Soviet doctrine of attack (Cold War)

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Suspected attack axes of the Warsaw Pact
Structure of a Soviet Mot Rifle Battalion
Outline of a Soviet tank battalion
Structure of a Soviet Mot rifle division
Structure of a Soviet armored division
Structure of a Soviet front
The 7 Great Threats to NATO posed by the Soviet Forces (U.S. Department of Defense Fact Sheet 1981)
BMP infantry fighting vehicle
T-64
T-72
T-80
Combat helicopter Mil Mi-24
Combat helicopters Mi-24 combat ground targets

The so-called Soviet attack doctrine , or attack doctrine of the Warsaw Pact , during the Cold War was essentially based on deep operations of strong armored units. The tactic was aimed at deep impacts on suitable front sections ( VRV ). Essential features here were main strikes with different emphasis on the "principle of mass" (effect of superior combat power at the decisive place and at the decisive point in time). These operations could be supported, among other things, by attack helicopters and air landings in the rear area.

aims

The main aim of the Soviet doctrine of attack was to bring the NATO defense system to collapse at an early stage in a kind of " blitzkrieg " through rapid tank advances in order to prevent the escalation to a nuclear war within a conventional war if possible. The decisive factor here was the strong upgrading of the Warsaw Pact with regard to its armored and artillery weapons. At the beginning of the 1980s, both superpowers still considered a conventional war feasible. The core tasks included:

  • Surprise attacks at different focuses, attack axes and times
  • Attack on a broad front in all strategic directions
  • Surprising hitting at high speed day and night with high mobility
  • fast and coordinated operations
  • Undermining a possible nuclear reaction by NATO

history

The Soviet military doctrine of the army has undergone several changes over time. While in the 1960s the main focus was on the nuclear response and conventional warfare was viewed as a supplement, the transition to more intensive planning of conventional war took place in the 1970s. Ten years later, the use of conventional weapons with the option of using tactical nuclear weapons as battlefield bodies had also become probable. Until 1985, all three types of operations, defense, counter-offensive and attack, were treated equally. NATO was also assumed to have a certain intention of aggression, which the WAPA wanted to counter by launching a counterattack in its territory in order to take the initiative again. A period of five to seven days was estimated for the capture of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1987 a defensive military doctrine prevailed again. For a time, the planning took into account the use of so-called "breakthrough battalions" with super-heavy T-10 tanks. A development that was later abandoned in favor of faster and more agile associations.

Operational planning for the Thuringian balcony (Fulda Gap)

For the so-called “ Fulda Gap ”, the Hessian corridor with the geographically shortest distance between the GDR and the metropolis of Frankfurt am Main and the most critical “interface” of the Cold War in Central Europe , the 8th Guard Army Weimar - Nohra of the GSSD planned the following deployment scenario: Breach of the Fulda Gap in the area of ​​responsibility of the V US Corps, crossing the Main and reaching the Rhine within a very short time. In the 1980s the 8th Guards Army had reached its maximum combat strength and had four elite divisions of up to 12,000 men (20th Guards Panzer Division, 20th, 39th and 57th Guards Mot Rifle Divisions) plus numerous support units such as the 43rd Guards Artillery Brigade, other missile brigades, troop flying units, the 6th Merseburg fighter-bomber division , the night reconnaissance battalion, etc. a. This also included army aviation forces which, according to projections, would have been able to destroy between 40 and 60 enemy tanks or a complete tank grenadier battalion (mot. InfBtl) within one day of combat. The 8th Guard Army was a highly mobile unit that had more battle and armored personnel carriers (at times 1,200 to 1,500 tanks, approx. 225 tanks per MSD) than any other Soviet tank unit of the Second World War. Your task in an armed conflict would be to break through the tactical defense zone of NATO (attack strips per division here about 15-20 km) within a single day of combat and continue the attack at high speed in the depths. The 1st squadron should break through the cover forces of NATO (11th ACR - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment ) and the 2nd squadron create the conditions to destroy the US Corps, Frankfurt, Frankfurt Airport and the river crossings over the Rhine to occupy. Ultimately, the 3rd season was given the task of crossing the Rhine and advancing to the German-French border. The strength of the 8th Guards Armored Army lay in the different use of its armored and the three mechanized divisions (BMP and BTR). To prevent the enemy battlefield from being sealed off, the air defense units of the 8th Guards Army were heavily upgraded in the 1970s. The operational plans of the enemy (Army Group CENTAG ) had become known at times through exposure and so the offensive planning could systematically prepare for it. This was also the case in 1982, when the Ministry for State Security came into possession of the highly secret GDP plan OP 3301.

Scheme

The army of the Warsaw Pact was on the one hand numerically and on the other hand equipped by the combat value of its weapon systems in such a way that at the time of the Cold War it could carry out an attack with high intensity, high operational mobility, day and night without interruption. The Soviet tank units were designed for great mobility with undiminished firepower and the rapid overcoming of water obstacles ("forcing waters"). For this, the T-64 , T-72 and T-80 battle tanks developed for attack operations had a high impact force. In addition to the strength on the ground, fire support was provided from the air by army pilots (in particular by the combat helicopter Mil Mi-24 “Hind”, the “ flying armored personnel carrier ”) and ground attack aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-25 , “Frogfoot”, which also actively target their targets at night could fight. The preparation for the attack was always preceded by a thorough ground-based reconnaissance in order to adequately clear up the course of the opposing position system in depth. One of the key functions in preparing for an attack was played by the company's own artillery forces, which unfolded about five to eight kilometers away from the planned breakthrough section. At a breakthrough section at least six times the numerical superiority over the enemy should be achieved. Then the attack group began to march and deploy from the starting / staging area, which was usually 20 to 40 kilometers deep on the territory of the GDR near the border and should not be within the range of the NATO artillery if possible. Here the troops were divided into, for example, BMP and BTR regiments or into advance, main and follow-up forces, in 1st and 2nd squadrons. In addition, combat support from engineers , air defenses, tank destroyers and the like. a. As soon as the artillery was ready to fire in its firing positions, the attack formation could leave its starting area on the marching streets. The operation plan stipulated which sequence lines (AL) had to be crossed at which fixed times . Further leadership / dividing lines formed the line for the deployment of the battalion, company and platoon columns (LEB, LEK and LEZ), the line of assault (LSA) and the line of dismounting (LA) of the Mot-Schützen from their combat vehicles.

Under fire protection from the artillery for 30 to 60 minutes, the regiments of the 1st Squadron reached the deployment section from their starting position, about 12 kilometers from the VRV. In this section they were divided into front and rear battalions (regimental reserve). Either the main battle tanks were divided into platoons among the Mot rifle companies, or they were also used as a group for focus attacks. The battalions in turn were divided into three reinforced companies as combat units deployed at the front with one company at a distance of 1.5 or 2 km as a battalion reserve. Frequently, however, reserves were foregone and all available forces were pooled for the attack. In order to achieve the required thrust, the first unit to encounter the enemy was mostly an armored train and Mot rifle companies mounted 50 meters behind it. At the height of the LSA, the deployment was now complete and the attack on recognized enemy was carried out at high speed (fire fighting with weapon stabilization system also possible while moving). At the height of the LA, the Mot rifle troops dismounted and carried out the storm and break- in into the enemy positions. In doing so, it was primarily important to take down the enemy's anti-tank forces with top priority . The battle tanks were used offensively, depending on the nature of the terrain (open terrain - “tank terrain”), in which they were widely diversified, targeting hard targets at high speed and fighting on the move. Here, too, the aim was to undermine the enemy's defensive fire as much as possible. As soon as own tanks and infantry broke into the position of the enemy, the artillery fire was shifted into the depths. With the rapid advances of the armored forces and the motorized infantry, open flanks were consciously accepted. The top priority was the expansion of the breakthrough section, the maintenance of the attack momentum and not of the own troops that had broken down.

Approach to forces

A Soviet GSSD army (exception: guard armies and shock armies) usually consisted of two Mot rifle and one tank division.

Combat strength of three Mot Rifle Divisions (MSD)

Combat vehicles and weapon systems number
Main battle tank 266 × 3 MB = 798 MB
Armored personnel carriers 346 × 3 AFVs = 1,038 AFVs
artillery 162 × 3 = 486 (corresponds to 3 × 27 batteries), guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, anti-tank guns (PAK)

Combat strength of a tank division (PD)

Combat vehicles and weapon systems number
Main battle tank 3 tank regiments of 125 MBTs each = 415 (also 1 Mot rifle regiment with 40 MBTs each), this may be a reinforced PD, the normal strength of a tank division is given as 311 to 325 MBTs
Armored personnel carriers 3 tank regiments of 39 BMP = 117 SPz each, 1 Mot rifle regiment of 111 BMP = 111 SPz each and a reconnaissance battalion of 15 BMP = 243 each
artillery 144 (corresponds to 24 batteries), guns, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, anti-tank guns (PAK)

Combat strength of a Mot Rifle Division (MSD)

Combat vehicles and weapon systems number
Main battle tank 1 tank regiment with 95 MBTs, 3 motorized rifle regiments with 40 MBTs each = 120, 1 independent tank battalion with 51 MBs = 266 MBs
Armored personnel carriers 3 Mot rifle regiments, 2 × 105 SPz, 1 × 111 SPz (BMP) = 321 SPz, 1 tank regiment with 10 SPz and 1 reconnaissance battalion with 15 SPz = 346 SPz
artillery Panzer and Mot rifle regiments: 1 artillery battalion with 18 × 122 mm guns, 4 battalions with 72 guns, 1 artillery regiment with 3 artillery battalions with 54 × 122/152 mm guns, 1 rocket launcher battalion (BM-21) with 18 launchers, 1 PAK battalion with 18 × 100 mm guns = 162 guns and multiple rocket launchers

There are also army troops in the form of a tank regiment with 95 or more battle tanks, as well as an artillery brigade with 72 guns and other formations.

Process principles

Attack preparation

A successful breakthrough, i. H. The severing of the defense section of a brigade and the tracking of further parts of its own into the depths of the enemy territory, through the defense line of NATO, required meticulous preparation of the attack on the part of the division and army headquarters. The tank attack was mostly preceded by concentrated artillery barrages and air strikes, with the actual breakthrough being hidden for as long as possible. For artillery preparation, high-angle weapons (pipe artillery and rocket launchers ) from various associations, such as the regiment or divisional artillery groups (RAG / DAG) could be combined. For this purpose, firing positions were taken about four to six kilometers in front of the own VRV. The artillery received fire orders for area and point targets. The fire starts around the time when attack groups march out of the staging area towards the target. There are also massive strikes on the opposing defense by army aircraft (attack helicopters) and ground attack aircraft . The artillery was assigned fire according to certain priorities:

  • Enlightened artillery positions and field airfields of the enemy, as well as other high-value targets
  • Enlightened command posts (BtlGefStd, BrigGefStd and DivGefStd), reserves and marching streets
  • Area targets in the depths of the defending battalion battle strip
  • enlightened companies at the VRV and in the depths

The artillery fire (“roll of fire”, “fire curtain” or “fire bell”), mainly of explosive fire and fragmentation ammunition , as well as bomblets , could last between 10 minutes and several hours, but mostly between 45 and 60 minutes depending on the strength of the enemy and the intensity of the fire summary multiple batteries. When the attack force reached the enemy's VRV, the storm exit line, about 500 meters in front of the enemy, the fire was mostly relocated deeper. A rollover move forward was also made when new firing positions, v. a. at armored artillery .

The ground offensive was to be preceded by raid-like air strikes for an estimated duration of six to eight hours by strong formations of fighter bombers, fighters and light bombers. The goals were prioritized as follows:

  • Fight against NATO radars and the creation of further flight paths in the enemy air defense
  • Destruction of NATO air forces, if possible while still on the ground, by systematically eliminating military airports and air bases. The target was to destroy 60% of the BLUE combat aircraft on the first strike
  • Achievement of air superiority (time, place, day / night) in order to create further operational freedom of action on the ground
  • Destruction of NATO command posts, primarily command posts at corps, division, brigade and battalion level. This applied primarily to nuclear weapon bases, supply depots, etc.
  • Combat high-value targets in the depths of the enemy space
  • Operational and tactical air landings to support the attacking leaders of the ground forces by taking possession of key areas and objects in the manner of a flick. The army pilots were able to make tactical air landings for 10 battalions of air-transportable troops at the same time to a depth of 50 km behind the enemy lines.

enlightenment

Another aspect for a successful breakthrough was the thorough investigation of the terrain and the positions of the enemy through reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance. This could be done on the ground by dismounted reconnaissance troops or mounted by low-noise reconnaissance vehicles such as the reconnaissance vehicle BA-64 or the BRDM . Combat reconnaissance, including reconnaissance through combat, could be carried out using lightly armed transport and armored personnel carriers such as the BTR , BMP, PT-76 floating tanks or battle tanks. This was supplemented by aerial reconnaissance in order to obtain as precise a picture as possible of the opponent's position and defense systems. The main task of reconnaissance was to identify gaps in the opposing defense and to exploit them in a targeted manner. There were also a number of long-distance and special reconnaissance platoons of the NVA and other armies of the Warsaw Pact, which were mainly recruited from paratroopers and airborne units and operated in the hinterland of the enemy territory.

Assignment of combat strips

The Panzer and Mot rifle units were subordinated to other combat support troops such as tank destroyers and engineers. Depending on the terrain, a tank battalion in attack was assigned a penetration depth of approx. 500 to 1000 meters, for a tank regiment a maximum depth of 5000 meters. The classic combat order consisted of two companies as 1st squadron and one company as operational reserve in 2nd squadron. Armored forces were placed under Mot rifle units and artillery for fire support. Different variants were conceivable here, depending on the terrain and the tasks of the association. Either the tank battalion (PB) of a mot rifle regiment (MSR) was divided into the mot rifle battalions (MSB), or in the case of a tank regiment (PR) the MSB was divided between the individual PBs. The staging areas of the attack group were to be chosen so that they were as far as possible out of the range of enemy artillery.

Unfolding

The introduction of the attacking forces for the development in the combat section usually takes place out of the marching order. The attack group developed into regiments , battalions , companies and even individual combat platoons at a distance of five to eight kilometers in front of the NATO VRV . It should be noted here that there was usually a delay strip of the cover forces in front of the VRV , where the first battles would have taken place. The deployment should begin as late as possible in the battle phase so as not to expose your own parts to the full effect of the opponent's anti-tank forces (e.g. MILAN , tank destroyers, etc.). The enemy's defensive fire should be undermined if possible. In the case of a high-speed Soviet tank attack, encounters with NATO units could hardly have been avoided. An increased concentration of forces and troop massing should be counteracted by loosening the attack formations, since a tactical atomic target or a focus target for air strikes would have arisen through agglomeration. On the other hand, a concentration of forces and means to create shock groupings was absolutely necessary in order to carry out a strong blow against the enemy lines. In addition, it was necessary to prevent the enemy from carrying out a counterattack into the flank of the Soviet tank unit, so it was the aim of the troop leader to bring up units as quickly as possible and to keep the VRV under artillery fire as constantly as possible. Flank attacks by the enemy should be sealed off with operational tank reserves and blocking detachments. The attack itself then took place with armored formations (wedge, wide wedge or chain) and mostly mounted on the side of the Mot-Schützen until they reached the opposing positions.

For a successful storm and break-in into the opposing position system, the following relationships between the attacking troops and the defending opponent were taken as a basis:

  • Superiority infantry: 4: 1 to 6: 1
  • Superiority tanks: 3: 1 to 5: 1
  • Artillery superiority: 6: 1 to 8: 1

Breakthrough section

For a breakthrough to be successful, the operational prerequisites had to be created to effect further breakthroughs in neighboring sections in order to avoid a concentration of fire by the enemy on a certain point and to split up the defending troops. For tactical reasons, the breakthrough should take place in the weakest defended area of ​​the opponent. The individual units of the troops were assigned certain breakthrough sections. A battalion 200 meters wide, a regiment up to 1000 meters and a division two kilometers. A NATO battalion defended on the other hand an engagement portion of three to five kilometers wide and about five kilometers deep, and a tank - or Panzergrenadierbrigade about 10 km to the twentieth This meant that a Warsaw Pact division would meet two combat companies in position, or at most one defending battalion. As a rule, an armored infantry battalion and a tank battalion for the counterattack was to be expected. Particular attention was paid to the flank protection. In the endangered sections, the intervention of PAH helicopters, often with a strength of two swarms (14 machines), was to be expected at any time , which had to be fought with Strela missiles and other weapon systems of the air defense. These sections were also particularly endangered by containment barriers and mine barriers. These in turn had to be removed by deploying pioneers with KMT mine clearance equipment or stretched loads. The laying of mine barriers at certain sections was also used by the Warsaw Pact. In addition to the breakthrough section for the main burden of the attack, secondary directions could be ordered and, depending on the development of the situation, a quick change of focus could be made. Breakthroughs can occur simultaneously or at different times. This can involve a combination with army pilots, air forces, and airborne forces (paratroopers, airborne tanks, etc.) in order to take important objects in the depths of the enemy territory in advance.

Followers

The 1st squadron (the foremost units made up about 20% of the total strength), which had to enlarge the breakthrough section, was followed at a distance of about 10 to 15 kilometers by the 2nd squadron, which had the task of breaking existing enemy resistance . The approach of the 2nd season had to be accomplished from the depth of the room and under maximum camouflage. The introduction of the 2nd Squadron was considered a militarily complex and complicated operation and, according to experts, was the weak point of a Soviet attack. A Mot rifle division usually deployed two reinforced MSR and two battalions side by side in the 1st squadron. For tactical considerations, the 2nd season should be introduced as late as possible into the battle in order to achieve the greatest possible wear on the opponent. The main task was to continuously expand the breakthrough section and secure it from enemy counter-attacks. The occupation of towns should be avoided as far as possible so as not to be worn out in house-to-house fights with high losses. Therefore, they should be bypassed or blocked as far as possible.

Operational maneuver groups

An operational maneuver group (English Operational Maneuver Group, OMG) was a heavy tank unit (often a reinforced tank division) of the Warsaw Pact, which had the task of using the element of surprise to force breakthroughs in the defense of NATO and with high impact force and speed to expand. An OMG was used for deep advances by a mobile army group and conducted the combined arms battle , with the main burden on its own armored weapon. The OMGs were to be deployed behind the first attack division, provided independently operating armored units in division or army strength, which had been given the goal of surprisingly pushing into the rear of the NATO combat strips within 24 hours by embracing troops and defending to break out from within. There they were supposed to fight enemy reserves that were brought up, cut lines of retreat, and pursue and destroy retreating enemy units. The concept of the OMG was first published by Donnelly in 1982. A wide variety of scenarios were conceivable here. The early planned deployment of a tank division as an OMG of the army, the deployment of a tank division as an OMG from the inventory of the 1st squadron or the specification of the introductory section of an OMG. The Soviet OMG concept was seen as the answer to the US AirLand Battle and FOFA doctrine.

Calculated losses

In order to be able to make statements about the expectation of losses, different extrapolation methods were used. It was assumed that there were 20% personnel losses within the first 24 hours of a battle day. As a result, an MSD would be worn out after about five days of fighting. According to the Soviet definition, an association with a 60% loss was considered destroyed.

Selected differences in the terminology of both military blocs (NVA - Bundeswehr)

Warsaw Pact (NVA) NATO
Attack strips Combat strip
Task (operational) Mission (army)
enlightenment Reconnaissance (Enemy) Reconnaissance (Terrain)
breakthrough Burglary
Introduction to the battle commitment
Flank Flank
Forcing water hazards Attack over waters
Battle order Deployment order
Battle Rules Battle structure
Combat task assignment
Battle situation location
Counterstrike Counterattack
Main blow Focus in action
Fighting opportunities Combat value
Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons
Chain (army aviator) Swarm (army aviator)
Air defense Air defense
maneuver (tactical) movement
News- Telecommunication
surgery Skirmish
operational structure Battle structure
Recognition Exploration
Rear services Logistics team
Blow Push
Dividing line Border of the combat strip
Branch of service Branch of service

See also

literature

  • Siegfried Lautsch: Germany as a theater of war. Experience and knowledge of an NVA officer . Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSBw), Potsdam, 2013, ISBN 978-3-941571-28-0 .
  • Heinz Magenheimer: The Defense of Western Europe. Doctrine, strengths, operational planning - an inventory from the perspective of NATO . Bernard & Graefe aktuell, Koblenz, 1986, ISBN 3-7637-5345-1 .
  • CN Donnelly: The Operational Maneuver Group. A New Challenge to NATO? International Defense Review 9, 1982. (English)
  • JV Braddock: Soviet concepts for land and naval forces . In: European Defense . Issue 3/1983, pp. 122–127.
  • David M. Glantz, Harold S. Orenstein: The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–1991: The Documentary Basis: Volume 1 (Operational Art 1927–1964) . Frank Cass Publishers, 1995, ISBN 978-0-7146-4547-6 . (English)
  • James C. Barbara, Robert F. Brown: Deep Thrust on Extended Battlefields in Military Review . October 1982. (English)
  • FM 30-40 (Field Manual). Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces . Headquarters Department of the Army, June 30, 1975. (English)
  • John G. Hines: The Principle of Mass in Soviet Tactics Today . In: Military Review . August 1982, pp. 13-23. (English)

Web links

Notes and individual references

  1. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa Heinz Magenheimer: The Defense of Western Europe. Doctrine, stock of strength, operational planning - an inventory from the perspective of NATO, e) On the Soviet concept of attack in Central Europe, Bernard & Graefe aktuell, Koblenz, 1986, pp. 76–91, ISBN 3-7637-5345-1 .
  2. ^ A b c d Siegfried Lautsch: Theater of War Germany. Experience and knowledge of an NVA officer. ZMSBw, Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, Potsdam 2013, ISBN 978-3-941571-28-0 .
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Dieter Krüger (Hrsg.): Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap. Strategies and operational plans of the alliances in the Cold War (= Point Alpha series of publications. Vol. 2). Parzeller, Fulda 2014, ISBN 978-3-7900-0486-1 .
  4. ↑ Troop Practice 6/1983. Darmstadt, Wehr und Wissen publishing company.
  5. ↑ Troop Practice 6/1983. Darmstadt, Wehr und Wissen publishing company.
  6. ^ Seven Days to the River Rhine
  7. ^ BAI: battlefield air interdiction
  8. ^ General Defense Plan
  9. ↑ up to the beginning of the 21st century. the Soviet and later the Russian army was inferior to NATO's night combat capabilities due to the lack of suitable night vision devices such as thermal imaging devices
  10. ↑ Disposal space for attack structure
  11. ↑ armored transport tanks, wheeled tanks with BMK
  12. ↑ when the AL is exceeded, the actual attack begins
  13. ↑ 2,000 combat aircraft, of which approx. 1,200 machines for the first wave of attacks and approx. 1,000 helicopters on the part of the Warsaw Pact
  14. ↑ especially at the interfaces between the defending brigades or between the combat sectors of the NATO corps
  15. ↑ conventional or nuclear "fire attack"
  16. ↑ Front Edge of Defense
  17. ↑ BSA: mobile blocking department of the pioneers (NVA) for laying mines
  18. ↑ Heinz Magenheimer gives alternative details of 50 km of attack strips / army, 10–20 km division, 4–5 km regiment and 1–1.2 km battalion
  19. ↑ NATO equivalent: Army Air Defense Force
  20. ↑ an attack speed of up to 100 km per day
  21. ↑ Blitzing Nato. “NATO is developing new methods to defend against a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact - and thus possibly aiming tomorrow's weapons at yesterday's targets.” In: Der Spiegel, November 26, 1984
  22. ↑ Laurent Carrel: Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory . In: ASMZ: Security Switzerland: General Swiss military magazine . Volume 149 (1983), Issue 10.