Mongol invasions in Japan

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Mongol invasions in Japan
English-language picture description of the military conflict
English-language picture description of the military conflict
date 1274 to 1281
place northern part of Kyushu
output Japanese victory
Parties to the conflict
Troop strength
1274: 4,000-6,000 1274: 28,000-30,000
losses

1274: 13,500 dead
1281: 100,000 dead
20,000 - 30,000 prisoners

The Mongolian attempts to invade Japan ( Japanese Genkō 元 寇 dt. "Incursion of the Yuan ", 蒙古 襲来 Mōko shūrai or モ ン ゴ ル 襲来 , Mongoru shūrai , both literally "Mongol invasion ".) Of 1274 and 1281 were the largest military attacks on Japan in pre-modern times. Even if they did not in themselves lead to the overthrow of the Kamakura shogunate , their contribution was decisive for the political upheaval - and thus for the further development of Japan.

History of the invasion attempts

Rise of the Mongols in the 13th century

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongols rose to become an invading power under the leadership of Genghis Khan . They successively conquered large parts of East and West Asia (see Mongolian warfare ). As early as 1234 they subjugated the Jin Dynasty (1125–1234) in northern China, from which they took over new weapon technologies such as firearms with gunpowder or explosive projectiles. They also took the Goryeo Kingdom on the Korean Peninsula and ended the rule of the Song Dynasty in southern China in the second half of the 13th century . In 1271, Kublai Khan , grandson of Genghis Khan, proclaimed the Yuan dynasty . With the consolidation of his power on the continent, he now sought to expand his sphere of influence to Japan.

Mongol embassies to Japan

In 1268 a first Mongolian embassy reached Dazaifu , the government capital of Kyūshū and the seat of Chinzei bugyō , the "Defense Commissioner for the West". There the ambassadors were not allowed to travel to Kamakura , but their message was passed on to the shogunate . Likewise, if only for the sake of form, the Imperial Court in Kyoto was consulted . In Kamakura, people reacted relatively indifferently to the content of the message, the desire to establish “friendly” relationships. The Bakufu (military government) was unwilling to enter into diplomatic contact with the Mongols. Information from Korea indicated an impending invasion, which caused fear among the court nobility in Kyoto. The political aristocracy in Kamakura under the leadership of the shogunal regent Hōjō Tokimune remained unimpressed. Firstly, the message contained no warlike statements, secondly, the island location of Japan and the army of well-trained samurai made you feel safe in the event of an attempted invasion. The Mongolian ambassadors were sent back without a reply. Other embassies also remained fruitless.

The first Mongol invasion in 1274

course

As a result of the unsuccessful embassies, Kublai Khan decided to launch a military strike. In 1274, for example, an expeditionary army of Mongolian, Chinese and Korean troops set out for Japan on around 1,000 Korean warships. Due to the time pressure during construction, the ships were of relatively poor quality and hardly suitable for the ocean. The armed forces, whose strength is said to have been 20,000 to 40,000 men with uncertain information, nevertheless quickly captured the Japanese islands of Tsushima and Iki on their way . After landing in Hakata Bay on Kyūshū, the most suitable place for the Mongols to invade, they met the Japanese Defense Army, formed by the local rulers, the Gokenin ( 御 家人 ), of the Kyūshū provinces, which make up the Bakufu already after the first embassy of the Mongols instructed to make preparations for a war.

In this so-called Battle of Bun'ei , the "First Battle of Hakata Bay", the invaders were initially superior to the Japanese not only in terms of numbers, but above all in terms of warfare: the closed formation of the Mongols outperformed the fight against man Samurai man, poisoned arrows increased defenders' casualties, and firecrackers caused panic among warriors and horses. The Mongols were also able to take Hakata quickly and to push the Japanese out of the bay into the interior on the 20th day of the battle. These entrenched themselves in the fortress Mizuki ( 水城 ) in order to be able to defend and hold the nearby Dazaifu, the seat of the defense commissioner. There one wanted to wait for the arrival of further Bakufu troops from central and eastern Japan. However, the Mongolian commanders decided to withdraw beforehand. The reasons for this are likely to have been the supply problems, which worsened the further the invaders penetrated into the interior of the country, and also the own losses. For example, the Mongolian general Liu Fu-heng was seriously wounded. The decision to retreat represented the turning point of the battle. After the troops had embarked in Hakata Bay, a heavy storm hit, which sank about a third of the less robust ships. In Kyōto, where people had prayed for Japanese victory in the temples, the storm was interpreted as a “divine wind”, a kamikaze . Whether the storm was decisive for the war or a Japanese victory would have been likely without it remains a matter of debate.

The social consequences after 1274

The invasion often led to the impoverishment of the Japanese soldiers. Because the war costs, such as for equipment and food, had to be borne by the warriors themselves. Therefore, many of them asked the Go'on bugyō ( 御 恩 奉行 ), the commissioner for compensation issues of the Bakufu , for compensation for their expenses. However, the Bakufu did not have the necessary financial resources, as there were no conquered territories or spoils to be distributed in this war. Accordingly, only about 120 warriors received compensation. The situation worsened as the Bakufu ordered the provinces in Kyūshū to keep armed troops ready to defend the coast to protect against further invasions. For the soldiers, this meant additional military service for three months a year immediately after the Mongols had withdrawn and for many years.

The political consequences after 1274

From a political point of view, Bakufu could still take advantage of the first failed invasion. In the course of the defense preparations, the Hōjō , the regent family, managed to consolidate their own power. On the one hand, they were able to get rid of their opponents, mostly through murder, and, on the other hand, defuse the division in their own families. In addition, they were able to extend their power from vassals to non-vassals for the first time . Nevertheless, preparing for another attempt at invasion should pose great problems for Bakufu and its resources.

Preparations for further invasions

Defense wall at Hakata. Mōko Shūrai Ekotoba , ca.1293
Wall remains at Imazu in the west of Hakata Bay

Bakufu obtained information from Korea and South China about the Mongols' preparations for a second invasion. As a result, it was decided in Kamakura to expand their own armed forces and to set up new military posts at strategically important points in Kyushus. These measures had far-reaching consequences for society: Since all men fit for war had to be in constant military readiness since the beginning of the first invasion, there was a lack of workers in the fields. Usually only old people, women and children worked the land. Much of the acreage was fallow. As a result of this slump in agricultural production, there were several famines on Kyūshū . At the same time, the Shinto belief spread massively in the population. The Bakufu sent at that time a variety messengers to temples and shrines, with the request that the local priests and monks may pray for the victory of Japan.

In May 1275 the course should finally be set for a new war. At that time, a Mongolian embassy reached Nagato Province on Honshu . They were admitted to the Bakufu , but executed in December 1275 to demonstrate a position of strength and intransigence towards the Mongols.

Now the Japanese had to decide how to proceed. In Kamakura, for example, a pre-emptive strike against Korea was considered, which, due to its strategic proximity to Japan and its warships, was an important factor in the Mongol invasion plans. The Bakufu rejected this idea again, however, because if the defensive strategy was maintained, the financial means for an offensive strategy were insufficient. Instead, it was decided to build a defensive wall around Hakata Bay in the hope of being able to better prevent another incursion there. Meanwhile, Kublai Khan set up an office for the conquest of Japan (literally: "Office for the Chastisement of Japan") in order to speed up the preparations. The Mongols ordered Korea to deploy 1,000 ships and 20,000 soldiers again. These were supplemented with around 50,000 Mongolian soldiers as well as 3,000 Song warships and 100,000 Chinese warriors. The latter, coming from China, were to unite with the Mongolian-Korean armed forces near the Japanese island of Iki.

The second Mongol invasion of 1281

course

However, the Mongols initially failed to coordinate these two troops. The Chinese were faced with logistical problems, triggered by an uprising by dock workers, the death of a high-ranking Chinese officer and difficulties in filling the ship's crew, which is why they were not ready to sail until the summer of 1281. In contrast, the Mongols urged the Koreans, who were ready to attack as early as the spring of 1281, to attack the Japanese island of Tsushima without waiting for the support of the Chinese. The Japanese were able to repel this first attack due to the improved defense.

The next advance took place only after the arrival of a first part of the Chinese troops. The armed forces advanced now, over Tsushima and Iki, on Kyūshū and landed in the area between Munakata and Hakata Bay. From there she tried to take the flanks of the wall. However, the Japanese were not only able to repel these attacks every time, but even counterattacked a few times.

Meanwhile, most of the advancing Chinese troops landed in Hizen province . But even against both troops of the invaders, the Japanese succeeded in the so-called Battle of Koan , the "Second Battle of Hakata Bay", which included the fighting in the bay itself and in the province of Hizen, the lines until August 14th In 1281, the 53rd day since the invasion, it held without major problems. On 15./16. In August, a typhoon hit the coast of Kyushu, devastating about a third of the Korean armed forces and well over half of the Chinese armed forces. The lower losses suffered by the Koreans can be explained by the fact that they were experienced seafarers and had recognized the signs of the typhoon in good time; they brought parts of the fleet a safe distance from the coast. With the withdrawal of the remaining troops to Korea, the second attempt at invasion ended.

According to recent discoveries by a Japanese researcher on the remains of the submerged fleet, most of them were river ships that were not up to the sea and its storms. The ships, which were quickly assembled within a year, had either been massively sabotaged at the mast feet by the Chinese shipbuilders or, due to lack of time, were so poorly executed that the technical construction was simply unsuitable for storms for the Chinese seagoing vessels, which otherwise had an excellent reputation.

The social consequences after 1281

The news of the victory reached Bakufu on September 23, 1281. This victory was mainly attributed to the temples and shrines that had prayed for the victory of Japan. Because this time, too, the storm was interpreted as a kamikaze , the decisive support of the gods. The idea of ​​Japan as the “land of the gods”, as Shinkoku ( 神 国 ), also gained popularity.

Even after the second invasion, the Japanese soldiers could not return to their families because the Bakufu kept all men ready for war for fear of a third invasion. In fact, another invasion was planned for 1283, called for by the King of Kōryu, who feared an attack by Japan on Korea and the pillage of their own supplies. However, due to the difficulties of the Mongols in their campaigns in Europe , these plans were disregarded.

The Japanese could not have known about this, however, which is why Japan's troops were under arms until 1294 and why the country was at war for over 20 years. This put additional strain on the financially troubled Bakufu . In addition, as after the first invasion, temples and vassals demanded compensation or a reward for their efforts. Since there was no spoil of war and no land to distribute, the Bakufu was not able to provide these compensations and rewards with empty state coffers. For the most part, Bakufu only distributed new titles and rights. Material goods were only occasionally used as a reward, which in addition usually had to be claimed from the court or sword nobility. Most of the rewards were given to temples and shrines, as these had a great impact on the population.

In 1294 the Bakufu finally announced that no more compensation would be paid. Many of the impoverished vassals and soldiers continued to do their duties. This was mainly due to their high level of discipline, their sense of duty - and the fear of a third invasion.

The political consequences after 1281

Japanese samurai board Mongolian ships in 1281. Mōko Shūrai Ekotoba , ca.1293
Destruction of the Mongolian fleet by the wind of the gods (scroll painting by Kikuchi Yoosai, 1847)

Although many factors certainly influenced the politics of Japan at the time, the Mongol invasions contributed to the downfall of the Kamakura-Bakufu , the Hōjō rulers or Shikken . Even before the invasion attempts, the Bakufu was posted: there were efforts to undermine the rule of the Hōjō. In addition, the vassals of Bakufu had increasingly borrowed from traders, who were able to expand their power more and more.

The invasions ultimately meant the decisive financial burden - for the state coffers in Kamakura, for the vassals and also for the people. Kamakura never considered distributing the war costs evenly to the entire population by introducing a tax for all of Japan. However, without additional income, Bakufu was no longer able to stop its own decline.

Conclusion

This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

The first landing is now viewed by many researchers as more of a sounding than a serious attempt at invasion. But even the second time, the Mongols were unable to seriously threaten the sovereignty of Japan. An important reason for this can certainly be seen in the fact that they were unable to play their trump card, the Mongolian cavalry , which swept across the continent with troops of up to several thousand men, due to the island position of Japan. Because the Mongols had little seafaring knowledge, they concentrated instead on transferring the few troops as quickly as possible. These could then only hold on to the coast without undertaking any major advances inland. The Mongolian military leaders were of course aware that the entire East and Southeast Asian region was hit by typhoons during these months. Their problem was rather that a large part of their ships had been built in a hurry for this invasion, which now could not withstand the winds and waves because of various construction defects and poor material.

Thomas D. Conlan claims that even without the two kamikaze Japan would have been able to repel the attacks by the Mongols and would not have needed this help. Instead, the storms gave both attackers and defenders a political means: The Mongols could have justified their defeat and saved face on the continent. For Bakufu, on the other hand, it was an opportunity to strengthen belief in a Japan that is protected by the gods.

Evidence of the invasions

Historical sources

On the part of the Yuan, there are official accounts of the invasions in the "History of the Yuan Dynasty" 元史 (Chin. Yuan shi ; Japanese. Genshi ), published around 1370 by Song Lian 宋濂 u. a. compiled official dynasty history (see 24 Dynasty Tales ). It covers the period between 1206 and 1369. Furthermore, the events are dealt with in the "New History of the Yuan Dynasty" 新 元史 (Chinese: Hsin Yuan shi ; Japanese: shin genshi ), a new version from the beginning of the 20th century. Corresponding entries can also be found in the "History of Korea" 高麗 史 (Japanese Kōrai shi ; Kor. Goryeosa ). On the Japanese side, in addition to letters, diary entries and official documents, there are also several narrative sources available. On the one hand, there are two emaki that were made on behalf of Takezaki Suenaga after the two incursions. On the other hand, there are two separate writings with the identical title "Teachings about the Hachiman for simple-minded children" 八 幡 愚 童 訓 (Japanese Hachiman-gudōkun ). Only the former, referred to as “GDK I” for distinction, is used as a source.

Excavations

Archaeological excavations and submarine salvage made it possible to compare the written evidence with artefacts again and again . This enabled assumptions, for example about the course of the protective wall, to be confirmed or corrected. On the other hand, it became apparent that accepted doctrines, such as B. about the troop strength, the influence of the weather, etc. in question.

literature

Non-Japanese secondary literature

  • Wolfgang Bockhold: The Hachiman-gudōkun (I) as a historical source, especially on the Mongol invasions in Japan. Dissertation, Munich 1982.
  • Thomas D. Conlan: In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga's scrolls of the Mongol invasion of Japan. Cornell East Asia Series, New York 2001, ISBN 1-885445-44-X .
Brief presentation of the book by the publisher here
The essay from the book in which Prof. Conlan questions the military inferiority of the Japanese: In Little Need of Divine Intervention. Archived from the original on December 15, 2011 ; Retrieved November 26, 2016 . (PDF; 570 KB)
  • Jacques Gernet: The Chinese World. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1997.
  • Luther Carrington Goodrich, Ryūsaku Tsunoda (Ed.): Japan in Chinese dynastic histories . Perkins, South Pasadena 1951.
  • John Whitney Hall, Kozo Yamamura (Ed.): Cambridge History of Japan - Vol. 3: Medieval Japan. Cambridge University Press, New York 1990, ISBN 0-521-22354-7 .
  • Kyotsu Hori: The Mongol Invasions and the Kamakura Bakufu . University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan 1967. (Dissertation)
  • James Murdoch: A History of Japan - Vol. 1. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1949.
  • August Pfizmaier : The history of the Mongol attacks on Japan. In: Meeting reports of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, phil.-hist. Classe, Vol. LXXVI, Issue 1, 1874, pp. 105-200. (Japanese source Mozokki with German translation).
  • George Sansom: History of Japan - To 1334. Charles. E. Tuttle Company, Tōkyō 1974.
  • Nakaba Yamada: Ghenkō: the Mongol invasion of Japan , Smith, Elder & Co., London 1916.

Japanese secondary literature

  • 佐伯 弘 次: 『モ ン ゴ ル 襲来 の 衝 撃』 ( Mongoru shūrai no shōgeki ), 中央 公論 社, 東京 2003, ISBN 4-12-490218-2 (日本 の 中 世, Volume 9)
(German: Saeki Kōji: The shock of the Mongol invasion. Chūō Kōron publishing house, Tokyo 2003.)
  • 長崎 県 鷹 島 町 教育 委員会 ( Fukuoka-ken Takashima-chō kyōiku iinkai ): 『鷹 島 海底 遺跡』 ( Takashima kaitei iseki ), 高 島 町 1988–2006.
(German: Education Committee of Takashima Township, Fukuoka Prefecture: Submarine Relics near Takashima. Takashima Township 1988–2006. 10 volumes.)

Web links

Commons : Mongol Invasions in Japan  - Album with pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Genkō was next to 文 永 蒙古 合 戦 Bun'ei Mōko kassen , dt. "Mongol battle in [the era ] Bun'ei " and 弘 安蒙 古 合 戦 , Kōan Mōko kassen , dt. "Mongol battle in [the era] Kōan " common name for the attempted invasions in the Kamakura period. In the specialist literature, the terms Mōko shūrai and Mongoru shūrai have established themselves . See Saeki 2003, p. 7.
  2. ↑ a b c The Brockhaus in Text and Image 2003 [SW], electronic edition for Office Library, Bibliographisches Institut & FA Brockhaus, 2003; Article: "Korea"
  3. ↑ S. Yanagida: 福岡 市 今 津 元 寇 防 塁 発 掘 調査 概 報. In: web: Comprehensive Database of Archaeological Site Reports in Japan. The Fukuoka Board of Education, March 31, 1969, accessed September 2, 2016 (japan).
  4. ^ Richard Storry: A history of modern Japan . Penguin, Harmondsworth, 9th ed. 1972, p. 40.
  5. ^ Richard Storry: A history of modern Japan . Penguin, Harmondsworth, 9th ed. 1972, p. 41.
  6. ^ Helmut Erlinghagen : Japan. A country study . CH Beck, Munich 1979, ISBN 3-406-06798-0 , p. 52.
  7. ↑ See Conlan 2001, pp. 253-275.
  8. ^ Translation of the relevant parts into English in Goodrich and Tsunoda 1951.
  9. ↑ See Conlan 2001, pp. 201-252.
  10. ↑ See Conlan 2001.
  11. ↑ For the history of the sources and a comparison of the contents of both GDK see Bockhold 1981, pp. 5–15.
  12. ↑ Classification of the Japanese historian Naomune Ono: Hachiman gudōkun no shohon ni tsuite. In: Setsuwa bungaku kenkyū. No. 8, Tōkyō 1943, p. 26ff. Quoted in Bockhold 1981, p. 6.
  13. ^ A translation of GDK I into German in Bockhold 1981.
  14. ↑ See e.g. B. Saeki 2003, pp. 7-53.
  15. ↑ See, for example, Nagasaki ken Takashima chō kyōiku iinkai 1992–1996.
  16. ↑ See Conlan 2001, pp. 254-275.