News and Security Services Act 2017

Basic data
Title:	Wet van 26 July 2017, houdende regels met betrekking tot de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten alsmede wijziging van enkele Wetten ( Law of 26 July 2017 with regulations relating to intelligence and security services and amendments to certain laws )
Short title:	Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017 ( Law on Intelligence and Security Services 2017 )
Abbreviation:	Wiv 2017
Type:	Law in the formal sense
Scope:	Netherlands
Legal matter:	Public order and security law
Issued on:	August 17, 2017 ( star 2017, 317 )
Entry into force on:	September 1, 2017 (partially) May 1, 2018 (fully)
Weblink:	Text of the law
Please note the note on the applicable legal version.

The Law on News and Security Services 2017 ( Dutch Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017 (Wiv 2017) ), also pejoratively referred to as Sleepwet or Sleepnetwet (German " Schleppnetzgesetz "), is a law of the Dutch Parliament that sets the legal framework for represents the two Dutch intelligence services , the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), and regulates control by the Control Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD). It replaced the law of the same name from 2002 (Wiv 2002).

Initially, the full law should come into force on January 1, 2018. However, as the search for candidates for the newly established Examination Board for the Use of Powers (TIB) took longer, the date of entry into force was postponed to May 1, 2018. The parts required to hire committee members and administrative staff who needed a security clearance have been in effect since September 2017.

Before it came into force, an advisory, non-binding referendum on the law took place on March 21, 2018 . A majority of the voters (49.44%) voted against the law. With a turnout of 51.54%, the referendum was valid. As a result, on April 6, the government decided to make minor changes to the law.

History of origin

In 2011, the Dutch Government's Control Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) issued a recommendation in which it advised, among other things, that the services should be given broader powers to intercept telecommunications over cables. The corresponding law from 2002 is "a bit out of date". The Second Chamber of the States General , the lower house of Parliament, then requested an evaluation. With this mandate, the independent Dessens Commission was founded in February 2013 and presented its report on December 2nd of the same year. The commission recommended that untargeted tapping and recording of wired telecommunications be allowed in future. Due to the growing distrust of the secret services, such an expansion of powers must be contrasted with a higher degree of "management, control and transparency".

Legislative process

The Dutch government published a draft proposal on the new Intelligence Service Act on July 2, 2015. In the following two months, everyone had the opportunity to submit an opinion on the draft law via an Internet consultation. This led to more than 1,100 mostly critical reactions, including from the telecommunications companies KPN and Tele2 , the employers' associations MKB-Nederland and VNO-NCW, and the Dutch Human Rights Committee, an independent supervisory body created on a statutory basis. They expressed concerns about the violation of citizens' privacy and the potential weakening of the competitive position of the Dutch economy, particularly the telecommunications sector. In response to this criticism, the government changed the draft proposal in April 2016, according to which an additional audit committee should be set up and the costs of telecommunications monitoring should no longer be passed on to the providers.

In 2016 the government issued an independent Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), i. H. commissioned an analysis of the impact of the draft law on citizens' privacy, carried out by scientists from the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) and the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society (TILT). The researchers were critical of the draft law and concluded that the risks to privacy were not adequately recognized and that the proposed safeguards were often insufficient to cover these risks.

The draft went to the State Council for consideration , which submitted a rather critical opinion to the government on September 21, 2016. In this opinion, the Council found that the draft law, while meeting the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of the proposed control system. For example, the newly established Audit Committee for the Use of Authorizations (TIB) could inadvertently fulfill an “alibi function” by working overly cautiously and issuing a permit by default. The State Council also expressed serious doubts about the retention period for data that the Services collects through extensive telecommunications surveillance. The ruling of the council again led to minor adjustments to the draft law, which was introduced to the second chamber at the end of October 2016. The Standing Committee on Home Affairs held three hearings with stakeholders and experts and more than 30 amendments were tabled during the plenary debate on February 7, 2017, most of which were rejected by the government and a majority in parliament. Finally, the draft was adopted by the Second Chamber on February 14, 2017 and by the First Chamber , the Senate, on July 11, 2017 . The results of both votes are as follows:

Voting results for the 2017 WIV in parliament
fraction	Second Chamber (number of seats)	First Chamber (number of seats)
VVD	For (40)	For (13)
PvdA	For (35)	For (8)
SP	Against (15)	Against (9)
CDA	For (13)	For (12)
PVV	For (12)	For (9)
D66	Against (12)	Against (10)
CU	For 5)	For 3)
GL	Against (4)	Against (4)
SGP	For 3)	For (2)
PvdD	Against (2)	Against (2)
50PLUS	For 1)	For (2)
Groep Bontes / Van Klaveren	For (2)	-
Van Vliet	For 1)	-
Small	Against (2)	-
Houwers	For 1)	-
Monasch	For 1)	-
OSF	-	For 1)
For:	115 (77%)	50 (67%)

On July 26, 2017, the royal copy took place and the law was published on August 17, 2017 in the Staatsblad, the public gazette of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Changes to the old law

Extension of powers

When the old Law on Intelligence and Security Services came into force in 2002, most international telecommunications were radio and satellite. Nowadays, cell phones , laptops and other mobile devices around the world communicate using fiber optic or copper cables . According to the old law, the AIVD and the MIVD are only allowed to intercept this wired communication if it is addressed to a specific person or organization. Under the new law, the services may also intercept wired communication more widely (“non-targeted interception”). This type of monitoring may only be carried out after a previously formulated and approved research assignment. The law therefore speaks of “research-oriented monitoring”. The most important reason for this type of authority extension is that sometimes the AIVD and MIVD do not focus on specific people when analyzing specific threats . This requires orientation research with a larger amount of communication data.

Tightening of controls

In order to guarantee the right to privacy of the citizens, the controls of the intelligence services are tightened: A new independent examination board for the use of powers (TIB) is to examine the legality of the consent given by the minister to the exercise of certain special powers before the actual exercise. According to the old law, permission from the minister to exercise special powers is sufficient.

In addition, complaints about the actions of the responsible ministers, the AIVD, the MIVD and the coordinator of the intelligence and security services can be submitted to the Control Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) during the Wiv 2017. The committee is divided into a control department and a complaint handling department. The Complaints Handling Department can, for example, decide that the AIVD or the MIVD must stop research or exercise a specific authority or destroy the processed data. According to the new law, the minister must obey this decision (Art. 124).

Another change to the old law is that the employees of the AIVD and the MIVD are given the opportunity to notify the complaints handling department of alleged deficiencies in the services. The reason for this new regulation is the importance of the reliability and integrity of these services.

Clarification of the regulations

Due to the rapid pace of technological development and the desire to give intelligence services a clear legal basis, a number of rules on hacking have been explicitly put into words. On the one hand, the Wiv 2017 expressly mentions the authority to access the desired computer via a computer or system of another person or organization. Second, the Wiv 2017 explicitly includes the authority to install technical devices on a computer, for example software that enables a camera or microphone to be activated in the computer. In addition, the Wiv 2017 stipulates that the services can first carry out a technical investigation before the actual intrusion into a computer.

The provisions on DNA analysis contained in the old Wiv Act 2002 have been supplemented. The old law contained no provisions on the storage of cellular material and the management of a DNA analysis file. The Wiv 2017 stipulates that DNA profiles that the intelligence services may produce on the basis of cell material may be compared with other DNA profiles in their own DNA database and other databases, such as the DNA database for criminals. The services must create the DNA profile within three months of receiving the cell material. Then they have to destroy the cell material within three months. The DNA profiles may be kept for a maximum of five years. With the approval of the minister, this period can be extended by five years at a time, with an upper limit of 30 years. The stored DNA profiles can be used as reference material for new profiles. They can also be shared with other authorities, for example with foreign security services.

The criteria for entering into a cooperation relationship with a foreign service, which in the old law were partially only to be found in the legal justification, are explicitly contained in the legal text of the Wiv 2017. The law also provides that the services may only enter into a new cooperation relationship with the consent of the minister. The inclusion of the criteria in the legal text is intended to promote transparency and care.

Coordination and the "Integrated Arrangement"

Article 3 of the law states that the Prime Minister , the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defense shall consult regularly on their policies in relation to the AIVD and the MIVD, respectively. The discussions between the competent ministers are prepared by a coordinator for the security and intelligence services in accordance with Article 4. This post is traditionally held by the Secretary General of the Ministry of General Affairs and has its own secretariat with specialist advisers.

The coordinator also chairs the Committee on Security and Intelligence in the Netherlands (CVIN), which is made up of representatives from the Ministry of General Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and Security consists. The task of the committee is to determine the need for news and to decide on priority issues. This gives rise to the proposal for an “integrated order” for the intelligence and security services, which is issued jointly by the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defense for a period of four years (Art. 5). Every year, the responsible ministers check whether the “integrated arrangement” needs to be changed. They may only make a change after consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Justice and Security (Art. 6).

Tasks of the services

AIVD

AIVD headquarters in Zoetermeer

For the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the law mentions the following tasks, which are listed after the letters referred to in Article 8, paragraph 2:

• A task : carrying out investigations into organizations and persons who are seriously suspected of posing a threat to the democratic legal order , the security of the state or other serious state interests;
• B task : the implementation of security checks for candidates for trustworthy functions (this task is regulated separately in another law);
• C task : the promotion of security measures, including those for the protection of parts of the authorities and the economy that are of vital interest to the maintenance of social life;
• D task : carrying out investigations into other countries;
• E-task : the creation of threat and risk analyzes for people, services and objects in the country;
• F-task : the provision of data, linked to various conditions, which the service knows about certain persons or institutions.

MIVD

Headquarters of the MIVD in The Hague

For the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the law mentions the following tasks, which are listed after the letters referred to in Article 10, paragraph 2:

• Task A : To conduct investigations into the military potential of other countries for the correct construction and appropriate deployment of the Dutch armed forces, as well as into factors which influence or can influence the enforcement and promotion of the international legal order, insofar as the armed forces are involved or are likely to be involved could be;
• B-task : conducting security reviews of candidates for trustworthy positions in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces as well as for their suppliers;
• C task : the procurement of information to prevent activities that are aimed at impairing the security or operational readiness of the armed forces, to promote the correct process of mobilization and the contraction of the armed forces, as well as for the undisturbed preparation and undisturbed deployment of the armed forces within the framework the enforcement and promotion of the international legal order;
• D task : promoting measures to maintain the security and operational readiness of the armed forces, including measures to protect information about the armed forces that are subject to confidentiality;
• E-task : carrying out investigations into other countries in relation to military-relevant issues;
• F-task : the creation of threat analyzes for persons, services and objects of military interest;
• G task : the provision, subject to various conditions, of data known to the service about specific persons or facilities of military interest.

Special powers

To carry out the above tasks, the law assigns both the AIVD and the MIVD a number of special powers. The exercise of these special powers is only permitted if the required information cannot be obtained or cannot be obtained promptly from publicly available sources.

The special powers are exhaustively listed in Articles 40 to 58 of the Act:

• the observation and tracking of people with or without the use of necessary equipment (Art. 40)
• the use of (covert) agents for the targeted acquisition of data on persons and organizations (Art. 41)
• the search of closed places and objects with or without the use of a technical aid (Art. 42)
• the search of a DNA analysis to establish or verify a person's identity. The cell material must be destroyed no later than three months after the analysis, the DNA profiles may be stored for a maximum of five years with the possibility of further extensions by five years each time (Art. 43)
• opening letters and other mail, but only with the permission of the Court of The Hague (Art. 44)
• intrusion into an "automated system" ( hacking ) with or without the use of a technical aid, incorrect signals, incorrect keys, incorrect functions or with a third party computer system (Art. 45)
• the targeted eavesdropping, receiving, recording and interception of any form of conversation or electronic communication (Art. 47)
• the untargeted monitoring of electronic communication, the subsequent determination of the type of telecommunication, the determination or verification of the persons or organizations involved, as well as the use of automated data analysis and the targeted selection of content data for further analysis (Articles 48–50). The law calls this authority "investigative investigation", opponents speak of a "trawl".
• requesting data from providers of a communication service that are required for targeted and untargeted monitoring, as well as requesting cooperation in the implementation (Art. 52-53)
• requesting data from providers of a communication service relating to the stored telecommunication of a user (Art. 54)
• the request for data from providers of a communication service about the communication traffic of a specific user at or around the time of the request (Art. 55)
• requesting the following data from providers of a communication service: name, address and number of a user. This is done via the Centraal Informatiepunt Onderzoek Telecommunicatie (CIOT), which acts as an intermediary for the relevant data from telecommunications and internet providers (Art. 56)
• the request to cooperate in undoing any existing encryption of the data for the purpose of targeted and untargeted monitoring (Art. 57)
• Access to all places that employees need to exercise their tasks and powers (Art. 58)

According to Articles 26 and 28, all these powers may only be exercised if the following conditions are met:

• Proportionality (the goal must outweigh and justify the invasion of privacy)
• Subsidiarity (the goal cannot be achieved with less difficult means)
• Purposefulness (the means must be consistent with a specific goal)

If the special powers referred to in Article 44 (opening letters), Article 47 (specific examination of communications) or Article 58 (access to housing) have been exercised with regard to a person, a review must be carried out five years after the end of the exercise of the person's can be informed about it, provided that no serious interests of the services or other countries are seriously damaged. This is known as the obligation to test (Art. 59).

The officers of the AIVD and MIVD have no police executive powers , for example, they are not authorized to carry a weapon or to make arrests. However, the police can use their powers based on information from the AIVD.

Access to databases

On the basis of Article 39, the AIVD and MIVD may request data from administrative authorities, officials and other persons who are considered to be informants in order to support the performance of their tasks . This includes, for example, the provision of complete databases or the granting of “direct automated access” to such databases. It concerns data that are voluntarily made available to the services and therefore does not constitute an exercise of any special authority , so it does not require the Minister's consent .

The direct, automated access to databases takes place according to the explanatory memorandum on the basis of a so-called "hit / no-hit procedure", i. H. The data can only be made available to the secret service if a search term matches a term in the database concerned (a "hit" or "hit").

The secret services may apply data analysis to data from publicly accessible sources, from their own databases, from databases provided by third parties and from databases to which there is direct automated access. The analysis includes the automatic data comparison from these databases, the search of data using profiles and the data comparison to search for specific patterns.

According to the explanatory memorandum, it was originally intended that no action should be taken against persons solely on the basis of the results obtained based on the application of a profile. However, it was finally stated in Article 60 (3) that human judgment and interpretation must be applied to the outcome of all forms of data analysis.

Retention periods

According to Art. 27, data obtained by exercising one of the special powers must be checked for relevance as quickly as possible and, as soon as this is no longer given, destroyed. The following retention periods apply to the rest:

• Most of the data that has been obtained by the services on the basis of this law and has not been used within one year (possibility of extension up to 1.5 years) must be destroyed.
• Confidential communication between a lawyer and his client must be destroyed immediately, unless the court of The Hague has given its consent.
• Data from investigative telecommunications surveillance (non-targeted surveillance) may be kept for a maximum of three years, with the exception of the part that has been used in the meantime.
• DNA material that has not been tested after three months (possibility of extension up to 6 months) must be destroyed.

Article 76 enables citizens to request access to the personal data that the services have processed about them. Article 80 also gives this right to non-personal data relating to a specific administrative matter. Regulations for applying for, granting and refusing such applications have been laid down in Chapter 5 of the Act (Articles 74 to 85).

Data provision and cooperation

In the last paragraph of the third chapter (Articles 62 to 70), the Wiv 2017 regulates the provision of the data processed by AIVD and MIVD. According to Article 62, the services may disclose data to their minister, administrative bodies and other persons or entities, as well as to foreign intelligence and security services with which they work. The regulations on domestic and foreign cooperation are contained in Chapter 6 of the Act (Articles 86 to 96).

For all data that are provided, the services can stipulate that they may not be passed on to third parties (Art. 65). Internationally this is referred to as the "third party rule".

At home

The cooperation between AIVD and MIVD has been regulated in Articles 86 and 87. Both services have been working together in the Joint Sigint Cyber ​​Unit (JSCU) since 2014 for the implementation of hack operations and targeted and untargeted surveillance.

If any of the services comes across information that could be relevant to the investigation of criminal offenses, the minister or the head of the service may inform the public prosecutor in writing in accordance with Art. 66 . Personal data may only be passed on if the recipient is also authorized to take action against the person concerned (Art. 68). Conversely, the public prosecutor's office must provide the AIVD or the MIVD with data that may be of interest for these services (Art. 93).

According to Article 91, the National Police , the Royal Marechaussee , the Tax Office , the Immigration and Naturalization Authority (IND) and the Social and Labor Inspectorate can perform tasks for the AIVD. The police use the regional intelligence services (RID-Wiv) for this. The Marechaussee can also perform tasks for the MIVD (Art. 92). Such tasks are carried out under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Defense according to the instructions of the head of the AIVD or the MIVD.

The AIVD and the MIVD may provide (technical) support to the police and other entities entrusted with the investigation of criminal offenses upon request (Art. 95).

Abroad

Before entering into a cooperation relationship with a foreign service, the consent of the minister is required. First, however, taking into account the following criteria, it must be weighed whether such admission is possible, and if so, in what type and intensity: the democratic embedding, the protection of human rights , the professionalism and reliability, the legal powers and possibilities as well as that Data protection level (Art. 88). These criteria are set out in what is known as a “consideration note”.

Foreign services with which such a cooperation relationship exists may be provided with data, provided that this does not impair the interests and the proper execution of the tasks of the Dutch services (Art. 89 (1)). However, if it concerns unevaluated data, the prior consent of the minister is required (Art. 89 para. 2). This approval does not have to be checked by the TIB. Unevaluated data are often larger amounts of data whose relevance for the service has not yet been assessed. If it concerns data that was collected during the untargeted surveillance of telecommunications, the Control Committee (CTIVD) must also be informed immediately.

For an urgent and important reason, both evaluated and unevaluated data may be shared with foreign services with which there is no cooperation relationship. This also requires the consent of the minister, without examination by the TIB (Art. 64).

The AIVD and the MIVD may provide (technical) support at the request of a foreign service, provided that this does not affect the interests and the proper execution of the tasks of the Dutch services. In addition, it must not lead to a foreign service itself collecting data in the Netherlands. The prior consent of the minister or the head of the service is also required (Art. 89 paras. 4 to 6). Conversely, the Dutch services can also request help from foreign partner services. Article 90 contains further provisions on this.

Approval and review

The consent of the minister is required for the systematic acquisition of data on specific persons from publicly accessible sources, but this can also be given in the mandate by the head of service or in the sub-mandate by an employee of the service (Art. 38).

Consent of the Minister

The prior consent of the responsible minister is required to exercise one of the special powers: for the AIVD of the interior minister, for the MIVD of the defense minister. At the written request of the head of the competent service, the minister can grant this approval for a period of up to three months, after which a request can be made for an extension for the same period (Articles 29 and 30). The minister's approval is also required for the various forms of cooperation with foreign services.

Consent of the court

However, when it comes to exercising a special power against a lawyer or a journalist in which confidential communication with his client or data can be collected via a source, the court of The Hague must give consent. This is done at the request of the minister for a period of up to four weeks, with the possibility of an extension (Art. 30). If, in other cases, data is collected about communication between a lawyer and his client through the exercise of a special authorization, it must be destroyed immediately (Art. 27 Para. 2).

Examination by the TIB

For most special powers, the law stipulates that the approval of the minister must be checked for legality by the newly established examination committee for the use of powers (TIB). The examination board consists of three members who are appointed for six years on the proposal of the minister. At least two of the three members, including the chairman, must have served as judges for at least six years . The TIB has its own secretariat (Articles 32 to 37).

Control committee

In Articles 97 to 134, the law regulates the Control Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD). With effect from this law, the committee consists of a control department and a complaints handling department.

• The Control Department controls the legality of the implementation of the Law on Intelligence and Security Services 2017 and the Law on Security Clearance (Wvo). On this basis, both the actions of the AIVD and the MIVD, for which the department has extensive investigative powers, are examined. The CTIVD gives the Minister non-binding advice.
• The Complaints Handling department investigates and assesses complaints about the AIVD, the MIVD, the responsible ministers and the coordinator of the intelligence and security services, as well as reports of alleged irregularities in the services. The judgment of the complaints handling department is binding.

The Audit Committee consists of four members, including a chairman, who are appointed by royal decree on a proposal from the Second Chamber for a term of six years. The chairman of the committee is also chairman of the control department. One member of the committee acts as chair of the complaints handling department. Both departments have three members, including their chairman. The control committee is supported by its own secretariat.

Reports are drawn up on the examinations carried out by the CTIVD. In addition, an annual activity report is submitted to the two chambers of the States General. Both the investigation reports and the activity report are public, but may contain a secret appendix that can only be read by members of the Intelligence and Security Services Committee (CIVD).

Review of the law

Article 167 stipulates that every five years the government will send a report to Parliament on the expediency and consequences of this law. In the coalition agreement of the Rutte III cabinet , it was decided that after two years an independent commission would begin with an initial review of the law.

Web links

• Full text of the law (Dutch)
• Grounds for the law (Dutch)
• Topic edition of the Justitiële verkenningen series of the Ministry of Justice and Security (Dutch, English summary )
• Website of the Control Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) (Dutch, English)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Invoering sleepwet uitgesteld tot 1 mei. In: Het Parool . October 31, 2017, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
2. ↑ Dutch force a referendum on telephone surveillance. In: Zeit Online . November 1, 2017, accessed November 4, 2017 . 
3. ↑ Ina D'hondt: Referendum - Dutch struggle with espionage law. In: ZDF today . March 23, 2018, accessed March 25, 2018 . 
4. ↑ Uitslag referendum over Wiv: meerderheid tegen. Kiesraad , March 29, 2018, accessed March 29, 2018 (Dutch). 
5. ↑ ^{a b c} Ontstaan ​​van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2017. (No longer available online.) In: Referendumcommissie. Archived from the original on January 25, 2018 ; Retrieved January 25, 2018 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
6. ↑ Commissie-Dessens biedt evaluatierapport Wiv 2002 aan. In: AIVD . December 2, 2013, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
7. ↑ Michael Persson: Commissie-Dessens: geef de AIVD meer bevoegdheden. In: de Volkskrant . December 2, 2013, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
8. ↑ Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten in consultatie. (No longer available online.) In: Rijksoverheid.nl. July 2, 2015, archived from the original on August 7, 2015 ; Retrieved November 4, 2017 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
9. ↑ Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 20 .. In: Internetconsultatie.nl. July 2, 2015, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
10. ↑ Huib Modderkolk: Cabinet houdt vast aan massaal aftappen internetverkeer. In: de Volkskrant . April 29, 2016, Retrieved November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
11. ↑ Advies W04.16.0097 / I. In: Council of State . September 21, 2016, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
12. ↑ What is he born with het advies van de Raad van State op het voorstel voor de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten? (No longer available online.) In: Rijksoverheid.nl. Archived from the original on October 13, 2017 ; Retrieved November 4, 2017 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
13. ↑ Forse kritiek op wetsvoorstel inlichtingeniensten. In: Computable.nl. December 3, 2016, accessed November 7, 2017 (Dutch). 
14. ↑ Ingediende amendementen op het voorstel van de wet op de Inlichtingen- veiligheidsdiensten 20 .. In: bekendmakingen Officiële. February 8, 2017, Retrieved November 7, 2017 (Dutch). 
15. ↑ Nieuwe Wet op de Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten. (No longer available online.) In: AIVD . Archived from the original on September 4, 2017 ; Retrieved November 4, 2017 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
16. ↑ Overview of stemmingen in the Tweede Kamer. (PDF) In: First Chamber of the States General . February 14, 2017, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
17. ↑ Stemming Wet op de Inlichtingen-en veiligheidsdiensten 20 .. In: First Chamber of the States-General . July 11, 2017, accessed November 4, 2017 (Dutch). 
18. ↑ Hoofdstuk 2: De diensten en de coördinatie tussen de diensten (article 3 t / m 16). (No longer available online.) In: Referendumcommissie. Archived from the original on January 25, 2018 ; Retrieved January 25, 2018 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
19. ↑ Mythes en misunderstood over de AIVD. (No longer available online.) In: AIVD . Archived from the original on October 15, 2017 ; Retrieved November 6, 2017 (Dutch). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
20. ↑ Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34588, 3, Memorie van toelichting. In: Officiële bekendmakingen. November 1, 2016, p. 58 , accessed November 29, 2017 (Dutch). 
21. ↑ Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34588, 3, Memorie van toelichting. In: Officiële bekendmakingen. November 1, 2016, pp. 132-133 , accessed November 29, 2017 (Dutch). 
22. ↑ CTIVD report no 49 about uitwisseling van ongeëvalueerde Gegevens. In: AIVD . June 30, 2016, accessed November 7, 2017 (Dutch). 

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