Demographic-economic paradox

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As a demographic-economic paradox or an economic-demographic paradox , economics and population science describe the fact that a population or a social class has fewer children the wealthier and more educated it is. In other words, the higher the per capita income and level of education, the lower the birth rate . This connection applies particularly in industrial nations, in Central and Western Europe since around 1850/1880. Before that time, it was the social upper class , whose children up to the age of marriage survived in greater numbers. In the last few decades, the demographic-economic paradox has also been observed among medium-sized businesses in developing and emerging countries .

Epistemological explosiveness

In industrial society, human reproductive behavior contradicts the biologically common one: from single-cell organisms to higher animals, living beings use access to food resources to reproduce. Both Thomas Robert Malthus and, following him on this question, Charles Darwin assumed that humans , like animals, multiply the faster the more resources were available to them, and it was still true in their time. The obviously different behavior of modern humans and its possible consequences occupy biologists as well as economists and demographers .

No paradox before modernity

Until well into the 19th century, it was mainly the full-scale farming population that created a permanent and often very high population surplus , while the sub-farming classes often remained so close to the subsistence level (and therefore had such a high child mortality rate ) that they did not even have their own Could reproduce number and had to be supplemented in each generation by socially descending peasant sons and daughters. Before 1800, urban populations and especially larger cities almost generally had a surplus of the dead, and here, of course, mainly the urban lower class again . For Malthus, Süßmilch and Darwin, such conditions were part of the general knowledge of their everyday lives.

Only the demographic transition creates the paradox

The demographic transition was associated from the beginning with the observation that the upper class, the number of births decreased earlier and more than the lower layer. The demographic-economic paradox could thus be read from population statistics as early as the end of the 19th century and triggered the first debates at that time. To this day, the topic has been taken up again and again. On the one hand, humans obviously differ from animal behavior at this point, on the other hand, the paradox calls into question common views of the nature of progress .

Up until the beginning of the 20th century, Europe experienced a population explosion , against which the melting of the upper classes seemed relatively insignificant to many, as the numerical loss could easily be compensated for by social advancement from the middle and lower classes. Nevertheless, at the end of the 19th century there were warning voices pointing to the possible consequences of the low birth rate in the upper classes and predicting a long-term dysgenic development. This warning was issued primarily by Francis Galton , whose name is inextricably linked with the idea of eugenics .

Today, based on the data, the paradox is not controversial, but the debate about causes and conclusions still seems to be just beginning.

Explanatory approaches

Children as human capital

The best-known explanatory approach tries to explain the paradox in economic terms: Wealthy adults do not have to rely on their own children to provide for their retirement , rather they incur high costs . Therefore, it is economically rational to maintain the number of own offspring low or completely without them.

According to the prevailing opinion, the monetary benefit of a child consists in a long-term increase in the parents' income and in a better protection of the parent against uncertain events. This view can be described as “work benefit” and the second aspect listed as what is known as “preventive benefit”.

The work benefit of a child consists in an increase in the parents' income during the time in which the child is earning its own income and making a transfer to the parents. This is why the importance of an adult child increases when it has a higher income.

The pension benefit relates to the provision of the parents in the event of unemployment or illness, for example. However, it depends on the structure of the social security system. The higher the income, the lower the relevance of a child's pension benefits for the potential parents.

The non-monetary benefit of a child is expressed in the fact that the children are not viewed as a burden, but as the greatest joy in their own life. Lifestyles also play a role. Based on a model that largely attributes child rearing to women, a distinction is made:

  • exclusively professionally oriented women
  • family and household-oriented women
  • Women who want the "best of both"

In the case of partnership parenting, the orientations of men must also be taken into account.

The social benefit relates to the social recognition that an individual receives from his or her social environment when deciding to have a child.

The monetary costs of a child are divided into two areas, direct and indirect costs.

The direct costs of a child are primarily the direct expenses for living expenses and expenses for the children's education. The direct costs for the offspring increase if parents place more value on their children's education.

A child's indirect costs are also referred to as opportunity costs . As a rule, the lost salary due to the interruption of employment, the reduction in pension entitlements or the reduction in career opportunities in the professional career are mentioned here. A key factor in this is the level of education of women, since a rising level of education generally entails higher opportunity costs due to a foregoing personal income from work.

The non-monetary costs of a child are, for example, the loss of leisure time or at least the limited opportunity for the parents to realize themselves.

The consequences of an increase in income on the number of children are best illustrated with the help of microeconomic household theory . As a basic assumption, the child is regarded as an investment good and a consumer good . When viewed as an investment good, the work and pension benefits already presented are considered. When viewed as a consumer good, the emotional and social benefits are considered.

This is why it is assumed that the individual utility function is subject to a budget restriction that indicates how many children and other consumer goods the parents can afford with a given income . However, a high income can also have an impact on the benefit aspect, as the additional income of a child has become dispensable.

This complex attempt to explain this is also confirmed by the data of historical demographics : before 1850, nobles, large industrialists and wealthy farmers certainly had the highest direct costs, but the lowest opportunity costs for their children, and for this reason also strong families.

Further thesis: Biographical universe

Herwig Birg developed an approach that both integrates and extends the financial approach . According to his theory of the biographical universe, people shape their future "life options" through decisions. This includes questions of money , but also of partnership , work and leisure , religion , circle of friends , etc.

Firm ties (such as marriage , children ), however, meant a foreseeable renouncement of alternatives (especially less freedom , career ). Children would therefore increasingly become a matter of biographical decision.

This observation fits in with the fact that, especially in affluent and educated populations, religious people worldwide have on average more children than secular ones. Because they usually forego many options due to their bids , so they have fewer option costs (opportunity costs) due to the family or even gain recognition within their respective community through marriage and children.

The theory can also explain why human populations tend to have more children when they are exposed to social or political discrimination : By depriving them of options, they have lower option costs from children than the oppressive social class .

Further influencing factors: duration of education, costs of contraceptives and knowledge about them, equality, repression

Higher incomes allow young adults to spend longer periods of time in training or studies, financed by their parents or by social expenses. During this time they have a lower or unsecured income of their own and on average they delay starting a family.

The cost of contraceptives such as the birth control pill in poor countries can require a relevant share of the monetary income and thus make it more difficult for poor people, and especially women with no market income, to have access to contraception compared to more affluent households. Individual knowledge of contraceptive options depends on education and is indirectly a function of income. However, the demographic-economic paradox was observed even before the development of modern contraceptives.

The desired number of children differentiates between the sexes; In many cultures, women who at least have to bear the physical burden of pregnancy and childbirth alone would like fewer children or do not want a very high number of children. A better financial position for women gives them alternatives and makes it easier for them to achieve their wishes. Poor families can strive to marry their daughters early to marry men, some of them significantly older, which then leads to earlier pregnancies and more numerous children; This is also less common if the family of origin has a higher income.

Higher income also allows greater use of services; loses the role of housewives in importance (the child-rearing more or less in passing allowed), the cost of children (the z. B. in the restaurant and theater visits or holidays owned places claim) are increasing. Higher incomes often require a division of labor and capital-intensive activity; that is difficult to reconcile with the housewife role and home work as child-conducive lifestyles.

Increasing prosperity and the associated longer life expectancy also encourage crowding-out effects, as the older generation occupies positions and spaces that are not available to the younger generation and thus influence their life planning. This applies to professional positions (and thus income opportunities for young adults) and especially to areas of real estate that cannot be increased and thus the space and the opportunity to create a family home. Many single-family houses in large cities that were built in the wake of the baby boom after the post-war period are still owned by the builders after the turn of the millennium or have recently been transferred to the next generation, which is also older. Due to the extended life expectancy of the parents, inheritances are often not taken until after the age of 50 and thus after the generative phase. For young people who are starting a family, the shortage of real estate due to the ownership of the elderly leads to rents and purchase prices that are often unaffordable for them. In Italy, for example, many young adults live with their parents, which counteracts starting a family and is cited as one of the reasons for the low birth rates there.

Sufficiently high incomes also lead to increased car ownership. Motor vehicle traffic and the risk of accidents it emanates represent a considerable impairment in the way the children and their parents shape their lives, increase the need to look after the children and lead to their parents having to pay for their transport (mommy taxis); this increases the workload for children and thus lowers the birth rate.

durability

The empirical observation is of interest that the number of children, once it has fallen in connection with economic and social development, does not rise again even if the standard of living falls. Extrapolated to longer time intervals, this would mean that the population initially declines after a high economic standard has been reached for the first time, but also continues to shrink in the event of a subsequent economic downturn.

See also

literature

  • Herwig Birg: The demographic turning point: the population decline in Germany and Europe . Beck, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-406-47552-3 .
  • Herwig Birg : The demographic-economic paradox. Schöningh Paderborn 2004
  • Herwig Birg et al .: Biographical Theory of Fertility . 1991.
  • David de la Croix, Matthias Doepcke: Inequality and growth: why differential fertility matters . September 2002 ( PDF ).
  • Oded Galor, Omer Moav: Das Human-Kapital: A theory of the demise of the class structure . In: Reviews of Economic Studies . tape 73 , 2006, pp. 85-117 , doi : 10.1111 / j.1467-937X.2006.00370.x .
  • R. Inglehart, P. Norris: Sacred and Secular . Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-521-54872-1 .
  • Petersen, Thiess; Lübcke, Britta (2006); The demographic-economic paradox, in :. WiSt, Heft 5, pp. 277-279

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Demographic-economic paradox. CESifo group (Ifo Institute and Center for Economic Studies CES), accessed on May 23, 2014 .
  2. ↑ Reiner Klingholz : Slaves of Growth. The story of a liberation . Campus, 2014, ISBN 978-3-593-39798-6 . P. 145

Web links

Wiktionary: Demography  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations