Battle of Seneffe

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Battle of Seneffe
Part of: Dutch War
Bataille de seneffe.jpg
date August 11, 1674
place Seneffe
output tied, both sides claimed victory for themselves
Parties to the conflict

Holy Roman Empire 1400Holy Roman Empire Holy Roman Empire United Netherlands Spain
Republic of the Seven United ProvincesRepublic of the Seven United Provinces 
Spain 1506Spain 

France Kingdom 1792France France

Commander

William of Orange
Jean-Louis Raduit de Souches
Count Monterey

Louis II de Bourbon, prince de Condé

Troop strength
Infantry 55,000 men, cavalry 15,000 men, together 70,000 men Infantry 35,000 men, cavalry 15,000 men, together 50,000 men
losses

8,600 dead or wounded, 5,400 missing or captured, a total of 14,000 men

dead or wounded 6,000 men, 4,000 missing or captured, 10,000 men in total

The information on troop strengths and losses can differ significantly in the literature

The Battle of Seneffe on August 11, 1674 took place during the Dutch War . A French army under Prince Condé and an Allied army made up of Spaniards, Dutch and troops of Emperor Leopold I faced each other under the command of William of Orange in the area around Seneffe in what is now Belgium . A bitter, loss-making battle developed from a French attack on the Allied rearguard. Both sides claimed victory for themselves.

prehistory

Louis XIV had entrusted Louis II de Bourbon, prince de Condé, the supreme command in the Netherlands. An army of about 45,000 men was subordinate to him. This collected at Tournai at the beginning of May . Reinforced with another corps, it finally reached 50,000 men. All of these were experienced soldiers. The task of Condes was to protect northern France against the troops of the Imperial, Spanish and Dutch who were gathered in the Netherlands. The Allied army consisted of 30,000 Dutch, the majority of whom were newly recruited under Wilhelm III. of Orange. There were also 15,000 Spaniards commanded by Count Monterey, the governor of Flanders , and 27,000 Imperial soldiers under Field Marshal Souches. The allies brought together 70,000 men.

The nominal supreme command lay with William of Orange. The relationship with the imperial commander, who was reluctant to submit to the much younger Orange, was difficult from the start. The different goals of the Allies were also problematic. The Dutch wanted to win Maastricht and Grave . The Spaniards wanted to wrest from the French the conquests they had made in Flanders and Hainaut . The aim of the imperial, on the other hand, was to bind as many French troops as possible in the Netherlands, so that one could proceed more safely on the Upper Rhine against the French army under Turenne . This disagreement meant that the summer was spent on the part of the allies with poorly targeted actions. It was not until the end of July that William of Orange managed to persuade Souches to cross over to the left bank of the Meuse near Namur . The allies then united on July 28 at Pervez .

course

Allied deposition attempt

Conde had time to take a strong position. He set up his troops between a forest and a dairy farm. The right wing leaned against the forest, the left wing against the dairy. The front was covered by the deeply cut and marshy river bed of the Pieton. On August 9, the allied army camped at Seneffe. The distance between the two armies was now only an hour. The allies threatened the left wing of the French, but they trusted in their strong position. On August 10, an Allied council of war decided against the will of William of Orange not to attack the enemy. Rather, they wanted to march towards Cambrai . Either this would induce Conde to give up his position and take up terrain more favorable to the allies, or, if he held the position, they would besiege one of the French fortresses. Souches rejected the danger of a flank march in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, which was put forward by some generals. On August 11th, the allies marched off in three columns. The left column formed the cavalry, the infantry formed the center and the right column consisted of the artillery and the baggage train. The Imperialists marched in front, followed by the Dutch and the Spanish. A rearguard of cavalrymen and dragoons from all allies came at the end.

French attack on the rearguard

Conde watched the maneuvers of the enemy and decided to attack the rear guard until the remaining Allied units were close to support them. At the same time, a smaller unit should attack the top of the Allies in order to delay support for the rearguard. The Allied rearguard was under the command of Charles Henri de Lorraine-Vaudémont . This had taken a favorable position to cover the marching army. As soon as he noticed enemy movements, he asked the Prince of Orange for reinforcements.

About ten o'clock Conde considered the main force of the enemy to be far enough away and began the attack on the rearguard. The town of Sennefe was taken, the Vaudemont cavalry defeated and forced to retreat. Conde gathered his troops and ordered the main force to be followed. For a long time, William of Orange Souches urged the Allies in vain to support the rearguard. Finally the Dutch and Spanish infantry took position at St. Nicolas. The right wing was covered by a swampy stream, the left by hedges and woods. No sooner had the troops taken their position than Conde attacked with his infantry and six artillery pieces. The French cavalry stood on both wings. They attacked several times and encountered strong resistance before they succeeded in driving the opponents out of St. Nicolas and the woods and taking up these positions themselves, with heavy losses.

Main fight at Fayt

The Prince of Orange, besieged by the French cavalry, withdrew to the village of Fayt , where he ordered his troops to take up a new position around 2 p.m. The entourage of allies and the war chest had meanwhile fallen into the hands of the French. Conde had fully achieved his original goal of destroying the enemy rearguard. Without considering that the main French power was still away, he wanted to continue attacking. The troops deployed were also exhausted. In addition, the imperial now strengthened the position of Orange. He considered his position in the village with church and castle with swamp, a ravine and forests to be favorable. He distributed his infantry and some artillery. He set up his cavalry and the gradually arriving imperial on a free plain behind.

Some reinforcements had arrived at Conde and he went on to attack without waiting for further troops. He commanded the center of the front himself. The infantry was followed by the cavalry in several meetings. Fourteen infantry regiments attacked the enemy from three sides in the central section of the front. The Allies, however, offered strong resistance and despite repeated French attacks it was not possible to drive the opponents from their positions near the village. The allies were also able to hold their own in the gorge on the left wing. Some of their cavalry even went over to counter-attacks. Even on the left wing, the French did not succeed in gaining decisive terrain.

The battle had already lasted three hours and the French suffered heavy losses. Conde did not break off the fight because he still hoped for the arrival of his main power. When it got dark, the cavalry movement stopped. The infantry battles continued in the moonlight until about 10 p.m. After that the guns fell silent on both sides. Both armies were prepared for the battle to continue the next morning. This did not happen because the shooting began again around midnight. The French cavalry fled and was difficult to collect again.

consequences

Conde realized that continuing the fighting the next morning would not be successful. So he decided to return to his original camp and had it done during the night. The allies also withdrew. Both sides later credited the victory. In the capitals of the warring factions involved, the Te Deum was sung in thanks for the victory.

literature

  • Hanns Eggert Willibald von der Lühe (Hrsg.): Militair Conversations-Lexikon. Volume 7: R, S. Verlags-Bureau, Adorf 1839, pp. 612–616 .

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Numbers according to: Gaston Bodart (Ed.): Military-historical War Lexicon. (1618-1905). Stern, Vienna 1908, p. 95 .