Hostage-taking in the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1996

The hostage-taking in the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1996 was an action by the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) Commando Edgar Sanchez . On December 17, 1996, during a diplomatic reception, MRTA fighters occupied the residential building of the Japanese ambassador and held around 120 diplomats, Peruvian politicians, officers, business people and other celebrities hostage. The MRTA first demanded the then President Alberto Fujimori to release all imprisoned Túpac Amaru members, in particular MRTA chief Víctor Polay and his deputy Peter Cárdenas Schulte, later a dialogue about the social conditions in Peru and prison improvements for their prisoners. On April 22, 1997, a command of the Peruvian Army stormed the villa and ended the occupation bloody. At 126 days, this was the longest hostage-taking in recent Latin American history. Alberto Fujimori resigned in November 2000 after it became known that his head of the secret service, Vladimiro Montesinos , had committed, along with a number of other serious crimes, among others. had ordered the immediate shooting of the surviving MRTA fighters after their arrest.

Background and context

The MRTA emerged from the Movement of the Revolutionary Left of Peru (MIR) . Politically, it was comparatively undogmatic and primarily fought to improve the miserable social situation of the indigenous rural population. The Túpac Amarus expressly distanced themselves from the tightly organized Maoist Sendero Luminoso ( Shining Path ). The occupation of the embassy was the last major action by the MRTA.

In September 1992, numerous leaders and members of the Shining Path and the MRTA were arrested in a large-scale operation - supported by the secret service and the military . In 1992, Fujimori's government had spectacularly captured the leaders of both large guerrilla organizations in Peru. Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán was tried, which caused publicity worldwide. After that, the activities of the two groups subsided. The Peruvian government under Fujimori finally disarmed a large number of the fighters through an offer of amnesty . By the end of 1994 6,400 rebels had given up their weapons.

The action of the MRTA in Lima in 1996 was a setback for the then President Alberto Fujimori. He had previously announced victory over the MRTA movement. According to estimates by correspondents, the country was relatively peaceful around 1996 , which in 1995 led to a large majority in favor of Fujimori's party and his re-election.

The MRTA's blow was aimed specifically at the Japanese embassy, as Fujimori is the son of Japanese immigrants. The Japanese were among the country's largest donors under his presidency.

After storming the embassy, Der Spiegel wrote: The MRTA rebels “had to die because a compromise negotiated would not have helped President Fujimori, whose popularity had plummeted in the fifth month of the hostage drama, to personal triumph. Torture and murder scandals in secret services, the coordinator of which Vladimiro Montesinos had made an unprecedented enrichment as the president's closest advisor, led to a crisis in the military and in the government. "

procedure

occupation

On the night of December 17, 1996, over 480 people attended a diplomatic reception at the Japanese embassy in Lima. The Japanese ambassador held a large reception on the occasion of Emperor Akihito's birthday . The then German ambassador Heribert Wöckel , his representative Jürgen Steinkrüger and development consultant Hannspeter Nintzel were among the guests.

A command of the MRTA under Néstor Cerpa Cartolini stormed the event at the reception in the residence of the Japanese ambassador . The MRTA fighters disguised themselves as waiters and thus gained access to a marquee in the garden of the residence. Most of the command’s 14 rebels were under 20 years of age. Many could neither read nor write and were in Lima for the first time in their lives .

The command released more than 200 of the 483 hostages on December 17th, mostly women. The MRTA fighters detained about 80 people in the living room of the residence. Ambassador Wöckel was in a separate room with 15 other people. Among the hostages were around a dozen ambassadors from all sorts of countries, two then Peruvian ministers (Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela ) and numerous Japanese business people. The ambassadors from Austria , Japan, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Greece and Spain were among the hostages.

The hostage-takers demanded the release of all imprisoned Túpac Amaru members, in particular MRTA chief Victor Polay and his deputy Peter Cárdenas Schulte . Around 400 MRTA activists were sitting in Peruvian prisons at the time.

During the hostage situation

The Peruvian government cut the power to the property immediately after the hostage-taking. The water supply was also cut off. The International Committee of the Red Cross provided hostages and hostage-takers with food. The hostage-takers had forbidden the introduction of alcohol; The Jesuit Father Juan Julio Wicht was only allowed a little mass wine by the MRTA fighters.

Among the hostages was the army general and founder of a Peruvian anti-terrorist unit Louis San Petri . In a food package from the ICRC , the head of the secret service, Vladimiro Montesinos, had a transmitter built into a Bible smuggled to him. San Petri thus sent information about the MRTA fighters to Vladimiro Montesinos. This answered by means of a smuggled pager .

The MRTA repeatedly let journalists into the embassy. Among these journalists were intelligence officials from the Peruvian Service who investigated the situation and made video recordings.

Father Juan Julio Wicht stayed with the hostages voluntarily, sought contact with the hostage takers and tried to mediate. Twice a week he took confession from the hostages and held a church service. "Some terrorists also took part," he said later. After learning about the liberation plans, he tolerated the use of force.

negotiations

The MRTA requested that President Alberto Fujimori be present in person during the negotiations. A member of the commando said on the radio that nothing would happen to the President, that he should " enter into dialogue" with the People's Ombudsman, Jorge Santisteban , and the Belgian clergyman Hubert Lanssiers . In the first week of the occupation, the MRTA activists backed off their calls for the release of their comrades in prisons, demanding better conditions for their detainees and a broad social dialogue about social change in Peru.

During the occupation, the rebels repeatedly released hostages through Archbishop Luis Cipriani . All three German hostages were released by the MRTA shortly after the occupation.

After Fujimori refused to release MRTA prisoners, negotiations did not progress. The negotiating commission recently included Archbishop Cipriani, Canada's Ambassador Anthony Vincent and Michel Minnig, the representative of the Red Cross. In the end, Cerpa largely gave in and only demanded the release of 20 sick comrades from the high-security prisons. Cuba was ready to grant asylum to the Túpac Amaru commando when they were safe. The then Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda intervened in the negotiations.

While Fujimori inter alia met with the then US President Bill Clinton and promised to resolve the occupation peacefully, the MRTA fighters noticed that tunnels were being dug under the embassy. The MRTA had heard scraping noises in early March, even though the military sounded marching music on the property. They went public and warned Fujimori not to play double games. At the same time, they moved the hostages from the ballroom on the ground floor to the upper floor of the building.

Japan opposed an early military action, which initially prohibited the use of Peruvian security forces on its embassy territory and urged negotiations. According to the Latin America News, the decisive factor for Fujimori to still carry out his storming plan and snub Japan in the process was the - non-public - support of the USA, which did not want to tolerate the diplomatic hostage- taking precedent as an example to be copied.

Operation Chavín de Huántar

On April 22, 1997, the Peruvian Army stormed the Japanese embassy and ended the occupation bloody. The operation was called Chavín de Huántar . Chavín de Huántar is an area in the Central Andes of Peru known for its underground passages.

140 elite soldiers from the army , air force and navy were involved in the storming. For training purposes, an exact replica of the message was set up on a training ground and scenarios were run through. The Peruvian units were supported in tactics, training and further preparation by the US Delta Force and the British Special Air Service (SAS). According to the news magazine Der Spiegel , the Peruvian army may also have brought in Israeli anti-terrorism soldiers. The exact preparation of the access was similar to the approach taken by the Israeli forces when they had prepared for the spectacular liberation operation in Entebbe in 1976 ( Operation Entebbe ). Miners dug an entire network of tunnels for the elite units. Without a loud drill, they drove several tunnels , each three meters deep, from neighboring houses under the embassy. From the tunnels, the military studied the movements of the MRTA and the hostages.

Politically, Fujimori later justified the order to attack with the reference that the MRTA command only wanted to allow doctor visits only once a week.

The first time the attack was attempted, the explosive charge in the tunnel did not detonate. The explosive device was then detonated using a car battery. Two heavy explosions from the tunnels initiated the operation at 3:30 p.m. Peruvian time (8:30 p.m. UTC ). Large numbers of the MRTA fighters have already been killed in the explosions. A fierce shooting ensued. Two soldiers were killed and 25 hostages were slightly injured. A judge at the Peruvian Supreme Court sustained a gunshot wound in the abdomen. He later died of complications from a heart attack . The then Peruvian Foreign Minister, Francisco Tudela , who was arrested , was hit in the foot. After 37 minutes of action, the balance sheet was drawn up: all 14 MRTA fighters were killed, two soldiers were killed, and a wounded hostage later died of a heart attack. Among the killed MRTA fighters was their leader Néstor Cerpa Cartolini . 71 hostages were freed.

The bodies of the MRTA fighters were kept under lock and key.

Reactions

In Germany, immediately after the occupation, a crisis team was set up in the Foreign Office and the Federal Government at the time ( Kohl V cabinet ) in Bonn offered the use of technical experts from the Federal Criminal Police Office .

After storming the embassy, Fujimori celebrated the victory with the soldiers involved and the hostages freed. "I did not hesitate a single minute to give the order for this liberation action," he told the media at the time. Protected by a bulletproof vest and standing on the roof of a car, he shouted: "In Peru we will not accept terrorism." His country had shown the international community that one should not be blackmailed by terrorism.

Post-story

Alberto Fujimori resigned in November 2000 after being embroiled in a scandal surrounding his secret service chief Vladimiro Montesinos . Montesinos himself was imprisoned for eight months. During this time in March 2001, the bodies of all 14 MRTA fighters involved in the embassy robbery were exhumed . The reason was the suspicion that soldiers murdered the MRTA fighters after they had arrested them. The investigation that followed revealed that at least three of the fighters had been executed.

According to observers, the Peruvian military felt that only 14 young and inexperienced fighters had been taken hostage and wanted to take revenge on the guerrillas. The hostage-taking was the last major armed operation by the MRTA.

In 2002, Montesinos was charged with directing his intelligence officers to execute the MRTA fighters. The indictment against him contained 70 charges. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison for conspiracy, corruption and embezzlement.