According to ancient sources, the so-called Callias Peace meant the temporary end of the Persian Wars for Greece in the 5th century. He is said to be 449/448 BC. . Of the Athens BC Kallias between the Delian League and the Persian Empire under great king Artaxerxes I have been negotiated. However, there are considerable doubts about the historicity of this event. The older doctrine, which regards the peace treaty as a historical fact, has been called into doubt in recent decades by a well-founded counter-thesis.
Course of the conflict
Ten years of rest
During the ten-year break in the fighting after the victory of the Greeks over the Persians at Marathon in 490, the largest fleet of the Greek states was created under Themistocles in Athens. The Persian threat at sea was to be countered with more than one hundred warships, as the defeated Great King Darius I prepared for a new campaign against the Greeks after the defeat of Marathon. But the death of the Persian king and the undertakings of his successor Xerxes I to secure and expand the newly won power gave Greece peace and quiet for the time being. However, after Xerxes had succeeded in consolidating his internal power, he prepared for campaigns in enemy territory in order to emerge from the shadow of his predecessors in his own power. In the autumn of 481 the preparations for a renewed armed conflict against the Greek poleis were completed.
At first, Xerxes tried to use his huge armed force as a means of pressure against the city-states and to bring them to their knees by means of massive threats. In fact, some smaller states surrendered without a fight. Medium-sized states such as Argos sought their salvation in neutrality, while Athens and Sparta, on the other hand, made it clear what they thought of a surrender without a fight by executing the Persian ambassadors who urged them to surrender. At the urging of Athens and under Spartan leadership, as recently as 481, as recently as 481, a total of thirty Greek states formed a common protection and defensive alliance against the Persians. Predominant disputes between individual poleis were initially settled under pressure from the alliance in the face of the common enemy.
The invasion of Xerxes
In the middle of the year 480, Xerxes' armed forces placed two ship bridges over the Hellespont and marched in the direction of the Thermopylae Pass , on which the Spartan king Leonidas had holed up with a few thousand men. The Greeks had withdrawn there because this only pass to Greece that was accessible from the north could be held with little effort in terms of man and material. Several attacks by the Persians on the pass failed. With the help of locals, Xerxes managed to bypass the narrow pass and thus put the main army of the defenders in serious danger. With his warriors - three hundred in number according to legend - Leonidas was able to hold off the enemy in a defensive battle until the allied troops managed to escape this danger. King Leonidas and his men went down in history as heroes.
At the same time as the tactical retreat of the Greek land army, the allied naval forces blocked access to Evia at Cape Artemision in order to prevent the Persians from landing in the rear of their own troops. This planned Persian pincer attack, which was unsuccessful for the Greeks, and the fact that the Persians lost numerous ships anchored off the coast in a storm, formed a ray of hope for Greece, which averted defeat at the last moment.
But with the fall of the position at the Thermophyls, Central Greece was open to the Persians. Xerxes was now marching against Athens. Numerous cities were devastated by the invaders on his way there. However, those who defected to the enemy, such as Thebes and Delphi , could hope for mercy and protection. In the devastated and deserted Athens, Xerxes set up his headquarters and made preparations for further action against the Athenians, who were preparing for the decisive battle in the sound of the island of Salamis . Xerxes had a throne built on the shores of Salamis in order to watch the sinking of the Greek fleet from there.
The sinking of the Persian fleet
With around three hundred agile triremes , the Greeks threw themselves against the Persian fleet and had an easy game in the narrow sound with the clumsy ships of the Persians, which hindered each other and were thus unable to maneuver. After twelve hours, Xerxes had to realize that his once proud fleet had been crushed by the small Greek ships and that he had to end his campaign for the time being. The remnants of its naval forces withdrew to Asia, the Persian land army withdrew to Thessaly, where it wintered. Xerxes returned to his satrap residency in Asia Minor, Sardis . For Greece, however, the Persian threat was not over.
The turning point at Plataiai and Mykale
In the winter of 480, the Persian Army Commander-in-Chief, Mardonios , launched a diplomatic offensive against the Greeks. He hoped to break the Greek alliance with the help of a separate peace for Athens. But Athens saw through this attempt to drive a wedge between the allies and refused. When, in the following year, Mardonios showed his true intentions by reoccupying Athens, which had meanwhile been repopulated, the Athenians gathered their troops and, led by the Spartan Pausanias , advanced against Plataiai , where the Persians had withdrawn, with an equal strength of thirty - to forty thousand determined soldiers.
After a few skirmishes, the allied Greek troops managed to gain the upper hand and inflict a heavy defeat on the Persians, which prompted them to evacuate Greece for the time being. The Persian fleet brought ashore at Mykale was also attacked and destroyed by Greek troops. As a result, the Ionian city-states rose against the rule of the Persians and joined the Greek alliance.
The Attic-Delian League
Until his assassination in 465, Xerxes had to give up his dream of a great Persian empire, whose territory also extended to Asia Minor , and was also unable to undertake a noteworthy advance on the coast of Asia Minor. The Attic-Delian League , which was founded in 478 and succeeded in eliminating the last Persian base on the Macedonian coast with the fall of Sions by the year 476, played a decisive role in preventing another major Persian offensive against Greece . It was not until the year 469 that a large Persian army succeeded in invading Cyprus and from there to undertake further advances towards Greece. But even this attempt to bring Asia Minor under Persian control failed because of the fierce resistance of the League. In the battle of the mouth of the Eurymedon , Kimon and his fleet defeated the Persians again and forced the enemy to retreat.
What actually happened after the Battle of Eurymedon is a matter of dispute in research. There is only agreement on one point, namely that with Salamis Themistocles the Greeks fought for freedom, with Eurymedon Kimon made Athens a great power.
After Kimon's return from exile, Athens signed a five-year truce with Sparta and turned increasingly to the old archenemy Persia. Around the year 450, 200 own and allied ships were sent to Cyprus, 60 of which went to Egypt at a request from Pharaoh Amyrtaios . There, at the Cypriot Salamis , the Athenians won a victory over the Persians, but could not achieve any significant advantages in the further course of the conflict. In Cyprus, the remaining ships besieged the city of Kition, but had to leave without having achieved anything, because the general died and a famine had broken out on top of that. On their return there was a land and sea battle at the height of the Cypriot Salamis. Both times the allied Phoenicians, Cypriots and Cilicians were defeated by the Athenians.
Ending the conflict
According to the controversial conventional evaluation of the source statements, the following picture emerges for the end of the conflict: In 449 or 448 a meeting between an Athenian embassy under the direction of Callias and the Persian king or his satrap is said to have taken place, which led to an agreement. The following provisions are mentioned:
- The Greek cities of Asia Minor were guaranteed autonomy.
- The Persian troops were forbidden to approach the Greek coast with the exception of three days' march.
- For Persian ships, a restricted zone was established in the Aegean, into which they were not allowed to advance.
- Athens undertook to respect the acquis of the Persian Empire.
The starting point of the modern controversy is the unreliability and inconsistency of some of the allegations made by the sources, as well as the fact that some of the sources keep silent about the peace agreement or even deny it.
Probably the earliest mention of a peace treaty between Greeks and Persians is the fictitious Socratic funeral oration in the Platonic Menexenos for the year 386, the authenticity of which seems to be secured by two quotations from Aristotle . This reference was written with a clear time lag and, due to its "hearsay" character, does not provide any useful source findings.
In German, the passage reads as follows:
It is therefore just that we also remember those who put the capstone of salvation on the deeds of the past by tracking down everything that was barbaric from the sea and driving them away. These were the ones who fought at sea on Eurymedon and fought against Cyprus and went to Egypt (...) You must be remembered and thanked for bringing the Great King to fear his own salvation not to be concerned about the ruin of the Greeks. (...) But after peace had come and the city had come to such honor, what happens to successful people arose against them, first jealousy and out of jealousy hatred.
In this source Plato speaks of gr. Eirene , which can mean both a peace agreement and a "de facto state of peace". In terms of time, this event points to the Eurymedon Battle, which is dated between 469 and 465.
One reads for the first time about a treaty between the Persians and Athens in the Panegyricus of Isocrates from the year 380. There it says:
When they dared to cross over to Europe and had bigger than it was fitting to do in mind, we arranged them (sc. The barbarians) so that they not only stopped waging campaigns against us, but had to see how their own country was devastated. (...) But you can see the size of the change most of all if you read the contract concluded under our rule and the one now recorded (sc. The peace of the king of 387/86) side by side. Because then it will be seen that we then restricted the rule of the great king and fixed some of the tributes and prevented him from sailing the sea.
This “contract” with the “Basileos” is said to have been concluded “at the time of our rule”, but it is of little help for an exact dating, since the “time of our rule” extends over the period from 480 to 405. The place in the Panathenaikos from the year 339 is also indefinite and almost congruent with the one from the Panegyrikos:
At the time of our rule they were not allowed to descend on this side of the Halys with a land army or to sail over Phaselis with warships. (...) But the polis, which concluded the honorable and splendid treaty with the great king (...), how can one not justly praise and honor them more than the one who has lagged behind in all of this?
Another passage can be used to specify the date. In the Areopagiticus of 356 Isocrates writes:
The Greeks trusted those who administered the state at the time so much that most of them voluntarily submitted to the polis (sc. Athens). Here one can guess a tangible date, as the state of Athens described fits the time of Areopagus, which was overthrown by Ephialtes in 462/61 . According to this, the contract must also have been concluded before 462/61, which makes a Eurymedonna-close dating of Isocrates probable.
Another important source for the Eurymedon approach is provided by Plutarch, who in Kimon 13: 4-5 simultaneously invokes Callisthenes and Krateros, which increases the source value for the evaluation in terms of usability. We learn from Plutarch:
This act (sc. The battle of Eurymedon ) humiliated the mind of the great king so much that he concluded that famous peace, in which he undertook to always stay away from the Greek sea for a day's ride and not to travel with an ore-studded warship on this side of the Cyanes and the Chelidonia . Nevertheless, Kallisthenes says that the barbarian did not conclude this treaty at all, but actually behaved in such a way out of fear as a result of that defeat and stayed so far away from Greece that Pericles with 50 and Ephialtes even with only 30 ships over the Chelidonia without that they encountered a barbarian fleet. In the collection of the people's resolutions that Krateros made, there is a copy of the treaty as one that actually came about. It is also said that for this reason the Athenians erected an altar of peace and paid special honor to Callias, who mediated peace.
Plutarch and Kim provide a further indication of peace around the years 469 to 465. 19: 3–4, where he reports on the fighting in Cyprus and Kimon's death without, however, going into the Peace of Callias:
After his (sc. Kimons) death no outstanding act against the barbarians was performed by any general of the Greeks.
Since the battle of Cyprus and Kimon's death took place before the year 449/48, a dating of Plutarch to the battle of Eurymedon is objectively justifiable. The hint that after the death of the great general no more outstanding deed should have been performed, excludes a favorable peace for Athens with the dreaded Persians. If Plutarch had known of such an act, he would have heard of such an act of glory.
Evidence of the peace treaty is found twice in Demosthenes, but without reference to a date. The speech for the freedom of the Rhodians from the year 352 can be seen:
There are two treaties between the Greeks and the great king: the one that our polis (sc. Athens) concluded and that everyone praises; then the Lacedaemonians concluded a treaty (sc. the peace of the king ), which all reject. And the two treaties by no means set the same law.
In another testimony, Demosthenes refers to the embassy of Callias and the life and death charges brought against him, in the course of which he is said to have been sentenced to a heavy fine of 50 talents for bribery. In the speech about the false embassy from the year 343/42 it says:
Those namely (sc. The ancestors) - I know well that everyone has heard this story - have Kallias, the son of Hipponikos, who mediated the peace that everyone praised - namely that the Great King and his army did not go on a day's ride He was not allowed to approach seas and on this side of the Chelidonia and Kyaneen he was not allowed to sail in a warship - almost killed because it was said that he was bribed on the occasion of this embassy; but when he was accounted for, they sentenced him to pay 50 talents. Nevertheless, nobody can say that sooner or later the city will have concluded a nicer peace.
However, this source does not provide us with any time information either. Nonetheless, an exonerating statement by a certain Arisides , mentioned by Plutarch and vouched by the Socratic student Aeschines von Sphettos , can be seen in favor of the accused. Because Arisides, a penniless cousin of Callias, died around 464. Since the trial of Kallias could only be started after his embassy, the date 449/48 is no longer applicable with this source and rather moves closer to the battle of the Eurymedon.
In his speech “ Against Leocrates ” from the year 330, Lycurgus reveals that the Athenians held hegemony over the Greeks for ninety years; and further:
They devastated Phenicia and Cilicia , triumphed on the Eurymedon on water and on land (...) surrounded all of Asia Minor and devastated it. But what the main point of victory was: They were not satisfied with having erected the victory sign in Salamis, but set the barbarians limits for the freedom of the Greeks and prevented them from exceeding them and concluded a treaty that the great king was beyond the Kyaneen and von Phaselis should not go with a warship and that the Greeks should be autonomous, not only those who inhabited Europe, but also those who inhabited Asia.
According to this, Lycurgus considers a peace treaty with the Persians to be historical and also dates it as a result of the Battle of Eurymedon.
Ephorus / Diodor
In order to understand why the prevailing doctrine assumes a historicity of the year 449/48, the historiography of Ephorus / Diodorus must be examined more closely. Meister takes the view that the tradition of the Battle of Eurymedon and the description of the battles on Cyprus are duplicates.
According to the tradition of Diodorus , who tried Ephorus , the following course of events emerged for the battle at Eurymedon : In the double battle at Eurymedon, which ended victorious for the Greeks at sea and on land, Kimon initially won with his fleet off Cyprus. On the same day, the Persian land forces suffered a defeat at the mouth of the Eurymedon. Thereupon the Athenians erected a sign of victory from the tithe of the booty, which bore the following inscription:
Since the sea separated Europe from Asia and the storming Ares plagued the cities of mortals, no such work has been done on land and sea at the same time among the people who inhabit the earth. After they had killed many Medes in Cyprus, they conquered 100 ships of the Phoenicians in the sea, which were full of men, and Asia groaned loudly when they were hit with both hands by the violence of the war.
Here, however, the historians are mistaken in that they mistakenly assume that it is the battle of the Eurymedon. The epigram quoted here rather describes the battles for Cyprus in the period 450/48, when Athens won a double victory on land and sea in front of the city of Salamis. Thucydides and Plutarch after Kallisthenes locate both theaters of war at the mouth of the Eurymedon and report on two battles that are said to have taken place on the same day; at Plutarch the conclusion of the Peace of Callias follows. Ephoros / Diodorus claim that Kimon defeated the enemy fleet off Cyprus and defeated the Persian army in Phenicia. Subsequently, the general is said to have decided to siege Salamis in 449/48 in order to subdue all of Cyprus after taking them and thus to end the war.
So it happened too. The Athenians began the siege of Salamis and made daily attacks; but those in the city who had projectiles and materials at their disposal were easily repulsed by the besiegers from within the walls.
The report then continues and provides some clues that suggest contradictions:
After the great king heard of the defeats in Cyprus and consulted with his friends about the war, he considered it beneficial to make peace with the Greeks. So he wrote to the leaders and satraps on Cyprus, under what conditions they could come to an understanding with the Greeks. As the Athenians responded and sent authorized envoys, the leader of which was Callias, son of Hipponikos , a peace treaty was reached between Athens and its allies and the Persians. (…) But after the treaty was concluded, the Athenians withdrew their forces from Cyprus. They had won a splendid victory and made a most glorious treaty. It also so happened that Kimon died of an illness while he was staying in Cyprus.
Here Ephoros / Diodorus report that Kimon hoped to end the war by taking Salamis and subjugating Cyprus, which he is said to have succeeded in despite the failure of the siege. Meiser explains this confusion by the fact that this description must have been a mixture of several sources. "What pretends to be a description of the events of 450/48 is in reality nothing more than the new description of the Eurymedon battle, it is a prime example of a doublet." That the stylistic device of the doublet manifests itself in these congruent descriptions , is characteristic of Ephorus, ultimately leads to the misdating of the peace in the year 449/48.
The denying witnesses
From the previously treated works of the historians, whoever wanted, could always find an interpretation in favor of existential theory. However, there are also ancient authors who vehemently speak out against the historicity of the Peace of Callias.
Callisthenes provides clear evidence of the Eurymedon dating of the event. In addition, however, he rejects the peace theory and notes that Artaxerxes withdrew after his severe defeat at the Eurymedon and only accepted the conditions of the alleged contract for lack of strength, but not of his own will. For Kallisthenes, after the battle at Eurymedon, there was only an unwanted truce between the warring parties, he considers a peace agreement to be ruled out.
From Theopompos the most negative sharpest formulation is delivered peace concerning us. It says about him:
By Theopomp from the 25th book of Philippica: The Hellenic oath is a forgery which, as the Athenians claim, the Greeks swore to the barbarians before the battle of Plataiai, just as the Athenian treaty with the great king Darius with the Greeks; furthermore, the battle of Marathon did not go as they all portray it in hymn glorification. And what else (...) the city of Athens brags about and the Greeks duped.
Immediately afterwards, Theopomp underscored his assertion by referring to the inscription stele, which he claims to have seen himself, but which has been lost today. With regard to the text of the contract it says:
Theopompus says in the 25th book of the Philippica that the treaty with the barbarians was a forgery because it was not engraved in the Attic but in the Ionic alphabet.
Since Theopomp knew that the Ionic alphabet was not introduced in Athens until 403/02, he could claim that it was a forgery. Meiggs objects, however, that the use of the Ionic alphabet can already be proven in several Athenian inscriptions before 403/02 and that it cannot be ruled out that the stele viewed by Theopomp is not the original but a copy from a later period have.
The silent witnesses
What is striking about the entire historiography of the Peace of Callias is the fact that contemporary authors have nothing to report about such an event and it was only at a great distance that posterity was suggested that such a peace agreement between Greeks and Persians had taken place through the mediation of Callias.
Herodotus is often used as a source for the historicity of the Peace of Callias, but on closer inspection it turns out to be too vague. He only speaks of an embassy “on another matter”. The section reads:
This, as some of the Greeks say, corresponds to a story that happened many years later: In Susa, the city of Memnon, messengers from the Athenians happened to be on another matter, namely Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and his companion. At the same time, however, the Argives had also sent messengers to Susa to inquire of Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, whether the friendship that Argiver and Xerxes had made continued, or whether they should consider themselves his enemies. King Artaxerxes replied that of course it still existed and that he preferred no city to Argos.
This location is completely unusable for dating to the year 449/48, since the mention of the embassy of the Argives must lead to the conclusion that this took place immediately after the arrival of the new Persian great king, which is documented for the year 465/64. Herodotus is the only contemporary witness of this company and therefore enjoys the highest source value. He does not speak of a peace between Greeks and Persians, but nevertheless provides an important indication of the dating. With the accession of Artaxerxes to the classical date of the peace call for the year 449/48 is not tenable. Moreover, no mention is made of such peace. If there had been such a thing, the father of historiography would not only have been read by an embassy “on another matter”. In view of the Hellenophile tendency in Herodotus' history, this formulation does not imply a glorious outcome of the mission for Athens. The vagueness in Herodotus' expression in particular leaves a lot of scope for speculation. Klaus Meister considers two interpretations: “Either a peace was actually negotiated at the time, but without result, or the subject of the negotiation was a completely different one, unknown to us. In research, the second option is generally preferred: It is pointed out that the Athenians came to Herodotus 'on a different matter' than the Argives: Since they had called the Great King to renew an alliance of friendship, it was unthinkable that the concern of the Athenians was the connection of a peace. "
Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Karl Wilhelm Krüger already pointed out Thucydides' silence at the beginning of the 19th century and used it as an argument for the non-existence of the peace agreement. Master remarks about the historian's silence: “In view of the fundamental importance that such a [peace between Athens and Persia] has for the further development of the Athenian-Spartan relations, a failure to mention it would be absolutely unforgivable, and so Thucydides's silence can only do so be understood that peace is unhistorical. "
Research opinions and state of research
Hermann Bengtson regards the peace treaty as historically documented for the year 449. The existence of a text of the treaty sealed by Artaxerxes II is, according to his conviction, secured by the deed of the Krateros from the first half of the 3rd century. Bengtson sees the course of events as follows: The peace was preceded by the expedition of the League of Nations against the "Cypriot Salamis" in 450, where the allies achieved a "brilliant victory" over the Persians. Following this victory, the “sending of the rich Callias to Susa” is said to have marked a turning point in the Greek-Persian relationship, as both sides recognized each other's spheres of interest after tough negotiations. Although no Persian warrior had set foot on Greek soil for over a century since then, the "Peace of Callias" was not a sheet of glory for the Athenians, as it "only achieved de facto recognition of the state in Asia Minor". The Athenians, however, had originally expected a legal recognition of their hemisphere and clear demarcation in the Aegean Sea through the negotiating skills of the respected Callias and no tolerance of the grace of Artaxerxes. Because of this weakness, it now came down to the peace program of Pericles , with the help of which Attic supremacy within the League was to be restored.
Ernst Badian is one of the modern exponents of the “Eurymedontheorie”. Badian does not deny the historicity of peace, but only deviates from classical dating by two decades. His early dating of the Peace of Callias to 465/64 is based on the assumption that Xerxes was ready for serious peace negotiations after his defeat at Eurymedon and that he actually made this peace with the Attic embassy led by Callias. The renewed journey of Callias to the Persians in Susa, which Diodorus, to whom Badian mainly refers, places in the year 449/48, is only a second embassy, solely for the purpose of the former alliance after Xerxes death with his son Artaxerxes to confirm.
After the fall of Kimon and the democratic turnaround in Athens, relations with the Persians intensified and the policy of rapprochement turned into aggressive, sometimes bellicose behavior on the part of the Athenians, who, according to Badian, consciously accepted a breach of the peace agreement. However, since this form of expansionary policy failed, and Kimon returned from his exile and reconciled himself with Pericles, the Athenians concluded a new peace alliance with the enemy. So it is only logical to date the second agreement following the Cyprus expedition to the year 449; The Epilykos Treaty concluded in 424 should be understood as a renewal of the Peace of Callias.
Klaus Meister's theory of non-historicity
Klaus Meister represents a completely different thesis, who rejects both the early dating (Eurymedon approach) and the assumption of a later contract conclusion 449/48. For him there was no embassy of Callias in Susa with the purpose of negotiating a legally binding peace treaty. Rather, the ceasefire following the Cypriot expedition resulted from a military stalemate. Mutual exhaustion led to a ceasefire. Only in the following decades and centuries would patriotic historians have made a peace treaty with the defeated Persians.
In view of the problematic situation of both Persia and the League of Nations, it can be assumed that a political solution to the conflict was in the interests of both sides. Whether a formal peace treaty actually came about after the Battle of Eurymedon or after 449/48 remains unclear, as there are arguments for and against both approaches. The alternative hypothesis that there was no peace agreement has not yet been clearly established.
Translations of the source texts
- Demosthenes , trans. v. JH Vince, CA Vince, T. Murry, NJ de Witt, NW de Witt; London 1926-1949 ( Loeb Classical Library ).
- Diodor , trans. v. Adolf Wahrmund, ( Langscheidt library of all Greek and Roman classics ), Berlin 1914.
- Herodotus: The stories of Herodotus , trans. v. Friedrich Lange, Otto Güthling (Ed.), Leipzig 1885.
- Isocrates , trans. by Theodor Flath, ( Langscheidt library of all Greek and Roman classics ) Berlin undated
- Lykurgos: speeches against Leocrates , trans. u. ed. v. Nicolai Adolph. Berlin 1885.
- Plato: Dialogues Charmides , Lysis, trans. and ext. v. Otto Apelt , Leipzig 1922.
- Plutarch: Plutarch comparative biography , trans. v. Otto Güthling . Leipzig 1925.
- Plutarch: Greek heroic lives - Themistocles, Pericles, Alkibiades, Alexander, Pyrrhos , trans. v. Wilhelm Ax , Stuttgart³ 1942.
- Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War , trans. v. JD Heilmann, Berlin 1938.
- Ernst Badian : From Platea to Potidea . Baltimore / London 1993.
- Ernst Badian: The Peace of Callias . In: Journal of Hellenic Studies 107, 1987, pp. 1-39.
- Erich Bayer: Greek history (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 362). 3rd, improved edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-520-36203-1 .
- Hermann Bengtson : The State Treaties of Antiquity . Vol. 2, Munich 1975.
- Hermann Bengtson: Greek History - From the Beginnings to the Roman Empire . Munich 1975.
- Jochen Bleicken : The Athenian Democracy . 4th, completely revised and significantly expanded edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 1995.
- Stefan Brenne: Ostracism and celebrities in Athens - Attic citizens of the 5th century. v. On the ostraka . Vienna 2001.
- Hans Gärtner: Callias . In: The Little Pauly . Vol. 3, Munich 1979, Col. 66f.
- Adalberto Giovannini , Gunther Gottlieb : Thucydides and the beginnings of the Athenian ark . Heidelberg 1980.
- Christian Habicht : False documents on the history of Athens in the age of the Persian Wars . Stuttgart 1961.
- Josef Hofstetter: The Greeks in Persia. Prosopography of the Greeks in the Persian Empire before Alexander . Berlin 1978.
- Russel Meiggs: The Athenian Empire . Oxford 1987.
- Klaus Meister : The unhistory of the Peace of Callias and its historical consequences . Wiesbaden 1982.
- Dahlmann on the Cimonic Peace , in Dahlmann research in the field of history Vol. 1, Altona, 1822, pp. 1–139.
- Krüger About the Kimonischen Frieden , Archive for Philology and Pedagogy, 1824, p. 205.