Kreuznach war target conference

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Kurhaus Bad Kreuznach: from January 2, 1917 to March 8, 1918, the seat of the main headquarters
Hindenburg and Ludendorff at the headquarters in Kreuznach (1917)

The Kreuznach war target conference took place during the First World War on April 23, 1917 in the main headquarters of the German Third Supreme Army Command (OHL) in Kreuznach between the Reichsleitung under Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and the OHL under Hindenburg and Ludendorff . This war target conference was a “high water mark of the official German annexationism”. The first was followed by a second war target conference on May 17 and 18, 1917 with the ally Austria-Hungary .

prehistory

Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1917)

The OHL had repeatedly urged the reluctant Chancellor to set “minimum and initial requirements”. However, according to Bethmann Hollweg, the way in which the war aims were designed depends on the situation at the start of the peace negotiations. In addition, an attempt must be made to “build golden bridges” for the first opponent who is ready for peace, and that precludes setting certain minimum and maximum goals. Bethmann Hollweg wanted to avoid a clear statement on the war aims, but was asked by Kaiser Wilhelm II , who was harassed by the military, to come to a war aims conference at the headquarters of the OHL on April 23. The fact that the conference was held at the headquarters of the OHL shows its strong position at the time towards the Reich leadership.

At the turn of the year 1916/17 this was preceded by a deep turning point in the development of German war policy. The Poland proclamation of November 5, 1916 with Poland as a German war target, the German peace offer of December 12, 1916, in which no essential war aim was abandoned, as well as the break with the USA through the transition to unrestricted submarine warfare had finally proven that the German leadership was determined to fight the war through by all means until the war aims were achieved, regardless of any foreign policy consequences. In addition, there was an event that was to shake all war target programs of the warring states - the Russian February Revolution , which raised hopes for a separate peace with Russia.

First Kreuznach war target conference

The OHL came well prepared, with detailed maps and a list of demands in the form of military imperatives.

The results of the conference, the Kreuznach program , were far-reaching demands, such as the annexation of Courland and Lithuania , a “Polish border strip”, the extent of which would depend on the future supremacy of Germany in Poland , which would also have to be expanded to the east. Russia was to receive Eastern Galicia and parts of Moldova as compensation . Austria-Hungary could receive compensation for this in Serbia , Montenegro and Albania , in the form of an annexed South Slavic state. Moldova to Sereth and western Wallachia to Craiova would also come to the allies. Romania should remain as large as possible and continue to exist under German control. In the west the claims remained the same: the vassal state of Belgium would have to cede Liege , the Flemish coast with Bruges and the area of Arlon , which, like Luxembourg and Longwy - Briey , would fall to Germany. In addition, France had to allow individual "border improvements" in Alsace-Lorraine , only "some border tips" were offered in favor of France as proof of goodwill towards the war-weary Austrians in order to "not let a peace with France fail".

The conference gave Admiral von Müller the impression of “complete excess in the East and West”. Bethmann Hollweg had nothing to oppose Hindenburg and Ludendorff in Kreuznach. The powerful OHL had wrested its maximum program from the weak chancellor. But Admiral Müller had the impression that Bethmann and his Foreign Minister Zimmermann did not take it tragically because they thought that in the end everything would turn out very differently. Bethmann Hollweg himself said that he had signed the minutes because his "departure from fantasies was ridiculous". Otherwise he is of course in no way bound by the protocol.

In the judgment of historian George WF Hallgarten, Kreuznach was not just one

"Orgy of Ludendorff's militarism, which had the amateur fantasist on the imperial throne in his pocket, but ... a huge coalition of anarchic interests, whose overall wish list the emperor, instead of curtailing it politically, made his own."

Negotiations with Austria-Hungary

Ottokar Czernin (1918)

Austria-Hungary was not involved in the first Kreuznach war target conference and was not informed immediately. However, after its triumph on April 23, the OHL urged an early conference with the alliance partner in order to obtain his approval of the annexation program. Finally, the State Department was forced to kuk Foreign Minister Czernin to win for a country exchange, in which the Austrian Eastern Galicia should remain in Russian hands, while Germany gains would receive. Ludendorff rumbled that nobody would sacrifice even a soldier for the "Sauland" today. Austria's interests were in truth in the Balkans, the annexation of part of Serbia and the establishment of a New Serbian vassal state "should mean a full replacement for Austria and strengthen the monarchy".

When the German ambassador in Vienna, Botho von Wedel , presented the Kreuznach program to Czernin at the beginning of May, the foreign minister was “concerned” about the contrast between Germany, which Poland, Courland and Lithuania were maintaining while Austria was losing eastern Galicia. Since the Reich leadership feared that Austria would be forced into a separate peace if they insisted on an exchange of countries, the German side finally waived the demand.

Second Kreuznach war target conference

On May 17 and 18, 1917, there was a second Kreuznach war target conference, at which the war targets were agreed with the ally Austria-Hungary, especially with regard to Romania. Austria-Hungary demanded his full integrity in Kreuznach, plus the Lovćen , military border adjustments in Serbia (especially the Macva ), the establishment of a small New Serbia without access to the Adriatic , the restoration of Montenegro and northern Albania, possibly with Pristina and Prizren , all three states militarily , politically and economically dependent on Austria-Hungary. A possible establishment of a New Serbia dependent on Austria-Hungary with an exit to the Adriatic Sea is described as a great sacrifice of Austria-Hungary. The Bulgarian wishes, especially on the lower Morava , will be met.

Germany demanded a permanent state of affairs in the Balkans, in which the small states would disappear, and advocated a large New Serbia (Western Serbia, Montenegro) and a Northern Albania, both closely attached to Austria-Hungary and militarily, politically and economically dependent on it. Italy was to be removed from Valona , southern Albania to be annexed to Greece and Salonika to become a free port .

“If Germany enforces the territorial annexation of Courland and Lithuania as well as the German side's prospect of Poland, it agrees that occupied Romania, with the exception of the Bulgarian Dobruja (border until 1913) and a border strip south of the Cernavoda - Constanza railway , as special state in Austria-Hungary falls, while ensuring economic participation of Germany in Romania. "

In return, Austria-Hungary waived a condominium in Poland and declared its disinterest in the Kingdom of Poland. On this basis, the two states undertook to “keep the mutual acquisitions and economic advantages in an appropriate ratio to one another, depending on the outcome of the negotiations”.

Czernin was very satisfied to secure such a large profit for the Danube Monarchy without having to forego Eastern Galicia, but he remained skeptical about the feasibility, because he reported on his impression of the conference: "They distributed uncatched fish there".

consequences

The Chancellor, who was already very much politically weakened, did not feel bound by the agreement. Bethmann Hollweg viewed the Kreuznach program as the maximum achievable war goals that would have to be striven for if Germany could dictate peace. But he was not prepared to miss a possible chance for peace because of this. On May 1, Bethmann Hollweg speculated that Ludendorff had pushed the question of the war objective in order to

“To be able to overthrow in the event of differences about the war goals, which would be easy to achieve at the moment. [...] I signed the minutes because my departure over fantasies would be ridiculous. For the rest, of course, I will not be bound by the Protocol in any way. If somewhere and somehow opportunities for peace open up, I will pursue them. "

The Chancellor, however, after resisting for so long in front of the Viennese Ballhausplatz, was forced by the overpowering OHL to give up his "flexible position" in the question of war objectives.

Kreuznach not only impaired the government's freedom of action in its efforts to achieve peace with Russia, but also threatened to strain relations with the Habsburg Monarchy as a result. The far-reaching program of Kreuznach also prevented the acceptance of a Russian peace offer, whereupon Russia instructed General Brusilov to prepare a new offensive.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Konrad H. Jarausch : The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany. New Haven / London 1973, pp. 223f.
  2. ↑ Wolfgang Steglich : The Peace Policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 67f.
  3. ↑ Oleh S. Fedyshyn: Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918 . New Brunswick / New Jersey 1971, p. 49.
  4. ^ Fritz Fischer : Reach for world power. The war policy of imperial Germany 1914/18. Droste, Düsseldorf 1964, p. 425.
  5. ^ Martin Kitchen: The Silent Dictatorship. The politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918. Croom Helm, London 1976, ISBN 0-85664-301-7 , p. 102.
  6. ↑ Erich Volkmann: The questions of annexation of the world war. The work of the investigative committee of the German National Assembly and the German Reichstag 1919–1928. Fourth row. The causes of the German collapse in 1918. Second section. The inner breakdown. Volume 12, 1st half volume, expert opinion by Volkmann. Berlin 1929, Volume 1, pp. 388ff (No. 204) (wording).
    Klaus Epstein : The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), pp. 24–47, here: p. 31.
  7. ↑ Hans Herzfeld : On German politics in the first world wars. Continuity or permanent crisis? In: Historische Zeitschrift 191 (1960), pp. 67–82, here: pp. 80f.
  8. ^ Klaus Epstein: The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), pp. 24–47, here: p. 31.
  9. ^ Konrad H. Jarausch: The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany. New Haven / London 1973, p. 223.
  10. ↑ Wolfgang J. Mommsen : The Urkatastrophe Germany. The First World War 1914–1918. (= Handbook of German History. Volume 17) 10th edition, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-608-60017-5 , p. 76.
  11. ^ George WF Hallgarten: The fate of imperialism in the 20th century. Three essays on causes of war, past and present. Frankfurt am Main 1969, p. 125.
  12. ↑ Oleh S. Fedyshyn: Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918 . New Brunswick / New Jersey 1971, p. 51.
  13. ^ Klaus Epstein: The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), pp. 24-47, here: p. 33.
    Wolfgang Steglich: Confederation security or peace of understanding. Studies on the peace offer of the Central Powers of December 12, 1916. Musterschmidt, Göttingen / Berlin / Frankfurt am Main 1958, p. 161.
  14. ↑ Wolfgang Steglich: The Peace Policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 74.
  15. ↑ Oleh S. Fedyshyn: Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1918 . New Brunswick / New Jersey 1971, p. 51.
    Ingeborg Meckling: The foreign policy of Count Czernin. Publishing house for history and politics, Vienna 1969, p. 169.
    Gerhard Ritter : Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. The problem of "militarism" in Germany. Volume 3: The tragedy of statecraft. Bethmann Hollweg as war chancellor (1914–1917). Munich 1964, ISBN 3-486-47041-8 , p. 528.
  16. ↑ Klaus Epstein: The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), pp. 24-47, here: p. 34.
    Wolfgang Steglich: The peace policy of the Central Powers 1917 / 18th Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 94.
    Ingeborg Meckling: The foreign policy of Count Czernin. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1969, p. 242.
  17. ↑ Wolfgang Steglich: The Peace Policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 95f.
    Ingeborg Meckling: Count Czernin's foreign policy. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1969, p. 243.
  18. ↑ a b c André Scherer, Jacques Grunewald: L'Allemagne et lesproblemèmes de la paix pendant la première guerre mondiale. Documents extraits des archives de l'Office allemand des Affaires étrangères. 4 volumes (German original documents), Paris 1962/1978, ISBN 2-85944-010-0 , Volume 2, p. 204 ff (No. 123).
    Wolfdieter Bihl (Hrsg.): German sources on the history of the First World War. Darmstadt 1991, ISBN 3-534-08570-1 , p. 281f (No. 141)
    Klaus Epstein: The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), p 24–47, here: p. 43f.
    Wolfgang Steglich: The Peace Policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 97f.
  19. ^ Andrej Mitrovic: The war aims of the Central Powers and the Yugoslavia question 1914-1918 . In: Adam Wandruszka, Richard G. Plaschka, Anna M. Drabek (eds.): The Danube Monarchy and the South Slavic Question from 1848 to 1918. Texts from the first Austrian-Yugoslav historians' meeting in Gösing in 1976 . Vienna 1978, pp. 137–172, here: p. 157.
  20. ^ Gerhard Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. The problem of "militarism" in Germany. Volume 3: The tragedy of statecraft. Bethmann Hollweg as war chancellor (1914–1917). Munich 1964, ISBN 3-486-47041-8 , p. 532.
    Ladislaus Singer : Ottokar Graf Czernin. Statesman of a turning point. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1965, p. 157.
    Wolfgang Steglich: The peace policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 99.
  21. ^ Klaus Epstein: The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the Spring of 1917. In: Journal of Central European Affairs 17 (1957), pp. 24–47, here: p. 32.
    Wolfgang Steglich: The peace policy of the Central Powers 1917 / 18th Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 71.
  22. ↑ Bruno Gebhardt : The Great Catastrophe in Germany. The First World War. (= Jürgen Kocka (Hrsg.): Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte. 19th century (1806-1918). Volume 5, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-608-60017-5 , p. 76.
    Wolfgang J. Mommsen : Was the emperor to blame for everything? Wilhelm II and the Prussian-German power elites. Ullstein, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-548-36765-8 , p. 224.
  23. ↑ Wolfgang Steglich: Alliance securing or peace of understanding. Studies on the peace offer of the Central Powers of December 12, 1916. Musterschmidt, Göttingen / Berlin / Frankfurt am Main 1958, p. 160.
  24. ↑ Wolfgang Steglich: The Peace Policy of the Central Powers 1917/18. Volume 1, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 74.
  25. ↑ Oliver Janz : 14 - The great war. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2013, ISBN 978-3-593-39589-0 , p. 293.