Royal coup in Romania in 1944

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King Michael I of Romania (1947)

The Royal coup was on August 23, 1944, the leadership of the Romanian king I. Michael performed overthrow the Kingdom of Romania . The result was the end of Marshal Ion Antonescu's military dictatorship and the military alliance with the German Reich , the defeat of which was looming in World War II .

As a result, Romania took part in the war on the side of the Allies . Domestically, the coup made a short-term democratization possible, but ultimately paved the way for the country to be integrated into Soviet power.

The historiography of Romania , which was communist-ruled until 1989 , and that of the Eastern Bloc described the coup as an anti-fascist uprising of the Romanian people, to which the king only contributed insofar as he was at its head.

prehistory

Romania before entering World War II

Romania had - although militarily inferior - as an ally of the Entente after the First World War in the Treaty of Trianon and Saint-Germain large territorial gains in the north-west and north at the expense of the decaying Habsburg Monarchy made. It was also able to use the turmoil of the Russian Civil War and appropriate Bessarabia . In terms of foreign policy, the country's governments tried to lean on the Western powers ( Great Britain and especially France ). On April 13, 1939 - shortly after the defeat of Czechoslovakia  - the British and French governments gave Romania a guarantee of assistance in the event of an attack against the country.

Domestically, Romania was constitutionally a constitutional monarchy . The governments had to contend with severe economic problems and mostly only had a short lifespan. In 1930 King Charles II took power and tried to gradually subordinate the country to his autocratic leadership. In 1938 he achieved the elimination of parliament and established a royal dictatorship .

The political changes in Europe at the beginning of World War II presented the current foreign policy fundamentally challenged: The Armistice of Compiègne in June 1940 sealed the defeat of France against the German Reich; Great Britain also fell out as a supporter of Romania. In the main political and military circles of Romania, fear of a Soviet invasion forced them to lean closely to the German Reich. This connection was of limited value for Romania, however, since Germany had already granted Bessarabia to the Soviet Union as part of its sphere of interest in August 1939 in the secret additional protocol of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact . The German government, asked for assistance by Charles II, recommended Romania to comply with Soviet demands for territorial cession. From June 28 to July 1, 1940, Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and the north of Bucovina without a fight . On August 30, 1940, Romania had to submit to the Second Vienna Arbitration , in which Hungary, who was also dependent on Germany but was at odds with Romania, received northern Transylvania from Romania.

As a result of these events, on September 4, 1940, Charles II was forced to appoint General Ion Antonescu , who was critical of him, as Prime Minister. Just two days later, he forced Karl to abdicate and, together with the fascist Iron Guard under Horia Sima, established a military dictatorship. After Charles II's abdication, his son, 18-year-old Michael I , was formally king. Antonescu, however, only granted him representative tasks; political power was in the hands of the military dictator and his government. Romania joined the Tripartite Pact on November 23, 1940 . After the Iron Guard tried unsuccessfully to take sole power in a coup in January 1941, Antonescu formed a government with Hitler's consent .

The campaign against the Soviet Union

Operation Jassy-Kishinev

When Hitler pushed ahead with preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 , Marshal Ion Antonescu saw an opportunity to win back the territories that had been lost to the Soviet Union in 1940 by participating in this campaign. Without a formal alliance being agreed, Antonescu allowed the Wehrmacht to use the country as a deployment base for the attack. Romania itself took part in the war with two armies ( 3rd and 4th Army ), which was initially very successful: the Romanian troops were able to recapture northern Bukovina and Bessarabia within a few weeks. In addition, it received the administration of Transnistria , an area in southern Ukraine with the city of Odessa .

From the end of 1941 military successes were less common; At the end of 1942, the two Romanian armies were finally involved in the battle of Stalingrad and were largely destroyed there. From 1943 onwards, the Romanian units newly established over the course of the year - like the German Wehrmacht - were mostly in retreat. By mid-1944 the Red Army had already advanced into Romanian territory in the northeast. Here the front stabilized temporarily. Operation Jassy-Kishinev began on August 20, 1944 : after a few hours, the attacking Soviet troops had overcome the German-Romanian lines of defense. The sections that were defended by the less combat-ready Romanian units were deliberately chosen as breakthrough points. Marshal Antonescu intended to build a new line of defense inside the country, but met with opposition from many of his generals, who viewed this as a senseless bloodbath.

Preparations for the coup

Iuliu Maniu

As the war lasted longer, the number of victims increased, and the outcome of the war became more and more unpopular among the Romanian population. Antonescu himself planned to leave the alliance with Germany and withdraw from the war in order to prevent an occupation of the country by the Red Army. However, for fear of German intervention, he continued to delay this step. He had intelligence information that opposition forces were pushing his overthrow, but he did nothing about it.

Secret negotiations between government officials and the Western powers in Cairo had made it clear that military support from the United States or Great Britain was not to be expected. The only option left was to strive for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union alone. The opposition parties, which were formally forbidden but not completely eliminated in their activities, learned of the secret talks and began in 1943 to found a "National Democratic Bloc" ( Blocul National Democratic ). In addition to the two major pre-war parties (the National Liberals and the Peasant Party ), it also included the Social Democrats and the Communists . The bourgeois parties hoped, through the participation of the Communists, that northern Bukovina and Bessarabia would remain with Romania in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Communist Party had little significance at first; its membership in the summer of 1944 is estimated at less than 1,000.

In July 1944, plans for leaving the military alliance with Germany became more concrete on the part of the opposition. The aim was to convince Antonescu to end the war. Only in the event of his refusal should he be arrested and a coalition government of the four opposition parties take power.

The course of the coup

The Royal Palace in Bucharest (1941)

The coup was originally planned by King Michael for August 26, 1944. In view of the dramatic military situation, however, the opposition felt urged to act quickly. The king's military adviser, General Constantin Sănătescu , arranged for King Michael to invite Antonescu to an audience. There Antonescu should agree to the withdrawal from the military alliance with Germany; otherwise his arrest was planned. Ion Antonescu visited the King for the planned audience on the afternoon of August 23rd. This took place in the Casa Nouă of the Bucharest Royal Palace. Antonescu's bodyguard was waiting outside the building; Michael had armed confidantes and officers posted in the adjoining rooms of his reception room. In the corridor in front of the room stood a captain of the palace guards who had also been informed of the coup plans with three non-commissioned officers. In addition to Ion Antonescu, the influential Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu attended the royal audience. He arrived at around 3:45 p.m., Ion Antonescu was about 15 minutes late, so he arrived at 4:15 p.m. Until then, King Michael and Mihai Antonescu talked superficially.

Michael I first addressed the breakthrough of the Soviet troops through the front and asked Marshal Antonescu how he intended to react. He denied a decisive success of the Red Army; Although there had been a Soviet advance, he was confident that he could stop it. The "Carpathian fortress" is insurmountable for the Red Army. Michael, on the other hand, demanded an immediate ceasefire. Antonescu refused and was asked by Michael to resign. This was also rejected by Antonescu; he could not place the fate of Romania in the hands of the young king. Michael was silent at first and then left the room on the grounds that he wanted to drink a glass of water. In the corridor he motivated the captain of the palace guards again for the possibly imminent access.

After Michael returned to his reception room, he asked Antonescu to reconsider his decision. When Antonescu replied that he would not change his mind, he let the captain of the guard enter. The latter told Antonescu that he was under arrest from now on. His hand was on the pistol; he had orders to shoot at Antonescu immediately in case he resisted or tried to flee. A guard searched Antonescu unsuccessfully for weapons. Antonescu called out to the conspirators that they would regret their actions; he announced that he would shoot everyone involved. Marshal Antonescu and Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu were locked up in a room on the upper floor where Michael's father Charles II - who was now in exile - kept his stamp collection. At the same time, other members of the palace guard arrested Antonescu's bodyguards waiting in the courtyard. Shortly afterwards, army units loyal to the king occupied the most important ministries and administrative buildings in Bucharest.

Then Michael consulted with his confidants about the formation of a new government. At that moment, the German ambassador to Romania, Manfred von Killinger , came to the royal palace. He had found out about the arrest of Antonescu, but initially considered this to be implausible. Michael threatened from Killinger that Soviet troops would occupy all of Romania in a short time. Michael replied that he "regretted" the situation; But he had to ask von Killinger "to accept the situation and to induce the Reich government to withdraw the German troops from Romania immediately in order to spare the previous brotherhood of the two armies the worst."

On the evening of August 23, at 10:15 p.m. Eastern European time , Michael I addressed his compatriots in a radio address . He announced the break of diplomatic relations with Germany, the armistice with the Allies and the overthrow of the dictator Antonescu. The speech lasted about 20 minutes; Michael justified the change of sides with the aim of regaining northern Transylvania , which was lost in 1940 .

The German reaction

The agencies responsible for foreign relations in Germany always observed the political events in the allied states with suspicion, especially with the advancing advance of the Red Army. This is how vague intelligence had reached Berlin that parts of the army and Romania's political scene were trying to abandon the alliance with Germany. Ion Antonescu himself tried again and again to calm Hitler down. On August 5, 1944, he had visited Hitler in Wolfsschanze and assured him that the entire Romanian army and the entire Romanian population were behind him. The German ambassador von Killinger had little insight into the political process and reported on August 10th that there were no signs of a conspiracy; King Michael is a guarantor for the German-Romanian alliance. A change of sides in Romania had been considered by the responsible German authorities. In this case, the occupation of the country was planned from the end of 1943; the associated operational plan was called "Operation Margarethe II". After Hitler saw the situation in Romania stable and he had assured himself of Antonescu's loyalty in February 1944, the plans for "Margarethe II" were not pursued any further. The German leadership was thus quite unprepared for the coup.

King Michael and his entourage initially hoped that the Germans would not fight the coup; the armistice with the Allies was linked to the offer of free unhindered withdrawal to the German units.

After von Killinger left the royal palace on August 23, he tried to organize German military resistance against the coup. However, he was locked in the embassy building. The same applied to the commanding general and commander of the German Air Force in Romania, Alfred Gerstenberg , who had the only numerically significant German combat formations near Bucharest. These were about 2,000 to 3,000 men who were responsible for protecting the important oil refineries in Ploieşti and who had little infantry experience.

The Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South Ukraine , Johannes Frießner , took over command of all German units stationed in Romania on his own responsibility late in the evening of 23 August. After King Michael's radio address, he called Hitler around 11 p.m. and informed him of the situation. Hitler was extremely angry with the events in Bucharest; that same night he gave Frießner the order to occupy Bucharest, install a new government and arrest King Michael and his court. Frießner described in his memoir that he was convinced of the impracticability of the order. Nevertheless, German units began to advance from Ploieşti to Bucharest, initially under the command of SS brigade leader Horst Hoffmeyer .

Gerstenberg, who was still locked in the embassy, ​​was able to persuade the new Romanian leadership to leave the building in order to make the German associations understand that their endeavor was hopeless. When he reached the troops led by Hoffmeyer, he conveyed the request of the Romanian government to the high command of the Army Group. However, he was ordered to take command of Hoffmeyer's units and occupy Bucharest. A few weeks earlier, Gerstenberg had assumed that “a single German anti-aircraft battery ” would be enough to regain control of the capital in the event of unrest.

The resistance of the Romanian units to the intervention of the German troops was stronger than expected by Gerstenberg. Gerstenberg's associations were repulsed north of the capital by General Iosif Teodorescu and the quickly assembled “Patriotic Guards”. The few German units in and around Bucharest proved too weak to take effective action. On the order of Hitler, some German dive bombers stationed there rose from the Băneasa air force base on the afternoon of August 24 and bombed the royal palace and some government buildings in Bucharest. On the same day Hitler ordered the deployment of the Brandenburg paratrooper battalion . This occupied the important Otopeni airfield on the night of August 25th . On August 26th, the Romanian associations succeeded in enclosing Gerstenberg's associations north of Bucharest. In Ploieşti, the Germans lost control of the oil refineries.

On August 28, the last German units had to withdraw from Bucharest. During a battle of retreat near Gherghița , Gerstenberg and Lieutenant General Rainer Stahel , who had been sent as combat commander of Bucharest by the Wehrmacht High Command only a few days earlier, were captured. The attempt by the German military to reverse the coup was thus a failure. The Red Army marched into Bucharest on August 31. Von Killinger shot himself in the embassy building on September 2, 1944, after killing his secretary and lover, Helga Petersen. The attacks by German troops on the ground and the bombing gave Romania an opportunity to declare war on Germany on August 25th.

The only thing left for Hitler to do was to have a Romanian government in exile under the leadership of Horia Sima , which, however, could not influence the course of events.

Consequences of the coup and further developments

Bucharest, August 30, 1944: Invasion of the Red Army
Eastern Front-South, August 1944: Retreat from Romania to Hungary, German and Romanian soldiers on trucks
Advance of the Red Army between August 19 and December 31, 1944
King Michael's abdication certificate, December 30, 1947

The German newsreel described the coup d'état as the "betrayal of the Romanian King Michael and his court camarilla", which "led to a critical situation on the southern front [...]". In Romania, the upheaval was welcomed by large parts of the population as a quick peace was in prospect. The Soviet Union, however, insisted on the active participation of the Romanian army in the further war against Germany. On August 29, a Romanian delegation led by the communist Lucrețiu Pătrăşcanu traveled to Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire . There was little room for maneuver; On September 12, 1944, an armistice was signed between the two states. It was agreed that Romania would have to take part in the war against Germany with 20 divisions , grant the Red Army free rights of passage for the entire country, pay high war compensation and confirm the renunciation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. Fascist organizations had to be banned and war criminals arrested. The Romanian soldiers captured before August 23, however, remained in Soviet prison camps until the end of the war. The armistice was agreed between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. The Allied Control Commission formally monitored the armistice until the Paris Peace Treaty was signed in 1947; in practice the body was dominated almost exclusively by the Soviet representatives.

In order to achieve the goal of regaining Northern Transylvania, Romania declared war on neighboring Hungary on September 8, 1944.

The direct military consequences of the coup were catastrophic for Germany. Without the Romanian troops, who immediately stopped fighting, the units of the Red Army were able to almost completely crush the 21 divisions of the German Army Group in Southern Ukraine . The 6th Army was largely destroyed a second time after the Battle of Stalingrad ; about half of the 8th Army was also affected. Of the 600,000 German soldiers, only a few tens of thousands escaped death or capture.

The rapid advance of the Soviet army to the west led to the collapse of the German Balkan front. In order not to be cut off, the Wehrmacht had to rush to evacuate Greece , Albania and large parts of Yugoslavia within a very short time . Furthermore, the Red Army was able to occupy Bulgaria . The loss of the oil fields and refineries around Ploieşti was particularly serious for the further course of the war . The already tense fuel supply situation worsened for the German military.

The coup also had an indirect impact on other events in Slovakia : The 30 or so members of the German military mission under Colonel Ott, who had been expelled from Romania, were taken from the train by underground fighters in the town of Martin on August 27 and shot the following day. This led to the premature outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising .

With Romania changing sides, 500,000 Romanian soldiers fought on the side of the Allies. By the end of the war, the Romanian army had lost 169,000 soldiers dead and wounded.

Domestically, too, the coup had far-reaching consequences. King Michael commissioned General Constantin Sănătescu to form a government made up of the military and representatives of the four parties of the National Democratic bloc. The main political representatives as ministers without portfolio were Iuliu Maniu from the Peasant Party, Dinu Brătianu from the National Liberals , Constantin Titel-Petrescu from the Social Democrats and Lucrețiu Pătrăşcanu from the Communists. The participation of the numerically very weak communists was rather symbolic. The reputation of Sănătescu and the king immediately gave the new government the necessary military and administrative authority.

Sănătescu was only accepted by the Soviets for a few months. The cause of the tensions were different views on the war indemnities to be paid, but also on the treatment of war criminals. The Soviet side submitted a list of 74 people in October, which it classified accordingly; two of them were members of the Sănătescu government and had to resign. The clashes with the Soviet occupying power and disputes between the parties soon led to the end of the government, which from November 4, 1944 was mainly composed of representatives from the four parties. On December 6, 1944 General Nicolae Rădescu succeeded Sănătescu in the office of Prime Minister. He was also Minister of the Interior and may have shot at a demonstration by left-wing forces in February 1945. For his part, Rădescu claimed that Soviet units fired at the demonstrators to provoke riots that would lead to his dismissal. The Soviet occupying power used this to further reshape the political balance of power in their favor. Rădescu had to be dismissed by the king on March 6, 1945 after the Soviet high commissioner Andrei Vyshinsky had threatened to question the state sovereignty of Romania. The Soviet troops stationed in the country disarmed Romanian units and occupied the Romanian general staff; At Vyshinski's request, Prime Minister Petru Groza became the chairman of the Ploughers ' Front ( Frontul Plugarilor , a small farmers' party) . The Peasant Party and the National Liberals then withdrew from the government. Groza formed a Popular Front government and initiated a land reform on March 22, 1945, during which land ownership over 50 hectares, but also the land of members of the German minority , was expropriated regardless of its size.

The Soviet Union supported Groza's position by handing back to Romania immediately after his assumption of office the meanwhile occupied northern Transylvania, which had to be ceded to Hungary in the Second Vienna Arbitration in 1940 .

In the Paris Agreements of 1947, the borders of Romania were finalized. The affiliation of Northern Transylvania and the neighboring areas to Romania was confirmed. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, insisted on the territorial changes of 1940; Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia finally came to the Soviet Union. King Michael I, who tried in vain to prevent the gradual takeover of the entire state apparatus by the communists, was forced to abdicate on December 30, 1947. In April 1948 the now communist-dominated Romanian parliament passed a constitution that defined the country as a "people's democratic republic" and provided for the transition to a communist social order.

The leading representatives of the military dictatorship - including Ion Antonescu himself - remained imprisoned, were sentenced to death in a show trial and shot on June 1, 1946. Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Brătianu, the leading civil forces behind the coup, were imprisoned in 1947 and 1950, respectively. Maniu was sentenced to life imprisonment and died in 1953, Brătianu in the year of his arrest. Their parties were banned in 1947. The smaller Social Democratic Party had to forcibly merge with the Communist Party.

Reception of the events in Romania in the post-war period

Many Romanian post-war historians reinterpreted the events of August 23, 1944 depending on the political situation. At first, the party was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. The official interpretation at the time was that the Red Army had liberated Romania. From the 1960s, when the PCR tried to break away from Soviet domination, attempts were made to upgrade the very marginal role of the Communist Party in the overthrow. The fall of the Antonescu regime was therefore a Romanian popular uprising led by the Communist Party. Until 1989, August 23rd was Romania's national holiday. The official language regime described the coup as a "revolution of national and social, anti-fascist and anti-imperialist liberation". This was linked to the assessment that the fight of the Romanian army on the side of the Soviet Union had shortened the Second World War by at least half a year.

literature

  • Paul Jeute: Bucharest. Myths, destruction, reconstruction. An architectural history of the city. Bonn, 2013, ISBN 978-3-944529-17-2 .

Individual evidence

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  3. Andreas Hillgruber: Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu. German-Romanian relations 1938–1944. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1954. p. 70.
  4. Andreas Hillgruber: Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu. German-Romanian relations 1938–1944. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1954. P. 55 f.
  5. Andreas Hillgruber: Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu. German-Romanian relations 1938–1944. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1954. P. 73 f.
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  7. a b c d e f g h i j k Hildrun Glass: Minority between two dictatorships: on the history of the Jews in Romania 1944–1949. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2002. pp. 9–12. ISBN 978-3-486-56665-9 .
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  13. Johannes Frießner: Betrayed battles. Holsten-Verlag, Hamburg 1956. P. 88 f.
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  22. ^ Yearbook for the History of the Socialist Countries in Europe, Volumes 29-30. Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1985. p. 58.
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