Green males

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In front of Simferopol Airport (February 2014)

"Green Man" ( Russian зелёные человечки ; Ukrainian зелені чоловічки ) in Russia as "polite people" ( Russian Вежливые люди called), are armed and masked members of the Russian armed forces , which in the course of the Ukraine War for the first time on the Crimea and later in the East of the country were used. The soldiers wore green Ratnik uniforms , balaclavas and Russian military equipment and did not wear any national emblems . They appeared in Crimea at the beginning of the annexation of Crimea, blocked and occupied administrative buildings and Ukrainian barracks and prevented the Ukrainian armed forces from intervening against the referendum on the status of Crimea .

Because of the color of their uniforms, they were known as "green men". This name was first used by the Crimean people, alluding to the fact that the troops apparently came out of nowhere.

Operations and equipment

In front of a Ukrainian barracks (March 2014)

The first green uniformed soldiers without a national badge appeared in Crimea at the end of February 2014. They were armed with Ratnik combat suits of the Russian infantry .

In March 2014, the “green men” began to take an active part in military operations in the Crimea. They blocked roads, occupied administrative buildings, police stations, military facilities and Simferopol International Airport. They took control of Ukrainian government institutions and occupied the building of the Crimean Supreme Council on February 27.

The “green men” have also been used in eastern Ukraine since the beginning of April 2014, especially in the Ukrainian regional authorities of Donetsk and Luhansk. They are proceeding according to the same pattern as during the occupation and annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014. In the Donetsk Basin, they have organized followers who carry out attacks on Ukrainian facilities for up to 500 US dollars. In addition to local followers, Russian volunteers and soldiers from the Vostok battalion from Chechnya also take part in the actions of the “green men” . Weapons are replenished across the long border between the two provinces and Russia, which the Ukrainian army cannot control.

origin

Russia initially denied any connection with the “green men”. Russia initially said the men were local "self-defense groups" who bought their uniforms and weapons from local shops. According to international media reports, the troops were armed with weapons used by the Russian army, their automobiles had Russian license plates, and the men spoke in a Central Russian dialect different from the South Russian dialect native to Crimea. For the fact that these groups were Russian professional soldiers, according to Otto Luchterhandt, among other things, the uniform Russian and ultra-modern uniforms and equipment, the well-coordinated military leadership of the units, the spaciousness and coordination of military actions, in particular the area-wide encirclement and occupation of the Ukrainian military bases, as well as the hijacking of the Ukrainian warships and the strict refusal to provide information about their origin and mission.

In some cases, GRU soldiers who posted photos on their social networks and were negligent with their name tags could be identified through Facebook .

In March 2015, Russian general Igor Kassatonov announced in an interview with RIA Novosti that the “green men” were members of a special unit of the Russian military intelligence service GRU . According to Kassonov, the deployment of Russian special forces was accompanied by deception and concealment measures ( maskirovka ) and disinformation . The Black Sea Fleet made the Russian takeover of power in Crimea possible from February 23. Officers had been privy to the plans and had prepared military positions in the Crimea for the transport of the "polite people". Military equipment was brought to the Crimea on ships from Novorossiysk and radio silence was observed during the transport . According to Kassatonov's information, the troops were transferred to the Crimea by air; six helicopters and three IL-76 planes landed in Katscha near Sevastopol .

In a TV question time on April 17, 2014, President Putin was asked who the “green men” were in Crimea. Putin admitted that the green uniformed troops were Russian soldiers deployed in Crimea. The situation in Crimea made the deployment of Russian armed forces “necessary”, Putin said.

The soldiers were recruited from the 3rd Guard Special Reconnaissance Brigade stationed in Tolyatti , which had previously been deployed in the Chechen and Georgian wars, and the 45th Airborne Guard Regiment for special tasks . In the Crimea, the “green men” were the vanguard and were part of a total of 11,000 to 30,000 soldiers who were involved in the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

Part of hybrid warfare

The deployment of the “green men” in Ukraine has sparked increased debate on hybrid warfare . A hybrid war uses a combination of intelligence operations, insurgent support, disinformation and other methods to attack the enemy instead of an open military invasion. It is crucial that the aggressor credibly denies these acts to the local and international community. Russia's initial denial of involvement created confusion and ensured that Ukraine and Western allies were not completely sure if they were Russian troops. Known as "Maskirowka", this strategy of deception and concealment gave Russian troops enough time to take control of the peninsula. In parts of eastern Ukraine, the conditions for a Russian hybrid war were particularly favorable: a large Russian military and intelligence presence, dominance of Russian media and the alienation of the population from the new Kiev government . In Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the elements of hybrid warfare have been used so successfully that, even after President Putin's admission, some people believe that the “green men” were local forces.

monument

Monument in Simferopol (2016)

On June 11, 2016, a memorial to the “polite people” was opened in Simferopol . The composition is made up of three sculptures: a military man (with a height of 2.5 m), a little girl who holds out a bouquet of flowers and a tomcat as a symbol of a peaceful, quiet life. The sculptor is Salavat Shcherbakov , who is also the creator of the memorial to long-distance pilots . There is also a monument to the “Polite People” in Belogorsk .

Web links

Commons : "Polite people"  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. This is how the so-called "Ukraine crisis" came about. In: Huffington Post , December 28, 2015, accessed October 19, 2016.
  2. Little green men, a hybrid war and the problems of NATO . Welt Online , June 25, 2014; Retrieved October 19, 2016.
  3. ^ Peter Hilpold: Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with Arguments Drawn from History . In: Chinese Journal of International Law , 14, No. 2, 2015, pp. 237–270.
  4. a b c d e Otto Luchterhandt : The connection of Crimea to Russia from an international law perspective . In: Archiv des Völkerrechts , 52, Nr. 2, June 2014, pp. 137–174.
  5. Niels Annen: Russia: Dealing with an awkward partner (PDF) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung , July 2015.
  6. a b c d e f g Hannes Adomeit : Russian military strategy: The lessons of the Russian generals . In: NZZ , July 18, 2014.
  7. Stefanie Bolzen, Christoph B. Schiltz: Operation green men . In: Welt Online , January 31, 2016.
  8. a b c Veronika Bílková: The Use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea (PDF) In: Journal of Foreign Public Law and International Law . 75, No. 1, 2015, pp. 27-50.
  9. When Putin called the green men . In: N-tv , March 2, 2015.
  10. Iulian Chifu and Andreea Ibănescu: The frozen conflicts seem to melt down . In Iulian Chifu and Simona Țuțuianu: Torn Between East and West: Europe's Border States . Routledge, New York 2017, ISBN 978-1-4724-7579-4 , p. 148 .
  11. a b Josef Joffe . The war of the little green men . In: Zeit Online , April 17, 2014.
  12. ^ A b Antonello Tancredi: The Russian annexation of the Crimea: questions relating to the use of force (PDF) In: Questions in International Law . 1, 2014, pp. 3–34.
  13. a b c Адмирал Касатонов: Севастополь готовится к базированию "Мистраля" . In: RIA Novosti , March 13, 2015. Archived from the original on October 25, 2016. 
  14. Keir Giles: Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Execise of Power . ( Memento of the original from November 8, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Chatham House, March 2016, p. 54. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.chathamhouse.org
  15. Putin and the Ukraine: “Our troops were also in the Crimea.” In: Der Tagesspiegel , April 17, 2014, accessed on October 19, 2016.
  16. Bastian Geigerisch: Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict (PDF) In: Connections: The Quarterly Journal . 15, No. 2, 2016, pp. 65-72.
  17. a b Nico Popescu: Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian . In: European Union Institute for Security Studies , January 2015.
  18. Mark Galeotti : Hybrid War and Little Green Men: How It Works and How It Doesn't ( Memento of the original from November 27, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . In Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa: Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives . E-International Relations, Bristol 2015, ISBN 978-1-910814-00-0 , pp. 156-164. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / shron.chtyvo.org.ua
  19. "Вежливые люди" из бронзы появились в Симферополе. In: BBC , June 11, 2016, accessed October 19, 2016 (Russian).
  20. В Крыму открыли памятник "вежливым людям"