Richard Dinkelmann

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Richard Dinkelmann (born November 4, 1868 in Heilbronn , † March 5, 1942 in Überlingen ) was a German officer and military advisor in China .

Life

Dinkelmann was the son of a chief customs inspector. After attending grammar school in Heilbronn, he joined the 7th Infantry Regiment No. 125 of the Württemberg Army as a volunteer on September 13, 1886 with the prospect of promotion . There he was promoted to second lieutenant on February 10, 1888 . Promoted to Prime Lieutenant on January 27, 1895 , Dinkelmann was simultaneously assigned to the infantry regiment "King Wilhelm I" (6th Württembergisches) No. 124 and from October 1, 1895 for further training at the Prussian War Academy . This was followed by a command to the General Staff in Berlin. Dinkelmann then took part in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900/01 with the East Asian Expeditionary Corps.

On July 15, 1908, Dinkelmann resigned from the Württemberg Army, joined the East Asian Detachment and became the commander of the legation guard in Beijing. As part of the Sino-German cooperation (1911–1941) , Lieutenant Colonel Dinkelmann was from 1911–1912 a military advisor in the Chinese Ministry of War. In 1911 the German Reich delivered newly developed weapons to China from depots of the German army . The German Reich had an oligopoly in the arms trade with China. In 1911, 91 percent of the weapons imported into China came from German production. In 1912, Yuan Shikai assured him that he would mainly buy armaments from Krupp . At the end of 1911 there was international criticism of the German Reich's arms exports to China, as it supplied not only the northern troops but also the revolutionaries in the south. The Foreign Office has meanwhile spoken out in favor of a complete delivery ban. Japan developed into an inexpensive competitor of the German Reich in arms exports to China.

Yuan Shikai Military Advisor

From 1913 until his death in 1916 Dinkelmann was the military advisor to President Yuan Shikai . The area around Shikai was given detailed advice: Major Bleyhoeffer taught at the officers' school in Beijing, while Captain König was the personal advisor to Yuan Keding, Shikai's son. In July 1913, government master builder Georg Baur (1859-1935, 1916 board of directors of Krupp) was appointed as a technical advisor. George Ernest Morrison had been Yuan Shikai's political advisor since August 1912.

At the beginning of his service with Yuan Shikai, Dinkelmann had the military attaché of the German embassy, ​​Captain Rabe von Pappenheim, write the following letter:

"I obediently report to the Royal Ministry of War that Major z., Recently appointed Military Advisor to the President of the Republic of China. D. Dinkelmann, previously an instructor in the Chinese army, informed me that the Chinese war minister had asked him privately and unofficially whether it would be possible for Chinese officers to continue to have access to German military training institutions, as has already happened before close. Major z. D. Dinkelmann asked me to inform him about the position of the local authoritative authorities on this question before giving a final answer to the local War Ministry. Should the German authorities not have concerns about the admission of Chinese officers to our military training institutes, he will induce the Chinese authorities to initiate the necessary official steps. Major Dinkelmann warmly supports the wish of the Chinese Minister of War and justifies his request for a benevolent consideration of the German authorities on this issue with the following: The bearers and promoters of foreign influence, especially in the military field, are less the Europeans employed in the Chinese service than the Europeans Foreign-educated or foreign-educated Chinese. The mostly very good accommodation they found there left them with a sympathy for the country in question, they have more or less adopted its nature and customs, speak its language and - in their own personal interest - advocate further dissemination of the same. The respect that Western education, military affairs, and technical achievements demanded of them is primarily for what they have seen themselves, for the facilities and products of their teachers. The strong Japanese influence in the army is by no means based on the few Japanese instructors who are still in Chinese service, but on the large number of officers who have been trained in Japan and who form a tightly knit clique. Every recommendation of a measure, an employment, a purchase is in this way, indirectly through the Chinese, much more effective than if an attempt is made to achieve something indirectly through the European, whose proposals must first be made bite to the Chinese, and whom they long with something Encounter distrust. A local company has z. B. received an order for French machine guns some time ago. The same proceeded from the 4th Department of the Ministry of War (Feldzeugmeisterei), in which a section chief in France received his military training. It is very much in the interest of our industry that these circumstances be taken into account and that every possible concession is granted to Chinese wishes. Initially, it would be a matter of resuming the command of Chinese officers to the Royal War Schools, the Shooting School and the Military Academy, as it was done earlier. The admission of Chinese officers to the war academy is of increasing importance. "

- Rabe von Pappenheim, June 12, 1913

"I cannot speak out in favor of the admission of Chinese to the war academy"

- Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke in the margin of the letter

“National vanity has a say in this. According to officers of other countries: Romania, Greece, Sweden, who were admitted to the Academy of War, equal treatment is the ardent desire of the Chinese. There is no reason to fear that the academy will be burdened, as admission will naturally be limited to a number of officers. The choice of what I will and can give any information I want, as I personally know all of the officers who will be considered, will of course have to be made very carefully. However, there are quite a number of Chinese officers who - partly in German war schools and in German regiments - have received sufficient military and social training, whose forms and behavior can be described as perfectly flawless and who have sufficient command of the German language to teach to be able to follow, so that the reputation and prestige of the highest German military educational institution will certainly not suffer from the admission of these officers. I can agree with Major Dinkelmann's reasoning in every respect. In my experience, the influence of foreign armies on the Chinese army administration is primarily based on the efforts of the officers trained in foreign armies, the military views, the type of training, the weapons and technical achievements of the army in which they were trained, To gain entry into their own army. "

- Rabe von Pappenheim, June 12, 1913

Shortly beforehand, 60 Chinese officers began a two-year training course at the Japanese war school, and there were also negotiations with the French government about officer exchanges.

“The great value that the Chinese army attaches to the military training of Chinese officers, especially in Germany, is clearly evident in the military career of the officers who have so far been trained in Germany; Of the 53 officers who were commanded to Germany between 1905 and 1911, 15 currently hold important positions (advisers, heads of departments and sections) in the War Ministry and General Staff, 9 are in leading positions in the provincial military administrations, and 11 are senior troop commanders in the front. All of these officers are extremely interested in efforts to strengthen German influence over the Chinese army; the appointment of Major Dinkelmann as a consultant, as well as the recent renewal of the contract of Captain a. D. Bleyhoeffer is largely due to their influence. The predominant position of the German arms industry in the international competition for orders to arm the Chinese army is also largely a consequence of the advocacy of the officers, who had the opportunity to learn more about the advantages of our weapons at German shooting schools and with German regiments. The main reason for the current Minister of War for Krupp weapons, as he has repeatedly assured me, is that he was able to thoroughly examine and appreciate himself when he was in command of Krupp. As Major Dinkelmann already suggests, the local war ministry first wants Chinese officers to renew their permission to visit the following schools: war schools, infantry and field artillery, shooting schools, military technical academy, artillery workshops, veterinary academy, riding school. Chinese have already been admitted to all of these schools. The Minister of War attaches particular importance to enabling Chinese officers to be admitted to the Royal Prussian War Academy. If the fulfillment of this main wish, which was also hinted at to me, can be made possible in any way, I am convinced that the Chinese army administration would feel obliged to be particularly grateful. She would undoubtedly show this gratitude in the broadest possible way towards German wishes - B. in the question of the employment of further German officers for the reorganization of the army, for arms deliveries, etc. - express. I therefore allow myself, on my part, to obediently point out the importance of taking precisely this wish into account. If there are fundamental concerns about admission to the War Academy, the permission for some officers to visit individual subjects or even just individual lectures from the various years of the Academy would be received here with great gratitude and satisfaction. As Dinkelmann informs me, the local war ministry would ask, if the desired commanding of the Chinese officers can be made possible in whole or in part, to be able to bring it about by autumn or winter of this year. I obediently ask the Royal War Ministry for information about the position of the relevant authorities on these questions, so that I can give Major Dinkelmann the relevant information. Signed Rabe von Pappenheim Captain in the General Staff d. A. and military attaché "

- Rabe von Pappenheim, June 12, 1913

The war ministry responded with a statement by Moltke, who was then head of the army general staff, to the foreign ministry, forwarded by Erich von Falkenhayn on September 6, 1913. Moltke justified his refusal because, in times of political tension, a high number of foreign officers in the army disliked things and that it “cannot be overlooked in what way they will use the knowledge that we have gathered”.

On August 1, 1914, the Reich government canceled all arms deliveries abroad. On August 14, 1917, China declared war on the German Reich and won the German concessions in Hankou and Tianjin. In 1921 a separate peace was concluded between China and the German Reich.

Military advisor according to Dinkelmann

On December 22, 1922, Sun Yat-sen concluded a friendship agreement with Adolf Abramowitsch Joffe with the Soviet Union . "Communism is unsuitable for China," they agreed. which included the dispatch of military advisers. Vasily Konstantinowitsch Blücher and Michail Markowitsch Borodin taught at the Whampoa Military Academy . On March 24, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek captured Nanjing . There he was received by the Shanghai “Green Gang”. In nearby Shanghai the workers prepared a triumphant reception for Chiang's revolutionary troops. Chiang moved into Shanghai and caused a massacre among the cheering proletariat. Blücher and Borodin fled China in 1927.

In 1927 Max Hermann Bauer became a military advisor to Sun Yat-sen.

literature

  • Hermann Niethammer: The officer corps of the infantry regiment "Kaiser Friedrich, King of Prussia" (7th Württ.) No. 125. 1809–1909. Stuttgart 1909. pp. 64f.

Individual evidence

  1. George Ernest Morrison (1862-1920) . In: Australian Dictionary of Biography
  2. PAA R17909
  3. Political Archive of the Foreign Office, Berlin R17909
  4. Political Archive of the Foreign Office, Berlin R17910
  5. ^ Mechthild Leutner, Andreas Steen: German-Chinese relations 1911–1927 . P. 33
  6. Every sun sets once . In: Der Spiegel . No. 10 , 1950 ( online ).