Sea battle at the Kaiserin Augusta Bay
Course of the battle
| date | 1. - 2. November 1943 |
|---|---|
| place | in front of Bougainville , New Guinea , Pacific |
| output |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 4 cruisers , 8 destroyers |
4 cruisers , 6 destroyers |
| losses | |
|
1 cruiser damaged |
1 cruiser sunk |
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The naval battle in the Empress Augusta Bay , known as the Battle of Bougainville in English, was a battle between the Japanese and the United States that took place on November 1 and 2, 1943 near Bougainville , an island in the northern Solomon Islands that became a territory heard of New Guinea took place. It was the result of a counterattack by the Japanese army after the Americans had landed in Empress Augusta Bay, but which was repulsed. The embattled Kaiserin-Augusta-Bucht is named after the former German Empress Augusta von Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach , as Bougainville was a German colony in the 19th century .
prehistory
The landing was part of Operation Cartwheel , which aimed to isolate the large Japanese base Rabaul and wanted to bypass it in order to reach the Japanese homeland. With the landing in the Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville , the Allies intended to form a bridgehead to build an airfield there. This bay was chosen because it was on the outer limit of the range of the Allied warplanes and the strength of the Japanese at this point was weak. The operation began on the night of 27 on October 28 with landings on Choiseul and the Treasury Islands . On November 1 , the 1st Marine Division of the I. Marine Amphibious Corps under Alexander A. Vandegrift of the US Marines landed in Empress Augusta Bay.
The landings were covered by 4 light cruisers and 8 destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Aaron S. Merrill . In anticipation of a Japanese counterattack, Merill had split his fleet into three groups. In front the four destroyers Charles Ausburne , Dyson , Stanly and Claxton drove under the command of Captain Arleigh Burke , behind them the main force with the light cruisers Montpellier , Cleveland , Columbia and Denver under Merill himself and at the end the destroyers Spence , Thatcher , Converse and Foote under the command of Captain B. Austin .
The Japanese, who considered Bougainville indispensable for the defense of Rabaul, sent a strong force consisting of the heavy cruisers Myōkō and Haguro , the light cruisers Agano and Sendai and the destroyers Hatsukaze , Naganami , Samidare , Shigure , Shiratsuyu and Wakasuki under the command of Admiral Sentaro Omori in the invasion area. These should meet a supply transport with 1,000 men at Cape St. George , bring them ashore near the invasion area, and then attack the American transport ships. This operation was hastily planned so that the commanders of the three divisions that had been newly formed from the cruisers and destroyers had little time to vote. The association met the transport ships at Cape St. George, but continued without them. Omori divided his force into three groups that were supposed to operate in lines side by side. In the middle the heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro drove , on both sides the destroyers, each led by a light cruiser, ran. On port (east) the Sendai under Rear Admiral Ijūin Matsuji with the destroyers Shigure , Samidare and Shiratsuyu and starboard the Agano under Rear Admiral Osugi Morikazu with the destroyers Naganami , Hatsukaze and Wakatsuki .
The battle
American reconnaissance planes had already spotted the Japanese at Cape St. George and scored a close hit on the Haguro at 1:30 a.m. , causing them to reduce speed. Shortly afterwards, a reconnaissance aircraft took off from the Haguro and reported a cruiser and three destroyers. To buy time for further educational work, Omori ordered a 180 degree turn. At 2:00 a.m. the aircraft reported that the Kaiserin Augusta Bay was full of transport ships. Omori then ordered another turn, this time towards the bay. The two turns had mixed up the formation so that the lines were now significantly closer.
The ships of the American Navy were slowly cruising in front of the bay. They had the first radar contact at around 2:27 a.m. Then they turned north. Admiral Merill planned to send his destroyer groups to carry out a torpedo attack , after which the cruisers should open fire from a safe distance. At 2:31 am, the Burke group turned north-northeast to get into position for a torpedo attack. Shortly afterwards, Austin's group turned south to reach a clear field of fire for a second torpedo attack. The order was misunderstood on the Foote . She got out of her position, which would later have fatal consequences.
The battle that followed was essentially a series of independent actions. The Japanese and American flotillas each operated as three independent units. These fought their own battles hardly coordinated with the other ships on their own side.
At 2:45 am, Austin's destroyers had radar contact with the Japanese naval forces , and all but the Foote , which had strayed from the force, turned 90 degrees to starboard west. The prospect of a surprise double strike from both destroyer divisions was good, but the discovery of the Shigure disrupted Merrill's plan.
At 2:46 a.m., Burke's destroyers had shot down 25 torpedoes and he ordered another one to be shot down. Rear Admiral Osugi received the alarm on the Agano . He had never fought a night fight before, but he accelerated and charged forward to find the enemy without warning his commander.
Ijuin on the Sendai and Hara on the Shigure were very experienced in night fighting, unlike Omori and Osugi. They realized that the American destroyers may already have launched torpedoes and responded immediately. Ijuin's line turned to starboard. The turn of the Sendai was very sharp. It cut the Shigure's path , and the two almost collided, passing each other within three meters of each other.
Merill, seeing the maneuvers from Ijuin's line, realized that the surprise had failed and that Burke's attack would fail. At 2:49 a.m., his four light cruisers therefore opened fire. Their target was the strongest radar echo, the Sendai . This had meanwhile shot down 8 torpedoes.
Omori turned his heavy cruisers south at the same time. He opened fire but couldn't see what he was shooting at. His volleys came in quick succession, but were several thousand meters too short.
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At 2:52 a.m., Merill's cruisers turned synchronously southwards in order to maintain the planned distance of 17 km. By changing course, they avoided the Sendai torpedo attack at the same time .
At 2:52 am, 6 "(15.2 cm) shells from the American cruisers struck the Sendai's boiler rooms , and further hits followed in the aft engine room, stopping the engines and damaging the rudder. At the same time, Samidare 8 fired Torpedoes at a distance of 15 km. She was barely able to prevent a collision with the Sendai , but with this maneuver she grazed the Shiratsuyu , the last destroyer in the line, and inflicted severe damage on it on the left.
After their torpedo attack, Burke's destroyers headed northwest, away from the battle. Then the Ausburne turned east-southeast, followed by the Dyson . The Stanley and Claxton made a sharper turn in response to an order intended not for them but for the cruisers, causing them to move south from the lead ship.
While the Sendai was burning, the Samidars and Shiratsuyu were in the neighborhood. The samidars received three hits in that battle. She was ordered to go alongside. Instead, it broke south, searching unsuccessfully for targets.
At 2:56 a.m. the Foote moved away from the cruiser line and tried to regain its position in Austin's line. Their efforts were hampered by Austin's change of course to the west at 3:00 a.m., which was necessary, however, to stay outside the cruiser's line of fire.
Omori was still in the dark about the position and direction of the enemy. His cruisers made a full circle and at 3:01 a.m. he was on a more southerly course. At the same time, Merill launched a long-range attack on the middle and right lines. At 3:01 a.m. when the Japanese cruisers turned south, he turned north.
Merill's orders were ignored by two of Burke's destroyers. The Stanley and Claxton therefore turned to starboard at 3:06 a.m. and moved southeast in the direction of the American cruisers. This separated them from their two companions. At 3:08 a.m., the Ausburne and Dyson turned to chase them, possibly mistaking them for Japanese warships . Also at 3:01 a.m., a torpedo from the Samidare hit the Foote while she was traveling at 34 knots and trying to overtake Austin and his flotilla. The explosion destroyed the rear three compartments, water penetrated six others and killed 19 sailors. Energetic leak protection saved the ship from sinking.
At 3:05 a.m., the Morikazu line was the easternmost of the three Japanese groups, about 12 km east of the American cruisers, which at that time were traveling north in a line southeast of the heavy cruisers. Finding nothing, Morikazu turned west to join Omori. Unknowingly, he led his destroyers across the bow of his own approaching cruisers. At 3:07 a.m. the Myoko collided with the Hatsukaze and severed the bow. This part was still hanging on the bow of the Myoko when she returned to Rabaul . The Haguro was just able to avoid the Wakatsuki , the last ship in the line. At 3:08 a.m., these two Japanese lines had inflicted serious damage on themselves and had to reorganize. Merrill ordered Austin's destroyer division to launch a torpedo attack while turning his cruisers south again. The timing was very well chosen, but this time too the orders were misunderstood and reduced the effectiveness of the American destroyers. At 3:10 a.m. Austin ordered his ships to prepare for a turn. On the Thatcher this order was misunderstood as an order to turn and so she turned. At 3:11 a.m., the Spence and Thatcher brushed as they approached each other at a speed of 30 knots. The Thatcher suffered severe damage along its superstructure. The damage on the Spence was less severe. However, both ships were still ready to fight.
Only twenty minutes had passed since the battle began, but the only force still under effective command were Merrill's light cruisers. As a direct result of misunderstood orders, Burke's ship was at the end of its own line. At Austin one ship was out of action and another damaged. The situation for Omori was dire. The Ijuin Destroyer Division had lost the lead ship, and their destroyers fought as they pleased or not. His heavy cruisers and the Second Division of Destroyers maneuvered ineffectively and damaged themselves rather than the Americans. Although he tried everything against the two formations, Merill was only able to score hits on the ships of the Ijuins line with his volleys at the beginning of the battle. And his cruisers had just barely avoided a collision (2:55 a.m.). Up until that point it was not a well-fought battle on either side.
Omori changed course from 180 to 160 degrees. At 3:13 a.m. he was able to locate Merrill's position by firing flares. Now Omori's artillery had the targets they had been looking for for so long. He opened fire at 3:15 a.m. and followed torpedoes at 3:18 a.m. When they had targets, the veterans on the Myoko and Haguro showed their remarkable accuracy. Heavy volleys hit the Montpellier repeatedly . Then, between 3:20 a.m. and 3:25 a.m., the Myoko and Haguro hit the Denver with three different volleys . These shells were all duds , but still caused considerable damage. They perforated the light cruiser in front, which had to pull out of the formation and reduce speed in order not to be pushed under water. The Columbia was also slightly damaged when it was hit by an 8 "(20.3 cm) dud that pierced its armor and came to a stand in a box. With the Japanese firing so accurately, Merill gave at 3:26 The order was given to fog up and drive back north with a 180-degree turn counterclockwise to increase the distance, which was only 12 km. In contrast, Merill's association scored between 3:10 and 3:20 am About ten hits from the 5 "(12.7 cm) and 6" guns on the Haguro . Again, most of the shells were duds, and only one man was killed and five injured. The Myoko found the Spence at 3: 8 p.m. and damaged it with two close hits and one hit at the point where the mess , baker's quarters and fuel tanks meet. Again the grenade was a dud, but salt water contaminated the fuel supply, causing the Spence to slow down indigency compulsion.
Driving further north, Austin spotted the damaged Sendai at 3:28 a.m. and fired eight torpedoes at it, two of which hit. The Sendai was under steam again, but her damaged rudder only allowed her to go in circles. She returned the fire, but it was ineffective, and the samidars and Shiratsuyu fled northwest. Austin's three destroyers took off and a fight developed. Austin shot 19 torpedoes but failed to score. Neither side could inflict artillery damage to the other, although at times they were only 3 km apart.
At 3:27 a.m., Omori believed he had sunk a cruiser and seriously damaged two others with torpedoes. The fountains of missed shots were interpreted as explosions, and when the American cruisers went out of sight due to fog and sudden turns, he believed he had sunk them. Just as he overestimated the damage he caused, he also misjudged the number of his opponents. So he faced seven heavy cruisers and 12 destroyers. Seeing himself victorious and not challenging fate, he ceased fire at 3:29 a.m. and ordered the retreat at 3:37 a.m., moving eastward from the scene.
Burke's destroyers spent most of the battle and all of the time the cruisers were in action regrouping. It was an hour before they returned to battle after their first torpedo attack and attacked the burning Sendai with artillery fire at 3:49 a.m. Then they spotted the samidars and the Shiratsuyu on their radar and started chasing them. However, they drove right between the Austin destroyers, and in the confusion the two damaged Japanese destroyers escaped. Burke fired at Austin at 4:24 a.m. At 4:54 a.m., the destroyers received orders to join the cruisers, but another target appeared on the radar, the damaged Hatsukaze . The two groups fired at her together with the artillery, whereupon she sank at 5:39 a.m.
The American cruisers were west and looking for further targets, but found nothing except for the Hatsukaze . They fired some shells at 5:00 a.m. at a distance of 10 miles, but got no hits.
Result
Empress Augusta Bay was a confusing battle. Omori has been criticized for maintaining a complicated formation. Because of this, its lines became disordered. A serious mistake was the maneuver he ordered at 2:52 a.m. His biggest mistake, however, was giving up the fight he had fought so well by then.
The American destroyers were largely ineffective. Burke's forces attacked and then disappeared for an hour. Austin's destroyers went through the middle of the battle and could also cause little damage, with the exception of incapacitated ships. Merrill's maneuvers were more complicated than Omori's twists. However, he was able to keep his cruisers away from the Japanese torpedoes, which was an important feat, and his cruisers did not fire at his own ships, another feat. It's also a little noteworthy that the radar-based fire was so effective in the beginning and then so ineffective for the outcome of the battle. The four cruisers fired 4,591 rounds of 6 "and 705 rounds of 5" grenades. During the brief period that the Japanese cruisers were involved, their visually controlled fire was much better than the American radar-based. In any event, the Japanese suffered the greater damage, many of them self-inflicted, and failed to achieve their tactical or strategic goals.
The Japanese lost a light cruiser, mostly to artillery fire, possibly aided by torpedoes. A destroyer was damaged in a collision and sunk by artillery fire. Another destroyer was moderately damaged in a collision and artillery fire, and a fourth was damaged in a collision. One light cruiser was slightly damaged by a near hit. The Haguro was slightly damaged by artillery fire, and the Myoko lost two torpedo tubes as a result of their collision.
For the Americans, one destroyer was badly damaged by a torpedo, one was moderately damaged by artillery and a collision, one destroyer was slightly damaged by a collision, and two light cruisers were slightly damaged by artillery. It is noteworthy that all of the Japanese grenades and many of the American ones that hit the target were duds.
Web links
- Battle description by Vincent O'Hara ( English )
- Brief overview on combinedfleet.com ( English )
- Biography of Arleigh Burke ( English )