Gumbinnen-Goldaper operation

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The Gumbinnen-Goldaper Operation ( Russian Гумбиннен-Гольдапская операция) was a Soviet offensive operation during World War II that was carried out from October 16 to 30, 1944. The operation was the first attempt by Army General Chernyakhovsky to break into East Prussia with the 3rd Belarusian Front across the German border . The goal of breaking through to Königsberg via Gumbinnen was not achieved, but the Soviet troops were able to establish themselves east of Treuburg via Goldap and Darkehmen to Schirwindt in the German border area.

Deployment and troop strength

After the success of Operation Bagration and the termination of the Kaunas Operation, the armies of the 3rd Byelorussian Front had advanced into East Prussia and took up positions on the line between Augustów and Wilkowischken in early September 1944 . Without the 39th Army (General Lyudnikow ), which was still involved in the Memel Operation (part of the Baltic Operation ) in the first half of October , Chernakhkovsky's front had the 5th, 28th and 31st Army and the 11th Army at its disposal. Guard army with a total of 404,500 men and 688 tanks. Air support was provided by the 1st Air Army under the leadership of General JM Nikolayenko.

Although the 3rd Belorussian Front was also subordinated to the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps , these units did not take part in the following operation. In addition, the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps was only concentrated in the Kaunas area on November 1st . The opposite German 4th Army (General der Infanterie Hoßbach ) of Army Group Center had 5 corps (15 divisions and 2 cavalry brigades) at the beginning of the operation and was considerably reinforced in the course of the operation. The East Prussian border had already been fortified in anticipation of the approach of the Red Army . The right wing of the German 4th Army, opposite the Soviet 50th Army on the Narew and Bober Sections between Lomscha and Augustów, was occupied by VI. and LV. Army corps held and not attacked during the offensive that followed.

The German XXVI was in the main area of ​​attack . Army Corps (General of the Infantry Matzky ), which shortly before the Soviet attack the northern section of the XXVII. Army Corps (General Prieß ) had taken over, the section of which was extended further south. The German troops could no longer be replenished with the replacement troops and were reinforced with newly established Volksgrenadier divisions , which had no combat experience and also had fewer battalions than the earlier infantry divisions.

Army General Tschernjachowski planned to lead the main thrust from the Wilkowischken area to Gumbinnen (today Gussew ) and to deploy the 11th Guard Army (General Kusma Galizki ) and the 5th Army (General Nikolai Krylow ). After the breakthrough of the German front, the 2nd Guards Panzer Corps (assigned to the 11th Guards Army) was to be introduced into the battle and the 28th Army (Lieutenant General Alexander Lutschinski ) held in reserve was to force the advance to Königsberg . The 39th and 31st Armies were supposed to secure the flanks and provide support during this operation. After the operation began, the plan turned out to be too big and was not implemented.

course

Soviet offensive

On October 16, at 9:30 am, the expected offensive of the 11th Guard Army against the north wing of the 4th Army on both sides of the Wilkowischken – Gumbinnen road began with strong artillery fire. The last phase of the artillery preparation ended at 11 a.m., then the attack by the 8th Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General MN Zavadovsky) and the 16th Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General SS Guryev). The first attack squadron - 5th, 26th, 31st and 84th, in the second meeting the 83rd and 11th Guard Divisions had taken their attack position about 200–250 meters across from the German main battle line , four other divisions (1st, 5th ., 16th and 18th Guard Division) followed as a second attack squadron. On the left wing of the army, the 36th Guards Rifle Corps under General JW Rysckow was deployed in the direction of Dobilin. On the northern wing the attack was accompanied by the 65th Rifle Corps (Major General GN Perekrestow) of the 5th Army, in the south the 31st Army (General Schafranow) attacked the positions of the German 131st Infantry Division .

The first break-ins occurred at the 1097 Grenadier Regiment of the 549th Volksgrenadier Division (Major General Jank) and at the 1141 and 1142 Grenadier Regiment of the 561st Volksgrenadier Division (Major General Gorn ), the German troops had to retreat to a first intermediate line. The Soviet troops then encountered strong resistance and took several days to break through the other tactical defenses.

The front of the German XXVI. Army corps could no longer be held south of Wirballen after the Soviet breakthrough and was gradually withdrawn behind the Pissa , but the successes of the Soviet offensive fell short of Chernakhovsky's expectations. On October 18, troops of the 11th Guard Army crossed the German border in the area south of Eydtkuhnen . Therefore, on October 20, the 2nd Guards Panzer Corps under Major General Burdejnj was brought into battle and the 11th Guards Rifle Division was assigned to it as support. While the focus of the attacks was previously on the north of the road to Gumbinnen, it has now been moved south to Angerapp . On the left wing of the 11th Guards Army, the 36th Guards Rifle Corps crossed the Rominte and began the attack on Goldap .

German counter-offensive

For the German 4th Army, with the threatened loss of Gumbinnen, there was a risk that the Red Army would have the opportunity to penetrate directly into Königsberg. In order to prevent this development, the 4th Army had to start a counterattack against the Soviet 2nd Guard Panzer Corps that had broken through on Nemmersdorf. For this purpose, two tank divisions and new infantry units were brought in as reinforcements in order to start the counterattack immediately. Two separate groups had the task of attacking both sides of the Rominte from the north and south to Großwaltersdorf in order to cut off and smash the troops of the Soviet 2nd Guards Panzer Corps and the 8th Rifle Corps. Parts of the German 5th Panzer Division (Colonel Lippert ) and the Parachute Panzer Division Hermann Göring (Major General von Necker ) managed to advance about 4-6 km south from the Gumbinnen area, but Grosswaltersdorf could not be reached. The Führer Grenadier Brigade (Colonel Kahler ), which was set up from the south via Daken to the north , also reached Tellrode. The 11th Guard Army initially wanted to continue their offensive to the west and on October 22nd stood in front of Gumbinnen and Nemmersdorf, where there was tough fighting with Volkssturm units during the battle for the Angerapp Line .

On October 21, on the orders of Army General Tschernachkowski, the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Alexander Petrow) of the 28th Army was brought into battle in the section of the worn-out 8th Guards Rifle Corps. The 128th and 20th Rifle Corps of the 28th Army were deployed in the section of the 5th Army to reinforce the offensive of the 65th Rifle Corps in the direction of Ebenrode (Stallupönen). On the right wing of the 45th Rifle Corps, the 159th Panzer Brigade of the 1st Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General WW Butkow ) provided by the 1st Baltic Front was also deployed.

On October 22nd, on the left wing of the 11th Guards Army, the town of Goldap was captured by the 36th Guards Rifle Corps. Here the from the area of ​​the VI. Army Corps brought up the 50th Infantry Division (Major General Georg Haus ) and other parts of the 5th Panzer Division set up to counterattack. Further German counter-attacks took place in the villages of Grünweiden and Weidengrund against other areas of the 11th Guard Army, which finally received the order to retreat.

Final phase

Although the 11th Guard Army succeeded in preventing the German encirclement operation, there was a risk that fresh German armored divisions could continue the counter-offensive. Therefore, on October 22nd, Chernyakhovsky ordered General Galizki to stop the offensive to Gumbinnen and to concentrate on the destruction of the German tank units near Großwaltersdorf. Finally, on October 23, Chernakhovsky decided to withdraw the troops of the 11th Guards Army about 15 kilometers behind the Rominte. The reason was that the headquarters of the Supreme Commander's Command (STAWKA) was expecting further reinforcements for the 4th Army. The offensive of the 1st Baltic Front, which was supposed to support the 3rd Byelorussian Front from the north, was also canceled, which gave the Wehrmacht High Command the opportunity to move several units of troops standing there against the 3rd Byelorussian Front. During the night from October 23 to 24, the troops of the 11th Guard Army and the 2nd Guard Panzer Corps retreated behind the Rominte.

The 31st Army (deployed south of the 11th Guard Army) and the 28th Army continued the offensive until October 26th. The Soviet 5th Army pushed the East Prussian 1st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Schittnig ) back to Schloßberg (Pillkallen district) in the north . On October 25th, Stallupönen was captured by the 28th Army.

From October 26th the 4th Army was considerably reinforced; therefore the operation was stopped on October 30th by the Soviet troops. Another counterattack by the 50th Infantry Division and the 5th Panzer Division was possible within the framework of the XXXIX. Panzer Corps (General Decker ) take back the lost city of Goldap in fighting between November 2nd and 4th; the front then ran directly on the eastern outskirts.

consequences

The troops of the 3rd Belarusian Front lost 16,819 men, 62,708 were wounded, and 127 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost during the operation. But they occupied more than 2000 km² of strongly fortified border area of ​​East Prussia. The 11th Guards Army alone captured 187 artillery pieces and mortars and brought more than 1,000 prisoners; the 5th Army took 129 guns and 1,366 prisoners. According to Soviet information, the German 4th Army lost around 40,000 men. To repel the Soviet attacks, the Germans had to move several divisions from Poland to East Prussia, thereby weakening the defense of the front on the Vistula .

At the same time as the successes of the 1st Baltic Front (Army General Baghramjan ) on the Memel section, German territory was occupied for the first time in World War II; German propaganda tried to belittle this demoralizing circumstance by devaluing the Soviet success. The population already living in the war zone was deliberately prevented from fleeing in order not to demotivate the rest of the population. The tactical retreat of the Soviet 11th Guard Army was stopped again after 15-18 km; more favorable positions were taken in order to undertake the reorganization of the associations. The 2nd Guards Panzer Corps lost a few dozen tanks on October 22nd and 23rd. When Nemmersdorf massacre 20 civilians were killed, the fact was exploited by German propaganda, to bring the population to the iron resistance, the number of victims was exaggerated here twice.

The Gumbinnen-Goldaper operation showed that stronger units had to be used to conquer East Prussia and, above all, more heavy artillery would be needed. During the second onslaught of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the German defense was finally overrun in the Battle of East Prussia in mid-January 1945 .

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Original plan of the operation
  2. ^ Dieckert: Kampf um Ostpreussen, p. 70
  3. ↑ Кривошеев и др. Россия и СССР в войнах 20 века.
  4. ↑ Plan of the operation
  5. ↑ Diary of the 5th Army for October 1944