Operation Attain Document

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Operation Attain Document
Operation Attain Document III chart March 1986.jpg
date January 26th to March 29th 1986
place Great Syrte
output American tactical victory
Parties to the conflict

United StatesUnited States United States

Political system of the Libyan Arab JamahiriyaPolitical system of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Libya

Commander

Ronald Reagan

Muammar al-Gaddafi

Troop strength
30 warships

225 aircraft

2 corvettes

3 patrol boats

losses

No

1 corvette sunk

1 patrol boat sunk

1 Corvette damaged

1 patrol boat damaged

35 dead

Attain Document is the code name for 1986 military operations by United States shipping units in the Mediterranean, north, and the Great Syrte .

aims

The operations, carried out as maneuvers under full combat readiness, were a reaction by the USA to older acts of terrorism by groups of the PLO , whose headquarters were then in Libya .

The official pretext of the exercises was to underline the freedom of navigation in international waters, since Libya claimed the Great Syrte, in violation of international law, as territorial waters . The area south of line 32 ° 30 'N comprised 62 nautical miles (115 km) of fishing zone, with Libya propagating this line as the Line of Death from 1973 onwards.

prehistory

In 1985 the cruise ship Achille Lauro was kidnapped in the Mediterranean by a Palestinian faction, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), and the 69-year-old American Leon Klinghoffer was shot. The actions to arrest and later convict the kidnappers resulted in complex political, military and legal entanglements between the United States, Italy and Egypt.

Kidnapping of an Egypt Air plane

On November 23, 1985, Egypt Air Flight 648 from Athens to Cairo was hijacked to Malta by three members of the Abu Nidal Organization (FRC) . An Egyptian flight security attendant on board shot and killed one of the hijackers, but was subsequently killed himself. The shots caused decompression of the cabin; However, the machine was able to land in Malta even though the runway lighting at Malta Airport was not in operation. In the hours that followed, the hijackers shot at three Israeli and two American passengers and pushed them out through an open door of the plane. An Israeli and an American died from gunshot wounds. Malta authorized Egyptian security forces to storm the plane to rescue the hostages. American participation was only permitted by the Maltese in an advisory capacity (officers of the Delta Force and two anti-terrorism specialists). Aircraft of the American aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV-43) escorted the planes of the Egyptian Command Force 777, which flew in on November 24th, and flew patrols to protect against unpredictable Libya. That same evening, an Egyptian commando stormed the hijacked machine. The smoke grenades used led to an aimless shooting on board due to the heavy smoke development. In addition to the kidnappers, of the 98 people on board (passengers and crew), 57 hostages were killed by smoke inhalation and gunshot wounds.

Terrorist attack at the airport in Rome

On December 27, 1985, there was a rampage at Rome 's Leonardo da Vinci airport by four (other sources: five) Arabs who also belonged to the FRC , as it later turned out. They threw two hand grenades among the passengers at the El Al counter and one in an airport café and then shot people at the counters of El Al, TWA and Pan Am with Kalashnikov automatic rifles . A total of 17 people were killed and over 70 wounded during this and the following lengthy exchange of fire with the police.

Terrorist attack at the airport in Vienna

Almost at the same time as the events in Rome, also on December 27, 1985, something similar happened at Vienna International Airport . Three men, who were also members of the FRC , threw hand grenades at waiting passengers on El Al Flight 364 and then opened fire for about two minutes. After a short hunt, one of the attackers was killed by security guards and two injured and captured. There were a total of 4 dead and over 30 injured.

The investigations into the three acts of terrorism revealed many indications and links to Libya, which made it clear that Libya had provided the terrorist groups with active logistical support.

US response

On 6 January 1986 appointed President Ronald Reagan a meeting of the National Security Council , a, in which, inter alia, Foreign Minister George P. Shultz , Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the CIA - Director William Joseph Casey were present. It was about what to do about Libya. With regard to public opinion and support from the Allies, William Casey raised concerns about military action because of the scant evidence; Syria and Iran also provided assistance to Abu Nidal . Various military options were discussed, such as bombing by F-111 or B-52 bombers by units stationed in Great Britain , but also pinpoint strikes by Tomahawk cruise missiles. In memory of the fiasco in Lebanon (escalation of the fighting and active US intervention after the attack on the US base in Beirut ), Weinberger urged clear guidelines. Shultz suggested a combination of economic sanctions and military presence. This proposal was accepted. For the non-offensive, but aggressive demonstration of military strength by naval units in the Mediterranean, offensive options should also be planned and kept ready “up your sleeve” just in case.

On January 7, 1986, the American President Reagan publicly announced a comprehensive trade and economic embargo against Libya through Executive Order 12544, and on January 8, 1986, all Libyan real estate and other assets in the USA were confiscated and all cash reserves in the USA were frozen . He also announced ship maneuvers near Libyan waters.

Reaction of NATO partners

On January 15, 1986, the USA called on the NATO states to support the US sanctions against Libya. Despite strong US pressure, the European allies did not initially join these measures. On January 9, 1986, the Italian government decided to stop arms deliveries to Libya immediately. In February 1986 France intervened in Chad ( Operation Epervier ) because almost at the same time as the conflict over the Great Syrte, Libyan troops had penetrated beyond the Aouzou strip into Chad, controlled the Ouadi Doum air base and used it for attacks.

Response from Libya

On January 13, 1986, two Libyan fighter planes of the type MiG-25 Foxbat intercepted a US reconnaissance aircraft of the type EA-3B in the Mediterranean for a short time .

The Libyan revolutionary leader Muammar al-Gaddafi responded on January 15, 1986 with a call to all Arab states to implement economic sanctions against the USA. He also announced the use of suicide squads to carry out attacks against “American imperialism” and the “Zionist opponent”. On January 25, 1986 Gaddafi again declared the Great Syrte to be the Libyan territorial waters and designated the straight line (32 ° 30 ′ N) between Misrata and Benghazi as a line of death. On January 25, 1986, Gaddafi was on board the missile speedboat Waheed and drove the declared line from Misratah to Benghazi to demonstrate.

Response from other states

The Council of Ministers of the Arab League , which also met in March in Tunis, condemned the American aggression and declared its solidarity with Libya.

Intervention by Libya and France and US support in Chad

At the same time as the US operations in the Great Syrte, Libyan intervention in Chad took place again. The Libyan air force and air defense were thus exposed to a direct potential for conflict with French and US aircraft in both the north and south of the country.

In February 1986, France sent around 1,400 foreign legionnaires , 12 Jaguar fighter planes and 8 F.1C-200 fighter planes with Transall transport planes, together with two C-135FR tankers and a Breguet Atlantic reconnaissance aircraft , which were in Bangui in the Central African Republic were stationed in the crisis region. The French military operation Épervier began. French Jaguar A fighter planes bombed the Libyan air force base Quadi Doum in northern Chad, rendering the runway unusable for several days. In retaliation for the French air raids on Quadi Doum, a Libyan bomber of the Tupolev Tu-22 Blinder type flew an attack on the airport of the Chadian capital N'Djamena on February 17, 1986 . After the Libyan bombing of N'Djamena on February 24, 1986, France increased its contingent in Chad by another 650 soldiers. In addition, Crotale and MIM-23B Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems and two other Jaguar fighter planes were relocated to N'Djamena with a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy military cargo aircraft of the US Air Force . On March 5, 1986, in northern Chad near Oum Chalouba, a firefight broke out between Chadian government troops, supported by French attack helicopters and rebels and Libyan soldiers on the other side. The USA and France increased their military aid to the Chadian government. Up to March 19, 1986, 235 people were killed in heavy fighting between government troops in Chad and pro-Libyan units, according to official figures. With the support of France, the government troops succeeded in retaking the Aouzou, Bardai, Zouar and Yebbi Bou airfields.

Operation planning of the USA

At the same time as the announcement of the sanctions and the naval maneuvers, President Reagan tasked the military with planning any offensive military options. The use of B-52 bombers and Tomahawk cruise missiles was ruled out in order not to compromise them because of their strategic, deterrent role. In January, General Bernard Roberts of the United States European Command and his key subordinates began evaluating possible Libyan targets and defenses. Vice-Admiral Frank B. Kelso prepared the 6th US fleet stationed in the Mediterranean for the planned maneuvers and possible offensive actions.

Operation Attain Document

26.-30. January 1986

Freedom of navigation exercise as a response to Libyan-sponsored terrorism (see previous story). North of the 32nd parallel (32 ° 30 'N).

  • USS Saratoga Battle Group
  • USS Coral Sea Battle Group

Operation Attain Document II

12-15 February 1986

Continued operation near Libyan territorial waters (inside the Flight Information Region of Tripoli ).

  • USS Saratoga Battle Group
  • USS Coral Sea Battle Group

Operation Attain Document III / Operation Prairie Fire

23-29 March 1986

Crossing the 32nd parallel (“line of death”) and escalation. Libyan attacks and implementation of Operation Prairie Fire by Vice Admiral Kelso. Sinking of two Libyan warships and another of unknown origin, possibly Syrian.

Course on 23/24 March

Damaged Libyan corvette of the Nanuchka II class

On March 23, 1986, US planes of the three carrier combat groups crossed the Libyan line of death in the Great Syrte. At 6:00 a.m. on March 24, the guided missile cruiser USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) crossed the line accompanied by the two destroyers USS Scott (DDG-995) and USS Caron (DD-970) . A Libyan aircraft missiles position near Surt (Sirte) fired at 7:52 AM two ground-to-air missiles of the type S-200 (SA-5) in the direction of an US combat aircraft type F-14A . But they missed their goal. At 10:00 a.m. two Libyan MiG-23 fighter planes took off from the Benina Air Force Base near Benghazi with orders to intercept and combat the US fighter jets. An E-2 air surveillance aircraft captured the Mig-23 and alerted two more F-14s from the aircraft carrier USS America (CV-66) , both of which intercepted MiG-23s at 20,000 feet (6,100 m). Several Libyan patrol boats were on course for the US carrier combat group in the afternoon. Two US attack aircraft of type A-6 discovered a patrol boat of La Combattante IIa class , and around 19:26 shelled a US aircraft with an anti-ship missiles of the type AGM-84 Harpoon the Libyan patrol boat and sank it. Forty minutes later, several US fighter jets (F-14, F / A-18, A-7E and EA-6B) attacked the anti-aircraft missile site near Surt (Sirte), and the Libyans activated the radars to fire the S- 200 missiles. The A-7E Corsair II then destroyed the anti-missile position with air-to-surface missiles of the type AGM-88 HARM . At 9.45 p.m. two US A-6E Intruders attacked a Libyan corvette of the Nanuchka II class with AGM-88 HARM missiles. The corvette Ean Mara MPK-9 was en route to the US guided missile cruiser USS Yorktown (CG-48) and was badly damaged and a fire broke out on board. The Libyan corvette was still able to return to the port of Benghazi. On March 24, 1986 at 7:30 a.m., another Libyan corvette of the Nanuchka II class was intercepted by US aircraft. An A-6E damaged the corvette Ean Zaquit (Ain Zaquit) (MRK-15) with cluster bombs of the Rockeye type and sank them with an anti-ship missile of the AGM-84 Harpoon type. Libya announced the downing of 3 US fighter jets in March. This information has been denied by the USA.

After the operation

After the operations were completed, US Vice President George Bush visited the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise off the coast of Oman on April 4, 1986 and spoke of the success of the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean against Libya and that this would be a lesson to Gaddafi. On April 5, 1986 there was an attack on the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, which was visited by US soldiers, and the USA began bombing Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15, 1986 in Operation El Dorado Canyon .

Individual evidence

  1. Executive Order 12544

literature

  • Daniel P. Bolger: Americans at War. 1975–1986: An Era of Violent Peace. Presidio Press, 1988, ISBN 0-89141-303-0 .

Web links