Gronau uranium enrichment plant

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Gronau uranium enrichment plant
Uranium enrichment plant in Gronau (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Gronau uranium enrichment plant
Coordinates 52 ° 12 '55 "  N , 7 ° 4' 26"  E Coordinates: 52 ° 12 '55 "  N , 7 ° 4' 26"  E
Data
operator Urenco
Installation August 15, 1985
Type Gas centrifuge
capacity 3900 t UTA per year
Degree of enrichment 3–6%
Website www.urenco.com
was standing 2019
Entrance gate of the uranium enrichment plant of the Urenco company in Gronau

The uranium enrichment plant in Gronau is the only commercial uranium enrichment plant in Germany. The gas centrifuge process is used to enrich uranium hexafluoride for use as a nuclear fuel in nuclear power plants . The plant belongs to the Urenco Group . The facility, which is subject to approval under Section 7 of the Atomic Energy Act , is located around 3.5 kilometers east of Gronau (Westphalia) .

Operator and owner of the facility

Current situation

The operator of the plant is URENCO Deutschland GmbH , its owner is URENCO Ltd. based in the UK. "Urenco" is the acronym for " Ur anium En richment Co mpany". Owner of URENCO Ltd. 1/3 each is the British, Dutch and German state, German interests are represented by URANIT UK Ltd. GmbH based in Jülich . URANIT is now owned half by E.ON Kernkraft GmbH and RWE Power AG , the then PreussenElektra AG and the RWE subsidiary Nukem GmbH each held 37.5 percent and Hoechst AG with 25 percent.

E.ON and RWE, as well as the British and Dutch governments, wanted to withdraw from their stake in URENCO around 2011 and planned to sell their shares on the stock exchange, which would have converted the company into a listed stock corporation. In particular, the goals of the Anglo-German-Dutch state treaty of Almelo on nuclear non-proliferation and securing uranium enrichment technology would, according to the German government, no longer be enforceable and the possibility of an IPO was no longer pursued from mid-2016.

Around 220 people are employed at the Gronau site, around 300 with affiliated companies, the 2018 annual financial statements of URENCO Deutschland GmbH Gronau names 270 (including from the areas of production and technology: 171, monitoring: 38, logistics: 21, administration: 28) and 12 trainees . The turnover in 2017 was 430 million euros, the share capital is 56.25 million euros.

Historical development

The three Urenco shareholders initially operated their uranium enrichment plants (Almelo, Capenhurst and Gronau) on their own responsibility. Based on the Anglo-German-Dutch State Treaty of Almelo (1970) to promote research and development of uranium enrichment using gas centrifuge technology and to prevent its use for military purposes, "Urenco Ltd" was established in 1971 by the governments of Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany for Marketing and coordination tasks established. It was not until 1993 that it became a holding , to which the shareholders brought their three enrichment companies and which also took over the stakes in Centec GmbH. The Dutch and British shareholders of Centec were identical, while the German share was held by the Society of Nuclear Chemical Engineering GmbH in Bergisch Gladbach, each of URENCO half of to Siemens belonging interatomic (active in Kernreaktorenbau) and the engineering group MAN belonged .

In 2006, the French atomic group Areva took a 50% stake in Centec's successor, Enrichment Technology Company Ltd (ETC) , which subsequently included France in the Almelo contract. As early as 1992, the USA was included in the circle of the original Almelo states through the contract "on the establishment, construction and operation of a uranium enrichment plant in the United States of America".

The URENCO and ETC operations in Germany are regularly inspected by EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the framework of the safeguards specified in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NVV) and the EURATOM Treaty. National responsibilities exist for the scope of these controls and essentially lie with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Preparation, start of production, plant expansion

prehistory

Research and development in the area of ​​uranium enrichment had already been carried out by the state nuclear research center in Jülich since the 1960s , before this area was transferred to the private uranium isotope separation company (URANIT) in Jülich, whose founding partners were Gelsenberg AG and Nukem GmbH . In the 1970s and 1980s, URANIT GmbH alone invested around DM 610 million in research and development of the gas ultracentrifuges and the establishment of its own uranium enrichment facility . URANIT GmbH also received the German third of the uranium enrichment company URENCO Germany founded in 1971 and was thus one of its founding companies. In addition, on the basis of a contract with the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology, URANIT GmbH took over the assets of Gesellschaft für Kernverfahrenstechnik mbH (GKT) from the federal government at the (not disclosed) book value as of December 31, 1985. The GKT was founded by the federal government in the 1960s as a federally owned company for research and development in the field of uranium enrichment. At that time, Degussa bought know-how and personnel for around DM 5 million.

The first plans for an “atomic energy center” near the Dutch border had already been announced in 1976, initially over 100 locations were selected as locations for a uranium enrichment plant, including Gronau and Ahaus among the last 11 locations on the shortlist . The decision was finally made in favor of Gronau, which was hoping for tax revenues in the millions, construction and supply contracts for the regional economy and 250 additional qualified jobs after the era of the textile industry in Gronau came to an end (1980/1981 bankruptcy of the van Delden group ). The advantages of the location from the point of view of the future plant operator URANIT GmbH: The area is sparsely populated, has good transport links and protests against the plant are not expected from the predominantly Catholic and conservative population.

On March 9, 1978, URANIT GmbH applied for a permit for the uranium enrichment facility with a capacity of 1,000 t uranium separation work (UTA) per year and at the same time examined the suitability of the location for a capacity of 5,000 t UTA / year. On December 6, 1978, the City Council of Gronau under Mayor Bruno Jäkel (SPD) approved the establishment of a uranium enrichment plant (UAA) with 42: 1 votes and on March 29, 1979 concluded the settlement agreement with URANIT GmbH, which initially set up a Centrifuge assembly plant and later that of a uranium enrichment plant with the previously requested maximum plant capacity of 1,000 t UTA / year. The city wanted to contribute 10 million DM to the total investment of DM 1 billion estimated by URANIT (including DM 600 million for the 1st construction phase alone for 400 t UTA / year), although it was at this point in time was in debt with 80 million. This included around DM 15 million for development costs and land purchases for the 96 ha of the site in the development plan 78/79, 16 ha of which for the centrifuge assembly plant and 60 ha for the uranium enrichment plant. The state of North Rhine-Westphalia has invested an additional DM 32 million.

URANIT GmbH wanted to set up the plant as quickly as possible in order to be able to keep a given delivery promise for nuclear fuel to Brazil after the initially planned supply of enriched uranium from the Anglo-Dutch-German joint plant in Almelo, the Netherlands, did not materialize.

After the public display of the application documents, a public hearing took place in Gronau on May 12 and 13, 1981 , at which the approx. 7,000 objections (including approx. 3,000 from the Netherlands) against the construction of the plant were discussed.

Approvals, construction and start of operations

On December 31, 1981, the first partial license for the production of nuclear fuel was granted by the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Economics as the nuclear licensing and supervisory authority and in February 1982 it was publicly displayed. In the partial license it was assumed that the site is planned for a capacity of 5,000 t uranium separation work (UTA) per year. In April 1982 the first construction and development work began on the site. The use of the Gronau location initially began with the construction of an assembly plant for the special centrifuges required, which were developed by CENTEC - Gesellschaft für Centrifugentechnik mbH and delivered ready for installation by MAN Uranit Gronau GmbH. The official laying of the foundation stone by the then Federal Research Minister von Bülow took place on September 23, 1982, so that in October 1982 construction of the first of 100,000 centrifuges required could begin.

The 2nd partial license was granted in 1983, the 3rd for operation with 400 t UTA / year in July 1984. On April 15, 1985, the plant started operating, and on August 15, 1985, the plant started production. On June 12, 1986, Federal Research Minister Riesenhuber officially inaugurated the facility, on the occasion of which around 300 people demonstrated and the police used tear gas and arrested one person.

Until 1983, URANIT GmbH was paid a repayable grant of 338 million DM as a contribution to the financing of uranium enrichment plants (only around 110 million DM were repaid) as well as approx. 49 million DM for the development of the Gronau location as part of the support from regions with high unemployment.

Start of production and expansion of the plant

Start of production as "UTA-1"

The uranium enrichment plant in Gronau went into operation on August 15, 1985 as "UTA-1" ("Uranium Separation Plant 1"). The further expansion of the plant from 400 to 1,000 tons of uranium separation work per year had already begun in January 1986; the corresponding expansion permit followed on April 19, 1989. The permitted annual quantities of UTA were increased to 1,000 t UTA / year through the license amendment in 1991 and the new license in 1994 (5th partial license). At the end of 1994 Urenceo and URANIT applied for a change permit to increase the enrichment capacity to 1,800 t UTA / year, which was approved by the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Economics on November 4, 1997 despite over 8,000 objections.

In 1998 the plant achieved the planned annual output of 1,000 tons of UTA, which was increased to 1,800 tons by 2005. According to information from URENCO, 800 million euros had been expended up to this expansion stage. For the expansion of the plant to 4,500 t UTA / year, the application according to § 7 Atomic Energy Act was submitted on September 22, 1998. In 1999 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Economics approved the construction of a second uranium separation hall for UAG, and in 2001 the storage of an additional 2,500 t of UF 6 feed either in the feed or tails warehouse.

Extension of the system by "UTA-2"

In May 2002, URENCO authorities, municipalities and nature conservation associations were involved in the application conference in order to discuss the documents to be submitted for the environmental impact assessment of the new plant, which were required for the application for capacity expansion by 2,700 to a total of 4,500 t UTA / year with a maximum enrichment level of 6 % Uranium 235 were necessary. This capacity almost corresponds to the maximum expansion to 5,000 t UTA / year already envisaged in the UAG's planning. In 2004, the red-green state government approved the operation of the enlarged facility, accompanied by around 7,000 objections.

On February 14, 2005, approval was given for the expansion of the company premises and the construction of the "UTA-2" with a planned additional annual capacity of 2,700 tons of uranium separation work. The UTA-2 consists of five modular operating units. Construction began in summer 2005 and the estimated costs were around 800 million euros. On June 9, 2008, the first cascade of the first operating unit went into test operation. The last cascade of the UTA-2 was put into operation in autumn 2011. The technical execution of the actual separation system is subject to the secrecy protection conditions in the economy. With the separation work capacity of the UTA-2 of almost 2,700 tons alone, it is theoretically possible to supply 21 large nuclear power plants.

For this purpose, the maximum permissible activity discharges and releases of radioactive substances from the chimneys, roofs and from the open storage facilities to the environment via air and water had to be re-applied for for the entire site compared to the older permit. They contain an increase of 4% for the discharge and release of α / β activity from buildings with the air, an increase of 90% with the water from buildings and the UF 6 outdoor storage areas, and a doubling of the values ​​for radon. Plant-related γ-radiation must be expected in the store for re-enriched uranium.

There is also a visitor information center on the premises. Free factory tours are offered for groups of 10 people or more, during which photography and the use of mobile phones are prohibited and, due to possible security checks, visitors who must be at least 18 years of age must have an identity card or passport ready.

Uranium enrichment

Initial state

The naturally occurring uranium ore consists essentially of the industrially insignificant uranium 238 . In order to manufacture fuel elements for nuclear power plants, the uranium 235 it contains must be extracted and isolated. For this purpose, the uranium ore is first processed into uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ). The uranium hexafluoride delivered to Gronau comes from the mining of uranium deposits and from re-enriched uranium ( tails ) from the state-owned Russian company Tenex in Seversk, Siberia . The delivered UF 6 has a natural degree of enrichment of about 0.7% 235 U . It is weakly radioactive, but its chemistry is very toxic. It reacts with water, steam or humidity to form hydrogen fluoride and hydrofluoric acid , both of which are highly corrosive.

In principle, the enrichment can be carried out according to various methods (including the gas diffusion, gas centrifuge or separation nozzle method). In the plant in Gronau, it takes place with gaseous uranium hexafluoride in centrifuge cascades, which are manufactured by the Enrichment Technology Company (ETC) in Jülich , which is part of the Urenco Group . The degree of enrichment of the system is 3 to 5% 235 U, with the UTA-2 even up to 6%. In a mixing plant set up together with the UTA-2, it is possible to set the degree of enrichment individually according to the customer's specifications. The 235 U content of the depleted uranium is around 0.3%, so around half of the natural 235 U content is extracted in the plant . In this process, about seven times as much depleted as enriched uranium is produced per ton of enriched uranium.

Process of uranium enrichment

The starting material is UF 6 delivered in solid form in transport containers . The UTA-1 is supplied by heating the transport container in an autoclave to 70 ° C, and in the UTA-2 by sublimation at 500  millibars from the solid phase. It is fed in gaseous form into an evacuated rotor rotating at high speed. Centrifugal forces press the heavy isotopes outwards against the wall of the rotor, while the lighter isotopes collect near the rotor's axis. This separation is intensified by a thermally excited countercurrent.

The individual centrifuges are connected together in cascades to repeat the separation in series and to increase the throughput in parallel. After reaching the desired 235 U enrichment, the enriched UF 6 can be withdrawn from the cascade. For this purpose, the gaseous uranium hexafluoride is fed into desublimators at the two outlets of the centrifuge cascade, which have been cooled to −70 ° C. The desublimators are then heated up and the uranium hexafluoride is passed into containers cooled to about 5 ° C., whereby the uranium hexafluoride is resublimed on the container walls and is thus again in solid form.

Infrastructure and environmental impact

The actual process steps of enrichment include cleaning and decontamination processes, the treatment and purification of waste water, the treatment and storage of solid waste, the storage of operating and auxiliary materials, the provision and, if necessary, the generation of auxiliary media as well as active and inactive workshops.

Both products ("Product") in various enrichment levels and compounds (eg "Feed" intended for enrichment) and their waste products ("Tails") are stored on the site.

  • Feed storage: open storage 8,200 m², 825 storage spaces, storage capacity for 10,000 t UF 6
  • Product storage (PL-2, storage of enriched UF 6 ): 1,250 t UF 6 with a maximum of 6% uranium 235 enrichment
  • UF 6- Tail warehouse (depleted UF 6 ): outdoor storage 31,300 m², storage capacity of 38,100 t UF 6
  • Uranium oxide storage: capacity 58,962 t triuranoctozide U 3 O 8 , the hall was approved in February 2005, and commissioning had not yet taken place in 2019
  • Buffer storage (part of the product storage): storage of raw waste and intermediate products up to conditioning and provision of conditioned waste for intermediate storage
  • Waste storage (part of the product storage): approx. 220 m² for max. 40 containers with a max. Volume of 563.5 m³ and a max. Total activity of 3.0 × 10 11 Bq

The storage of a total of 10,000 t of feed, 1,250 t of product (up to 6% enrichment) and 97,062 t of tails as well as the handling of 7,285 t of feed, 1,327 t of product and 76,514 t of tails is approved. At the end of March 2017, around 21,000 tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride were already stored outdoors next to the plant.

The release of radioactive substances (α activity) into the environment was in 2005, 2015 and 2016, respectively

  • with the waste water: 2.7 × 10 3 / 3.9 × 10 3 / 5.9 × 10 3 Bq
  • with the exhaust air; 2.9 × 10 4 / 3.2 × 10 4 / 2.9 × 10 4 Bq

In 2015, the annual radiation exposure from direct radiation (γ local dose) was up to 0.93 mSv and in 2016 up to 0.96 mSv (the highest value measured by the operator on the system fence including the natural subsurface).

The electrical power consumption from the 110 kV network is designed for up to 18 MW for the entire system.

Transport and material flow

UF 6 tank

The uranium hexafluoride is transported to and from the site in steel pressure vessels that must comply with the ANSI N14.1 or ISO 7195 standards. Steel tanks of the types 48 ″ F or 48 ″ Y (read: 48 inch Ypsilon) are particularly common ; The dead weight of these containers is 2.5 tons, the capacity 12.5 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the containers are 3.8 meters long, have a diameter of approx. 122 cm and a wall thickness of 16 millimeters. These containers almost correspond to the recommendations of the international atomic energy organization IAEA , according to which very little material may escape over 30 minutes in a fire developing at 800 ° C. Despite the known high level of corrosiveness of UF 6, the containers are only checked for leaks every five years. According to the Industrial Safety Ordinance, they are considered to be pressure vessels .

It is transported by truck and rail, and the Gronau uranium enrichment plant is connected to the Deutsche Bahn rail network. The rail transport is carried out by Hence Nuclear Technologies , a former subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn, which was sold to the French Wollen SA in April 2007 . Uranium hexafluoride rail transports from Pierrelatte , France, point to the Comurhex uranium conversion plants of the French Tricastin nuclear plant as the uranium hexafluoride supplier, where UF 4 from natural uranium is fluorinated to UF 6 . The transport on the premises takes place at a low height, so that in the event of an accident the least possible damage to the transport container is to be feared.

In 2002, Urenco expected up to 2,770 truck transports per year (if all transports were carried out by road) or 840 rail wagons per year (if all transports were to be carried out by rail) on the occasion of the plant expansion.

97% of the uranium enriched here is transported abroad for further processing by road. For further use in pressurized and boiling water reactors in Germany, enriched uranium hexafluoride is transported to the Lingen fuel assembly plant by Advanced Nuclear Fuels in Lingen , Lower Saxony , where it is first processed into uranium dioxide and finally into fuel assemblies . For its transport, slightly smaller containers than for uranium hexafluoride are used, each with a capacity of 2.2 tons.

Depleted uranium hexafluoride is supplied to Russia, France, Great Britain and Sweden, among others. The Federal Environment Ministry does not regard it as radioactive waste , but as a preliminary stage to new nuclear fuel , i.e. as a raw material. The same containers are used for its transport and storage as for the raw material uranium hexafluoride.

From 1996 to 2008, over 27,300 t of depleted uranium in the form of UF 6 was transported to Russia as "valuable material". After media reports about rusty uranium hexafluoride containers in Russia and the expiry of a contract for the re-enrichment of depleted uranium, depleted uranium hexafluoride intended for long-term storage was converted into the chemically more stable and less toxic uranium oxide in a French deconversion plant in order to then bring it back to Gronau. At the end of July 2019, a delivery of 600 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Russia for the first time was confirmed by the Ministry of Economics, Innovation, Digitalization and Energy of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, but in May 2019 the first six transport trains with a total of almost 3,600 tons of uranium hexafluoride already had one Reached facility in Yekaterinburg. In mid-November 2019, a special train with 12 wagons was held up for a few hours by demonstrators with a blockade action and accompanied by several actions from Gronau to its destination in Russia. A total of 12,000 tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride are to be exported by 2022, of which only a small part is to be made usable again in the local factory and the largest part is to remain in Russia for "permanent storage".

The waste generated and conditioned in the Gronau facility is stored in the Gorleben waste storage facility or in the interim storage facility for radioactive waste in one of the facility's buildings until a repository is available.

Incident prevention, incidents that have occurred and reportable events

Pension planning

In accordance with the requirements of the Radiation Protection Ordinance and the Major Accidents Ordinance , Urenco, as the operator, has been distributing the brochure "Public information according to the Radiation Protection Ordinance and the Major Accidents Ordinance" by mail to all households in a certain area of ​​the uranium enrichment plant (Gronau, Epe, parts of the Dutch municipality of Losser). In terms of content, incidents and possible risks are discussed, how their effects can be limited and how residents should react in the event of an alarm.

In the Borken district administration and for the Gronau fire brigade, according to Urenco, there is a “special protection plan 'Urananrichungsanlage Gronau'” as well as the object deployment plans for the measures required in the event of an incident (including fire fighting, blocking certain traffic routes or areas, warning or informing the population). Alerting, ongoing briefing including instructions on how to behave for the affected population and the all-clear are given by the authorities via radio and loudspeaker announcements.

Of the various accident possibilities investigated, the crash of a fast-flying military aircraft into the container hall or the transfer facility leads to the greatest damage. Due to the extremely low probability of occurrence, such a fall was assigned to the residual risk , against which no structural or other technical protective measures were taken.

In the assumed most severe internal incident with UF 6 releases due to the breakage of a Tails exit pipe or the fall of a UF 6 container outdoors, the MIK value is only fallen below approx. 10 km or 6 km away from the system , at which does not cause damage to humans, animals or plants.

Incidents that have occurred and reportable events

By June 2019, there were 35 reportable events in the facility . The majority of incidents are rated 0 on the International Nuclear Incident Rating Scale (INES).

date Events from the 1999–2019 annual reports
04/04/1999 Anomalous pressure curve when heating a UF 6 container in the homogenization autoclave
11/17/1999 Anomalous pressure curve when heating a UF 6 container in a mixing autoclave
06.12.2000 Failure of the pressure control to automatically start one of the two redundancies of the deluge system
01/02/2001 Crash of an empty 30 "B container (UF 6 )
05/30/2001 Failure of the remote triggering of fire dampers during recurring tests
01/16/2002 Failure of the remote triggering of fire dampers during recurring tests
03/08/2002 Failure of the fusible link triggering of a fire damper during recurring tests
03/20/2004 Failure of the ventilation system in the UTA building
07/25/2006 Leak in the container decontamination with contamination of the floor pan by uranium-containing solution
10/17/2006 Exceeding the permissible amount of the liquefied UF 6
07/17/2009 Inadmissible pressurization of newly constructed compressed air reservoirs
08/31/2009 Emptying a UF 6 container with an impermissible union nut
11/12/2009 Execution of welding work deviating from the execution documents
01/21/2010 Release of uranium hexafluoride into the tank preparation space
10/12/2010 Failure of a travel limit at the gantry crane feed warehouse
05/01/2011 Unavailability of an emergency diesel generator set during recurring tests
06/20/2011 Falling out of a filled 48 ″ Y-Tails container from the gripper of a transport vehicle
07/23/2011 Automatic triggering of the emergency ventilation in building UTA-1
06/07/2012 Smoldering fire in the switch cabinet of the UPS system
03/11/2013 Overfilling of a 48 ″ Y-Tails container
08/07/2013 Automatic triggering of emergency ventilation
10/31/2013 Failure of the GAN extraction system in the TI-1 building
03/21/2014 Falling out of an empty 48 ″ Y-container from the load gripper of a forklift
08/10/2014 Damage to a fire protection door in the UTA-2 when transporting a 48 ″ Y-container
01/17/2015 Failure of a UPS system in the UTA-1 building
09/17/2015 Requirement for emergency ventilation during repair work in the UTA-1
02/02/2016 Anomalous operation of the emergency ventilation A00GAM during recurring inspection in building UTA-1
09/20/2017 Wrong direction of rotation of a feed pump for emission monitoring
02/16/2018 Incorrect triggering of fire dampers during recurring tests
07/22/2018 26-hour unavailability of an emissions monitoring device (defective CPU of a monitor)
07/05/2019 Failure of an emergency diesel generator set during recurring testing in UTA-1
May 21, 2019 Incorrect control of fire dampers during recurring tests in UTA-2
December 09, 2019 Collision of a filled transport container with a hall door

On July 25, 2006, about 15 liters of the liquid leaked while pumping uranium-contaminated transport container rinsing water, which was collected in a tub. About three square meters of the tub was contaminated and had to be cleaned. This incident was classified as an INES level 1 incident with reporting category N.

Another incident occurred on January 21, 2010 in which an employee was exposed to increased levels of radioactive radiation . When a supposedly empty transport container was opened, the employee's arm, legs and feet were contaminated by escaping uranium hexafluoride. The employee was first taken to a nearby hospital and then to the Münster University Clinic for observation . According to the operator, no radiation was released to the outside, so that there was no danger to the local population. The emergency ventilation for the affected area led the contaminated room air to the outside via the exhaust air chimney, with an activity release of approx. 15–20% of the weekly limit value for alpha activity was achieved. This incident was classified as an INES level 0 incident with reporting category E.

On June 20, 2011, a 48 ″ container with depleted uranium fell from a 25-ton forklift truck while driving out of the facility in the direction of the outdoor storage facility. The forklift had to brake for reasons that have not yet been clarified. The container held by a transport device fell to the floor from a height of around 30 centimeters.

Gun parts were discovered in an employee's locker in August 2018. The employee was fired. The prosecutor is investigating.

On December 9, 2019, a reportable event occurred when a collision between a lowering gate and a transport trolley that was loaded with a 48 ″ container with depleted uranium hexafluoride occurred during an internal transport.

politics

The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology considers the security of supply with uranium to be very high. Last but not least, the refining of uranium in the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau and its processing into fuel elements in the fuel element production plant in Lingen generate “quasi local energy”.

Opponents of nuclear power see the continued operation of the plant as a contradiction to the decision of the federal government to phase out nuclear power. On June 17, 2011, the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia applied for the plant to be closed, which was supported by the Federal Council but rejected by the Federal Government. Following a request from members of the Bundestag, the federal government again refused to close the building in December 2011, referring to the Almelo Treaty, the resolutions to phase out nuclear energy, which excluded uranium enrichment, and unlimited operating licenses.

Since 1986, a citizens' initiative has organized a so-called “Sunday walk” every first Sunday of the month in order to point out what they believe to be the dangers of the plant and the negative consequences of uranium enrichment. From 1998 the subject of uranium transports from and to Gronau came into focus and in 2006 led to the start of a joint Russian-Dutch-German campaign to stop the “uranium waste exports” from Gronau to Russia. In 2011 a demonstration with 15,000 people took place in Gronau.

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

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