Trusted Computing Group

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Trusted Computing Group
legal form consortium
founding 2003
Seat Beaverton (Oregon) , USA
Website trustedcomputinggroup.org

The Trusted Computing Group ( TCG ) is an industry-operated standardization organization that develops an open standard for trusted computing platforms . In 2003 it adopted the standardization work of the former Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) and is continuing it.

Goal setting

The detailed objectives of the TCG are defined on their website as follows:

"Trusted Computing Group members develop and promote open, vendor-neutral, industry standard specifications for trusted computing building blocks and software interfaces across multiple platforms."

"Members of the TCG develop and promote open, manufacturer-independent industry standard specifications for cross-platform Trusted Computing components and software interfaces."

- Trusted Computing Home

“Trust” means the expectation of a device or software that it will behave in a predefined manner for a specific purpose.

According to this definition, such a " Trusted Platform " should be able to clearly identify changes in a computer platform and thus clearly identify both external software attacks and changes due to configuration, malfunctions, security gaps and influences of the own operating system or application programs.

The reaction to such a change should take place through an appropriate, secure operating system. This operating system is explicitly not part of the TCG specification, which is defined as an operating system agnostic.

organization structure

The organizational structure of the TCG bypasses the restrictions of the predecessor organization TCPA, which required unanimity in decisions and thus blocked itself. Instead, qualified majorities apply in the TCG .

There are three groups of members in the TCG. In addition to the different membership fees, classification in one of the groups also entails different rights:

  • The "adopters" ( $ 8,250 contribution per year) have access to the draft specifications and other non-public sources of information, but they have no voting rights. For companies with fewer than 100 employees, the membership fee is reduced to $ 1,000 per year.
  • Members of the "Contributors" ($ 16,500 per year contribution) are also allowed to participate in the working groups that develop new specifications. They also elect two representatives from among their number who represent this group on the Board of Directors, where they are actively involved in decisions.
  • The exclusive group of "Promoters" (55,000 US dollars per year) has permanent seats on the board and in the work groups and decides on the admission / appointment of new companies to this group. Members are AMD , Hewlett-Packard , IBM , Infineon (recently and the only European company), Intel , Lenovo , Microsoft and Sun .

The management group, the “Board of Directors”, consists of the group of promoters and two companies chosen by the contributor members, currently Wave Systems and Seagate .

In addition, further membership forms have been established in recent years to enable the scientific sector to access the technology free of charge. As a result of these considerations, a so-called "Liaison Program" was introduced, which interested, qualified organizations such as B. enables universities to become members free of charge, but without voting rights.

The TCG has also set up an independently staffed “TCG Advisory Council”. There is also a mentor program in which universities are advised and informed by qualified TCG members.

The work in the TCG is carried out in the individual workgroups, whose activities cover the entire area of ​​computer platforms. The TCG currently has around 120 members.

Details of the specification

Overview of the specifications

The first important specification was presented by the TCPA in July 2001. Work has progressed since then: there are currently a total of 40 individual specifications and whitepapers that have been adopted and published, and further documents are in the works. The total volume is over 1200 pages.

The specifications are arranged in groups:

  • Best Practices and Principles
  • Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specifications, the core security element for Trusted Platforms
  • TPM software stack (TSS) Specifications, the driver and API - Stack for TPM
  • PC Client Specifications
  • Infrastructure Specifications
  • Server Specifications for trusted computer servers
  • Trusted Network Connect (TNC) Specifications, an extension of previous security communication protocols , which also contains information about the security guidelines used and platform states.

At the moment, the specification work is mainly in the area of ​​mobile communication.

Main components of the TCG specification

The basis for the TCG specifications of a trusted computing platform are two security extensions of standard computer platforms : the Trusted Platform Module and the Core Root of Trust Measurement.

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

The TPM is an additional computer security chip (comparable to a secure chip card chip) on the motherboard z. B. a PC that provides the basic computer security mechanisms:

The TPM chip generates and stores the cryptographic keys and certificates , signs data objects and verifies their signature, and offers other support functions such as monotonous counters, location functions and backup and migration functions for the key material.

The TPM is a passive element that has to be instructed by the host system to store data securely or to perform the functions mentioned. It cannot interrupt the program flow or stop the main processor. The TPM functions mentioned must be used by a suitable trusted operating system and the corresponding application software.

The specifications stipulate that the TPM can be switched on or off at any time at the request of the user via a BIOS function and can also be deactivated by the user during active operation.

Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM)

A BIOS extension called Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) represents the first stage of a secure boot process. Starting with the CRTM, the integrity of the following code section is measured with a hash function and the measured value is then securely and digitally signed stored in the TPM. This takes place hierarchically, starting with the CRTM in the BIOS, and then continues step by step to the higher system layers: the rest of the BIOS, boot routine, operating system - loader , kernel, device driver up to the application programs. This means that after the boot process, the application programs or an external server can check whether the boot process has been completed safely, no boot virus or the like is present, and whether the operating system has been started correctly.

It is important that these functions are not contained in the TPM, but in the loader or operating system: these in turn use the capabilities of the TPM for these functions. This function must be created individually for each operating system and implemented in the boot part of the operating system .

Available hardware

Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) are now offered in discrete or integrated form from Atmel , Broadcom , Infineon , Sinosun, STMicroelectronics and Winbond .

IBM notebooks have been shipped with TPM chips since the beginning of 2003. In December 2003, Intel introduced the first motherboard (D865GRH) with TPM. In the meantime, computers equipped according to the TCG standard are available from most manufacturers.

With Intel's "Platform Trust Technology" (ptt), a discrete TPM is no longer absolutely necessary and its tasks are taken over by the CPU.

criticism

The security requirements for the central trust module, the TPM, were mainly based on the lower requirements of the American market for comparable products such as security chip cards. While the security implementation of similar security modules such as B. Chip card chips from European manufacturers certified as standard according to Common Criteria (CC) EAL5 +, and so that the corresponding technology is also widely available, the official TCG specification only requires certification according to CC EAL4, a value that other providers can also meet. The aim here was not what is technically possible, but what is commercially desirable. However, products evaluated according to CC are only recognized internationally up to EAL4.

The hash calculation SHA-1 used for the digital signature of the TCG is now considered theoretically vulnerable under certain conditions. Critics complain that the TCG specifications could therefore become vulnerable to security in the future and can no longer fulfill the actual purpose of a secure platform. The theoretical weaknesses mentioned here are collision attacks , while a TPM would require a pre-image attack , which is practically impossible.

So far there is no compliance program that can be used to check whether the respective implementation of the TCG specification (both of the TPM hardware and of the software modules) from different providers corresponds to the specification. With other technologies (e.g. USB) introduced and tested possibilities would be e.g. B. Third-party evaluation or self-evaluation with official test sets. There is therefore no simple way for the potential user (unless you test yourself) to find out whether a product according to the TCG specification also contains TCG (e.g. quality certificate based on defined rules and monitoring of this process ). In spring 2006, however, the TCG worked intensively on a compliance program and had already made a first draft for such a program public.

The long initial phase of the creation of the specifications, which were only adopted and published after intensive internal discussions, led to a great deal of mistrust among the public. Here it was neglected to inform the public through early, easily understandable and simple summaries and to help technical editors with the creation of qualitative articles. Since the adopted and published specifications have reached more than 1200 pages, one is ultimately dependent on appropriate external literature to get an overview.

Further criticism is often ignited at the basic technology of Trusted Computing and at the digital rights management that can be implemented with it . Only a platform that cannot be manipulated in all functions can guarantee that further security measures and security mechanisms at the operating system and application levels cannot be overridden. Such security measures include solutions such as copy protection , rights management , license checks and references . The respective criticism is mostly independent of the TCG itself and is dealt with in the corresponding articles.

See also

literature

  • Wilhelm Dolle, Christoph Wegener: Hell fire. Trusted Computing for Linux: State of the Art. In: Linux Magazin. 4, 2006, ISSN  1432-640X , linux-magazin.de
  • Christian Koenig , Andreas Neumann, Tobias Katzschmann (eds.): Trusted Computing. Technology, law and socio-political implications of trustworthy system environments. (= Communication & Law series of publications. 22). Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 2004, ISBN 3-8005-1341-2 .
  • Chris Mitchell (Ed.): Trusted Computing. (= IEE Professional Applications of Computing Series. 6). Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET), London 2005, ISBN 0-86341-525-3 .
  • Siani Pearson: Trusted Computing Platforms. TCPA Technology in Context. (= Hewlett-Packard Professional Books ). Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River NJ 2003, ISBN 0-13-009220-7 .

Web links

Pro trusted computing

Against trusted computing

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Contact Us . Trusted Computing Group
  2. ^ Trusted Computing Home March 2006.
  3. ↑ TCG Glossary of Technical Terms . TCG homepage, March 2006.
  4. ^ TCG Board of Directors . TCG homepage, March 2006.
  5. ^ TCG Advisory Council . (PDF; 460 kB) TCG homepage, March 2006.
  6. ↑ Current Members on the TCG homepage, March 2006.
  7. ↑ Available trusted computing platforms . ( Memento of the original from April 26, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. March 18, 2006 Link no longer available (October 11, 2011) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.tonymcfadden.net
  8. ↑ Intel Platform Trust Technology (PTT): TPM For The Masses. December 20, 2017, accessed July 19, 2020 .
  9. ↑ Information on the Trusted Platform Module for Intel® NUC. November 15, 2019, accessed July 19, 2020 .
  10. ↑ Stefan Krempl: 22C3: Trusted Computing on an insecure basis on heise online, December 28, 2005.
  11. ↑ Reinhard Wobst, Jürgen Schmidt: Hash me . heise.de , February 18, 2005.