Eryxias

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The beginning of Eryxias in the oldest surviving medieval manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale , Gr. 1807 (9th century)

The Eryxias ( Greek Ἐρυξίας Eryxías ) is an ancient literary dialogue in ancient Greek, which was ascribed to the philosopher Plato , but certainly did not come from him. The inauthenticity was already recognized in antiquity. The author, who cannot be assigned to any particular philosophical direction, was apparently in the late 4th or early 3rd century BC. Active.

The content of the short work is a fictional conversation between the philosopher Socrates , his companion Eryxias and the politicians Erasistratos and Kritias . The relationship between wealth, wisdom, virtue and a good, successful life is discussed. Socrates presents material wealth as problematic. He considers wisdom to be the most valuable possession, because it enables an optimal state of mind.

In modern antiquity, dialogue is accorded a remarkable literary quality. The philosophical content is judged less favorably. The course of the discussion is criticized as erratic.

Circumstances, participants and course of the conversation

The dialogue takes place in Athens between 427 and 415 BC. From, probably towards the end of this period. Athens is already in the Peloponnesian War , but the catastrophic Sicily expedition of 415-413 has not yet taken place; it seems to be imminent soon. Socrates appears as a narrator who tells a friend or friends the course of the conversation.

Critias is a historical figure who also appears in real dialogues of Plato. He has 404–403 BC BC, long after the eryxias' era , took part in the reign of terror of the Thirty as a leading oligarchical politician and finally fell in the struggle against the victorious democratic forces. Eryxias is referred to in the dialogue as a friend and relative of Critias and we learn that he comes from the village of Steiria . Erasistratos is introduced as the nephew of the politician Phaiax . Since Eryxias is only attested in the dialogue named after him, his historicity is not certain. It is possible that the dialogue figure Erasistratos is identical to the politician of the same name who, like Critias, belonged to the body of the oligarchic "Thirty Tyrants".

Characteristic of the course of the conversation is the tenacity with which Socrates' discussion partners hold on to their opinions. Neither can really convince the other, a common result will not be achieved. It is not discussed until an agreement is reached, but the interlocutors move on to a new point if an agreement seems to them to be hopeless.

content

Socrates (Roman bust, 1st century, Louvre , Paris)

The question of the definition and value of wealth

Socrates is on a walk with Eryxias in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, the columned hall dedicated to "Zeus the Liberator" at the northwest corner of the agora . There they meet Critias and Erasistratos. Erasistratos has only recently returned from Sicily and reports on the political situation there. He compares Syracuse with a wasp's nest and says that the Syracusans can only be overcome with an extermination campaign. There they see the Syracuse ambassadors who are just in Athens. Among them is a man who - as Erasistratos relates - is considered the richest and at the same time the worst of all Greeks living in Italy. Its wealth consists of excellent lands as well as slaves, horses, gold and silver.

Socrates takes this as an opportunity to draw attention to the question of what constitutes wealth. The richest is considered to be the one who possesses the most valuable. The most valuable does not have to be something material; everyone would rather be healthy and poor than languishing in possession of the greatest treasures. Based on this consideration, Socrates asks what is the most valuable possession for a person. Erasistratos replies that it is eudaimonia ("bliss"), the state of mind associated with a good, successful lifestyle. As Socrates points out, eudaimonia occurs most of all among the successful, among those who behave correctly and are least likely to be mistaken. Acting right requires knowing what is good and what is bad. The quality that enables this is wisdom. It follows that wisdom, as the cause of eudaimonia, is the most precious possession. The wise man acts best, he is the richest and the happiest person at the same time.

Now Eryxias intervenes in the debate. His objection to Socrates' thesis is that wisdom alone is not enough. Man also needs external goods such as food and clothing; without this wisdom is useless. In Eryxias' opinion, if such elementary needs remain unsatisfied and one is poor as a beggar, one can hardly be considered rich and happy. Socrates replies that the wise does not get into such misery, but knows how to help himself. He could secure his livelihood with his knowledge. Thereupon Eryxias jokingly accuses Socrates, who lives in modest circumstances, of considering himself wise and therefore believes he is richer than Callias , an Athenian famous for his luxury. That seems absurd to Eryxias. He thinks it is alien to the world to redefine the term “wealth” in such a way that the wisest is the richest. A thesis that nobody will agree with is not helpful. More sensible are the questions under which conditions wealth is praiseworthy or disgraceful and whether it represents a good or an evil. The discussion now turns to this topic.

Eryxias believes that being rich is a good thing; there was general consensus on this. Anyone who says the opposite is crazy. Critias opposes this. He argues that wealth can lead to bad things, such as adultery with greedy women of neighbors or excessive diet that is harmful to health. Let the poor man not be exposed to such temptations. According to Kritias' line of thought, if wealth is bad for some, it cannot be good in itself, otherwise it would be good for everyone. Eryxias is outraged by the contradiction, but has nothing to say in return.

The Prodikos episode

To prevent slipping into the unobjective, Socrates intervenes and distracts the conversation a little. He tells of an incident that he recently witnessed. The famous sophist Prodikos von Keos had taken the same view as Critias now: wealth is not good in itself, but only for those who have the necessary wisdom to use it sensibly; for others he is an evil. The background to this was the prodic's claim to be a wisdom teacher. A youngster then cornered the sophist by asking him whether the wisdom imparted to a person necessarily and immediately results in all his behavior becoming good, and whether such wisdom can be taught as a professional competence. Prodikos spoke out for the teachability and against the innate nature of "goodness" - the aretḗ (virtue). In doing so, however, he exposed himself to the charge that he considered virtue - the key to the good life - to be a purely human achievement comparable to mastery of technology. So he got into a dilemma pointed out by his adversary: ​​If the correct way of life is inevitably and immediately derived from the knowledge that can be learned, prayers for divine guidance are superfluous; then man has to procure what he asks of the gods for himself. The sophist shrank from this consequence of his thesis, because that would be an avowal of infidelity. As Socrates reports, Prodikos maneuvered himself with his opinion on the sidelines, so that he was expelled from the high school where he taught.

Value, benefits and needs

After the digression, Socrates turns the conversation back to the question of what wealth consists of. He draws attention to the fact that the value that is attached to individual possessions is culturally determined and therefore subjective. What some consider useful is of no use to others. Only what is useful is considered valuable. What is useful is what satisfies needs, but needs depend on the situation. Hence, the value of possessions turns out to be relative. For that reason, when a means is needed to achieve an end believed important, it appears valuable. If the end can be achieved in another way without the means, this is completely devalued. Material wealth is one such means. The means has no value in and of itself, but rather it preserves it as a result of its usefulness for an end and only keeps it as long as it serves the end.

You also have to know how to use a remedy properly. Knowledge itself is also a useful resource, namely the one that gives other resources their value. Therefore it is not primarily about things, but about information. For example, horses are worthless to their owner if he cannot ride; they only become valuable to him after a riding instructor has taught him the necessary knowledge. It is the same with money; it is also a resource that cannot be of value until one has learned to use it.

Critias is indeed impressed by Socrates' statements, but still does not allow himself to be won over to his strange-looking way of thinking. So Socrates finally takes a new approach. He starts from the premise that the value you attach to property is related to the needs you have. Following on from this, Socrates asks whether one leads a happier life with many and great or with few and minor needs. He puts forward an argument that Critias must agree with, which leads to the conclusion that a multiplicity of needs is a sign of an unfortunate situation. For example, a sick person has more needs than a healthy person, and an addict is tormented by special desires. Those who need less and are relatively needless live better.

Socrates now asserts that the rich are those who have the most material needs and who need the most means to meet them. According to this, they are in the worst condition because they lack a lot. Seen in this way, the materially richest turn out to be the “poorest” from the point of view of eudaimonia. With this conclusion the dialogue ends.

Historical background and time of origin

In modern research it is almost unanimously assumed that it cannot be a work of Plato. For this, deficiencies in the line of thought and in the literary design are asserted. In addition, there is a cultural-historical argument: In the dialogue, an apparently civil servant Gymnasiarch (gymnasium supervisor) is mentioned, who drives Prodikos out of the gymnasium. The grammar school as an office with such a regulatory function was only introduced after Plato's death.

The most likely time of writing is the late 4th or early 3rd century BC. It is often assumed that the author, about whom nothing can be determined, belonged to the Platonic Academy . However, this is uncertain, as is his supposed intention to polemicize against the Stoics . According to one hypothesis, the author, as a Platonist , turns against the doctrine of the Stoics, according to which wisdom is the only good and all other possessions are insignificant from a philosophical point of view; he considers this assertion to be extremism alien to life and advocates a hierarchical order of values ​​with wisdom at the top.

reception

The Beginning of Eryxias in the first edition, Venice 1513

Since the Eryxias was considered spurious in antiquity, it was not included in the tetralogy of the works of Plato. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios listed it among the writings that were unanimously regarded as not coming from Plato. He gave Erasistratos as an alternative title .

A small fragment of a parchment manuscript from the 4th century and a papyrus fragment from the 2nd century have been preserved. The papyrus contains a quote from the Eryxias , which there is attributed to the philosopher Aeschines von Sphettos , a student of Socrates. This attribution was still known in the Middle Ages: the Suda , a Byzantine encyclopedia, leads among the dialogues of Aeschines Eryxias and Erasistratos . The encyclopedist apparently did not know that Erasistratos was an ancient alternative title to Eryxias , but assumed that it was about two different works.

In the Middle Ages, the Eryxias was not accessible to the Latin- speaking scholarly world of the West. In the Byzantine Empire, however, he found a few readers. The oldest surviving medieval manuscript dates from the 9th century.

After its rediscovery in the age of Renaissance humanism , the Eryxias received occasional attention. The humanist Antonio Cassarino († 1447) made the first Latin translation . He titled it Eryxias vel De diviciis ("Eryxias or About Wealth") and dedicated the pseudo-Platonic criticism of the pursuit of wealth to the Doge of Genoa Tommaso Fregoso, the head of the aristocratic class of a flourishing trading town. Cassarino's translation was not printed. The first edition of the Greek text was published in Venice by Aldo Manuzio in September 1513 as part of the complete edition of Plato's works published by Markos Musuros . The Latin translation created by the humanist Willibald Pirckheimer and published in Nuremberg by his printer Friedrich Peypus in 1523 is based on this edition .

In the 18th century the Eryxias was valued for its ethical content, but in the 19th century it was mostly viewed negatively as a failed imitation of Plato's early dialogues. In recent research he is usually counted among the more successful of the pseudo-Platonic dialogues. He is recognized as having a remarkable literary quality; the philosophical yield, on the other hand, is judged unfavorably. The interpretation of the Prodikos episode, which makes an unfinished impression, causes considerable difficulties. Klaus Döring describes it as an " eristic farce", a mere gimmick that only serves to demonstrate the art of argument. A serious effort to clarify the questions raised there is lacking.

Editions and translations

  • Joseph Souilhé (ed.): Plato: Œuvres complètes , vol. 13, part 3: Dialogues apocryphes . 2nd edition, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1962, pp. 77–113 (critical edition with French translation)
  • Hieronymus Müller (translator): Eryxias . In: Erich Loewenthal (Ed.): Platon: All works in three volumes , Vol. 3, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 832–852 (only translation)

literature

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ For the dating of the dialogue act, see David Edward Eichholz: The Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Eryxias . In: The Classical Quarterly 29, 1935, pp. 129–149, here: p. 130 and note 6; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 331; Robert Mayhew: Prodicus the Sophist , Oxford 2011, pp. 223f.
  2. ↑ On historical Critias see Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 108–113.
  3. ↑ Eryxias 396d; see. John K. Davies: Athenian Property Families, 600-300 BC , Oxford 1971, pp. 328f .; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 142f.
  4. ↑ Eryxias 392a.
  5. ^ Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: p. 69 note 2; John K. Davies: Athenian Property Families, 600-300 BC , Oxford 1971, p. 523; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 141.
  6. ↑ Carl Werner Müller: The short dialogues of the Appendix Platonica , Munich 1975, p. 255, note 1; Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 77.
  7. ↑ Eryxias 392a-393a.
  8. ↑ Eryxias 393a-394a.
  9. ↑ Eryxias 394a-395e.
  10. ↑ Eryxias 395e-397c.
  11. ↑ Eryxias 397c-399c. See also Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 70–75; Konrad Gaiser : Protreptik und Paränese in Platon , Stuttgart 1959, p. 62f .; Carl Werner Müller : Small writings on ancient literary and intellectual history , Stuttgart 1999, p. 28f.
  12. ↑ Eryxias 399d-402e.
  13. ↑ Eryxias 402e-403c.
  14. ↑ Eryxias 403c-406a.
  15. ↑ Eryxias 406a.
  16. ↑ Joseph Souilhé (ed.): Plato: Œuvres complètes , vol. 13, part 3: Dialogues apocryphes , 2nd edition, Paris 1962, p. 83.
  17. ^ Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 76.
  18. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 331; Alfred Edward Taylor : Plato. The Man and his Work , 5th Edition, London 1948, p. 550; David Edward Eichholz: The Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Eryxias . In: The Classical Quarterly 29, 1935, pp. 129-149, here: 140-142, 148; Renato Laurenti: Pseudo Platone: Erissia , Bari 1969, p. 71f. Holger Thesleff has a different opinion : Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 366; he tends to be early dating (360s). See Robert Mayhew: Prodicus the Sophist , Oxford 2011, p. 223; Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 76–78; Eugen Dönt : Two remarks on pseudo-Platonic writings . In: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 110, 1967, p. 286.
  19. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 331f. Antistoic polemics from a member of the younger (“skeptical”) academy suspects Carl Werner Müller: Kleine Schriften zur antiken Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 50–52. William KC Guthrie , A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, p. 397, oppose a reference to the Stoa ; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 366; Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 75f .; Renato Laurenti: Pseudo Platone: Erissia , Bari 1969, p. 54f.
  20. ^ Alfred E. Taylor: Plato. The Man and his Work , 5th edition, London 1948, p. 550.
  21. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3.62. See Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : Der Platonismus in der Antike , Vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990, pp. 90-93, 345f.
  22. ^ Described by Herbert Hunger : Pseudo-Platonica in a 4th century edition . In: Wiener Studien 74, 1961, pp. 40–42.
  23. ↑ The Lemma in the Suda is edited by Gabriele Giannantoni (Ed.): Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae , Vol. 2, Naples 1990, p. 600.
  24. ^ Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Gr. 1807. See on this manuscript and its dating Henri Dominique Saffrey: Retour sur le Parisinus graecus 1807, le manuscrit A de Platon . In: Cristina D'Ancona (Ed.): The Libraries of the Neoplatonists , Leiden 2007, pp. 3–28.
  25. ↑ On Cassarino and his work as a translator, see James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , Leiden 1994, pp. 154–160.
  26. ↑ On Pirckheimer's translation, see Niklas Holzberg : Willibald Pirckheimer , Munich 1981, pp. 301–311.
  27. ^ David Edward Eichholz: The Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Eryxias . In: The Classical Quarterly 29, 1935, pp. 129–149, here: 129.
  28. ^ Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 69, 77f .; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 331; Alfred E. Taylor: Plato. The Man and his Work , 5th Edition, London 1948, pp. 548, 550; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, p. 396; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 13, note 29 and p. 366.
  29. ^ Klaus Döring: The Prodikos episode in the pseudoplatonic Eryxias . In: Klaus Döring, Michael Erler, Stefan Schorn (eds.): Pseudoplatonica , Stuttgart 2005, pp. 69–79, here: 77.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on March 11, 2014 .