Kindermann Wolscht affair

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The Kindermann-Wolscht affair revolved around three travelers who began a trip to the Soviet Union in October 1924 and were arrested in Moscow that same month. In the indictment of June 1925, the defendants Karl Kindermann , Theodor Wolscht and Maxim Napolinowitsch von Dittmar (also: von Dittmarin or von Ditmar) were accused of espionage against the Soviet Union and attempted murder of high Soviet leaders. The trial against the three was closely related to the Cheka trial , which was held in Leipzig at almost the same time, and took place against the background of difficult German-Russian negotiations.

The people involved

The Kindermann-Wolscht affair is described by Kindermann himself, but also by other authors, as the Moscow student trial, which is just as inapplicable as the reduction of the affair to the two actors Kindermann and Wolscht.

Kindermann had already completed his studies and with his dissertation on "Poisons in antiquity" was considered to be one of the youngest doctors in the German Reich at the time. When he came back from a study trip to Spitzbergen at the end of 1923 , he found “everywhere very cramped conditions. The inflation with its sad consequences had robbed many students of the means for further studies, the overcrowding of all professions and the resulting difficulty in earning something as a student trainee made me, like so many other fellow students, want to go out into the world go out and cross a long stretch. "Until that time, he continued to live in the student milieu, presumably for financial reasons, and lived in a Berlin student accommodation in a former barracks at Friedrichstrasse 107." We have been in the courtyard of the old guard barracks since During the war two wooden barracks, which were supposed to be torn down long ago, but had been transferred to them as an apartment because of the great hardship in which so many students lived. Each barrack consisted of a series of spacious rooms in which two students could always live together. Most of us had to make a living by working night as a newspaper seller or in the factory. We often had no time to study. ”Von Dittmar will later claim in Moscow that the student residence on Friedrichstrasse was brought into being by the Consul organization .

In this environment, Kindermann, who apparently continued to define himself as a student for lack of other alternatives, met Theodor Worscht in the spring of 1924. “Since Theo Wolscht and I agreed with one another on many questions of worldview and the former had long wanted to go on a trip abroad, I suggested that he join me. He was two years older than me, came from the Rhine and had a great sense of the practical. ”Kindermann did not find much more information about Wolscht, especially not about whether he was still studying at the time or seriously about you Graduation thought.

The unclear life situation comes to light even more clearly in von Dittmar: “We are not sufficiently informed about the past life of this apparently degenerate descendant of a noble family residing in Estonia. As a penniless, adventurous emigrant, he studied law for various semesters at German universities (Heidelberg, Berlin). ”Various circumstances, which will be discussed later, suggest that he only pursued a pro-forma degree . Von Dittmar was of lesser importance for the German reception of the Kindermann-Wolscht affair , as he - although a German-Baltic - was an Estonian citizen and also only played a subordinate role in the German-Soviet entanglements associated with the affair. He also died in custody after the verdict was pronounced and was therefore no longer relevant in the last act of the drama. Another person who played an important role in the affair is also left out of the usual naming: the German diplomat and employee at the German embassy in Moscow, Gustav Hilger . Jörn Happel goes so far as to speak of a Kindermann-Wolscht affair in his study about him , but of a Kindermann-Hilger affair .

Since the lives of Kindermann and Hilger are well documented, the protagonists Wolscht and von Dittmar are briefly outlined below, as only sparse information is available about them. Von Dittmar, who died in Moscow, and Wolscht, who apparently no longer appeared in public after the end of the affair, have left only a few traces.

Theodor Wolscht

The most absurd accusations were made against Theodor Wolscht in the course of the Moscow trial, which unfortunately are based on false statements by Karl Kindermann. Before going into this in more detail, we must first refer to Alfred Erler, who paints a very positive picture of Wolscht and at the same time is one of the few - albeit without citing sources - who provides some clues about Wolscht's biography.

“Theodor Wolscht, born in Frankfurt a. M. on September 23, 1901. During the war, he and his father, a retired high school professor, changed whereabouts several times. At Easter 1920 he passed the final exam at the Boppard grammar school . After working as a carpenter's apprentice for a year, he volunteered for health reasons on the estate of an old lady whose deceased husband had been close friends with his father. This lady's son, Dr. jur. R., induced him to study chemistry and promised to support him. So he came to Berlin. There he was for a while in the Neomarchia armed forces, a beating student union, third officer, but later resigned because of his communist-friendly outlook. "

Using the Frankfurt address book from 1901, the birth of Theodor Wolscht can only be partially verified. The entry “Wolscht, Emilie, gb. Runge Invoice Councilor Wi Priv. Affenthorpl. 22/1 ”, but there are no direct references to the family relationships or the parents of Theodor Wolscht. And in contrast to Erler, Happel does not speak of a high school professor in relation to Wolscht's father , but rather creates the impression that “Professor Dr. Wolscht ”was a“ real ”professor. The son was supposed to send to him from his trip "in addition to other natural produce, Siberian mosses [...] which he wished to have for his microscopic studies".

The place where Theodor Wolscht began an apprenticeship as a carpenter must also remain open, because Erler only mentions a “master carpenter Kerberloh in O.” The “estate of an old lady” and her son, Erler elsewhere than Wolscht's “former principal”, also remain open Dr. Rossi ”as a patron of Wolscht in the dark.

Theodor Wolscht's former membership in a striking association is probably beyond doubt. Kindermann already mentioned them, and Erler quotes a fellow student after "a full beard hid his pretty shots". It is unclear whether he left the “Wehrschaft Neomarchia” because of his “communist-friendly view” or whether it still existed at all at the beginning of the 1920s. According to Happel, the Neo-Marchia had already dissolved in 1887. "The Corps Marchia and Landsmannschaft Marchia existed there [Berlin] until 1933."

On the other hand, there is certainly evidence of Wolscht's communist sentiments. “A letter from Wolscht's former principal Dr. Rossi expressly testifies to Wolscht's communist sentiments and even blames him for allowing himself to be captured by Berlin Communists. ”When, in the course of preparations for the trip, Kindermann and Wolscht were suggested by the Soviet embassy to join the KPD to speed up the formalities , took place only child man this step. Wolscht "could not get a party book and therefore decided not to make the trip as a registered member of the KPD, but as a sympathetic communist".

As already quoted above, Kindermann praised Wolscht's “sense for the practical”. This would fit what Egon Erwin Kisch said about him, namely that Wolscht was a member of the technical emergency aid 'auxiliary service' ''. For Kisch, who was the only one to report on Wolscht's alleged membership, this is correct, as he completely unilaterally took the Soviet propaganda about the Moscow trial at face value. "Wolscht is a member of the anti-Semist-monarchist corporation 'Neomarchia', a member of the technical emergency aid 'auxiliary service', has dealings with Günther, who was involved in the Rathenau murder, and according to a letter from his father to the ' Vossische Zeitung' (which was not known during the negotiation) '- or, according to his father's point of view: out of boasting - boasted that he had already blown out the light of life for many Bolsheviks. " Stefan Großmann , founder and editor of the political weekly Das Tages-Buch , felt compelled to Kischs - as he himself put it:" convincing Statements on the Moscow Trial ”- to be straightened out, since they themselves would exceed the tolerance of the Tag-Book .

However, Kish was not the only one - along with the Moscow prosecutors - who made absurd claims about Wolscht and his past. Kindermann also claimed during his Moscow interrogations “that his comrade Wolscht took part in the world war and sank a submarine. The impossibility is obvious, because Wolscht was still at school throughout the war. The two friends had spoken a hundred times on the subject. A mix-up is impossible. The assertion that Wolscht and Kindermann are members of the Consul organization is equally false . It wasn't one of them. Kindermann as a Jew would never have been accepted by this anti-Semitic association. [..] Kindermann was also very well informed about the political direction of his friend Wolscht. All residents of the dormitory knew that Wolscht had resigned from the Neomarchia armed forces because of his communist views and had no connection with the OC. ”Erler cannot explain why Kindermann made such untruthful statements. It remains undecidable for him whether Kindermann had become a pathological liar, found himself in a mentally insane state, “or lost all courage due to the many torments in the months of pre-trial detention and, as a result of this mental depression, simply everything, trusting the assurances and promises of an early release I signed [.] what was asked of him ”. Kindermann himself claimed that he was drugged while drafting these accusations and "was misused to involuntarily sign a document, the content of which was completely unknown to me".

With the death sentences, pardons and an exchange of prisoners, the Kindermann-Wolscht affair was formally over in September 1926. There has been no trace of Theodor Wolscht since his return to Germany.

Maxim Napolinowitsch von Dittmar

Maxim Napolinowitsch von Dittmar (born April 17, 1902 in Kuressaare (German Arensburg ) - † March 1926 in Soviet custody in Moscow ) was the son of Leopold Manfred Napoleon von Dittmar and his second wife, née Ella Meta Mathilde von Ditmar. According to Kindermann, it was von Dittmar who approached him and recommended himself as a travel partner. "In doing so, he repeatedly pointed out that as a Baltic-German, Estonian nationality, he not only mastered the Russian language perfectly, but above all had good personal relationships with Soviet people in Germany and Russia." Kindermann, who von Dittmar considered reserved and taciturn who also surrounded himself with a slightly mysterious aura, nevertheless describes him in great detail:

“From his stories I could see that Max von Ditmar came from an old Baltic family that had become impoverished by the Russian Revolution. He started his studies penniless and soon had to interrupt it again in order to earn a living as a working student. In this way he came to the Baden Black Forest town of Villingen and worked in a factory here. At the same time he joined the Communist Party and became its registered member. As a result, he maintained relationships with individual Soviet employees at the embassies in Vienna and Berlin. Although I was never adequately informed of the nature of his connections, I believed that they were by no means dishonorable. He probably wanted to join the Soviet Russian service later.
Ditmar was the relative of a well-known German Reichstag member of the legal community. He had repeatedly told me of his acquaintances with these circles, who, however, had no idea that he was secretly a communist. He told me several times that under no circumstances should you know, otherwise he would get into trouble. [..] Ditmar's life in Berlin was little different from ours. He too was starving a lot and sometimes did not enjoy hot food for days. The great journey, he said, should be a stepping stone for him through which he could improve his future. He wanted to gather impressions and experiences on the way in order to use them for journalistic purposes after returning home. "

Alfred Erler can add a few more details about Dittmar as a person, but is much less open-minded than Kindermann:

“As a penniless, adventurous emigrant, he studied law for various semesters at German universities (Heidelberg, Berlin). According to his mother, Ella von Ditmar, he was a wavering pipe in political matters, now radically right, now radically left. He later turned out to be a characterless pathological liar. Std. Riemschneider explains that W. and K. had fallen for Ditmar, although he had warned his friend K. several times about this person. Through stud. Rose was recommended to Ditmar to Kindermann and in the barracks had acted as an ardent Trotsky admirer. "

For Erler, von Dittmar is the villain in the story, whom the unsuspecting students Kindermann and Wolscht fell for. They accepted him as a travel companion and entrusted him with the negotiations with the Russian embassy. The fact that Erler referred to von Dittmar as "an apparently degenerate descendant [.] Of an aristocratic family residing in Estonia" can almost be considered polite in view of the failures of Egon Erwin Kisch and Stefan Großmann towards von Dittmar. For Kisch, von Dittmar was already suspicious because he was a Balte, because they always represented “a stubborn reactionary fanaticism, no nationalistic shouting was loud enough for them, no abuse of democracy was hurtful enough”. (P. 1006) "Dittmar is a Baltic nobleman, closely connected to the most radical of the German nationalists Baron Freytag-Loringhoven , and comes from the country whose aristocracy has only one political goal: to cause confusion in the neighboring communist empire". (P. 1009) The fact that von Dittmar Kindermann distanced himself from these circles does not play a role in Kisch's verdict. For Kisch he is Balte, and in his opinion we come across them everywhere “as the heralds and whips of an aimlessly staggering chauvinism, as heralds of the struggle against all. In their spirit, they have remained completely the borderline people, the colonists who make settlement policy with fire and sword. This is how they still think today as emigrants, this is how they once acted in their homeland as devoted servants of tsarism. "(P. 1006)

And for Stefan Großmann, too, who tried to critically question some of Kisch's failures, von Dittmar is the “typical Baltic filthy soul” (p. 1012), who had previously acted as an “informator” for the Soviet Union in Vienna. On the side he was "active as a courier for the Estonian, Lithuanian and, probably, also for the German government" (p. 1012). Großmann considers him to be an informer for the Moscow police, who was the only one of the three defendants to have submitted a pardon after the verdict and who, moreover, was touched "with gentle gloves" by the public prosecutor Kyrilenko. (P. 1013) Central parts of the indictment were based on “Dittmar's stories and on the childish fairy tales of the 'expert' Heinz Neumann , a German communist with a bad reputation”. (P. 1012) As repugnant as Kisch's generalizations are, von Dittmar himself contributed to the fact that posterity kept him in bad memory. He was one of the main prosecution witnesses in the Moscow trial and the creator of the most absurd stories about his co-defendants. His motives for this are in the dark. Questions as to whether he was a spy who was targeted at Kindermann and Wolscht from the start, or whether he stood up against his co-defendants in Moscow to save his own skin, can no longer be answered. In his first interrogation in the Moscow trial, he came out as a "staunch right-wing nationalist" who had become a staunch Bolshevik through the experience of imprisonment:

“I began to feel vaguely that I had been on the wrong path all along, but I didn't want to see this yet. And in prison, when I saw the unmasked former rulers for the first time, I was horrified to get to know the real grimace (sic!) Of the bourgeoisie. I saw that the clergy did not mourn the waning interest in the teaching of Christ, God forbid, they spoke of the good old days, of lost power and money. The officers and the landowners did not mourn the fate of the fatherland. but they thought of the past orgies, where they had eaten and drank well and could swing their knuckles. These revelations were terrible to me.
Everything I believed in until now, religion, honor, morality and all the beautiful, attractive slogans of the borugeoisie, all of this disappeared into a terrible abyss, and of these ideals for which I was ready to sacrifice my whole life is only the ugly grimace of a money worshiper and bloodsucker remained. "

How truthfully Kindermann reproduced these words must remain open, but on many points the indictment, interrogations and confessions are reminiscent of an anticipation of Arthur Koestler's famous novel Solar Eclipse . This applies above all to the statements passed down by Dittmar during the trial and his closing words there, in which he once again claimed that "certain circles of civil society" had taken advantage of him and his companions for their goals. “I consider it my duty to recognize that the type of treatment, the cleanliness and the food in the prison of the OGPU . would be desirable in all European countries. I am now committed to Soviet policy and am not asking for mercy. As I lived, I will die! ”

Immediately after the death sentence was pronounced, there was a final brief conversation between Kindermann and von Dittmar, still in the courtroom. Von Dittmar claimed to have been coerced into behavior that was harmful to others. He gave Kindermann hopes of receiving help from the German government, but saw no comparable opportunity for himself from the Estonian government. Nevertheless, he hoped that a pardon to the Soviet government would save him from being shot. Following this conversation, Kindermann gave Dittmar an understanding:

“I can understand that he was sharply reprimanded for converting to the Bolsheviks. But one must never forget the severe mental and physical torments the young person suffered in the inner prison. The staging of the trial shootings, the constant death threats, the meeting with diabolical provocateurs, the cross-examinations and the promises of the Chekists all brought him down. Also note that it is the OGPU. so far it has often been possible to bring foreign diplomats, former officers, clergy, industrialists, older men of solid character to their knees. Those who only criticize Ditmar may ask themselves whether they themselves have not succumbed to the schemes and machinations of such a sophisticated institution as the Bolshevik secret police. "

The travel plan

The Moscow judgment of July 3, 1925 says: “The reactionary forces of Germany, which, with the de facto assistance of German Social Democracy, have stifled the repeated attempts of the working class to throw off the yoke of capitalist slavery, have the active terrorist secret organization from among them 'Consul' ('GOC') [..] resigned. ”In 1924, this Consul organization decided to send Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar to Moscow,“ to whom the following tasks and plans were assigned, based on the precise statements of Kindermann and Dittmar , partly also Wolschts are to be regarded as fixed: the exploration of both the internal organizational structure of the Comintern and its connection with the Communist Party of Germany, as well as the government organs of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. In particular, these persons had the task of determining whether the commercial agency and the authorized representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had connections with the Communist Party of Germany, especially in Berlin and Riga, and which ones. Another fundamental task of this group was the preparation and implementation of terrorist attacks against members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia, Comrades Stalin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky. "

Beyond this “headline article in a communist entertainment paper”, the travel plans of the three convicts were much more trivial or even naive. As already mentioned above, the impetus for this trip came from Karl Kindermann and was not least the attempt to counteract the professional perspectives that were not available under the prevailing economic conditions (he was a classical philologist) - including the satisfaction of thirst for adventure. The plan concocted by Kindermann provided for an approximately two-year journey, the actual destination of which was to be Beijing:
“1. Russia this side of the Urals. Several months in Moscow. Visit to the most important economic and scientific centers such as: Leningrad, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Nizhny-Nówgorad, Odéssa and Kiev.
2. Central Asia with the center in Irkútsk, Semiplatinsk, Barnaúl, Tomsk, Irkutsk, trips to Riáchta, Urgá, Chitá and the Buryat region.
3. The arctic zone. From Irkutsk to Jakútsk, Bulún and the Arctic Coast.
4. The Amur region.
5. Beijing. "

Kindermann, who originally wanted to take the trip with an Indian friend of his, but was refused a visa by the Soviet embassy, ​​had in the meantime met Theodor Wolscht and began to correspond with universities in his target areas. “All letters and replies from Siberia indicated that we would be received there with great joy. and be able to collect many invitations. ”But two important problems still had to be solved: Kindermann and Wolscht needed financial support for the trip, and they needed permission from the Soviet embassy in Berlin to enter and pass through.

About the successful search for sponsors, Manfred Schmid writes: “The well-known editor-in-chief of the“ Berliner Tagblatt ”, Theodor Wolff , granted them a larger advance on travel reports. They had also approached various German companies that had previously been active in Russia with the suggestion of reporting on the economic conditions there, finding sources of sales and initiating business. They were even given substantial sums of money by volunteer donors who had heard of the two young people's plans. The philosopher Oswald Spengler, with whom Kindermann had contacted, also supported her project. " Alfred Erler judged this benevolently and skeptically: “The plan itself was good and only the timing was unfortunate. In addition, the nominal leader, Dr. Kindermann, as much too young and not up to difficult entanglements. Incidentally, this does not exclude the possibility that, with a normal political constellation, valuable fruits for science could have been produced. The enthusiasm often does a lot. "

Attempts to obtain the necessary papers for a stay in the Soviet Union from the Soviet embassy were initially less successful. This was where von Dittmar came into play, who had learned about the travel plans and offered himself as a travel partner. “The unsuspecting students put their trust in him and entrusted him with negotiations with the Russian embassy. Suddenly a different wind was blowing from Moscow. The Russian authorities suddenly seemed interested in the expedition, promised all kinds of support and only demanded that the students spend a semester in Moscow before starting the long journey. The young people responded with joy when they were given hope of free travel 1st class on Russian railways as well as free accommodation and board in the famous Soviet headquarters. They also expected to get in touch with the Soviets personally. "

Erler rightly asks where the reasons for this sudden accommodation on the part of the embassy are to be found. He cannot offer a definitive answer, only hypotheses. One said the Soviets targeted Dittmar because they thought he was an Estonian spy. According to the second, it was a planned trap for the chosen victims Kindermann and Wolscht. The further course of history seems to speak for the thesis of the planned trap, even if it cannot be regarded as proven to this day. The thesis sounds plausible against the background that Kindermann and Wolscht were the peacocks for the exchange of Woldemar Rose alias Peter Alexander Skoblewsky, who was sentenced to death in the Cheka trial mentioned above . He was arrested in March 1924; the trial against him did not begin until the spring of 1925, however. In plain English, this would mean that Skobolewsky's arrest would have turned the Soviet embassy in Berlin. The question that then arises as to whether the Soviets developed such forward-looking tactics at the time cannot be answered.

The trip to Moscow and the arrest

On October 9, 1924, Kindermann and Wolscht began their journey to Moscow in Berlin. It first took them to Riga, where they changed to the direct train from Riga to Moscow. Kindermann found this trip that begins here to be a true luxury trip.

Von Dittmar had already left for Estonia a few days earlier to visit his mother there; he wanted to join his travel partners on the Latvian-Russian border, but was late and only met with them in Moscow. In return, Kindermann and Wolscht got to know Gustav Hilger, who worked at the German embassy in Moscow: “He was interested in our trip and gave us some good advice. He graciously introduced us to various important ordinances, the knowledge of which was valuable to any foreigner in Soviet Russia. When he heard of our intention to undertake a study trip to Siberia, he agreed to stand by us at his rate and kindly invited us to come to the German embassy in the near future. "

In view of the difficulties that were later connected with this meeting for Hilger and that led to serious diplomatic entanglements between Germany and Russia, it is appropriate to get to know this encounter from Hilger's description. He found Kindermann and Wolscht's travel plans “as fantastic as they were impracticable. I drew the young people's attention to the fact that entry into Central Asia was strictly forbidden for foreigners, that a trip to Cape Chelyuskin, which lies on the other side of the Public Circle, would be an extremely difficult and costly expedition, and that economic activity in the interests of foreign companies was the result of the foreign trade monopoly existing in the Soviet Union is punishable without special permission. However, the people I spoke to were not convinced. With youthful obstinacy, they persisted in claiming that they had thought and prepared everything carefully. The fact that things were really miserable was shown by the condition of her very meager, but otherwise completely harmless, luggage during the customs inspection. I considered it my duty to make young people promise that they would contact me when they arrived in Moscow, as I was determined to hold them back from careless steps. So I gave them my business card with address and phone number. This card would later play an unpleasant role. ”Jörn Happel quotes from other sources even more details from this meeting between Hilger and the two travelers to Moscow, which makes them appear rather naive people, but whom he nevertheless wanted to help. From this point of view, it was not a non-binding invitation to visit the German embassy, ​​but an express request to protect you from further dangers. Despite another telephone contact with Hilger, the two did not comply with this request until their arrest on the night of October 26th to 27th, 1924.

Around October 16, 1924, Kindermann and Wolscht arrived in Moscow and felt they were warmly welcomed - as they believed, also because they were perceived as communist comrades. Von Dittmar arrived too, and the three of them completed a rather tourist program in the city over the next few days, which also included a visit to the Lenin mausoleum . On the third day of their stay they contacted the Comintern to thank them for their invitation to Moscow and to ask for further support. There they met Heinz Neumann , who promised them further help and provided them with accommodation in an emigrant home, where they had frequent and mostly friendly contacts with German emigrants. That must have been the time when Kindermann euphorically wrote a letter to his parents:

"... We live together in a large, spacious room that has been kindly assigned to us by the People's Commissariat for Science and Enlightenment. The hospitality which our Russian comrades show us is unique and amiable. We will be introduced to all institutes, everything will be explained and we will be given the opportunity to get to know the higher education system of the Soviet state ... We are invited almost every day. In our house is the Russian department of European student aid, which is led by the Americans and the British ... Since yesterday we made the acquaintance of German comrades. In the home of political emigrants, where all the refugees reside, we have become guests and will never forget the wonderful hours we spend there. "

Von Dittmar had meanwhile managed to arrange an invitation to visit Lunacharsky and Krupskaya on October 27th . Then, on October 21st, they received a new roommate whose presence worried them. A few days later, on October 26th, the premonition turned out to be correct by chance: This "Comrade Friedmann" was an OGPU informer who was assigned to her. Kindermann hoped to be able to talk to Heinz Neumann about it the next day, so that what they considered to be unjustified spying would be ended.

This conversation with Neumann took place just as little as that with Lunacharsky and Krupskaya, because they were arrested that same night. Looking back on this arrest, Kindermann wrote: “When I studied the trial files after eight months, I found all kinds of minutes with statements by German communists from the emigre's home. Their claims were as foolish as they were untrue. The people had answered all the examining magistrate's questions as he wished. This proved that we had been extradited to the Moscow OGPU by German compatriots. The representative of the KPD at the Comintern, today's Reichstag deputy Heinz Neumann , was particularly involved. "

Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar ended up in the Lubyanka , where they were housed in separate cells.

Detention and interrogation

Lamar Cecil suspects the reason for the arrests in Kindermann's behavior: “In the hostel Kindermann, the communist out of comfort and by nature a show-off, seems to have uttered several loud criticisms of the Soviet regime, which angered the young communists in the building. They in turn reported Kindermann's diatribe to GPU agents who were stationed at the hostel. “Kindermann himself describes his behavior as rather impeccable. Although he had gradually noticed some contradictions in his environment, he does not reveal that he had expressed himself to other residents of the emigre's home in the manner suggested by Cecil. What he reports, however, is that other emigrants in conversations with him have criticized their Moscow living conditions quite harshly. It remains to be seen whether this was sincere criticism, or whether this was an attempt to induce Kindermann on his part to make negative statements about the Soviet system, which could then be used as grounds for arrest. Therefore, Cecil must also admit - on the assumption that von Dittmar was a Russian spy - that “the opinion of the Reich Commissioner for Public Order that the arrest had already been arranged before Kindermann and Wolscht had left Berlin, has a certain basis seems to have. "

But there was apparently another accusation, which was directed primarily against Kindermann: In his book Diary of Hell , Richard Hermann Krebs, alias Jan Valtin , claimed that Kindermann had identified homosexual tendencies. Heinz Neumann, along with critical remarks about the Soviet Union, provided the template for denouncing the three to the GPU. The accusation of homosexuality, which was also quoted by Happel, was not included in the later indictment, although homosexuality was a criminal offense in the Soviet Union.

The German embassy first found out about the arrest of the three from members of an American student organization that had rooms in the same building in which Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar lived. The Russian authorities did not officially notify the embassy until November 13, 1924. At first the embassy was not too alarmed and hoped that the prisoners would be released soon. “But when the ambassador made a personal presentation to Tschitscherin on this matter in December 1924 , he said: 'Hilger's knowledge of human nature has obviously let him down in this case,' because it had meanwhile been found that Kindermann and Wolscht were by no means harmless young people , but cunning criminals who came to the Soviet Union to cause serious harm. At the ambassador's request for more information, Chicherin stated that the proceedings were pending and that he could not provide anything concrete about it. "

In the meantime, the detainees were interrogated. Kindermann was first questioned on the night of November 4th to 5th, 2014. He was confronted with the charge of having come to Russia from the Foreign Legion to do espionage assignments for German fascist groups. At the same time he was presented with alleged confessions from his comrades Wolscht and von Dittmar, who had confessed to their espionage activities as well as their work for the Consul organization . Since Kindermann denied everything and pointed out that he had come to the Soviet Union as a communist, he was informed that this would be checked by the KPD, but that this could take weeks or even months.

Kindermann spent the time after that in various prison cells without coming into contact with his former companions. During this time, Kindermann's father in particular tried to mobilize support for his son in Germany and, through his former professors, to persuade the Foreign Office in Berlin to intervene diplomatically. "On the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann , the German embassy in Moscow then worked hard to get the two German students released (the third student, Max von Dittmar, as an Estonian citizen, did not fall within their area of ​​responsibility)."

While these efforts to get a release were unsuccessful, Karl Kindermann's next interrogation took place in January 1925. Now the examining magistrate accused "my comrades and me of having come to Russia on behalf of the German legal circles and the Social Democrats to carry out an assassination attempt against Trotsky and Stalin". If he continued to deny this, he would unfortunately have to be shot. Since Kindermann did not admit anything, he was taken back to the cell until a series of nocturnal interrogations started in the last week of January, during which he confessed. Kindermann blamed provocations by an OGPU informer who had been smuggled into the cell and later claimed the confession had been wrested from him under hypnosis.

Meanwhile the affair surrounding the three prisoners had become a matter of the highest level. “On February 7, 1925, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union advised on the proposal of the Voikskommissariat for Foreign Affairs on the German students Karl Kindermann, Theodor Wolscht and Max von Dittmar who had already been arrested on October 26, 1924 by the OGPU. A commission should be set up on this matter. There was also the question of whether representatives of the German embassy should be admitted to the arrested. ”As early as February 12, a resolution was passed which, among other things, stipulated that the German embassy would not be allowed access to the arrested persons to publish extracts and to give foreign correspondents an insight into their detention conditions. Most decisive for the further fate of Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar was the fourth point of the resolution: “To consider the maximum exploitation of this matter in the negotiations with the German government as necessary. This matter has to be linked to the upcoming communist [sic] trial in Germany over the 'ČK', as well as other trials in which Russian citizens have been charged. ”In other words, the three should be part of the bargaining ground for the ongoing negotiations Germany about the course and outcome of the Cheka trial .

On the night after the confession, Kindermann does not give a date, but his description suggests that it must have been shortly after the Central Committee decision of February 12th, he became a meeting with Felix Edmundowitsch Dzerzhinsky , the head of the OGPU , in which Michail Abramowitsch Trilisser , the head of the foreign department of the OGPU, also took part. In the course of this meeting he was offered to participate in the "staging of a large-scale sensational trial" before the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, for which he was offered Soviet citizenship and compensation in dollars. Kindermann refused and did not allow himself to be changed by the references to a press campaign already launched against him in Germany. On the way back to the cell, he was subjected to a mock shooting. In the time after that he tried to improve his situation through pretended madness and several hunger strikes, repeatedly interrupted by offers of cooperation from the OGPU. “I went on hunger strikes nine times from mid-February to mid-June and starved a full 57 days over the course of four months. Only my youthful energy, despair, the will to live and the desire for freedom made me endure this unspeakable ordeal. "

On March 5, 1925, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party dealt again with the Kindermann case. The background was that the arrest of Kindermann had evidently aroused displeasure among German communists, which is why it was decided to propose to the Central Committee of the KPD "that both party members and workers should be informed about the way in which Kindermann joined the KPD" . Hermann Weber et al: “Karl Kindermann's father, Hermann Kindermann, was an active member of the SPD and KPD for a certain time, explaining why this was deemed necessary from the point of view of the Central Committee. In 1925, after he had left politics, he ran a debt collection company in Durlach. There he employed the local KPD chairman, whom he knew from his time as a communist, and who in turn asked Karl Kindermann to join the KPD in order to accelerate the receipt of the Soviet visa. He paid his membership fees for several years, which means that Kindermann had been a KPD member since 1920, but only stuck stamps from 1924 on his membership card. That in turn made the document suspicious at the GPU. ”At the same time, it was decided to intensify press work on the case, in which the domestic and foreign press were to be made known to such interrogation materials“ which can be presented in accordance with the further investigation interests ”. Also in March 1925 a group of German communists visited the Lubyanka . Under Trilisser's guidance, they also got a glimpse into Kindermann's cell. However, it had been thoroughly cleaned beforehand, and he had previously been given the privilege of having a bath. “Soon afterwards a report appeared in numerous German newspapers that various Germans had visited me and said they were very satisfied with my excellent treatment. At the same time, all allegations of the bourgeois press about the allegedly poor health of the students were indignantly rejected. "For Kindermann and his co-defendants, meanwhile, remained uncertain about their situation, and at least Kindermann was no longer interrogated:" March, April, May and a part of June I passed lonely. [..] I continued the hunger strikes. My situation became more and more desperate. "

The process

In the meantime, the Cheka trial had taken place before the State Court in Leipzig from February 10 to April 22, 1925 . It ended with three death sentences, including for Woldemar Rose alias Peter Alexander Skoblewsky. As a “strange counterpart” to the Cheka trial , the Soviet activities against Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar were able to pick up speed again - but with a certain time lag.

At the beginning of June Kindermann was summoned for an interrogation for the first time and confronted with his case file. A few days later, on June 18, 1925, at “the session of the special college of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union” in the criminal case “concerning the charges brought against the citizens Kindermann, Wolscht and Ditmar [..]” the indictment was approved and decided to "schedule the trial for June 24th, IJ [..]". By June 19, the time had come when, according to Gustav Hilger, “the bomb burst and the entire Soviet press published an indictment against Kindermann and Wolscht, accusing them of having entered the Soviet Union to give Stalin and Trotsky cyanide, among others to poison. To this end, as the visiting card I found with them, they had taken out my advice and assistance. The purpose of the Soviet action was now clear: the Soviet government wanted to create an impressive counterpart to the Leipzig trial and to compromising a member of its Berlin embassy. "

The trial in which Nikolai Wassiljewitsch Krylenko represented the prosecution and in which Max Levien took part as interpreter and Béla Kun as clerk began on June 24, 1925 and, according to Jörn Happel, was "excellently prepared". He quotes an editorial that appeared at the start of the trial in the largest newspaper in Ukraine, which was entitled “On the Trial of German Fascists” and ended as follows: “At the same time, the activities of German diplomats need to be illuminated; one of them, Herr Hilger, was evidently initiated into the masquerade with the communist documents that the German terrorists had provided themselves with. We know what mainly Polish consuls and councilors of the Polish legation are concerned with in the Soviet Union. Do we expect about the same surprises when we take a closer look at the 'extra-diplomatic' activities of German diplomats? ”These attacks on the German diplomats, above all Gustav Hilger, caused a stir in Berlin and alarmed Gustav Stresemann , who spoke of a ridiculous counterpart to the Leipzig trial and it was also certain that it was only about "winning exchange objects for Skobolewski [...]".

For the three defendants, such considerations may have been of little relevance. They were faced with a ludicrous charge, and Kindermann was declared at the beginning of the trial, “that I am for offenses against sections 61 and 64 of the Penal Code of the USSR. was charged and would probably be shot ”. The fact that the contradictions and untenability of the allegations against them were not only obvious to the defendants themselves, but also to the majority of the German press, with the exception of Die Rote Fahne , should not have been consolation in the specific situation. In addition, there were false confessions, their revocation and also clumsy behavior on the one hand, spy reports and spies or GPU agents disguised as witnesses or "experts". The most unpleasant behavior here was apparently the above-mentioned Heinz Neumann, who stood out with a caricature of German reality, which was absurd even for the circumstances at the time, and which caused the representative of the German embassy to leave the courtroom as a sign of protest.

On July 3, 1925, at 1 o'clock in the morning, the judgment was announced:
“On the basis of what has been said, the Special College of the Supreme Court of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics condemns
1. Karl Kindermann,
2. Theodor Wolscht,
3. Maxim von Dittmar,
a) on the basis of Section 61 of the RSFSR Penal Code. and in accordance with Section 58 (1) of the Penal Code on the highest level of punishment;
b) on the basis of Section 64 of the RSFSR's Stragkodex, and in accordance with Section 58 (1) of the Penal Code, to the same level of punishment and, overall, to the highest level of punishment, for shooting
The judgment is final and no appeal can be made against it. ”The judgment was unanimous. Gustav Hilger was no longer mentioned by name; "The main culprits were the German right-wing circles".

Kindermann's account of the previous trial reads like an anticipation of the Moscow show trials or the trials before the People's Court . This does not become more bearable if one recognizes that this Moscow trial was supposed to be a conscious answer to the Leipzig Cheka trial , in which the law was also trampled underfoot several times and the verdict arose “as a result of criminal proceedings with a› chain of legal violations ‹“. It is precisely this that Egon Erwin Kisch totally fails to recognize when, in his thoroughly justified criticism of the Leipzig trial, he makes himself a blind partisan of the Moscow indictment against Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar and, after the verdict was pronounced, mocked that there was no danger of its execution. It is up to Stefan Grossmann to answer in the daily book :

“Kisch thinks that the danger that the execution of the three would be carried out never existed. Well, for the time being they are sentenced to death. I am pleased that the death sentence does not disturb Kisch's sleep, there is only the fear that the convicts themselves sleep less well, and their fathers, mothers, brides, and brothers may not be so carefree. But are death sentences pronounced so that they are not believed? The death sentence as a teasing pastime - you have to have very robust nerves to find these Moscow jokes nice. [..]
Yes, Egon Erwin Kisch, was against the shame of the Leipzig high treason trial in which the defenders were thrown out, in which a mentally ill person Epileptic wanted to ride himself and his former comrades to their deaths, and anyone who did not protest against the trial of Herr Níedner has no right to get upset about Moscow. So here it can happen!
Nevertheless, in the end, a very melancholy question: Didn't we imagine justice in a socialist state to be a little different? Didn't we hope that the socialist state would finally draw practical conclusions from determinism? Socialism, we learned, is science turned into life. The will of no one is free - and there is not just the old poor sinner's bench of the accused, just as it once did, judges pronounce death sentences, just like in the barbarous age of the 'deterrent theory', and even the old police scoundrels appear as main witnesses, tout comme chez nous. Moscow, that means a Leipzig working in worse forms.
For what purpose the world revolution was started! "

The Hilger affair

Gustav Hilger was drawn into the process directly through his business card, which he had given Kindermann in October 1924 during the joint train journey. Actually nothing more could be accused or proven. The fact that his name was highlighted in the indictment, but was no longer mentioned in the judgment, was probably due to the diplomatic efforts of the German ambassador Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau , according to Happel . But the German side asked for more: a declaration of honor for Gustav Hilger. The negotiations for such a declaration took place against the background of German-Soviet economic negotiations which had been suspended on the German side, but which both sides wanted to resume. The matter was made even more difficult by the fact that a declaration of honor would have been the responsibility of the Soviet Foreign Ministry ( Narkomindel ), the allegations against Hilger had been made by the GPU. This affected not only interstate, but above all domestic sensitivities and power structures. Neither government was ready to back down. Brockdorff-Rantzau was annoyed by the persistence of the Russians and broke off the economic negotiations. He threatened to leave Moscow if no declaration of honor was made in favor of Hilger. He also asked Stresemann for permission to leave Moscow at his own discretion and to send the business delegation home. Stresemann, however, insisted that it was important not to miss any chance for a solution and instructed Brockdorff-Rantzau and the business delegation to stay in Moscow. After a long series of conferences between the embassy and the narcotic diaphragm, a solution was finally found. On August 8, 1925, Izvestia published a statement from the German embassy stating that Hilger had not been mentioned in the final judgment and that "on the basis of negotiations that have since been held, both governments consider the matter closed" .

Lamar Cecil gives an assessment of these diplomatic disputes:

“The solution to the question of honor was clearly a compromise. Rantzau boasted that only his repeated threats to leave Moscow had compelled Russia to exonerate Hilger, and certainly there was some justification for his pride. The critical issue from the Russian point of view was the continuation of the economic talks. Chicherin feared that if Rantzau left Moscow, the business delegation would surely follow him and thus end all hope of an economic agreement. Chicherin had therefore agreed to publish the German declaration in Izvestia and to allow the narcomindel to confirm it. But Rantzau had also made major concessions after abandoning his original demand that Hilger's published discharge should come from the Russian government and not from the German embassy. More importantly, he had failed to separate the business talks from the question of honor . Although the Hilger declaration made no mention of the economic talks, negotiations were resumed shortly afterwards and led to a German-Russian economic agreement that was signed in October 1925. The compromise on the question of honor removed the greatest obstacle to the logical and long-awaited solution to the entire incident: an exchange between Kindermann and Wolscht for Skoblewsky. "

The end of the Kindermann-Wolscht affair

After the verdict was announced, Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar awaited several months' imprisonment, combined with uncertainty about their future fate. Kindermann wrote that he had been waiting all the time for the sentence to be carried out, i.e. for his shooting. He knew nothing about the diplomatic disputes and the efforts of the Soviet government to get Skobolewski free. On Christmas Eve 1925, mail was given to him for the first time by friends and his parents. From this he learned that he had been pardoned. “The OGPU. had not yet considered it necessary to notify me of the conversion of the sentence to a ten-year prison sentence. "

On July 6, 1925, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist All-Union Party (Bolsheviks) decided to form a commission to publish the petitions for clemency of the “fascist students”. Kindermann had also submitted one - at the suggestion of the German embassy - leaving it open as to whether it also contained an admission of guilt, as an OGPU employee had previously asked him to do. From his point of view, however, the request for mercy was itself an admission of guilt, since he considered himself innocent and therefore believed that he did not have to ask for mercy. He only gave in to the urging of the embassy employee. It was not until the beginning of October 1925 that what was presumably a decisive turning point took place: “On October 1, 1925, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party accepted a proposal made by Maksim Litvinov regarding the convicted German students, which was not discussed further. It was probably a suggestion to pardon Kindermann and Wolscht. ”A few days later, the trade agreement between Germany and Russia was passed. This was accompanied by negotiations in Berlin about the release of those sentenced to death in the Cheka trial: “The diplomats in Berlin conferred behind closed doors. The Soviet embassy negotiated directly with the German government and achieved an initial success. Litvinov informed the Central Committee with satisfaction on October 27th that the German side agreed to the simultaneous conversion of the respective death sentences into prison sentences for Kindermann, Wolscht and Skoblewsky. On October 30, the pardon should be announced in Germany as in the Soviet Union. On October 31, 1925, the Soviet judiciary officially converted the death sentences into ten-year prison sentences, but forgot - intentionally or not - to inform the students of this life-saving decision, as the German embassy complained in January 1926. "This complaint leads Kindermann on an initiative back from him, because he had the aforementioned letter from his parents, through which he had learned of his pardon, forwarded to the German embassy. It was only in this way that she found out, according to Kindermann, that the authorities had not informed him, which then led to the complaint to the Foreign Ministry.

As a result, Kindermann was transferred to Butyrka prison in January 1926 , where he met Theodor Wolscht, who was housed in the neighboring cell, for the first time after the trial. The two were able to communicate with each other by knocking signals. Kindermann was officially informed about his pardon here in February 1926; the letter shown to him was dated November 5, 1925. In the following months, however, he learned nothing about his further fate.

On the diplomatic side, too, little seems to have happened in the spring of 1926. After Happel, the Soviet ambassador Krestinski first spoke with Foreign Minister Stresemann about an exchange of prisoners in May 1926. At the end of June 1926, the German side was apparently already certain that an exchange would take place, and on July 5, Chicherin also informed the Central Committee that negotiations with the German government on the exchange of prisoners were going well. He asked for preparations to be made for the liberation of the students and their evacuation. ”On August 12, 1926, the majority of the German cabinet, as Happel emphasized, agreed to the exchange, and on September 10 the amnesty for Kindermann and Wolscht took place the Soviet authorities. Kindermann, however, describes a less smooth process for the time after his pardon in November 1925: “When the German government, despite all the repeated requests by the OGPU, which worked with the help of the Foreign Commissioner, did not want to agree to an exchange, the OGPU took action. took another initiative and arrested a number of German consulate officials in various cities in the Soviet Union. Again the indictment was espionage in favor of the German government, and a second trial against Germany seemed imminent. This snub could no longer be ignored in Berlin. After unsuccessful protests, an agreement was signed between the two governments in September 1926 in which Germany undertook to exchange the Chekist Skobolewski and some of his comrades for Wolscht, myself and the German consulate officials and their wives. "

Lamar Cecil confirms this representation by Kindermann and also makes it clear why, as previously mentioned, there was only a majority German cabinet decision for the prisoner exchange. “The German courts, although eventually persuaded to hand over the prisoners, were initially reluctant to pardon Skobolewsky, who had recently been found guilty of serious crimes against the republic. Second, the Reichswehr was firmly against freeing a man who had not only tried to undermine the German state, but also to murder the head of the Reichswehr. ”Therefore, on July 3, 1928, a cabinet majority rejected the exchange, among other things because she saw approval of the Russian hostage policy in agreeing to the exchange . When the German ambassador in Moscow, Brockdorff-Rantzau, among others, pointed out the dangerous effects of such a decision, another cabinet vote took place on July 20. This time a narrow majority voted in favor of the exchange, but the now defeated side did not accept it, and Reichswehr Minister Otto Geßler appealed against the decision. Stresemann, who shared the opinion of Brockdorff-Rantzau that if the exchange were refused, the entire foreign policy would be at stake, sent the ambassador from Moscow “to give President Hindenburg, who alone could pardon Skobolewsky and thus make the exchange possible, his point of view to explain. Stresemann then asked Chancellor Marx to convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting to force Skobolewsky to be replaced. This meeting took place on August 12, 1926, and again the majority voted for the exchange. On this occasion, however, Gessler's resistance could not override the majority decision. The pardon request was forwarded to Hindenburg, who approved it. "

On September 10, 1926, Skobolewsky had meanwhile returned to Moscow, Kindermann and Wolscht were informed of their release by an embassy employee, and one day later they were able to leave the Butyrka. “Wolscht and I argued for a long time about the future prospects. The thought of giving up this habitual life in the Bolshevik penitentiary struck us as strange at first. We didn't really want to believe in it yet… ”They left Moscow by train in a special GPU car and traveled to Leningrad. Here they were again housed in a prison before they could continue their journey by ship to Stettin from there.

What became of Wolscht after his return to Germany could not be fathomed. “Kindermann then wrote his memory book› Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead ‹, a thoroughly complacent report, and spent some time at home and abroad as an anti-Soviet author and lecturer. Skobolewski worked in the Red Army, rose to division commander before he was shot in the Stalin Terror in 1939. "Gustav Hilger continued his diplomatic career as an" Eastern expert "and remained the Foreign Office's adviser on Russia policy during the Second World War and afterwards more important Adviser to the German and US governments in the 1950s and 1960s.

swell

  • Karl Kindermann: Two years in Moscow's houses of the dead. The Moscow student process and the working methods of the OGPU , Eckart-Verlag, Berlin / Leipzig, 1931. The book was published in 1932 under the title In the toils of the OGPU by the London publisher Hurst & Blackett.
  • Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , Alexander Fischer Verlag, Tübingen, 1926. ( The fate of the Moscow students in the catalog of the DNB )
  • Gustav Hilger: We and the Kremlin. German-Soviet relations 1918–1941. Memories of a German diplomat , Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt am Main and Bonn, 1955.
  • Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (eds.): Germany, Russia, Comintern , II, documents (1918–1943), De Gruyter Verlag, Berlin / Munich / Boston, 2014, ISBN 978-3-11-033978 -9 .

The documents in the Federal Archives (place of use Berlin-Lichterfelde) were not evaluated for this article:

literature

  • Lamar Cecil : The Kindermann Wolscht Incident: An Impasse in Russo-German Relations 1924–1926 , in: Journal of Central European Affairs , Volume XXI, Number two, July, 1961, pp. 188-199.
  • Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged. For three German students, a trip to China ended in Moscow. In: Contributions to regional studies , No. 3, 1997, pp. 16–19 (The contributions are a supplement to the State Gazette for Baden-Württemberg.)
  • Jürgen Zarusky : The German Social Democrats and the Soviet Model. Ideological debate and foreign policy concepts 1917–1933 , Oldenbourg, Munich, 1992, ISBN 978-3-486-55928-6 .
  • Wolfgang Müller: Russia reporting and Rapallopolitik, German-Soviet relations 1924–1933 in the mirror of the German press , dissertation on obtaining the academic degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Philosophical Faculty of the Saarland University, Saarbrücken, 1983.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged
  2. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 11
  3. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 7. The Friedrichstadt-Palast is located at this address today , at that time the barracks of the 2nd Guards Regiment were located here on foot .
  4. ↑ a b c Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 13
  5. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 44
  6. ↑ a b c Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 17
  7. ^ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert: Gustav Hilger , p. 121
  8. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 10
  9. ↑ Mahlau's Frankfurter Adressbuch , 33rd year (1901), p. 447
  10. ↑ Jörn Happel: The East Expert: Gustav Hilger , p. 135
  11. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 19
  12. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , pp. 5–6
  13. ↑ a b c d Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 36
  14. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 11
  15. ↑ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert: Gustav Hilger , p. 434, note 542.
  16. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 17
  17. ^ A b c d Egon Erwin Kisch & Stefan Großmann, in: Das Tag-Buch , edited by Stefan Großmann, 6th year, 2nd half year, Berlin, 1925, pp. 1006-1014 . For technical emergency aid see also: Michael H. Kater: Die 'Technische Nothilfe' in the field of tension between workers' unrest , entrepreneurial interests and party politics , Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Volume 27, 1997, Issue 1, pp. 30-78
  18. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 149
  19. ↑ Lamar Cecil writes that von Dittmar “died of a 'heart attack' in the Lubianka in March before. He was only 25. "(Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , p. 198. /" Ditmar had died of a 'heart seizure' in the Lubianka the preceeding March. He was only twenty-five. ") Cecil refers to 1926, the year of the prisoner exchange, after which Kindermann and Wolscht were allowed to return to Germany. Kindermann says: "According to the official notification of the external commissariat, Max von Ditmar 'died' on March 23, 1926 'of a heart attack' (!) In the internal prison of the OGPU ." (Karl Kindermann: Zwei Jahre im Moskaus Totenhäuser , p. 175)
  20. ^ A b Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 14
  21. ^ All of the following quotations from Kisch and Großmann: Egon Erwin Kisch & Stefan Großmann, in: Das Tag-Buch , edited by Stefan Großmann, 6th year, 2nd half year, Berlin, 1925, pp. 1006-1014
  22. ↑ The passage is quoted as a verbatim speech by Kindermann. (Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 167–168)
  23. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 175
  24. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 177
  25. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 178
  26. ↑ a b Judgment against Kindermann, Wolscht and von Dittmar of July 3, 1925 , in: Karl Kindermann: Zwei Jahre in Moskaus Totenhäusern , pp. 226–229
  27. ↑ Schwäbischer Merkur of July 6, 1925, quoted from Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged
  28. ^ A b Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 11-12
  29. ↑ Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged
  30. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 19
  31. ^ Alfred Erler: The fate of the Moscow students , p. 17
  32. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 18
  33. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 20
  34. ↑ Gustav Hilger: We and the Kremlin , p. 141
  35. ^ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert: Gustav Hilger , P. 122-123
  36. ↑ Quoted from Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged
  37. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 18–35
  38. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 37
  39. ^ Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , p. 191. “While at the hostel Kindermann, the Communist by convenience and a braggart by nature, appears to have made several stentorian criticisms of the Soviet regime which angered the young Communists quartered in the building . They in turn reported Kindermann's diatribe to GPU agents planted in the hostel. ". Jörn Happel also assumes, without further evidence for his thesis, that Kindermann began to openly criticize the Soviet Union, which resulted in GPU agents reporting him. (Jörn Happel: The Eastern Expert: Gustav Hilger , p. 124)
  40. ^ Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , p. 191, note 16. "If Ditmar was a Soviet spy, the opinion of the Reich Commissioner for Public Order that the arrest had been arranged even before Kindermann and Wolscht had left Berlin would appear to have some basis in fact. "
  41. ^ Jan Valtin: Diary of Hell , Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne and Berlin, 1957, p. 59
  42. ^ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert: Gustav Hilger , p. 124
  43. ^ Matthias Heeke: Journeys to the Soviets. Foreign tourism in Russia 1921–1941 with a bio-bibliographical appendix to 96 German travel authors , LIT, Münster / Hamburg / London, 2003, ISBN 978-3-8258-5692-2 , p. 522
  44. ↑ Gustav Hilger: We and the Kremlin , p. 142
  45. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 49-53
  46. ↑ Manfred Schmid: Sentenced to death - pardoned - exchanged
  47. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 86
  48. ^ Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern , p. 420
  49. ↑ Quoted from Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern , p. 424
  50. ↑ In the Hermann Weber et al. However, there is no evidence in the printed documents that this intention was also the basis for the arrest of the three.
  51. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 115
  52. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 133
  53. ^ Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern , pp. 437-438 including note 69
  54. ^ A b Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 147
  55. ^ Jürgen Zarusky: The German Social Democrats and the Soviet Model , p. 191
  56. ↑ Protocol No. 1, in: Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 224–225
  57. ↑ Gustav Hilger: We and the Kremlin , p. 143
  58. ↑ Quoted from Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Experte , p. 131
  59. ↑ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert , p. 132
  60. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 153
  61. ↑ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 171–172
  62. ^ The judgment, quoted from Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , pp. 226–229
  63. ↑ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert , p. 134
  64. ↑ Artur Samter and the Cheka Trial
  65. ↑ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert , p. 132
  66. ↑ Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert , p. 135
  67. ↑ Quotation from Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , pp. 195–196
  68. ↑ Quotation from Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , p. 196. 'The solution of the Ehrenfrage was clearly a compromise. Rantzau boasted that only his repeated threats to leave Moscow had forced Russia to exonerate Hilger, and certainly there was some justification for his pride. The critical issue from the Russian point of view was the contintuation of the economic talks. Chicherin feared that if Rantzau left Moscow the economic delegation would surely follow him and thereby end all hope of an economic treaty. Therefore, Chicherin had agreed to permit the publication of the German statement in Izvestia and its confirmation by the Narkomindel. But Rantzau, too, had made large concessions, having surrendered his initial demand that the published exoneration of Hilger proceed from the Russian Government rather than from the German embassy. More importantly, he had failed to keep the economic talks separate from the Ehrenfrage. Although the statement regarding Hilger made no mention of the economic talks, the negotiations were resumed shortly thereafter and led to a Russo-German economic treaty signed in Ortober 1925, The compromise concerning the Ehrenfrage removed the greatest obstacle to reaching the logical, and long expected , solution to the entire incident itself: an exchange of Kindermann and Wolscht for Skoblevsky. '
  69. ^ A b Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 183
  70. ↑ Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (eds.): Deutschland, Russland, Komintern , p. 453
  71. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 179
  72. ↑ Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (eds.): Germany, Russia, Comintern , p. 471
  73. ^ A b c Jörn Happel: Der Ost-Expert , pp. 140-141
  74. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 187
  75. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 188
  76. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 211
  77. ↑ Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , pp. 196–197. "The German courts, although eventually persuaded to surrender the prisoners, were at first reluctant to agree to pardon Skobolewsky, so recently found guilty of grave crimes against the republic. Secondly, the Reichswehr was firmly opposed to freeing a man who had not only attempted to subvert the German state but to assassinate the Reichswehr's commander as well. "
  78. ↑ Lamar Cecil: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident , pp. 197-198. "Also at the foreign minister's request, Rantzau returned to Berlin to present his view to President Hindenburg, who alone could pardon Skobolewsky and thus make the exchange possible. Stresemann then asked Chancellor Marx to call an extraordinary session of the Cabinet in order to force the issue of Skobolewsky's exchange. This session met on August 12, 1926, and once again the majority favored the exchange. On this occasion, however, Gessler's opposition was not allowed to overrule the majority decision. The request for pardon was forwarded to Hindenburg. who granted it. "
  79. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two Years in Moscow's Houses of the Dead , p. 212
  80. ^ Karl Kindermann: Two years in Moscow's houses of the dead in the DNB catalog. The font is issue 7/8 of the emergency series published by Eckhart-Verlag . Ongoing treatises on the nature and work of Bolshevism .