USS Iowa turret explosion

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Template:Infobox generic The USS Iowa turret explosion was an explosion that occurred in the Number Two 16-inch gun turret of the United States Navy battleship USS Iowa (BB-61) on April 19, 1989. The explosion in the center gun room of the turret killed 47 of the turret's crewmen and severely damaged the gun turret itself.

The first investigation into the explosion, conducted by the US Navy, concluded that one of the gun turret crewmembers, Clayton Hartwig, who died in the explosion, had placed an explosive device in the breech in a suicide attempt after the end of an alleged homosexual affair with another sailor. After outside observers questioned the methods and conclusions of the Navy's investigation, a further investigation in conjunction with Sandia National Laboratories found that an overram of the powder bags into the gun, along with the age, structure, and condition of the powder, had likely caused the explosion, but that a final determination on the true cause was impossible. Nevertheless, Hartwig was cleared of complicity and the Navy apologized to Hartwig's family.

Background

Recommissioning

Main articles: Iowa class battleship, USS Iowa (BB-61), and Armament of the Iowa class battleship

Iowa was the lead ship of her class of "fast battleship" designs planned in 1938 by the Preliminary Design Branch at the Bureau of Construction and Repair. She was launched on 27 August 1942 and commissioned on 22 February 1943.[1] She was the first ship of her class of battleship to be commissioned by the United States.[2] Iowa’s main battery consisted of nine 16 inch (406 mm)/50 caliber Mark 7 naval guns, which could fire 2,700 pounds (1,200 kg) armor-piercing shells some 24 nautical miles (44 km).[3]

Iowa undergoing modernization in 1983

After serving in both World War II and the Korean War, she was decommissioned 24 February 1958 and entered the Atlantic Reserve Fleet at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. After a quarter-century in mothballs, Iowa was modernized, primarily at Avondale Shipyards near New Orleans, Louisiana as part of President Ronald Reagan's "600-ship Navy" plan, and recommissioned 28 April 1984, one year ahead of schedule.[4] Under the command of Captain Gerald E. Gneckow, in order to expedite the schedule, many necessary repairs to Iowa's engines and guns were not completed and the mandatory US Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) inspection was not done at this time.[5]

Almost two years later, beginning on 17 March 1986, Iowa underwent her overdue InSurv inspection. Conducted under the supervision of Rear Admiral John D. Bulkeley, the ship failed the inspection. Among many other deficiencies, the ship was unable to achieve its top speed of 33 knots during a full-power engine run. Bulkely, reportedly extremely angry with the numerous safety and maintenance failings discovered during the inspection, recommended that Gneckow and several other of the ship's officers be charged with dereliction of duty. Bulkeley personally recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations and Lehman that Iowa be taken out of service immediately. Lehman did not take the ship out of service, but instructed the leaders of the Atlantic Fleet to ensure that Iowa's deficiencies were corrected.[6]

A month after the InSurv, Iowa failed an Operation Propulsion Program Evaluation (OPPE). A short time later, however, the ship retook and passed the OPPE.[7] In July 1987, Larry Seaquist assumed command of the battleship and her crew.[8]

After a deployment to the Persian Gulf, Iowa returned to Norfolk for maintenance on 10 March 1988. On 23 May, Fred Mosally replaced Larry Seaquist as Captain of the Iowa.[9][10]

Gunnery training and experiments

A cutaway of a 16-in gun turret aboard an Iowa-class battleship

A week after taking command, Moosally and his executive officer, Mike Fahey, canceled a planned $1 million repair package for Iowa's main gun batteries, including repairs to the main gun turrets' lighting, eletrical, powder hoists, and hydraulic systems; 75 detailed deficiencies in all. Instead, the funds were spent on overhauling the ship's powerplant.[11]

In August 1988, in preparation for departing for sea trials, Iowa's main gun powder charges were returned to the ship. The charges had been stored off-ship during the Iowa's time in the shipyard undergoing repair. During the time off-ship, from April to August 1988, the powder bags, enclosed in metal cannisters, were stored on unventilated, aluminum-covered barges in the York River. Although Navy guidance stated that powder should not be exposed to temperatures exceeding 70 degrees Farhenheit because it could cause the powder to decompose and become unstable, the powder on the barges was subjected to temperatures of up to 125 degrees. In August 1988, Iowa set sail on sea trials around the Chesapeake Bay area, in which Moosally briefly ran the ship aground, but caused no damage, and then began refresher training in the waters around Florida and Puerto Rico in October.[12]

Between September 1988 and January 1989, Iowa conducted little training with her main guns, in part because of ongoing, serious maintenance issues with the main gun turrets. According to Ensign Dan Meyer, officer in charge of the ship's Turret One, morale and operational readiness among the gun turret crews suffered greatly.[13]

Master Chief Stephen Skelley (center, facing camera). Iowa's Turret Three is in the background.

In January 1989 Iowa's Master Chief Fire Controlman, Stephen Skelley, and Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Michael Costigan, persuaded Moosally to allow them to experiment with increasing the range of the main guns using "supercharged" powder bags and specially designed shells. Moosally was led to believe, falsely, that top officials from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) had authorized the experiments. In fact, John McEachren, a mid-level bureaucrat with NAVSEA had given the go-ahead to conduct the experiments even though he had no authority to do so. McEachren concealed his approval of the gunnery experiments from his superiors.[14]

Several of the officers and noncommissioned officers in charge of the main gun turret crews believed that Skelley's and Costigan's proposed experiments were dangerous, especially because of the age of and numerous maintenance problems with the main guns and gun turrets. Meyer complained to Lieutenant Commander Roger John Kissinger, Iowa's chief weapons officer, about the proposed experiments, but Kissinger refused to convey the concerns to Moosally or halt the experiments.[15]

Iowa's Turret Two center gun is loaded to fire. First, a 1,900-pound shell is moved from the shell hoist into the spanning tray (also called the cradle) to be rammed into the gun breech.
Next, the powder bags are rolled from the powder hoist (top) into the spanning tray.
Finally, the rammerman, at left, operates a lever which uses hydraulics to ram the powder bags into the gun's breech. The spanning tray is then folded out of the way and the breechlock is closed.
Turret Two's center gun fires.

On 20 January 1989, off Vieques Island, Iowa's Turret One fired six of the experimental shells using the supercharged powder bags. Skelley claimed that one of the 16 in shells traveled 23.4 nautical miles, setting a record for the longest conventional 16 in shell ever fired. Although the shells had been fired without serious incident, Meyer and Petty Officer First Class Dale Eugene Mortensen, gun chief for Turret One, told Skelley that they would no longer participate in his experiments. Skelley asked Turret Two's gun chief, Senior Chief Reggie Ziegler, if he could use Turret Two for his experiments, to which Ziegler refused. Skelley then asked Lieutenant Phil Buch, Turret Two's officer in charge, and Buch acquiesed.[9][16]

A week after the long range shoot at Vieques, Iowa's new executive officer, Commander John Morse, directed a main battery drill, over the objections of his gun crews, in which Turrets One and Two fired while both were pointed 15 degrees off the starboard side of the ship's bow. At this angle, one of Turret Two's guns was firing over Turret One. During the shoot, one of the powder bags in Turret Two's left gun began to smolder before the breechlock was closed. Jack Thompson, the left gun captain, was barely able to close and latch the breechlock before the gun discharged on its own. The concussion from Turret Two's guns shredded Turret One's gun bloomers (the canvass covers at the base of the main gun barrels) and heavily damaged Turret One's electrical system. Dan Meyer said of the shoot that it was, "The most frightening experience I have ever had in my life. The shock wave blew out the turret officer's switchboard and the leads. We had no power, no lights for a time. Men were screaming. There was panic."[17]

In February the battleship returned to Norfolk. In Norfolk, Ziegler complained to his wife about the morale, training, and safety situation aboard Iowa, stating, "We're shorthanded. Chiefs with seventeen years of service are quitting. I've got to teach these kids to push the right button, or they'll blow us to kingdom come! My butt is on the line!"[18] He added that if he died at sea, he wanted to be buried at sea. Before leaving Norfolk in early April 1989, Third Class Gunner's Mate Scot Blakey, a member of Turret Two's crew, told his sister, Julie Blakey, "I'm not thrilled with some of the things we're doing on the Iowa. We shouldn't be doing them. Something could go wrong." When Julie asked, "Why are you doing them?" Scot replied, "We don't have a choice."[19]

Preparation for fleet exercise

On 10 April the battleship was visited by commander of the US 2nd Fleet, (then) Vice Admiral Jerome L. Johnson, and on 13 April sailed from Norfolk to participate in a fleet exercise in the Caribbean Sea near Puerto Rico.[9] The exercise, titled "FLEETEX 3-89", began on or around 17 April under Johnson's command. Iowa served as Johnson's flagship during the exercise.[20]

Throughout the night of 18 April, Turret Two's crew conducted a major overhaul of their turret in preparation for a firing exercise scheduled to take place the next day. The center gun's compressed-air system, which cleansed the bore of sparks and debris each time the gun was fired, was not operating properly. The center gun's powder hoist also was not operating correctly. The hoist would not stop automatically when a bag reached the top of the hoist. The crew tried to jury-rig the hoist with a part from a flattened Pepsi can, but it still would not automatically stop as designed.[21]

Also on 18 April, Iowa's fire-control officer, Lieutenant Leo Walsh, conducted a briefing to discuss the next day's main battery exercise. Moosally, Morse, Kissinger, and Costigan did not attend the briefing. During the briefing, Skelley announced that Turret Two would participate in an experiment of his design in which D-846 powder would be used to fire 2,700-pound shells.[22]

D-846 was among the oldest of the powder lots on board Iowa, dating back to 1943–1945, and was designed to fire 1,900-pound shells. In fact, printed on each D-846 powder cannister were the words, "WARNING: Do Not Use with 2,700-pound projectiles."[23] D-846 powder burned faster than normal powder which meant that it exerted greater pressure on the shell when fired. Skelley explained that the experiment's purpose was to improve the accuracy of the guns. Skelley's plan was for Turret Two to fire ten 2,700-pound practice (no explosives) projectiles, two from the left gun and four rounds each from the center and right guns. Each shot was to use five bags of D-846, instead of the six bags normally used, and fire at the empty ocean 17-miles away.[24]

Ziegler was especially concerned about his center gun crew. The rammerman, Robert Backherms, was inexperienced, as was the powder car operator, Gary Fisk, the primerman, Reginald L. Johnson, and the gun captain, Errick Lawrence. To help supervise Lawrence, Ziegler assigned Second Class Gunners Mate Clayton Hartwig, the former center gun captain, who had been excused from gun turret duty because of a pending reassignment to a new duty station in London, to the center gun's crew for the firing excercise. Because of the late hour, Ziegler did not inform Hartwig of his assignment until the morning of 19 April.[25]

The rammerman's position was of special concern, as ramming was considered the most dangerous part of loading the gun. The ram was used to first thrust the projectile and then the powder bags into the gun's breech. The ram speed used for the projectile was much faster than that used for the lighter powder bags, but there was no safety device on the ram to prevent the rammerman from accidentally ramming the powder bags at the faster speed. Overramming the powder bags into the gun could subject the higly flammable powder to excessive friction and compression with a resulting increased danger of premature combustion. Also, if the bags were pushed too far into the gun a gap between the last bag and the primer might prevent the powder from igniting when the gun was fired, causing a misfire. None of Iowa's rammermen had any training or experience in ramming nonstandard five bag loads into the guns.[26]

Explosion

On 19 April, the crew prepared for the day's main battery firing exercise. Meyer, assigned to a five-hour watch on the bridge, searched in vain for the day's firing plan. The firing plan was a mandatory document that detailed the day's gunnery exercise and contingency plans if anything went wrong. Regulations stated that the ship could not fire without one. In spite of repeated inquiries by Meyer to the main battery office, which fell under Kissinger's command, a firing plan was never produced.[27]

At 08:31, the main turret crewmembers were ordered to their stations in Turrets One, Two, and Three. The turrets reported that they were manned and ready 30 minutes later. Vice Admiral Johnson and his staff entered the bridge to watch the firing exercise. Iowa was steaming at 15 knots 260 miles northeast of Puerto Rico.[28]

Turret One fired first, beginning at 09:33, and completed its firing drill. Turret One's left gun misfired and its crew was unable to get the gun to discharge. Moosally now ordered Turret Two to load and fire a three-gun salvo. According to standard procedure, the misfire in Turret One should have been resolved first before proceeding further with the exercise.[29]

Forty-four seconds after Moosally's order, Lieutenant Buch reported that Turret Two's right gun was loaded and ready to fire. Seventeen seconds later, he reported that the left gun was ready. A few seconds later, Errick Lawrence, in Turret Two's center gun room, reported to Ziegler over the turret's phone circuit that, "We have a probem here. We are not ready yet. We have a problem here."[30] Ziegler responded by announcing over the turret's phone circuit, "Left gun loaded, good job. Center gun is having a little trouble. We'll straighten that out."[31] Mortensen, monitoring Turret Two's phone circuit from his position in Turret One, heard Buch confirm that the left and right guns were loaded. Next, Ernie Hanyecz, Turret Two's leading petty officer suddenly called out, "Mort! Mort! Mort!"[32] Ziegler shouted, "Oh, my God! The powder is smoldering!"[33] At this time, Ziegler may have opened the door from the turret officer's booth in the rear of the turret into the center gun room and yelled at the crew to get the breech closed. About this same time, Hanyecz yelled over the phone circuit, "Oh, my God! There's a flash!"[34]

Debris and smoke fly through the air as Turret Two's center gun explodes.

At 09:53, Turret Two's center gun exploded. A fireball between 2,500 and 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit and traveling at 2,000 feet per second with a pressure of 4,000 pounds per square inch blew out from the center gun's open breech. The explosion caved in the door between the center gun room and the turret officer's booth and buckled the bulkheads separating the center gun room from the left and right gun rooms. The resulting fire released toxic gasses, including cyanide gas from burning polyurethane foam, which filled the turret. Shortly after the initial explosion, the heat and fire ignited powder bags in the powder-handling area of the turret. Nine minutes later, another explosion, most likely caused by a buildup of carbon monoxide gas, occurred. All 47 crewmen inside the turret were killed. The nine crewmen in the turret's powder magazine, located adjacent to the bottom of the turret, were able to escape.[35]

Immediate aftermath

Turret Two's sprinkler system failed to operate. Firefighting crews quickly responded and sprayed the roof of the turret and left and right gun barrels, which were still loaded, with water. Meyer and Kissinger, wearing gas masks, descended below decks and inspected the powder flats in the turret, noting that several tons of unexploded powder bags in and around the turret were now "glowing a bright cherry red." [36] On Kissinger's recommendation, Moosally ordered Turret Two's magazines, annular spaces, and powder flats flooded with 16 tons of seawater, preventing the remaining powder from exploding.[37]

After the fire was extinguished, Mortensen entered the turret to help identify the bodies of the dead crewmen. Mortensen found Hartwig's body, which he identified by a distinctive tattoo on the upper left arm, at the bottom of the 20-foot deep center gun pit instead of in the gun room. The gas ejection air valve for the center gun was located at the bottom of the pit, leading Mortensen to believe that Hartwig had been sent into the pit to turn it on before the explosion occurred. After most of the water was pumped out, the corpses in the turret were removed without noting or photographing their locations. The next day, the human remains were flown from the ship by helicopter to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. From Puerto Rico, the remains were flown on United States Air Force transport aircraft to the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.[38]

Navy pallbearers, attended by an honor guard, carry the remains of one of the victims from the turret explosion after its arrival at Dover Air Force Base on 20 April 1989.

An explosive ordnance disposal technician, Operations Specialist First Class James Bennett Drake, from the nearby USS Coral Sea was sent to Iowa to assist in unloading the powder in Turret Two's left and right guns. After observing the scene in the center gun room and asking some questions, Drake told Iowa crewmen that, "It's my opinion that the explosion started in the center gun room caused by compressing the powder bags against the sixteen-inch shell too far and too fast with the rammer arm."[39]

Morse directed a cleanup crew, supervised by Lieutenant Commander Bob Holman, to make Turret Two "look as normal as possible". Over the next day, the crew swept, cleaned, and painted the inside of the turret. Loose or damaged equipment was tossed into the ocean. No attempt was made to record the locations or conditions of damaged equipment in the turret. "No one was preserving the evidence," said Brian R. Scanio, a fireman present at the scene.[40] A team of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) investigators (the predecessor of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service or NCIS) stationed on Coral Sea was told that their services in investigating Iowa's mishap were not needed. At the same time, Moosally called a meeting with all of his officers, except Meyer, who was working in Turret One, in the ship's wardroom. At the meeting, Iowa's legal officer, Lieutenant Commander Richard Bagley, instructed the ship's officers on how to limit their testimony during the forthcoming investigation into the explosion. Terry McGinn, who was present at the meeting, stated later that Bagley, "Told everybody what to say. It was a party line pure and simple."[41]

Investigation

Several hours after the explosion, Admiral Carlisle Trost, the Navy's CNO, issued a moratorium on the firing of all 16-inch guns, "until the investigation into the accident aboard USS Iowa is completed."[42] Vice Admiral Joseph S. Donnell, commander of Surface Forces Atlantic, appointed Rear Admiral Richard Milligan to conduct "an informal one-officer" investigation into the explosion.[43] Throughout Milligan's ensuing investigation, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Leon "Bud" Edney, reportedly often telephoned Donnell to give suggestions on how the investigation should be conducted, which Donnel passed on to Milligan. Said Rear Admiral John E. "Ted" Gordon, the Navy's Deputy Judge Advocate General at the time, "I like Bud Edney, and I warned him about the dangers of 'command influence,' but the wouldn't listen. He constantly got Joe Donnell on the horn and told him exactly what to do. This totally undercut any kind of independent inquiry. Milligan was nothing more than Edney's clone."[44]

At first, the NIS theorized that one of the dead crewmen, Clayton Hartwig, who died in the explosion, had placed an explosive device in the breech in a suicide attempt after the end of an alleged homosexual affair with another sailor. Hartwig had named Kendall Truitt, a fellow shipmate, as the sole beneficiary on a $50,000 life insurance policy, with double indemnity for accidental death. That policy kicked off a Naval criminal investigation that eventually concluded Hartwig was angry at Truitt over a cooling of their relationship, crafted a detonator and set off the blast. This conclusion was strongly disputed by others and this theory was later abandoned and Hartwig cleared.

Extensive tests were later conducted by Sandia National Laboratories and the explosion is thought to have been caused by an "overram" of the ram that moves the shells and propellant into the breech. The use of D846 fast burn propellant in place of normal D845 propellant while firing the larger 2,700 pound projectiles, plus inadequate crew training including a new turret captain were also held to blame, although no official cause has ever been determined.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, publicly apologized to the Hartwig family stating that there was no proof that Hartwig had deliberately detonated the powder bags.[45] As Hartwig was only a last-minute replacement for his duty station the day of the accident, it was deemed that premeditation for causing an explosion was impossible. Independent psychiatrists who analyzed Hartwig's background found no signs of psychosis, paranoia, or clinical depression, concluding that Hartwig was content with his job, anticipating his next assignment in a security role in London, and that the great weight of the evidence ran counter to suicide. [46]

Aftermath

The #2 Turret was trained forward with its own mechanism after the explosion and superficial repairs were conducted. All the related repair pieces are stored inside the turret, but the turret has never been completely repaired.

Iowa deployed to Europe and the Mediterranean Sea in mid-year. Iowa decommissioned in Norfolk, 26 October 1990. Iowa, as part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, was berthed at the Naval Education and Training Center in Newport, from 24 September 1998 to 8 March 2001 when the ship began her journey, under tow, to California. The ship arrived in Suisun Bay near San Francisco on 21 April 2001 and is part of the Reserve Fleet there.

Due to the damage in Turret 2, the Navy put New Jersey into the mothball fleet, even though the training mechanisms on New Jersey’s 16 inch guns had been welded down. The cost to fix New Jersey was considered less than the cost to fix Iowa; however, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of 1999 demanded that the Navy substitute Iowa for New Jersey; additionally, the Navy was to arrange for New Jersey’s donation for use as a museum ship. The Navy made the switch in January 1999, paving the way for Camden, New Jersey, to acquire USS New Jersey.

Iowa was maintained in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 until 2006, when the Secretary of the Navy struck Iowa and placed the ship on donation hold to allow transfer for use as a museum ship.

Popular culture

"Into The Breech", the twelfth episode of Season Five of JAG has a group of law students under the supervision of the main characters perform a mock trial of an incident where an explosion in a gun turret killed 29 people.[47] The episode was loosely based on this incident and investigation.[47]

In 2001 the event was recalled in the movie A Glimpse of Hell starring James Caan and Robert Sean Leonard.[48]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to USS Iowa turret explosion.

References

Notes

  1. ^ Naval Historical Center. "Iowa". DANFS.
  2. ^ Iowa. Naval Vessel Register. The Department of Defense. Retrieved on 6 September 2008.
  3. ^ Johnston, Ian (2002). The Battleships. London: Channel 4. pp. p. 120. ISBN 0752261886. OCLC 59495980. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  4. ^ Naval Historical Center. "Iowa". DANFS.
  5. ^ Thompson, p. 26. Although Iowa was refurbished within budget, the final price tag was $50 million above the originally projected cost, mainly because of overtime paid to the ship's contractors.
  6. ^ Thompson, p. 26–27. The problems discovered during Bulkeley's inspection included hydraulic fluid leaks in all three main gun turrets, totalling 55 gallons per turret per week, Cosmoline (anticorrosion lubricant) which had not been removed from all the guns, detoriated bilge piping, frequent shorts in the electrical wiring, pump failures, unrepaired soft patches on high-pressure steam lines, and frozen valves in the ship's firefighting system. Main gun Turret Three leaked so much oil, hydraulic fluid, and water that the crew referred to it as the "rain forest." The sources indicate that none of Iowa's officers were actually charged with dereliction of duty. In fact, it appears that Gneckow was promoted to rear admiral sometime later.
  7. ^ Thompson, p. 27.
  8. ^ Thompson, p. 28 gives 25 April as the date of the change of command. The change of command ceremony took place on top of main gun Turret Three with a formation of Iowa sailors stationed in front of the turret. At that time, one of the guns in Turret Three was loaded and primed. If the gun had discharged it would have probably caused numerous casualties to the assembled sailors and to the official party on top of the turret which included Gneckow, Seaquist, three other admirals, the Undersecretary of the Navy, and a United States Marine Corps detachment.
  9. ^ a b c "USS IOWA(BB-61) Detailed History". USS Iowa Veterans Association. The Veteran's Association of the USS IOWA (BB-61). Retrieved 2008-08-09.
  10. ^ Thompson, p. 33–35. Although most captains of Iowa, including Gneckow, were promoted to rear admiral upon the completion of their two-year tour as captain of the ship, Seaquist was not promoted. According to Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, Seaquist was not promoted because Seaquist was an "iconoclast" and, "The admirals didn't quite understand Larry. He never paid attention to the flag officers' community. It takes politics to become an admiral in the United States Navy. That's a sad commentary, but true, and Larry wasn't a very good politician." Fred Moosally, from Youngstown, Ohio was nicknamed "the Moose" from his days playing football at the United States Naval Academy. He was the academy's 1965 most valuable player and had played on the same team with Roger Staubach. His class rank upon graduation in 1966 was 812 out of 868. Thompson (p. 35–40) describes Moosally as very-well connected politically with many of the Navy's top admirals, mainly because of tours on the staffs of Metcalf, the CNO, and Admiral Thomas Hayward, and in the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs. Moosally had requested the command of a battleship, and was supported in his campaign by (then) Rear Admiral "Bud" Flanagan, Rear Admiral Richard Milligan, the Navy battle group commander in Charleston, South Carolina, and (then) Rear Admiral Jeremy Michael Boorda. The current CNO, Admiral Carl Trost, apparently appreciated Moosally's successful efforts in the legislative liason office to get Congress to fund two new aircraft carriers, two frigates, and a nuclear-powered cruiser.(Thompson, p. 39)
  11. ^ Thompson, p. 46–47. One of the deficiencies needing repairs was the sprinkler system in Turret 2, including the ones in the powder magazines, intended to help put out any propellent fires, were inoperable. Turret 2's commanding officer, Lieutenant Philip Buch, refused to document the deficiencies in the turret, reportedly saying, "I don't give a shit about paperwork, because if this turret blows up, I'll be dead, and who'll give a rat's ass about paper work!" (Thompson, p. 49)
  12. ^ Thompson, p. 51–57. Master Chief Chuck Hill, Iowa's former chief enlisted gunner, had warned his replacement, Master Chief James Hickman, not to accept the powder bags that had been stored on the barges. Hickman ignored Hill's warning and accepted the full lot of powder. Hickman also allowed the powder lots to be intermingled when loaded on the ship, against Navy policy since lots often burn at different speeds, making accurate gunfire difficult. Many of the bag cannisters were dented and broken and many of the powder bags themselves often broke open upon being taken from the cannisters and sent up the hoists to the guns. The grounding incident occurred on 25 August when, apparently encountering difficulty in conning the ship through shallow water, Iowa, with Moosally at the helm, narrowly missed colliding with the frigates USS Moinster and Farragut and cruiser South Carolina before running aground in soft mud outside the bay's main ship channel near the Thimble Shoals. After one hour, Iowa was able to extricate herself without damage and return to port (Thompson, p. 58–60). According to Thompson, the near-misses with the other navy ships were recorded in Iowa's log as attempts to "render honors" to them. Although other US Navy vessels observed Iowa grounded in the mud, the incident apparently was not acted upon by Moosally's superiors. Mike Fahey, the ship's executive officer, warned the other officers on Iowa to never mention the grounding to anyone, including superior Navy officers.
  13. ^ Thompson, p. 68–69.
  14. ^ Thompson, p. 69–71. Skelley, 40, from Decatur, Illinois, had devoted his life to studying battleships and battleship gunnery. After completing an initial active-duty tour with the Navy, Skelley returned to civilian life. For the next 15-years his only steady job was selling kitchenware door-to-door. At the same time, Skelley served in the Navy Reserve, eventually rising to the rank of Master Chief Petty Officer, and returned to active duty at that rank. Said Seaquist of Skelley, "I decided that Skelley was brilliant, but was also a weird little fellow who required a very tight leash...He could be dangerous if left to his own devices, because he was totally fixated with getting more accuracy and range out of the guns, even if that entailed cutting corners and compromising safety." (Thompson, p. 30) Costigan was a 1972 Naval Academy graduate who had been twice passed over for promotion to commander. He had previously served on the New Jersey and, like Skelley, was a battleship devotee.(Thompson, p. 61–62.)
  15. ^ Thompson, p. 73.
  16. ^ Thompson, p. 70–81. The Turret One gun crew leaders, which fired the experimental loads, considered defying the order because of the unauthorized nature and perceived danger of the experiment, but in the end fired their guns. In the 1950s, the US Navy had fired a nuclear-equipped 16-inch shell 13 nautical miles further than Skelley's shell. Ziegler, 39, was a 19-year Navy veteran and was scheduled to retire in January 1990. He had volunteered for the assignment to Iowa. Thompson describes Buch as an, "immature, emotionally fragile young officer, who regularly broke the Navy's taboo about fraternizing with enlisted men." (Thompson, p. 48)
  17. ^ Thompson, p. 77–80, 87–88. During the same shoot, Moosally ordered Turret One's crew to manually fire their guns using lanyards, which is a dangerous, last-ditch method used to fire the guns. The gun chiefs in Turret One refused to carry out the order. Before Moosally became aware of their refusal, someone noticed that Turret One's guns were actually pointed directly at Iowa's bow and the Moosally's order was rescinded. The guns were subsequently manually unloaded. Costigan then refused to participate in a post-shoot debriefing to discuss what had happened.
  18. ^ Thompson, p. 82.
  19. ^ Thompson, p. 82–87.
  20. ^ Thompson, p. 15. Thirty US Navy ships were participating in the exercise, including the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea, seven cruisers, three guided-missile destroyers, two conventional destroyers, seven frigates, three amphibious assault craft, a communications ship, two oilers, a minesweeper, two ammunition ships, plus three South American frigates including one from Venezuela and another from Brazil.
  21. ^ Thompson, p. 88–89.
  22. ^ Thompson, p. 89. Kissinger would later claim that he told Moosally about the experiment before the exercise began (Thompson, p. 95).
  23. ^ Thomposon, p. 89.
  24. ^ Thompson, p. 89–90, 97.
  25. ^ Thompson, p. 18, 85, 90–92. Each gun had a five-man crew, consisting of a powder-car operator, who controlled the small hoist that lifted the powder up to the gun room; a cradle operator, who aligned the spanning tray so that the projectile and powder could be rammed into the gun breech; the rammerman, who operated the hydraulic ram to push the shells and powder into the gun breech; the primerman, who stood on a platform below the gun and inserted a .30-caliber rifle cartridge into the open breechlock to trigger the detonation; and a gun captain, who directed the other four crewmembers and synchronized the loading and firing cycles. Johnson has been assigned to Iowa less than two months and had never participated in a live fire exercise. Fisk had been assigned to the ship less than three weeks before. Lawrence was "under instruction" to become a gun captain and had never directed the firing of one of the main guns without the supervision of an experienced gun captain. Backherms had never operated the rammer during a real gun shoot.
  26. ^ Thompson, p. 85, 91.
  27. ^ Thompson, p. 93–96. At 09:45, Kissinger realized that there wasn't a firing plan and directed Yeoman Vergil Marshall, stationed in Turret Two's powder handling room, to come to the main battery office and prepare one. Seaman Nathaniel Clifford Jones was sent to replace Marshall in the powder room. In order for Marshall and Jones to relocate, Condition Zebra, the strictest damage control condition on the ship, in which all watertight and blastproof doors and hatches had been sealed, was temporarily violated. At 8 a.m. the morning of the shoot, Kissinger conducted a quick exercise brief behind Turret Two but gave out wrong information, such as that the guns were to fire to port, when the opposite was true and that nearby Navy ships would also participate in the shoot, which wrong. He mentioned Skelley's experiments, thereby endorsing them (Thompson, p. 95).
  28. ^ Thompson, p. 15, 95–97. Around this time, Kissinger ordered Senior Chief Robert Porter, Iowa's master-at-arms, to escort Legalmen First Class Robert Kenneth Morrison and Michaell William Helton to Turret Two. Kissinger stated that the two legalmen were "goofing off". Morrison and Helton were assigned to Turret Two's right gun room. Untrained in 16-inch gunnery, the two legalmen could only stand and watch the guncrew perform their duties. Morrison and Helton were both killed in the explosion.
  29. ^ Thompson, p. 98–100. Moosally's order to Turret Two also violated drill protocol. Lieutenant Leo Walsh, the ship's fire-control officer, was supposed to direct the loading and firing of the guns instead of the orders coming directly from the bridge. Turret One's left gun crew "super elevated" their gun eight times to try to coax the last powder bag to slide down against the primer in the breech, to no avail. Turret One's left gun remained in a "hang fire" condition until it was manually unloaded hours after the explosion in Turret Two.
  30. ^ Thompson, p. 101.
  31. ^ Thompson, p. 101.
  32. ^ Thompson, p. 101.
  33. ^ Thompson, p. 101.
  34. ^ Thompson, p. 100–101. Gunner's Mate Third Class Michael Estes, working in Turret Two's powder flats, stated that he believed that Ziegler had opened the door to the center gun room and shouted at the crew to close the breechlock. The door was found blown off of its hinges, leading Mortensen to believe that it was open at the time of the explosion (Thompson, p. 127).
  35. ^ Thompson, p. 97, 101–107. Several of the turret's crewmembers had time to don chemical/biological filter masks, which failed to protect them from the poisonous gasses filling the turret. The bodies of four or five men were discovered piled around the turret's lower hatches, indicating that the men had tried to escape before being overcome by the gasses. The nine surviving crewmen were in magazine A-515-M from which they were assigned to deliver powder bags through scuttles into the powder flat (powder handling area) at the base of Turret Two.
  36. ^ Thompson, p. 103–107. Meyer and Kissinger were accompanied by Gunner's Mate Third Class Noah Melendez in their inspection of the turret.
  37. ^ Thompson, p. 107–124. Meyer recommended to Kissinger that the powder rooms be flooded, which Kissinger immediately forwarded to Moosally. After the explosion, Moosally ordered the ship to General Quarters, which meant that all doors and hatches were closed, impeding efforts by firefighting teams to approach Turret Two to fight its fires. Iowa's chief enlisted engineer tried to shut down electrical power to the forward portion of the ship, but Lieutenant Commander Dan Kimberlain, deputy chief engineer, relieved the engineer on the spot and canceled the order. Shutting off the electrical power would have prevented the firemen's hoses from working. While firefighters were extinguishing the fire in the turret, unknown Iowa personnel broke into and looted the lockers of several of the Turret Two crewmembers as well as some of the firefighting personnel. The Navy would later try to deny that this had taken place, before admitting that it had.
  38. ^ Thompson, p. 88, 100–101, 126–133. Because of a shortage of properly trained crewmen, Ziegler had been forced to reassign eight men to different duty stations an hour before the firing drill. Therefore, there was no accurate roster detailing the position of each of the 59 men assigned to the turret. The Navy's investigation would later find that only 13 men were formally qualified for the postions they were filling. The pattern of the debris in the center gun room led Mortensen to belive that the rammer had been inside the gun breech at the time of the explosion, indicating to him that an overram had occurred. John Mullahy, working in Turret Two's powder magazine, overheard during the shoot someone say that the center gun's gas ejection air was not functioning. Navy investigators would later conclude that the body in the pit was actually that of Gunner's Mate Third Class Peter E. Bopp even though Hartwig was more than 50-pounds heavier and seven inches taller than Bopp. Meyer had discovered and identified Bopp's body in the turret officer's booth. Meyer made a rudimentary sketch of the locations of the bodies in the turret which would later contradict some of the findings in the navy's initial investigation. With assistance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the navy was able to complete identification of all 47 sets of remains on May 16, 1989.
  39. ^ Thompson, p. 129. Drake also helped Mortensen unload the powder from Turret One's left gun.
  40. ^ Thompson, p. 109–110.
  41. ^ Thompson, p. 124, 133–134.
  42. ^ Thompson, p. 135.
  43. ^ Thompson, p. 135.
  44. ^ Thompson, p. 135–136.
  45. ^ Ten years after Iowa tragedy, only evidence left is memories
  46. ^ The Navy's Scapegoats, Gerald Posner, Penthouse, January 1990
  47. ^ a b "JAG: Into the Breech". TV.com. Retrieved 2007-05-15.
  48. ^ IMDB: A Glimpse of Hell

Books

  • Diehl, Alan E. (2003-01-27). Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups. Potomac Books. ISBN 1574885448. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Schwoebel, Richard L. (2001). Explosion Aboard the Iowa. Diane Pub Co. ISBN 0756765838. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Thompson II, Charles C. (1999). A Glimpse of Hell: The Explosion on the USS Iowa and Its Cover-Up. W. W. Norton. ISBN 0393047148. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

Web

Further information

Audio/visual

  • A&E Network (2001). History Undercover: USS Iowa Explosion. A & E Home Video.
  • Salomon, Mikael (Director) (2001). A Glimpse of Hell (Television production). 20th Century Fox Television.. Independent review: [1].

Printed media

  • Conahan, Frank C. (1990). Battleships, issues arising from the explosion aboard the USS Iowa. The Office of the Distributor. ASIN B00010DRDG. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Garzke Jr., William H. (1995). Battleships: United States Battleships, 1935-1992. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557501742. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Milligan, Richard D. (1989). Investigation to inquire into the explosion in number two turret on board USS Iowa (BB 61) which occurred in the vicinity of the Puerto Rico operating area on or about 19 April 1989. Secretary of the Navy. ASIN B00071T0DU. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Shilts, Randy (2005). Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military. St. Martin's Griffin. ISBN 0312342640. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
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