  17. ↑ a b 2021 Long March Launch Vehicle Launch / Piggyback Opportunities. In: cgwic.com. Retrieved March 25, 2020 (English).
  18. ^ Thaicom and China Great Wall Sign MoU on UAV and Space Technology Cooperation. In: ryt9.com. October 10, 2019, accessed June 29, 2020 .
  19. ↑ 李淑 姮: 中国 航天 科 工 航天 三江 ： 跨越 发展 新 时代 改革 创新 赢 未来. In: thepaper.cn. October 2, 2019, accessed April 18, 2020 (Chinese).
  20. ↑ Sebastian Freier: Germany remains on the ground. In: welt.de. October 19, 2019, accessed March 26, 2020 .
  21. ↑ Gunter Dirk Krebs: KL-Alpha A, B. In: space.skyrocket.de. Retrieved March 26, 2020 (English).
  22. ↑ 堵 开源: 中国 新一代 中型 运载火箭 固体 发动机 试车 成功 有望 大幅 降低 发射 成本. In: guancha.cn. July 5, 2018, accessed March 26, 2020 (Chinese).
  23. ↑ About Us. In: castcc.com. Retrieved March 28, 2020 (English).
  24. ↑ About Us. In: en.cgwishc.com. Retrieved March 28, 2020 (English).