Eurasia Corporation

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Eurasia Corporation
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IATA code :
ICAO code :
Call sign :
Founding: 1925
Operation stopped: 1943
Seat: Siân

(1925–1937 Shanghai)

Fleet size: 30 (1939)

F 13 , W 33 , W 34 , Ju 52 / 3m

Aims: National and international
Eurasia Corporation ceased operations in 1943. The information in italics refers to the last status before the end of operation.

The Eurasia Corporation was a Chinese airline that was founded as a joint venture between Deutsche Luft Hansa and the Chinese government. The starting point for the establishment was the Transeurasia project of the DLH.

The Transeurasia Project

The Transeurasia project included the creation of a "major flight route" to China. The project was tackled by Deutsche Aero Lloyd as early as 1925 . As a result of the preliminary studies, the DAL submitted a proposal to the USSR for the construction of a transcontinental line to China or Japan . This initiative was warmly supported by the Reich government and the responsible ministries for reasons of foreign, economic and air policy. For the traffic there was not the problem of the inadequate flight performance of the existing aircraft. But there was a lack of the appropriate infrastructure . Basically there were three possible routes: the north route via Siberia , the south route via the Middle East , India and Indochina and the Pamir route via Tehran , Kabul and Xinjiang . The southern route was ruled out due to expected political problems with the British Empire, the Pamir route due to the insufficient altitude performance of the aircraft available in 1926. The Siberia route offered itself as a connection to the Deruluft route (Königsberg – Moscow). Corresponding negotiations were initiated with Moscow and since German-Soviet relations were still good at that time, DLH soon received permission for a test flight. On July 23, 1926, two Junkers G 24 took off from Berlin and flew 10,000 km to Beijing in ten daily stages . The flight was mainly used to explore the route and demonstrated that a flight connection to China was possible at least in the summer months. The result was to be noted: "The Russian government is fundamentally willing to carry out the line together with us [the DLH], but expects funding from us for several years in the sense of the financial slogan now issued by Russia."

In 1928 two more test flights were carried out to Irkutsk , based on the existing Soviet ground organization. In addition, there was a flight Berlin - Tokyo from September 18 to October 18, 1928, in which a Junkers W 33 covered 14,250 km in 90 hours of flight time.

The global economic crisis had considerable negative consequences for the Transeurasia project, so that the planned major flight connection Germany-China with an airline to be founded in China did not materialize, although a corresponding agreement was concluded in Nanjing on February 21, 1930 . This contract provided for a beeline between Berlin and Beijing with a route over the USSR. The rejection of the ratification of the agreement by the RVM led to annoyance on the part of the Soviet and Chinese sides, who were very interested in the route, but were dependent on appropriate outside capital for the operation. Only with difficulty and with the support of the Foreign Office , the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Defense , the DLH was able to get the RVM's promise for a small solution, i.e. H. the establishment of an airline in China for domestic Chinese traffic. The connection to Europe could also be established by third parties or by rail. For the Reich this solution was quite inexpensive: instead of necessary subsidies i. H. v. 2.0 million RM p. a. the Reich made a total of RM 1.2 million available for the three years 1931–1933 for the big solution. This sum was sufficient to cover all costs of DLH (upfront and running costs) as well as the proportionate balance sheet loss.

However, DLH had not yet written off its plans for a connection to China. Since the Soviet Union remained closed to it and the southern route via India should not be used for political reasons, the DLH tried in 1936 and 1937 to explore the Pamir route in order to be able to establish a connection between Germany and China. The Lufthansa board of directors from Gablenz took part in the long-haul flights again and again. In August 1937, however, the Junkers Ju 52 / 3m he was using had to make an emergency landing in China due to an engine failure, with the crew being captured by Chinese soldiers and only released after a long period of imprisonment. This route proved to be ultimately unsuitable because of the terrain (a 5,400 m high pass had to be flown over), the unexplained rule of law and the lack of meteorological advice.

Thus, only the southern route remained open as a connection route to China. To this end, an application for overflights from India and Burma was submitted to the British government in early 1938 , which was complied with. The DLH benefited from the fact that British air traffic was planning an expansion to Central and Eastern Europe and was therefore dependent on the benevolence of the Reich. In late 1938, the Siam government also agreed. On April 22, 1939, the start of a reconnaissance flight on the planned route via India, Burma, Siam and Indochina to Tokyo, from where the Japanese-occupied areas in northern China and Manchukuo were approached. The connection to Eurasia should take place in Hanoi. Another special flight from Bangkok to Tokyo was carried out in August to prepare for the regular connection between the two axis partners. The plans were to use the Fw 200 from 1940 instead of the Ju 52 / 3m previously used . Travel times of three days to Bangkok and five days to Tokyo were planned. With this, DLH would have offered by far the fastest connection to the Far East. However, the war put an end to the planning.

For Lufthansa, the Transeurasia project turned out to be a failure. The original intention to build a transcontinental route to China failed because of the desperate financial situation of the empire during the Great Depression and later, when the funds were available, because of the political differences with the Soviet Union. The Pamir route was not manageable in terms of traffic, the southern route was only expanded in the summer of 1939, without being able to establish a connection to China before the war began.

Company history

Civil aviation route network in China 1934. Eurasia routes ocher.

After the big treaty between DLH, the USSR and China, which did not establish an air connection between the Reich and China with a route via the USSR, a "small" treaty between the Reich and China could be ratified. Therefore, on February 1, 1931, "Eurasia" was founded. DLH participated in this with a third, the Chinese government with two thirds of the capital. The German capital contribution was mainly made up of real assets, i. H. Aircraft, the first four of which arrived in China in February 1931. However, DLH was forced to advance the necessary capital on the Chinese side or to bring in itself. The advanced 400,000 RM were to be repaid by the Chinese Ministry of Transport by 1936, which later turned out to be almost impossible due to lack of money. On May 31, 1931, DLH aircraft and personnel could begin operations on the Shanghai – Nanjing – Beijing – Manjur route. Constant fighting in China made it difficult to set up fixed air routes, as these were often adapted to the circumstances and rarely lasted. However, Eurasia always tried to keep an eye on the connection to the Soviet Union, as the USSR for its part had already tested the Moscow – Irkutsk route in 1929, with a branch to Urga in Mongolia.

In order to demonstrate the practical possibility of carrying out scheduled traffic between Berlin and Shanghai, three newly purchased Junkers W 34s were transported to China by air. The first two machines were transported by air by the flight captains Polte and Lutz to Urumchi in June 1933 , 10,000 km being covered within four days with a total of 50 flight hours. “The third W 34 made available for Eurasia was transferred by air from Berlin to Shanghai in just 4 days. This excellent performance proves once again that it is possible to carry out a regular service between Berlin and Shanghai in around five days on fast mail planes ”. Unfortunately, this successful demonstration could not be implemented accordingly. At the Chinese request, the route was changed in 1932 so that the connection to the Soviet Union should now take place via Xinjiang. As early as July 1933, the route had to be closed again due to the unrest that broke out in Xinjiang. This meant that the Eurasia was restricted to domestic Chinese air traffic and was able to write off the original goal of an air connection via the Soviet Union. A north-south route Beijing- Canton and the west-east route Shanghai - Lanzhou , where the route branched north to Paotau , was operated. The route to Canton was soon closed due to the inadequate infrastructure, but a route south to Yünnanfu was set up. In the following, DLH's interest was directed towards the connection of Eurasia to a beeline for Europeans to the Far East. In an initial plan, Eurasia should set up a line to Calcutta or Rangoon, where the mail exchange with the IAL should take place. The negotiations failed because the IAL reciprocity, i. H. Permission to fly into China, wished. The Chinese side did not grant this right to a foreign company in order not to create a precedent against Japanese claims. The connection to the Air France route to Hanoi was made on July 10, 1936 by a Chinese airline (South Western, seat: Canton) on the Canton – Hanoi route. On November 5, 1936, the Chinese National Air Corporation (CNAC) opened the route to Hong Kong, which also established the connection to the IAL. German aviation fell behind. At the request of the German ambassador to China, the first Ju52 / 3m was transported to China by air in 1934. This served on the one hand to advertise the quality of German aviation products, but also to be able to stand up to the CNAC. The CNAC was founded with the participation of the capital of Pan American Airways and used modern Douglas DC-2 and DC-3 .

By and large, the operation of Eurasia turned out to be an extremely expensive undertaking, as losses were at the expense of capital and it was soon consumed. By 1936 the capital was increased in several steps from three million to nine million Mexican dollars, with a cumulative loss of 4.4 million Mexican dollars by June 30, 1936.

The beginning of the open war in July 1937 led to various route changes, but also to a greatly increased need for transport for functionaries and wealthy Chinese. Eurasia moved its head office to Kunming and gave up all routes north of Sian. Therefore Beijing and Shanghai were no longer served. In return, however, it was possible to obtain landing rights in Hanoi (Vietnam) and Hong Kong. Before the war began, the CNAC and Eurasia together had 30 aircraft. This number was reduced to five by the end of 1941 as a result of fighting and frequent accidents. China thus proved to be a bottomless pit not only for DLH, but also for Pan American Airways. When the war began in Europe on September 1, 1939, the Eurasia had to stop the routes to Hong Kong and Hanoi, as only German personnel were deployed on them. Thanks to the use of Chinese personnel, these routes could soon be reopened. The company continued to operate until the end of 1941, although it was repeatedly affected by armed conflicts, although most of the aircraft had since been lost to accidents and the effects of war. A total of 26 aircraft, mainly Junkers F 13, W 33, W 34 and Ju 52 / 3m, were used. Of these, eleven were lost due to breakage, and ten were destroyed by armed conflict. In contrast to the CNAC, however, the Eurasia only had to complain about injuries when it came to losses from the effects of the war.

At the beginning of July 1941, the Chiang Kai-shek government broke off diplomatic relations with the German Reich after the Reich recognized the reform government in Nanjing, which was under Japanese supervision. As a result, the Chinese government demanded the immediate withdrawal of German personnel from Eurasia and their departure to Indochina. From August 1, 1941, the management of Eurasia was exclusively in Chinese hands. The share of DLH in the company remained, however, the interests of DLH were taken over by the Chinese side. The German staff had to leave the country by September 15, 1941. At the same time, the Chinese government stopped paying its debts to DLH and directed DLH to seek a post-war solution.

The empire could no longer play a credible role in China due to the warfare of its ally Japan. Therefore, the expulsion of the Eurasia employees was a logical consequence of the Reich's policy in the Far East, the consequences of which the DLH had to bear. However, German influence had decreased significantly by 1940. At the end of 1940, nine Germans were still working for Eurasia, two of them pilots. A total of 777 people were employed. From 1938 the DLH began to withdraw its flight personnel. Whereas in 1938 only 25% of the flight performance was provided by Chinese pilots, this proportion rose to 83% by 1940. The separation from the German employees did not bring the hoped-for success. The American side was not ready to deliver flight material because Eurasia was on the black list. Instead, the CNAC was supported, in which the PAA was involved. In this situation, the CNAC naturally tried to take advantage of it and damage Eurasia economically. It succeeded exceptionally well, as CATCO, as the successor company to Eurasia, only achieved the performance of its predecessor in 1940 in 1946.

The history of Eurasia and with it that of DLH's participation in air traffic in China ended in November 1943. At this point in time, Eurasia was liquidated and the German share was confiscated as enemy property.

See also

Web links

literature

  • Andreas Acktun: Air traffic in Germany and Great Britain 1924 to 1946. Commercial enterprise in the field of tension between state and entrepreneurial interests. Tectum, Marburg 2006, ISBN 3-8288-9166-7 .
  • Peter Moeller, Larry D. Sall: Eurasia Aviation Corporation - A German-Chinese Airline in China and its Airmail 1931-1943. 2007, OCLC 244439876 .

swell

  1. ↑ Bodo Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials for an unsuitable modernization attempt. Wiesbaden 1975, p. 106.
  2. ↑ Fischer von Poturzyn, Josef M. Jurinek (Ed.): Yearbook for Air Traffic 1926/27. P. 5.
  3. ↑ 1st meeting of the working committee, economic report, September 30, 1926, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  4. ^ Karl-Dieter Seiffert: The German air traffic 1926-1945 - On the way to world air traffic. ( German aviation. Volume 28). Bonn 1999, p. 236.
  5. ↑ Berliner Tageblatt. May 14, 1930.
  6. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 126.
  7. ↑ Overview of the cost coverage for the flight service in China by Deutsche Lufthansa, August 26, 1933, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  8. ↑ Carl August von Gablenz: D-ANOY conquers the Pamir. Berlin 1937.
  9. ↑ Quarterly Report III / 38, p. 6, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  10. ↑ Quarterly Report IV / 38, p. 6, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  11. ↑ Quarterly Report II / 39, p. 6, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  12. ↑ Quarterly Report III / 39, p. 6, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  13. ↑ Viktor Porger: The technical development of long-distance airplanes in all countries. In: Nauticus. 1940, p. 195.
  14. ^ Annual report DLH 1931, p. 46, DLH archive
  15. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials… 1975, p. 202 ff. By 1933, the DLH had advanced 782,000 RM, of which in 1940 200,000 RM were still open
  16. ^ Lennart Andersson: Chinese 'Junks'. Junkers aircraft exports to China 1925–1940. In: Air Enthusiast  55, 1984, pp. 2-7.
  17. ↑ Appendix I to the minutes of the meeting of the working committee [of the supervisory board] on December 6, 1929, p. 2, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  18. ↑ Berlin – Shanghai: 10,000 kilometers in 50 flight hours. In:  Innsbrucker Nachrichten , June 13, 1933, p. 7 (online at ANNO ).Template: ANNO / Maintenance / ibn
  19. ↑ Quarterly Report III. Quarter 1933, p. 6, BA Berlin, inventory “Deutsche Bank”. The first two W 34s were transferred between May 31, 1933 and June 10 and 13, 1934.
  20. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 135 ff.
  21. ^ Memorandum on meetings held in London on October 10, 1934, October 12, 1934, BA Berlin, "Deutsche Bank" inventory
  22. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 134.
  23. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 132 f.
  24. ↑ K.-D. Seiffert: German air traffic 1926–1945. 1999, p. 236 ff.
  25. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 194.
  26. ↑ Quarterly Report III / 39, p. 7, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  27. ↑ L. Andersson: Chinese 'Junks'. 1984, p. 5 ff.
  28. ↑ Quarterly reports 1931 to 1940, BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  29. ↑ In addition to the not yet fully repaid advance payment from 1931, there was a material loan of $ 150,000 for four Ju 52s
  30. ↑ Quarterly Report III / 41, p. 3 f., BA Berlin, inventory "Deutsche Bank"
  31. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 212 ff.
  32. ^ B. Wiethoff: Air traffic in China. Materials ... 1975, p. 199.