Operation teardrop

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Operation teardrop
Lifeboat with survivors of the submarine U 546 amid a group of destroyers of the US Navy on April 24, 1945
Lifeboat with survivors of the submarine U 546 amid a group of destroyers of the US Navy on April 24, 1945
date April to May 1945
place Atlantic Ocean
output United States victory
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

United States 48United States United States

Commander

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) Eberhard Godt

United States 48United States Jonas H. Ingram

Troop strength
7 submarines 4 aircraft carriers , 42 destroyers
losses

218 dead
unknown, many wounded,
33 prisoners
5 submarines sunk

126 dead,
unknown many wounded,
1 sunk destroyer

The Operation Teardrop was an operation of the United States Navy , whose goal was German submarines to sink, from which one went out, that they, with V-1 - armed "wing bombs" on the East Coast of the United States were headed. The two large anti-submarine - task forces of the US Navy was able to destroy five of the submarines, with a loss of a destroyer escort . After the war, the Allies concluded that there were no missiles on the ships.

Operation Teardrop was planned in late 1944 in response to intelligence that Germany was building a missile-armed submarine force. The plan was carried out in April 1945 after Germany sent several Class IX submarines from Norway towards the United States. While bad weather conditions in the North Atlantic Ocean severely restricted the effectiveness of the four US escort aircraft carriers , destroyer escorts were able to find and destroy most of the German submarines. Four of the attacked submarines were sunk with their entire crew. Most of the crew of the other sinking submarine were captured and their specialists brutally interrogated. In return, the USS Frederick C. Davis (DE-136) was sunk with most of its crew. The remaining submarines surrendered to the US Navy in early May 1945 as part of the general German surrender.

background

In late 1944 the Allies received intelligence indicating that the Navy was planning to use V-1 to attack cities on the east coast of the United States. In September of that year, Oscar Mantel, a spy captured by the US Navy, told the FBI that several missile-armed submarines were being readied. Analysts from the United States Tenth Fleet then examined photos of unusual fortifications in submarine bases in Norway, but concluded that these were just wooden rails for loading torpedoes. More rumors of missile armed submarines emerged later in the year, including one spread by Sweden's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force . The British Admiralty disagreed with these reports. He estimated that the V-1 missiles could be attached to Class IX submarines, but it would be unlikely that the Germans would invest their scanty resources in such a project.

A gray missile on a camouflaged ramp in front of a hedge.  The roofs of houses and street lights can be seen behind the hedge.
A V-1 on a launch pad at the Imperial War Museum Duxford

Despite assessments by the Tenth Fleet and the Admiralty, the U.S. military and government remained concerned that Germany could retaliate against east coast cities. In early November 1944, the Eastern Sea Frontier began an intensive search for submarines within a 400 km radius of New York City . In early December 1944, spies William Curtis Colepaugh and Eric Gimpel, who were arrested in New York City after landing in Maine with U 1230, told their interrogators that the Germans were preparing a group of rocket-armed submarines. On December 10, the incumbent Mayor of New York City, Fiorello LaGuardia , warned the public that Germany was considering a long-range missile attack on New York City. LaGuardia's warnings and the allegations of the captured spies sparked considerable media coverage. Despite everything, the United States Department of War , which was dominated by the US Army, advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 11th that the risk of a missile attack was so low that it would not justify the withdrawal of resources from other tasks . The US Navy did not support this assessment.

In response to the perceived danger, the United States Atlantic Fleet prepared a plan to defend the east coast from air and missile attacks. This plan was code-named "Operation Bumblebee" but was later renamed "Operation Teardrop". Completed on January 6, 1945, the plan included the use of anti-submarine units of the US Navy and units of the United States Army Air Forces and the US Army, which were responsible for shooting down attacking aircraft and missiles. The core of the plan was the formation of two large task forces, which were deployed in the middle Atlantic and were supposed to form a blockade against submarines approaching the east coast. These Sonderkommandos were formed from various pre-existing escort aircraft carrier groups and used Argentia, Newfoundland as a base of operations. In addition to defending against missile attacks, these large troops were also tasked with fighting the new and highly developed Class XXI submarines , had they started operating in the central Atlantic. The commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Vice-General Jonas H. Ingram , gave a press conference on January 8, in which he warned of the risk of a missile attack and announced that a large force would be set up to defend against such submarines.

In January 1945 Albert Speer made a propaganda broadcast claiming that V-1 and V-2 missiles "will fall on New York on February 1, 1945". This heightened the US government's concern about the threat of missile attacks. However, the Germans were unable to launch missiles from their submarines after both attempts to develop submarine launchable missiles failed. In June 1942 U 511 tested the launch of small short-range artillery rockets, which could be ignited under water. The development of the system was terminated in early 1943 as it affected the seaworthiness of the submarine. In November 1944, the German military began developing a launch container for the V-2 that could be pulled by a submarine. These containers were to be positioned off the US east coast and then used to attack New York. The AG Vulcan in Stettin received the order to build a prototype in March or April 1945, but there were no significant developments until the total collapse of the German Reich . It is unlikely that the system would have been successful had it been completed.

surgery

Initial lineup

Nine German Class IX submarines were dispatched from Norway to patrol Canada and the United States in March 1945 . On April 12th, the boats U 518 , U 546 , U 805 , U 858 , U 880 , U 881 and U 1235 were assigned to the " Seewolf Group " and assigned to attack shipping south of New York. The remaining two submarines - U 530 and U 548 - were sent into Canadian waters. The point of their departure was to "annoy and defy the United States."

Decoded information from the Enigma enabled the Allies to know the dropping off and the destination of the troops. Vice-Admiral Ingram and the US Tenth Fleet concluded that the Sea Wolf group boats were carrying V-1 missiles and started Operation Teardrop. The ships of the First Barrier Force , which consisted of the escort aircraft carriers USS Mission Bay and USS Croatan as well as 20 destroyer escorts, cast off between March 25 and 27. The first target was Argentia, to refuel there and to form a 190 km long line, with the two aircraft carriers , each protected by four destroyer escorts, drove to the western end of the line. However, the bad weather prevented the aircraft carriers' aerial operations.

As they headed west, the group of sea wolves was ordered to attack shipping traffic by the submarine commander. The ships did not find any targets as the Allies had shifted their convoys south to avoid the German submarines and the bad weather. The German submarines thus began to reach their initial target positions east of the Newfoundland Bank on April 8th. The commander assigned twelve different scouting routes to the sea ​​wolf group between April 2nd and April 19th. The radio signals were deciphered by the Allies, which gave them detailed information about the locations of the submarines.

First Barrier Force actions

Shortly before midnight on April 15, U 1235 appeared on the radar of the USS Shanton , some 800 km north of Flores Island . She immediately attacked the submarine with its Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar, but missed when it descended. Supported by the USS Frost , the Shanton spotted the submarine on the sonar and fired three more rounds of mortar. The third attack, which took place on April 16 at 12:33 a.m., sank the submarine and its crew.

Shortly afterwards, the Frost spotted U 880 on the radar when it tried to leave the area over water. After the submarine had been made visible with a flares , the destroyers escorted opened fire with their 40 mm Bofors guns . This happened from a distance of 590 m at 02:09. U 880 dived there, but was registered by the Shanton's sonar and the frost . The two US ships fired several mortar shells at the submarine, of which the Shanton finally scored the final hit at 04:04 a.m. and sank the submarine together with its entire crew. Both submarines were hit by the Hedgehog projectiles to severe explosions, which increased the fear of missiles carried and motivated the First Barrier Force to intensify its efforts to destroy the other submarines.

After U 1235 and U 880 had been sunk, the First Barrier Force steered west. Consolidated B-24s of VPB-114 equipped with Leigh Lights discovered U 805 on the water surface on the night of April 18-19 . The submarine was only 50 miles from Mission Bay and its escorts, but was not attacked as the aircraft carrier could not determine for sure whether it was a hostile one until the submarine descended. On the night of April 20, U 546 attempted to torpedo a destroyer escort, but missed it. The following night, U 805 was spotted by the USS Mosley but escaped after being chased for over two hours by the Mosley , USS Lowe and USS JRY Blakely .

The First Barrier Force saw its last success on the night of April 21-22. Shortly before midnight, the USS Carter discovered U 518 via sonar. The USS Neal A. Scott then came to support and launched the first Hedgehog attack on the submarine. Thereupon the Carter attacked with a mortar and sank U 518 with its whole crew. At the time of the attack, the First Barrier Force was on its way back to Argentia after being replaced by the Second Barrier Force .

Actions by the Second Barrier Force

The Second Barrier Force consisted of the escort aircraft carriers USS Bogue and USS Core as well as 22 destroyer escorts. Bogue and ten destroyers departed from Quonset Point on April 16 , while the Core and twelve destroyers departed from Bermuda and other locations. The ships were stationed along the 45th degree of longitude in a 169 km long patrol line and headed east. This line consisted of 14 destroyer escorts at a distance of eight kilometers, with the Core and her four escorts at the northern end and the Bogue with her four escorts at the southern end.

On the night of April 22nd to 23rd, the commander of the submarines disbanded the Sea Wolf group and sent the three surviving submarines to positions between New York and Halifax . Shortly thereafter, U 881 , U 889 and U 1229 , which had previously operated separately, were sent to positions between New York and Cape Hatteras . The radio messages were deciphered by the Allies, adding to fears that the submarines would attempt to attack American cities.

The Second Barrier Force encountered their first submarine on April 23, when a Grumman TBF of the VC-19 sighted U 881 about 119 km northwest of the Bogue shortly after noon . The plane dropped depth charges, but they did not cause serious damage to the submarine. This was the first air strike during Operation Teardrop. The next day, U 546 discovered the Core and attempted to maneuver into a position from which it could attack the escort aircraft carrier. The submarine tried to defeat the carrier, but was discovered by the USS Frederick C. Davis at 8:30 a.m., which immediately prepared the attack on U 546 . After captainleutnant Paul Just realized that his submarine had been discovered, he shot a wren torpedo at the destroyer escort from a distance of 590 m . The Frederick C. Davis' Foxer diversion was unsuccessful and the torpedo hit her engine room at 835 a.m. She sank five minutes later, with 66 of the 192 sailors being rescued. A ten-hour chase with eight American destroyers then began before the USS Flaherty severely damaged U 546 with her Hedgehog mortar . The submarine emerged immediately but was sunk when the Flaherty and three or four other destroyers opened fire on it. Kapitänleutnant Just and 32 other crew members survived the attack and were taken prisoner.

A bearded man walks towards the camera along a narrow gangway while holding on to the railing.  Water is visible under the gangway and a large group of black-clad men pass in opposite directions or watch the bearded man.
Lieutenant Just comes aboard the USS Bogue after being rescued.

In order to obtain information about the possible existence of missiles carried on board, some of the survivors of the U-546 were interrogated extremely brutally. After brief interviews on board the Bogue , the survivors were transferred to a US base in Argentia. When they arrived on April 27, eight specialists were separated from the other 25 survivors who - unlike the separated eight - were sent to a prisoner of war camp. The specialists were placed in solitary confinement and subjected to "shock interrogation" techniques, which included strenuous physical exercise and physical violence in the form of kicks and blows. On April 30th, Lieutenant Just gave some information about the composition and mission of the group of sea wolves just before he passed out. However, from the information provided by Just and other specialists, it was not possible to determine whether the submarines were carrying missiles. The eight men were sent to Fort Hunt ( Virginia ) shortly after VE Day , where the tough interrogations continued until Just decided on May 12 to write a report on the history of U 546 . The historian Philip K. Lundeberg wrote that the beatings and torture of the survivors of U 546 were a “one-time atrocity”, motivated by the acute pressure of the interrogators to get information about possible rocket attacks as quickly as possible.

From April 24th, the Second Barrier Force slowly moved west and south to find the remaining submarines. On the night of April 25, a submarine appeared on the radar of the USS Swennig , but escaped pursuit. After a week's search south of the Newfoundland Bank, the Second Barrier Force was split up on May 2nd to cover a larger area. During this time, the Mission Bay Group, with its three escort aircraft carriers and destroyers, strengthened the Second Barrier Force .

U 881 was the fifth and last submarine to be sunk during Operation Teardrop. It was discovered on May 5, just before sunrise, when trying to break the underwater blockade. It was discovered by the destroyer USS Farquhar , who immediately switched to starboard and dropped depth charges, which sank the submarine with all of its crew at 06:16. U 881 was the last German submarine to be sunk by the US Navy during World War II.

The Second Barrier Force built its final barrier along 60th Longitude West on May 7th. After the end of World War II, she accepted the surrender of U 234 , U 805 , U 858 and U 1228 on the high seas before returning to bases on the east coast of the USA.

aftermath

A missile launches horizontally from the deck of a WWII submarine
A missile is launched from the deck of the USS Cusk (1951).

After the Germans surrendered, the US Navy continued to try to find out whether the submarines had missiles on board. The crews of U 805 and U 858 were interrogated and confirmed that their ships were not equipped with missile launchers. Captain Friedrich Steinhoff , who was in command of U 511 during the missile tests, was captured and interrogated by U 873 during the surrender . There was abuse during the interrogation. An official US Navy investigation opened after Steinhoff committed suicide a short time later at Charles Street Jail in Boston . It is not known whether the Allies knew of Steinhoff's involvement in the missile tests.

The tactics used in Operation Teardrop were evaluated by US Navy officers after the war. The escort aircraft carriers were hampered by the bad weather during the operation. Even so, they were successful in forcing the submarines on a diving course, which greatly reduced their speed. Other reports stress the importance of cooperation between destroyers escort during an attack on submarines, arguing that single-line blockades, such as those used in most cases during Operation Teardrop, were less effective than a group of ships on patrol a certain area. Nevertheless, Philip K. Lundeberg described the operation as "a classic demonstration, not only of coordinated hunter tactics, partly derived from the experience of the British, but also from the heavy influence of communication information in forbidden transit and operation areas of submarines."

In the years after World War II, a variant of the V-1 was used by the US Navy to test missile launches from submarines. Republic-Ford JB-2 missiles were tested by the USS Cusk and the USS Carbonero in a series of trials that began on February 12, 1947. These tests were successful and led to the development of further cruise missiles that could be launched from submarines . The success of the US Navy in launching a variant of the V-1 from a submarine demonstrated that it would have been technically possible for Germany to do the same.

Web links

Commons : Operation Teardrop  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Blair (1998), p. 688.
  2. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 213-215.
  3. a b Siegel (1989), p. 33.
  4. Lundeberg (1994), p. 215.
  5. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 215-216.
  6. ^ Blair (1998), p. 683.
  7. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 213-214.
  8. ^ Neufeld (1995), p. 255.
  9. Blair (1998), pp. 686-687.
  10. ^ Morison (1956), p. 345.
  11. a b Blair (1998), p. 216.
  12. Lundeberg (1994), p. 216.
  13. a b Lundeberg (1994), p. 218.
  14. ^ Morison (1956), p. 349.
  15. Lundeberg (1994), p. 219.
  16. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 219-220.
  17. a b c d e f Lundeberg (1994), p. 220 and 127.
  18. a b Morison (1956), p. 350.
  19. a b Morison (1956), p. 351.
  20. a b Blair (1998), p. 687.
  21. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 221-22.
  22. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 224-225.
  23. Lundeberg (1994), pp. 225-226.
  24. Lundeberg (1994), p. 226.
  25. Y'Blood (2004), p. 272.
  26. Blair (1998), pp. 689-690.
  27. Lundeberg (1994), p. 229.
  28. Lundeberg (1994), p. 230.
  29. Polmar and Moore (2004), p. 87.
  30. Duffy (2004), p. 72.