Battle for Changsha (1939)

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Battle for Changsha (1939)
Japanese soldiers during the Battle of Changsha
Japanese soldiers during the Battle of Changsha
date September 17 - October 6, 1939
place Changsha in the southern Chinese province of Hunan
output Chinese victory
Parties to the conflict

China Republic 1928Republic of China (1912–1949) China

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

Commander

China Republic 1928Republic of China (1912–1949) Chen Cheng Xue Yue Guan Linzheng
China Republic 1928Republic of China (1912–1949)
China Republic 1928Republic of China (1912–1949)

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Okamura Yasuji

Troop strength
180,000 soldiers 90,000 soldiers,
large numbers of ships,
over 100 motor boats

The Battle of Changsha took place during the Second Sino-Japanese War from September 17 to October 6, 1939. It was the first Japanese attempt to conquer the city of Changsha in the central southern Chinese province of Hunan . After the offensive began on September 17th, the Japanese army overstretched its lines so that the Chinese defenders managed to attack their western flank. Nevertheless, the Japanese reached Changsha, but were unable to conquer the city because the Chinese had cut off their supply lines. After heavy losses, they withdrew on October 6th.

In 1941 , 1942 and 1944 further battles took place for Changsha.

background

Since 1937, Japan had been able to conquer large parts of China along the coastal regions including Shanghai , Beijing and Wuhan . The KMT government had withdrawn to the war capital Chongqing in the mountainous inland province of Sichuan . The Japanese expeditionary force to China set the target at Changsha in the province of Hunan . The province was on the one hand important for the nationalists to maintain the food supply, on the other hand it represented a possible to Sichuan. Likewise, from Changsha the connection of the KMT capital to the remaining cities on the Yangtze in the east could be cut off. The city of Changsha itself had already been devastated by the withdrawal of troops from Wuhan and the scorched earth order hastily issued by Chiang Kai-shek .

Balance of power and planning

After two years of incessant fighting, the war in China had stalled. At the beginning of September, the Japanese General Nishio Toshizō of the China Expeditionary Army and Lieutenant General Itagaki Seishirō moved with their forces to take Changsha. The 101st and 106th Japanese Divisions were set up on the west bank of the Gan River in northern Jiangxi , while the 3rd , 5th , 13th and 33rd Japanese Divisions marched from southern Hubei to northern Hunan .
The Japanese armed forces gathered 100,000 for this. The Imperial Army called the operation the Gan Xiang Operation on the Rivers, which limited the area of ​​operation.

The National Revolutionary Army forces in defense of Changsha comprised the 9th War Zone under the command of General Chen Cheng . This had around 365,000 soldiers. Xue Yue , the war zone front-line commander, developed a tripartite defense of Changsha. He built three conventionally fortified lines of defense with static garrison troops . After contact with the enemy, they were to receive the order to retreat and lead the Japanese units to prepared attack locations, where they were to be crushed by specially trained storm troops . He also set up mobile field troops that allowed the Japanese to run over them to operate as guerrillas behind their lines . In addition to these forces, he continued to provide reserve troops for the defense of strategically important points and replacements for the storm troops . In addition, the armed forces carried out systematic scorched earth measures in order to prevent the Japanese troops from transporting and acquiring supplies. The aim of the planning was a slow and loss-making advance of the Japanese expeditionary army on Changsha, in the course of which the combat strength of the Japanese units would slowly wear out due to logistical problems, while they would encounter more and more Chinese resistance.

Course of the battle

With a westward attack from Jiangxi to Henan, the Japanese began the offensive on September 17th. But after stretching the front too far to the west, the Chinese succeeded in a counterattack from the north and south, which forced the Japanese to retreat.

On September 19, the Japanese decided to attack the Chinese along the Xinqiang River. They used poison gas against Chinese positions. Japan had not ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 , which outlawed the use of poison gas. The Chinese were forced to withdraw from the Xinqiang River area on September 19. Two Japanese divisions then managed to cross the river with the help of strong artillery fire . They continued to advance to the bank of the Miluo River.

Heavy fighting raged until September 23, during which the Chinese withdrew ever farther south to lure the Japanese into the cauldron that was being prepared by additional battalions in the west and east. On September 29, the Japanese reached the outskirts of Changsha, but were unable to conquer the city because Chinese troops had meanwhile cut off their supply routes. On October 3rd, General Xue Yue ordered a major counterattack. The Japanese withdrew northwards with heavy losses. On October 10th, Chinese troops had recaptured all the areas they had occupied before the battle began.

consequences

The Chinese leadership tried to keep the initiative after the victory at Changsha. Chiang Kai-shek commanded the winter offensive from 1939-1940 . In a general offensive from Shanxi in the north to southern China, large parts of the country were to be recaptured.

Footnotes

Note: this article was started in 2006 based on the article in the English Wikipedia .

  1. a b c Rana Mitter: China's War with Japan, 1937 - 1945. London, 2014 p. 166, p. 211
  2. Hans J. van de Ven: War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945. London, 2003, pp. 237 - 239
  3. ^ Tobe Ryoichi: The Japanese Eleventh Arme in Central China, 1938-1941. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford , 2012, p. 217f
  4. Stephen MacKinnon: The Defense of the Central Yangtze. in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, Hans van de Ven: The Battle for China - Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 - 1945. Stanford, 2012, pp. 217f
  5. Hans J. van de Ven: War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945. London, 2003, pp. 237 - 239
  6. Chronology (English)
  7. ^ Rana Mitter: Forgotten Ally - China's World War II, 1937 - 1945. New York, 2013, p. 212