Operation daycare

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Operation daycare
Part of: Pacific War
The Ise after being converted into a hybrid aircraft carrier, 1943
The Ise after being converted into a hybrid aircraft carrier, 1943
date February 10-20, 1945
place Waters between Singapore and Japan
output Japanese victory
consequences All ships used reach Japan
Parties to the conflict

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

United States 48United States United States United Kingdom Australia
United KingdomUnited Kingdom 
AustraliaAustralia 

Commander

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Chiaki Matsuda

United States 48United States James Fife Jr. Charles A. Lockwood
United States 48United States

Troop strength
2 hybrid aircraft carriers
1 light cruiser
5 destroyer
aircraft 		26 submarines
2 destroyers
Over 88 aircraft
losses

Several planes

No

The Operation Kita ( Japanese 北号作戦 Hoku gō sakusen , dt. Operation North ) was an operation of the Imperial Japanese Navy in February 1945 during the Pacific War in World War II . In this operation, the two hybrid aircraft carriers of the Ise class and their escort ships were relocated back to Japan from Japanese-occupied Singapore , where they had been stationed together with other units of the Imperial Navy since November 1944. The two ships were also loaded with crude oil in barrels and other materials essential to the war effort, in order to bring as many raw materials as possible to the homeland, since the Allied ships in the Pacific were now able to intercept and sink every Japanese convoy. The movement of the unit was discovered by the Allies, but it could not be stopped by submarines or aircraft attacks. The two converted capital ships were able to evade several enemy attacks and reached Japan on February 20, 1945. As a result, the two Ise- class ships and their escorts were among the last large surface ships to break through the Allied blockade and reach the Japanese mainland from Southeast Asia before the capitulation of Japan .

background

In the course of 1944, the Allies were able to restrict and block the supply of essential oil and fuel from the Japanese-occupied areas of Southeast Asia to Japan through a network of operational submarines, which cut off Japanese supply lines and the overall economic situation of the home country always was further tightened. Since the Japanese war industry was unable to adequately replicate trading and tankers, Japanese shipping began to come to a standstill in the waters of Southeast Asia. Due to the restriction of Japanese activities in these waters, the number of ships of the Imperial Navy that were sunk by the Allied naval units operating in the area decreased. Therefore, the order was issued to all Allied submarines to give priority to sinking Japanese warships when attacking enemy units. In 1944, for example, the battleship Kongō , seven Japanese aircraft carriers , two heavy and seven light cruisers were sunk by American submarines. As a result of this constriction with regard to the incoming raw materials, the Japanese military leadership assumed at the beginning of 1945 that no convoy in which tankers were running would reach the main Japanese islands in the future. Therefore the Japanese Navy tried to transport oil in barrels on cargo ships in the hope that these would not be attacked by the enemy units so quickly. At the same time, some aircraft carriers and smaller escort units were also loaded with barrels in order to transport oil from the central collection point for raw material supplies to Southeast Asia in Singapore to Japan.

On November 11, 1944, a few weeks after the defeat in the sea ​​and air battle in the Gulf of Leyte and the subsequent retreat of the Japanese fleet for their home country, the two Ise- class ships , the Ise and the Hyūga , which had been converted into hybrid aircraft carriers in 1943, left , which formed the 4th carrier group of the Imperial Navy, under the command of Rear Admiral Chiaki Matsuda entered the Japanese port of Sasebo to join the remaining naval forces in the Southwest Pacific. This was done on the one hand to reinforce the units there with two new warships and on the other hand to station these two large ships near a reasonably safe source of fuel like Singapore. Before casting off, both ships were each loaded with 910 t artillery and rifle ammunition, which were intended for the troops of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji in Manila in the Philippines . Because suffered at the scheduled time for shipment Manila under heavy Allied air offensive, the ammunition was on 14 November on the Spratly Islands unloaded for future of smaller units such as coastal and chasers in the Manila Bay to be brought. On November 20, the two converted Japanese warships set course for the Lingga Islands , on which an important Japanese base was located, and arrived there on the 22nd of the same month. Since the Allies had already deciphered the Japanese radio codes years earlier, they were informed of the movement of the two hybrid aircraft carriers and therefore instructed several submarines stationed in the Lingga Islands to track these ships. The American units succeeded in doing this, but refrained from attacking the two enemy combat ships. During December, both Japanese ships were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina , adding to the port's anti-aircraft positions with their 25mm cannons . On January 11, 1945, the two ships were ordered to Singapore. US 3rd Fleet units , supported by Fast Carrier Task Force aircraft , patrolled the South China Sea January 10-20 to intercept the Ise and Hyūga .

Preparations

At the beginning of February 1945, the Hyūga , the Ise and some other smaller escort ships received the order to return to Japan. The operation for this breakthrough attempt was named Kita ( north ) by the Imperial Navy Operations Staff in Tokyo . The aim of the association of the two battleships was not only to return to Japan, but to carry as large a quantity of important raw materials as possible through the Allied blockade. The escort ships of the two capital ships were the light cruiser Ōyodo , which was assigned to the 4th carrier group, and the three destroyers Asashimo , Hatsushimo and Kasumi . The combined association of the 4th carrier group and the three accompanying destroyers was called the final force.

The ships of the final force ran from the Lingga Islands to Singapore on February 6, where they began loading supplies in the port the following day. Shortly before entering the port of Singapore, the Ise drove to a sea ​​mine dropped by an Allied aircraft , but suffered only minor damage to the bow, which could only be repaired during the port stay. In Singapore, the Hyūga took 4,944 barrels of aviation fuel and 362 barrels of normal fuel on board, and 440 Malay workers who had worked on the nearby oil fields were stationed on it. The Ise stashed a total of 5,200 barrels of aviation fuel in its holds and took 551 workers. In addition, both ships each loaded 1,590 tons of rubber , 1,590 tons of tin and 180 tons of other metals. The cruiser Ōyodo was loaded with 110 tons of tin, 64 tons of tungsten and 64 tons of aviation fuel, 45 tons of rubber, 36 tons of zinc and 18 tons of mercury , while a further 130 tons of rubber and tin were divided between the three destroyers.

Since the Allies were able to crack the current Japanese naval code PURPLE and intercept most of the enemy radio messages, they were precisely informed about the composition of the final force , their cargo, their destination and their possible route. The commander of the American submarine units in the Southwest Pacific, Rear Admiral James Fife Jr. , gave the interception of the Hyūga and the Ise the highest priority for his units and stationed 15 submarines along the suspected route of the enemy ships. At the same time, a plan was developed on the American side to sink the Japanese ships through coordinated action by naval warships and US Army Air Force bombers . At the same time, Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid , commander of the 7th Fleet , stationed the four battleships USS Colorado , Mississippi , Pennsylvania and West Virginia in northern Philippine waters around the Allied bridgehead in the Gulf of Lingayen on Luzon from attacks by Japanese capital ships Protect Singapore. These American ships, which were potentially dangerous for Operation Kita , were to remain there until the Army Air Force was able to protect the American beachhead on Luzon by air superiority. Since the Army Air Force was tasked with protecting further allied actions in the Philippines and bombing industrial facilities on Japanese-occupied Taiwan , the intensive hunting campaign for these aircraft on Japanese ships in the South China Sea, which had been planned for some time, was repeatedly postponed.

journey

Approximate route of the final force (Japanese controlled area in white, Allies in red, Soviet Union in dark gray, place names in English)
Hyuga

The ships of the final force left Singapore on the evening of February 10, 1945. This date was chosen by Admiral Chiaki, since a bad weather front on the route to Japan was predicted for a longer period of time, thus minimizing the possibility of detection and localization by enemy reconnaissance aircraft could be. The British submarine HMS Tantalus , which monitored the port exit of Singapore, was able to pursue the departing Japanese unit and tried to attack the enemy ships the following day, but had to abandon the attempt when it was attacked by a Japanese E13A aircraft. After the Tantalus successfully escaped the attacks of the enemy seaplane, she reported the last position and direction of travel of the Japanese ships to the headquarters of Admiral Fife.

The four American battleships in the waters around Luzon were ordered, also on February 10th, to return to the American base at Ulithi in the Pacific, where they were to be repaired and prepared for their role in the invasion of Okinawa . After some deliberation, the ships were released for this purpose and left Philippine waters on February 14th without being involved in any actions against the final force .

During February 12, several American submarines attempted to attack the Japanese force. At 1:45 p.m., the Charr located the enemy formation using its radar for the first time at a distance of 7.8 nm and reported this to its superior position, to Admiral Fife. The Charr could not attack the Japanese ships, but began to pursue the targets. About an hour later, the Blackfinn was also able to locate the formation, this time at a distance of 13 nm. During the next 14 hours, these two boats, supported by the Flounder , the Pargo and the Tuna, tried unsuccessfully to get themselves into a favorable position to fire towards the enemy formation. The Japanese escorts did not notice the American units in pursuit. Farther north of these, the three American submarines Guavina , Hake and Pampanito tried to get into range at the same time , which also failed. Some of the American units lost the enemy unit during the day.

Also during February 12th, an American aircraft discovered the Japanese capital ships for the first time. As a result, from now on American reconnaissance aircraft were almost always within radar range of the Japanese ships and reported all movements of the Japanese to their superiors with Admiral Kinkaid's staff, who then passed this information on to Admiral Fife. On the morning of February 13th, a group of Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy and 40 North American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers took off from the airfields on Leyte and Mindoro to attack Japanese ships with explosive and explosive devices Sink roll bombs . These bombers were escorted by a total of 48 North American P-51 Mustang fighters. Although the aircraft were close to their target in order to attack together, they could not make out any enemy ships because of the low, closed cloud cover. A blind bombardment based on radar location was subsequently forbidden by Kinkaid, as there was a risk of hitting the chasing Allied submarines, as they were not always at diving station. Therefore, the American machines returned to their bases in the Philippines after the unsuccessful attack attempt. On the same day, however, the two Australian destroyers HMAS Arunta and HMAS Warramunga left their position with Admiral Oldendorf's fleet in the Gulf of Lingayen and stopped at a position about 260 nm west of Manila. There they should be in readiness in order to be able to rescue the crews in the event of the anticipated air raid on the final force of downed aircraft.

In the course of February 13, other Allied submarines tried to get into attack positions. The Bergall , Blower and the Guitarro of Admiral Fife were stationed along the presumed route of the Japanese hybrid aircraft carriers and their escorts. At around 12:30 p.m. on the same day, the submerged Bergall was able to see the enemy ships and tried to get into a favorable position to fire. At a distance of about 4,400 m, it fired a total of six torpedoes , none of which hit. The Blower also tried to hit one of the ships, but none of the five torpedoes fired at the Ōyodo and one of the hybrid aircraft carriers hit its target either. The two submarines were therefore noticed by the Japanese escorts and had to dive to avoid the enemy depth charges. The USS Bashaw and USS Flasher , which were Admiral Fife's northernmost submarines, first located the final force in the early afternoon of February 13th. At about 3:15 p.m. the surfaced Bashaw sighted the flotilla as it drove out of a rain veil. However, she was also discovered and attacked by a Japanese seaplane. In parallel, the hybrid aircraft carriers began firing at the submarine from their main turrets, forcing the Bashaw to submerge. The nearby flasher was unable to carry out an attack due to the increased vigilance of the Japanese and, like all other Allied submarines in the area, lost direct contact with them.

On February 14th, the Americans tried to launch another air strike against the Japanese unit. Since the Japanese ships were already out of range of the Allied aircraft launched by Leyte, the American Aircraft Association was smaller this time than the one launched the day before and again could not make a target due to low clouds. In the days that followed, no further air strikes were launched against the two battleships, reducing the US Army Air Force's track record of only shooting down several land-based enemy fighters and a Mitsubishi Ki-57 transport aircraft , which occurred between February 12 and 14 stayed near the Japanese flotilla. With no further air strikes planned by Admiral Kinkaid, the two Australian destroyers were also released from their potential rescue mission on February 15.

Vice-Admiral Charles A. Lockwood , Commander in Chief of the submarines of the American Pacific Fleet, followed the unsuccessful attempts to intercept the Ise and the Hyuga in the South China Sea and therefore ordered the stationing of a total of eleven submarines between the Luzon Strait and Japan at an early stage , as he ran away was convinced the Japanese warships would take this route. However, Admiral Chiaki chose the route through Formosa Strait , which allowed the Japanese ships to escape the American submarines stationed by Lockwood.

On the evening of February 15, the association's ships reached the Matsu Islands and anchored there for five hours. Following this, Admiral Chiaki planned to first call at a few ports in Korea and then to get to the important Japanese military port of Kure via Kammon Strait . At midnight on February 15, the imperial association left the Matsu Islands and was accompanied by the Japanese destroyers Kamikaze and Nokaze for parts of the course of February 16 . At 5:07 on the same day, the Rasher sighted the enemy ships moving at around 18 knots and fired a fan of six torpedoes at one of the escort ships, none of which hit. This was the last time one of the American submarines was able to locate the Japanese because the remaining Allied units had been misplaced by Admiral Lockwood.

From 9:06 p.m. on February 16 to 7 a.m. on February 18, the final force finally anchored off Zhoushan , near Shanghai , before heading for the Japanese military port of Sachon on the south coast of Japan's Korea , where it left at 4 p.m. arrived the same day. She left this position at 7 a.m. on February 19 and headed for Mutsurejima Island , where she arrived at 4 p.m. and again anchored overnight. At 10 a.m. on February 20, the final force finally reached the Japanese port of Kure, where the important raw materials were unloaded. These ships were among the last Japanese warships that were able to reach the main Japanese islands before the end of the war, coming from Southeast Asia.

consequences

The Allied naval commanders were disappointed that the total of 26 American submarines used had not even been able to damage the two Japanese battleships. Admiral Fife came to the conclusion that the unexpectedly high speed of the final force , the bad weather and technical equipment on board the Japanese ships, which enabled them to register the radar waves from submarines and use them to locate the enemy units, were responsible for the inadequate success of its operational units were responsible. In a letter to Admiral Lockwood, he wrote that the failure of his submarines was "a bitter pill" and inexcusable. In a reply, Lockwood admitted that he had relied too much on intelligence reports and reports from Admiral Kinkaid's planes, which resulted in his boats being misaligned.

Japan's new strategy of now transporting oil on freighters and warships proved to be a success and ensured that oil imports in the first quarter of 1945 were higher than those in the fourth quarter of 1944. During February, the Allied U- However, boats also sank most of the Japanese cargo ships operating in Southeast Asia, which completely stopped oil imports from these areas in March. After the withdrawal of the final force , the heavy cruisers Ashigara and Haguro and the light cruiser Isuzu were the only operational capital ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy in Southeast Asia. All ships, supported by a few destroyers, were stationed in the port of Singapore; these units no longer tried to break through to Japan and were all sunk between April and June 1945 by enemy air raids and submarines. Due to a shortage of fuel, the Hyūga and the Ise no longer ran from the port of Kure and were used for the remainder of the war to strengthen Kures air defense capacity against the attacking American aircraft. However, both capital ships were sunk during the particularly violent Allied air raids in June 1945 . The Ōyodo , which had been used to train recruits in the port of Kure since arriving in February, was also sunk during these air raids on July 28th. The three accompanying destroyers of the final force did not live to see the end of the war either. The Asashimo and Kasumi were sunk by American air strikes on April 6th while escorting battleship Yamato towards Okinawa during Operation Ten-gō , and the Hatsushimo sank after a mine hit near the Japanese port of Maizuru on July 30th.

See also

Remarks

  1. ↑ a b c Bob Hackett u. a .: Tabular movement profile of the Japanese oil tankers. 2011.
  2. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Bob Hackett u. a .: Tabular movement profile of the Hyuga. 2011.
  3. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, pp. 816-817.
  4. ^ A b John Prados: Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. 1995, p. 703.
  5. ^ A b M. J. Whitley: Battleships of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia. 1998, p. 199.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Bob Hackett u. a .: Tabular movement profile of the Ise. 2011.
  7. ↑ a b H. P. Willmott: Battleship. 2002, p. 200.
  8. ^ John Prados: Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. 1995, p. 701.
  9. ↑ a b c d Eric Lacroix and Linton Wells: Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. 1997, pp. 650-651.
  10. Jump up ↑ Mark Stille and Tony Brian: Imperial Japanese Navy Battleships 1941-1945. 2008, p. 30.
  11. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, p. 846.
  12. ^ A b W. J. Holmes: Double-Edged Secrets: US Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II. 1979, p. 201.
  13. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, pp. 846-847.
  14. ↑ a b c Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. 1953, p. 492.
  15. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. 2002, p. 178 u. 303-304.
  16. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. 2002, pp. 176-178.
  17. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. 1953, pp. 470, 491-492.
  18. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, p. 826 u. 848.
  19. ↑ a b c d e f g h Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, p. 847.
  20. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945. 2002, p. 178.
  21. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. 1953, pp. 492-494.
  22. ^ A b G. Hermon Gill: Australia In The War Of 1939-1945, Series Two, Navy, Volume II: Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945. 1968, p. 599.
  23. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, pp. 847-849.
  24. ^ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. 1953, p. 494.
  25. ↑ a b c d e Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, p. 849.
  26. ↑ a b c d Eric Lacroix and Linton Wells: Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. 1997, p. 652.
  27. ^ Clay Blair: Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. 2001, pp. 852-855.

literature

  • Clay Blair : Silent Victory: The US Submarine War against Japan. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2001, ISBN 1-55750-217-X .
  • Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (= Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume 5). University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1953, OCLC 256469807 . (1983, ISBN 0-912799-03-X ).
  • G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945 . (= Australia In The War Of 1939-1945. Row 2, Volume II). The Griffin Press, Adelaide 1968, OCLC 65475 . Retrieved July 17, 2011.
  • WJ Holmes: Double-Edged Secrets. US Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World War II. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1979, ISBN 0-87021-162-5 .
  • Eric Lacroix, Linton Wells: Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1997, ISBN 0-87021-311-3 .
  • Samuel Eliot Morison : The Liberation of the Philippines. Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944-1945. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 2002, ISBN 0-252-07064-X .
  • John Prados: Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Random House, New York 1995, ISBN 0-679-43701-0 .
  • MJ Whitley: Battleships of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia. Arms and Armor Press, London 1998, ISBN 1-85409-386-X .
  • HP Willmott: Battleship. Cassell Military, London 2002, ISBN 0-304-35810-X .
  • Richard Worth: Fleets of World War II. Da Capo Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001, ISBN 0-306-81116-2 .

Web links

Commons : Operation Kita  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files
Japanese name: As is common in Japan, the family name comes before the first name in this article . So Chiaki is the family name, Matsuda the first name.
This article was added to the list of articles worth reading on March 4, 2012 in this version .