Operation Berezino
The operation Beresino ( Russian Операция Березино ) headed by Pawel Sudoplatow deceived the time of the Second World War, the existence of a battle group Scherhorn by a radio play of the Soviet secret service NKVD before. Under the code name Freischütz was from October 1944 on behalf of the Armed Forces High Command of the FHO (FHO) the support and care and later the evacuation of the imaginary, 2,000 men strong, behind the front scattered battle group under Lt. Col. Henry Gerhard Scherhorn be ensured .
background
On the Russian side
As early as 1941, the Soviet secret service NKVD had been conducting counter-espionage in its own country against agents and partisans of the two German intelligence services, the Reichsführer SS (SD) security service and Abwehr . As part of Operation Monastyr (Операция Монастырь) , double agents were installed under the leadership of NKVD officers Viktor Ilyin and Mikhail Maklyarsky , who, after they had gained the trust of the Germans, gradually uncovered their networks and eliminated actual spies. The success of this procedure aroused Stalin's interest and, after initially only being informed about the progress, Stalin demanded that the operation be expanded into a disinformation campaign on a strategic level.
This was done in mid 1942. Thus, for example, supplied the NKVD agent Alexander Demianov (codename Heyne) the High Command FHO under the later BND boss Reinhard Gehlen with detailed plans of the Red Army . As in the case of the Soviet Rzhev offensive , some of these even contained real information to support the camouflage of the double agents. In a further expansion stage, it was decided at the beginning of 1944 to expand the objective of the procedure by systematically dismantling German special forces and supplying them behind the front.
On the German side
In June 1944, the Red Army began Operation Bagration to retake the Belarusian capital, Minsk . The operation was very successful and in the course of this operation the German Wehrmacht was pushed back beyond what was then the Polish border . On July 9, 1944, the German Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Scherhorn was captured with parts of his guard regiment of the 286th Security Division and his radio operator.
On August 18, 1944, a radio operator who had been left behind reported to his command post with the news that he had established contact with a German combat group in the Berasino area - about 100 km east of Minsk. This would consist of around 2500 soldiers scattered behind the front and was led by a colonel named Scherhorn. The aim of the combat group is to break through to the west. In addition, the group asked for support from Army Group Center in their project.
Colonel Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky of counterintelligence of the army high command suspected that the message from the beginning a feint Soviet and refused to troops to support the battle group Scherhorn to send. Reinhard Gehlen, as a representative of the SD, opposed this, who considered the message to be credible, because in the last summer offensive of the Wehrmacht a complete division had succeeded in returning to the front line in East Prussia, 500 km away . The conflict between the two competing intelligence services was also reflected in these opposing positions. For example, after the defeats of the previous year, the army's secret service fell out of favor with the top leadership and was increasingly being ousted by the SD under the sovereignty of the SS . Ultimately, the chief of staff, Alfred Jodl , decided to start a rescue operation.
course
The rescue operation under the name “Company Freischütz” began with the dropping of four reconnaissance teams by parachute in the region. Organized by SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny , the groups consisted of eight volunteers from the Jagdverband Ost I of the SS Jäger Battalion 502 in Red Army uniforms and armed with appropriate weapons. Two of the commandos did not answer again. The third informed the operations management that it had landed far away from the actual landing zone and was making its way back on foot. Three weeks later it crossed the front near Lithuania . The fourth reconnaissance unit then actually reported contact to Kampfgruppe Scherhorn via radio, and Combat Squadron 200 of the Luftwaffe responsible for special operations was tasked with confirming the existence and subsequent supply of the combat group.
At the beginning of October 1944, a liaison officer was then removed to find potential landing sites for aircraft. However, since doubts about a possible radio game by the opponent still persisted, it was considered sensible to remove these doubts first of all to bring the deposed officer back in person before further ventures, because up to now only radio messages about everything that had happened had been received. After consultation between Army Group Center, the responsible Air Fleet Command 6 and the KG200, a Junkers Ju 290 from Wormditt was also used to drop a doctor, other radio operators and an Air Force officer at the point where the Scherhorn Combat Group set fire signals. This group also reported by radio afterwards and confirmed the continuation of the search for a suitable landing area. As this turned out to be increasingly difficult, however, it was decided on the German side to drop material for the combat group with the parachute after all, because in the meantime it had become mid-October and the combat group reported a shortage of provisions and ammunition as well as wounded people from ongoing fighting with the Red Army . From October 21, 1944, supply flights of the Ju 290 and Heinkel He 111 followed with varying frequency and the dropping of the necessary technology to create a makeshift airfield. In March 1945, a knight's cross was thrown off for Colonel Scherhorn.
At the end of 1944, the combat group signaled the completion of the airfield. In the meantime East Prussia had been lost in the course of the war and the operational base of the Freischütz company had to be relocated to Tutow in Pomerania . Two transport machines made their way from there to the trapped people and the new airfield. However, when they reached their destination and approached the marker lights of the runway during the night, a battle seemed to break out on the ground and explosions could be seen. Nevertheless, one of the two pilots dared to continue the approach and only had to break it off when the runway marker lights were abruptly extinguished on the ground. Scherhorn reported to Otto Skorzeny that they had been surprised by a Russian air raid and that the airfield was permanently damaged. Since the Russians are now allegedly also taking intensive action on the ground against the combat group, it would separate itself in three separate groups to the north.
Since the radio contact between Skorzeny and the combat group did not break off despite the withdrawal, it was planned to pick up the remaining soldiers next from a frozen lake in Poland. Bad weather and a lack of fuel at the Luftwaffe, reported by Scherhorn again and again, delayed the mission. In the meantime, Pomerania was also lost and the operational base of the Freischütz company relocated to Großenbrode in Holstein . Nonetheless, the supply of material, ammunition and medicine by parachute continued until February 16, 1945. A last rescue attempt was made around April 20, 1945. Two Arado Ar 232 transport planes specialized on uneven runways took off from Großbrodel airfield. However, neither of them achieved their goal. The first machine had to turn back due to a technical defect and the second machine had to turn off due to bad weather.
Review
As a result, according to current sources, the Scherhorn Combat Group was exclusively a ghost army that arose from the actions of the NKVD. Carried by Russians of German origin and speaking, defectors and anti-fascists . Their goal of tying up valuable German capacities in the final phase of the war and thus withdrawing them from the actual war events was achieved. Thanks to the misjudgment of the SD with its representatives Gehlen and Skorzeny, food and equipment were continuously absorbed by the radio game, as was the already scarce resources of Kampfgeschwader 200. At least 39 flights are occupied and over the almost ten months - over which the deception is maintained could - the Germans sent 22 commandos with at least 13 radios.
The role of Scherhorn
After the front collapsed in the course of Operation Bagration in 1944 and Scherhorn was taken prisoner of war injured , he was first imprisoned in Moscow's Lubyanka prison . He was urged by the local secret service to write reports about the fight against partisans in the occupied eastern territories. At some point in the autumn of 1944 it was then moved westwards by car in a journey lasting several days. After arriving in a small place called Sloboda, near Baryssau , he was led into a hut according to his own description. Officers from the Soviet secret police ( GPU ) were waiting for him together with Antifa people in German uniforms and his guards introduced him to a young SS officer in Russian uniform, who was one of the German radio operators sent by Skorzeny.
After the operation, Scherhorn remained in captivity in a camp near Moscow until the summer of 1949 and then returned to a middle-class existence in Lower Saxony .
Trivia
The story was freely adapted for a three-part television series in the GDR in 1966 . The title of the short series was “ Secret Command Boomerang ”, with Alfred Müller and Horst Weinheimer in the leading roles .
Literature and individual references
- ^ Pavel Sudoplatov, Anatolii Pavlovich Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. Schecter, Leona P. Schecter: Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster . Warner, 1995, ISBN 978-0-7515-1240-3 , pp. 173-182 (English).
- ^ Hermann Zolling, Heinz Höhne: Pullach intern, part 2. Spiegel 13/71, March 22, 1971, accessed on April 20, 2020 .
- ↑ a b Vladimir Schmorgun: Krasny Sokol . Golos, Moscow 2005, ISBN 5-7117-0081-2 , p. 208–255 (Russian, lib.ru [accessed April 24, 2020]).
- ↑ a b c Erik Verg: Skorzeny's ghost army. Zeit (magazine), June 19, 1952, accessed April 20, 2020 .
- ^ Peter Wilhelm Stahl, Manfred Jäger: Secret Squadron KG 200: the truth after over 30 years . 4th edition. Motorbuchverlag, 1984, ISBN 978-3-613-01034-5 , p. 139 ff .
- ^ A b Günther W. Gellermann: Moscow calls Army Group Center; What was not in the Wehrmacht report - the operations of the secret Kampfgeschwader 200 in World War II . 1st edition. Bernard & Graefe, 1988, ISBN 978-3-7637-5856-2 , pp. 135, 138 and 141 .
- ^ Otto Skorzeny: My commando company. War without fronts . 5th edition. Universitas, Munich 1993, ISBN 978-3-938392-11-9 , pp. 362 ff .