Natural ethics

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The nature of ethics is concerned with the value of nature . Here, nature is understood to mean the entire inventory of life on earth and all biological, ecological, physical and chemical processes.

Delimitation and questioning

Natural ethics is a scientific discipline, a discipline of ethics that poses its questions in the context of biology and philosophy , but theological , political and sociological arguments often also play a role in the discourse. It encompasses both anthropocentric and physiocentric perspectives and asks questions about how to deal with nature in a morally justifiable manner and about the value of nature and its phenomena. Her specific question, which addresses aspects of nature, distinguishes her from environmental ethics , which also poses questions about technology and the moral criteria of its application.

A central question in natural ethics is which beings or things should be given an intrinsic value and which beings should be taken into account for their own sake . There are different positions for this. While pathocentrism ascribes an intrinsic value to all pain-sensitive beings, biocentrism , ecocentrism and holism go beyond that. In biocentrism all living beings are viewed as morally valuable, in holism even inanimate natural phenomena (such as mountains or species).

A series of questions follow from the natural ethical approach, which relate to practical social and political action and the way we deal with the nature around us. The philosopher Angelika Krebs formulated a few questions :

  • Do we have duties with regard to or also duties towards nature?
  • Is there only human dignity? Or should nature also deserve awe: the earth, the seas, the forests, the rivers, the plants, the animals?
  • Can the traditional anthropocentric ethics still be justified today in the face of ecological crisis experiences, or does it have to give way to a new physiocentric ethic?
  • Is global nature conservation something we owe to people who depend on nature, or is it something we owe nature itself?

A second perspective asks about the "reason of nature".

Anthropocentric Concepts

One can distinguish between anthropocentrism in the epistemological and in the moral sense. According to moral anthropocentrism, people deserve the highest value and only people have morality. Epistemic anthropocentrism emphasizes that in the natural-ethical discussion about whether nature has a moral value, only people participate and appear as moral subjects who name and assert their interests, while nature or aspects of nature only appear as objects of morality. It can therefore be assumed that the values ​​that can be assigned to nature are necessarily anthropocentrically determined. Nevertheless, from an anthropocentric perspective, it can also make sense to attribute a value to nature beyond human purposes. Anthropocentric concepts of natural ethics relate ethical positions to the human being who z. B. can assign moral values ​​to nature. In itself nature has no value, but only for people. In the discussion about the protection of nature and through studies of environmental history, the anthropocentric position has come under suspicion that it ultimately led to the destruction of nature. On the other hand, arguments for values ​​of nature that are beyond an instrumental relationship to nature can also be formulated from the anthropocentric position. In order to relativize the claim to a central position of humans in anthropocentrism, it is now spoken of a humanistic view when the determination of the values ​​of nature is made from the perspective of humans. Arguments that speak for a moral value of nature from an anthropocentric point of view can be assigned to four strategies: physiological, perceptual, social and inclusive modes of argumentation.

Physiological arguments

Arguments relating to human physiology emphasize its dependence on nature. Although humans can technically break certain ties to nature, they remain tied to nature, especially in technology that uses certain aspects of nature. Physiological arguments can be limited to instrumental aspects (e.g. economic benefit) or linked to moral implications e.g. B. in the basic needs argument.

The Basic Needs argument states that humans, as living beings that are metabolically related to their environment , cannot have a reasonable interest that can be generalized in destroying the natural conditions of their life. From this it is deduced that nature or certain aspects of nature that are significant for the physical existence of humans must be preserved due to the value of human life. This means that man has the task of protecting nature not only for reasons of utility but also for moral reasons. This moral obligation of people towards nature or natural aspects is based on the self-worth of people.

The moral implications of the basic needs argument emerge particularly clearly when the moral subjects who decide about the state of nature are not themselves affected by the consequences of their decisions, but people in other societies or future generations, because in this case the instrumental aspect cannot be included in the decision-making process in a corrective manner. But if one recognizes that the moral implications of individual action are related to the wellbeing of all people, then the consequences of the decision also affect the moral integrity of the decisive subject. The decision, however, depends on who belongs to the moral community and is therefore relevant for the morally justifiable decision-making (see also arguments for inclusion).

Perceptual arguments

The perception of nature in both the aesthetic and the practical mode involves people emotionally in their experience of nature and at the same time enables them to experience themselves through nature.

The enrichment of people's self-awareness in encounters with nature would speak for their own value in nature. In this respect, the aesthetic argument emphasizes that in the experience of natural beauty the aesthetic sense of the human being can be activated even before the conscious reception of works of art has started. So z. For example, Martin Seel classifies the perception of natural beauty as a motivation for people to become artistically active, and it is given an aesthetic intrinsic value. On the other hand, the perception of natural beauty relieves people of responsibility for the world. “The aesthetic intrinsic value of nature results from the eudaemonistic intrinsic value that the practice of aesthetic contemplation has for humans. […] The protection of aesthetically attractive nature is owed to the observer of nature and not to nature itself. The observer's good life has moral intrinsic value, not the good of nature itself, ”emphasizes Angelika Krebs. Nature enables the individual to have an emotional self-awareness that has a different quality than that in (urban) social life. In the aesthetic experience of the landscape, the individual fragmented in his social roles and functions experience himself in his potential wholeness, so that the natural landscape can be given a value for people that is interested in its preservation. This interest mainly concerns the wilderness , i. H. Aspects of nature that are only slightly influenced by humans and contain aesthetic, emotional and practical potentials for experiences that cannot be made in the technically transformed and functionally determined world, e.g. B. Experiences of the sublime.

Beyond contemplative consideration, nature also offers a field of practical experience with a reality that is not or to a small extent technically shaped and in which the individual can more easily distance himself from social norms. The practical argument relates to the experience that many behavioral norms and restrictions imposed by property relations that stand in the way of the practical development of human autonomy in the city can be less rigidly controlled in the countryside and more easily ignored. In this respect, rural nature enables a practical experience of freedom. In addition, in modern times, nature is associated with freedom. From the interest in this experience of autonomy in nature, a value of nature for humans can be derived.

Social arguments

Social arguments argue that nature has a value e.g. B. for the cultural survival of a society. For a society that defines itself in difference to nature, a concept of nature beyond cultural models is necessary in order to determine what culture can actually be. On the conceptual level, nature serves as a borderline concept to name the other of culture, what it is not, and to formally define culture. For the other of culture stands nature, which is formulated in terms of content using certain cultural patterns and figuratively as concrete nature e.g. B. Landscape can be experienced.

Heimat uses this thought as an argument : because the other of culture disappears by z. B. dissolve its concrete views, then the concept of culture loses its specific meaning or changes this. This change in the content of the culture then leads to a change in the determination of social and individual identity. The value that z. For example, in nature conservation a familiar natural environment and a historically created landscape originates from the moral interest in the continued existence of a certain type of socialization of people and their cultural self-image (e.g. in terms of individual and social identity).

Another form of social argument for the value of nature is the educational argument . The educational argument says that the practical handling of animals and plants by humans is an expression of their moral attitude towards nature and that this moral attitude towards nature is not independent of moral ones Attitudes within society. For example, Immanuel Kant emphasizes that respect for living beings and open-mindedness for natural beauty can protect people from brutalizing one another. This hope is expressed in relation to the demonstrative love of nature in combination with racist ideologies z. B. of nature conservation under National Socialism viewed critically.

The pedagogical argument is made from the anti-speciest side, as it is e.g. B. represented in eco-anarchism , radicalized. While standing Antispeziesisten the anthropocentrism critical, but argues Antispeziesismus insofar anthropocentric when he power relationships of people criticized other organisms, but not relationships between non-human animal perceives as potential violence. The anti-speciestic argument is based on the ideal of a non-violent and domineering society in which no forms of oppression, e.g. B. political, economic, educational, erotic or emotional relationships should exist. This claim applies not only to relationships within the human species, but ultimately also to the relationship between humans and other species. Anyone who is interested in a non-violent and domineering society from an anthropocentric perspective must also extend this claim to the relationship to other species and their moral attitude towards them, so that nature has its own value.

Including arguments

The inclusive argument strives for a mediating position which, from an epistemic, anthropocentric perspective, can also recognize physiocentric consequences, especially those of pathocentrism . The relationship between anthropocentric and physiocentric concepts is affected by the question of the extent of moral communities to which responsibility relates or whose members can demand corresponding consideration. By expanding moral communities, anthropocentric concepts can ultimately also integrate physiocentric argumentation strategies. From an anthropocentric perspective, the logical extension of moral communities could be limited to individuals communicating with each other, extended to other societies and people unable to communicate their interests, and animals and plants could also be included. Just as there are still conflicts between people within a moral community that have to be negotiated, if the moral community were expanded to include all living beings, a harmonious state would not be achieved. Moral conflicts persist, the only difference being that a conflict of interest between a person and an animal (at least among people) would have to be debated as a moral question.

Physiocentric Concepts

Pathocentrism

If one characterizes morality as something that strives for the same respect for the good life of all creatures, the argument follows that animals can also lead a good life and therefore it does not make sense why moral people care only about the good life of other people should care. It is assumed that at least animals, from a radical point of view also plants and inanimate nature, feel something and thus have a moral intrinsic value. This would protect them for their own sake, i.e. H. even if this is detrimental to mankind, such as the renouncement of medical animal experiments and critical variants of animal husbandry. This "pathocentric" argument is sometimes used. a. represented by Peter Singer , Tom Regan and Ursula Wolf .

There are a number of objections to this argument of suffering. One is the Policing Nature objection. according to which the pathocentrism leads to the absurd consequence that wild prey must be protected from predators.

Biocentrism

As with all natural ethical perspectives, biocentrism is based on an ethical model that assigns an ethical intrinsic value to everything “living”. If this eigenvalue is the same for all entities , i.e. without gradation, one speaks of radical biocentrism or egalitarian biocentrism , otherwise it is hierarchical or weak biocentrism . One of the best-known representatives of biocentrism is Albert Schweitzer , to whom the paradigmatic formulation of reverence for life goes back: "I am life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live".

holism

In natural ethics, holism is cited as a view of the intrinsic value of nature. Prominent representatives of holism are Arne Naess ( deep ecology ), Carolyn Merchant ( ecofeminism ), Aldo Leopold ( land ethics ), Adolf Meyer-Abich and Jan Christiaan Smuts ( creative evolution ), who coined the term for the first time. The holistic approaches share the opinion that the whole is more than the sum of its parts . Accordingly, the value of the whole cannot be determined by its constituent parts, and priority is given to the whole over its parts. In relation to the intrinsic value of the whole, this means that the individual components that are functionally fitted to the whole also have to fit in morally.

A variant of holism is ecocentrism , which, unlike biocentrism, which only relates to the value of individual living beings (individuals), also assigns a moral value to species, communities, ecosystems and landscapes, i.e. super-individual wholes.

Nature's own worth

The distinction between self-worth, intrinsic value and utility value of nature is to be understood in the context of the discussion about the interpretation of § 1 BNatSchG . There is a requirement that nature and the landscape should be protected “on the basis of their own value”, among other things. The intrinsic value of biological diversity was already mentioned in the preamble to the Biodiversity Convention (1992).

Problem of valuation

It is controversial how the own value of nature can be filled with content, since the nature conservation discussion has produced a “confusing variety of concepts of intrinsic value”. Therefore, the requirement, which is not filled out in the legal text, to protect nature on the basis of its own value, has no practical relevance in the case law . Gassner and Heugel emphasize: “From an evaluation perspective, it should be emphasized that the syllable 'Eigen' does not help the practical application of the law”; Ultimately, “the concept of intrinsic value cannot deliver what it promises”. Nevertheless, two generally different approaches can be identified in nature conservation ethics:

  1. To protect nature for the sake of people
  2. To protect nature for its own sake

In the moral-philosophical discussion on natural ethics, it is proposed to differentiate between the instrumental value of nature ( utility ), the inherent value of nature (intrinsic value) and the intrinsic value of nature (self-worth) with regard to nature or aspects of nature . Since these values ​​are located on different levels, they do not have to be mutually exclusive, but they can lead to a conflict of norms in society , from which priorities result.

Utility, intrinsic and self-worth

The utility and intrinsic value of nature are determined by an anthropocentric ethic (see above). Nature's self-worth is based on a physiocentric ethic (see above).

The instrumental utility of nature is determined by people's interests and demands for use. In general, one speaks of their utility value with regard to the economic interests in natural goods. The utility value can be qualified via the manner in which they are appropriated (picking flowers to give them away) as well as via production costs and pricing (growing flowers to sell them). In addition to the quantifiable economic value, there is a eudaemonistic-oriented value of nature that is geared towards a good quality life (see below).

The inherent intrinsic value of nature is given to it in relation to culture and identity of people, which gives it its own value for people. Certain aspects of nature can be connected with history and memories and thus acquire cultural significance for a society and also for individuals and therefore be valuable. "In order to emphasize the aesthetic, symbolic and cultural functions of nature for humans beyond the instrumental framework of using nature as a resource, this value of nature is also referred to as the intrinsic value of nature". This intrinsic value of nature is linked to cultural meanings and social goals, such as ideas about the good life. One speaks therefore of eudaemonistic intrinsic values ​​that nature and landscape can have for people.

The intrinsic self-worth of nature resides within it, regardless of its appreciation by people. Nature and aspects of nature would therefore have a value in themselves that should be respected by people. People claim their self-worth and recognize it in the Basic Law: "Human dignity is inviolable". In addition, human self-worth requires that all human beings must be given self-worth and that their dignity should therefore be respected in every human being. For the intrinsic self-worth of nature, this means that in addition to people, other living beings and even non-living aspects of nature have a dignity that should be respected by people. This claim gives rise to problems such as logical paradoxes, ethical conflicts and action problems on both the theoretical and the practical level. The nature conservation economist Ulrich Hampicke states that most people "who speak of the 'intrinsic value' of nature tend to mean an inherent rather than an intrinsic value," that is, no self-worth.

Reason of nature

The idea of ​​the rationality of nature means that living nature has developed strategies that we consider sensible or intelligent in humans.

This includes the "reason of feelings" in the sense of Dieter Zimmer , the justice strategy of the "Tit for Tat", the collective intelligence as "swarm intelligence" and more generally the "cooperation" in the sense of the primate researcher Tomasello , for example as a combination of reciprocity and solidarity . Darwinism also reflects the ethics of utilitarianism and is based on it at the same time.

The legal anthropologist Axel Montenbruck also bundles these approaches under the term natural ethics. In his opinion, from the point of view of dualism , it is open whether, in the sense of idealism , these are strategies that humans have developed for themselves, so that the strategies have been evolutionarily tested and such successful natural reason can only be classified analogously to those of human reason and only affirm this. From the point of view of naturalism , however, it could also be a question of genetically promised moral-analogous instincts in humans , which the natural being humans can only use relatively freely and culturally in groups.

See also

literature

  • Vittorio Hösle : Philosophy of the ecological crisis. Munich 1991, ISBN 3-406-38368-8 .
  • Angelika Krebs : Ethics of Nature. A map. With a foreword by Bernard Williams . DeGruyter, Berlin / New York 1999, ISBN 3-11-015830-2 .
  • Angelika Krebs (Ed.): Naturethik. Basic texts of the current animal and eco-ethical discussion. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1997, ISBN 3-518-28862-8 .
  • Angelika Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. In: A. Krebs (Ed.): Naturethik. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-28862-7 , pp. 337-379.
  • Uta Eser, Thomas Potthast: Nature conservation ethics . An introduction to practice. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1999, ISBN 3-7890-6016-X .
  • Uta Eser, Ann-Kathrin Neuruther, Albrecht Müller: Wisdom, luck, justice. Ethical lines of argument in the National Strategy on Biological Diversity. Edited by the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation . Landwirtschaftsverlag, Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-7843-4007-4 .
  • Annemarie Nagel, Ulrich Eisel: Ethical reasons for the protection of nature. In: Stefan Körner, Annemarie Nagel, Ulrich Eisel (eds.): Nature conservation reasons. Bonn Bad Godesberg 2003, ISBN 3-7843-3839-9 .
  • Reinhard Piechocki : Landscape, homeland, wilderness. Protection of nature - but which one and why? Beck Verlag, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-406-54152-0 .
  • Konrad Ott: Ipso facto. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1997, ISBN 3-518-58243-7 .
  • Paul Taylor: The Ethics of Respect for Nature. In: A. Krebs (Ed.): Naturethik. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-28862-7 , pp. 111-143.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, pp. 337-345.
  2. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, p. 183 ff.
  3. ↑ Ethics of Nature. on the website of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, October 20, 2010.
  4. ↑ a b A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 343.
  5. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, p. 197.
  6. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, p. 196 f.
  7. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 58 f.
  8. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 68.
  9. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 364 f.
  10. ↑ U. Eser, T. Potthast: Nature conservation ethics . An introduction to practice. 1999, p. 56 f., 60 f.
  11. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 366 ff.
  12. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 366.
  13. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, p. 189.
  14. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 370 f.
  15. ↑ Martin Seel: Aesthetics of Nature. Frankfurt am Main 1992.
  16. ↑ A. Krebs: An overview of natural ethics. 2007, p. 374.
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  18. ↑ Dieter Groh, Ruth Groh: Weltbild und Naturaneungung. Frankfurt am Main 1990.
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  22. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics of Morals. § 17.
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  29. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, pp. 199-205.
  30. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 59 ff.
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  35. ^ Models of ethics or relative ethics. Documentation at the University of Hanover
    → See also Kirsten Schmidt: Blind chickens as a test case for animal ethics theories. In: Journal for Philosophical Research . Volume 62, Issue 4, October / December 2008.
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  38. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 64 ff.
  39. ↑ R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, pp. 214-221.
  40. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 63 f.
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  43. ↑ a b R. Piechocki: Landscape home wilderness. 2010, p. 192.
  44. ^ Heugel Gassner: The new nature conservation law. CH Beck Verlag, Munich 2010, RN 113. “It would be best to delete the concept of intrinsic value because of its ambiguity” (Hampicke 1996, quoted in: R. Piechocki: Landschaft Heimat Wildnis. 2010, p. 192)
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  56. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 80 ff.
  57. ↑ U. Eser, T. Potthast: Nature conservation ethics . An introduction to practice. 1999, p. 61 f.
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  61. ↑ U. Eser among others: Wisdom, luck, justice. 2011, p. 83 f.
  62. ↑ GG Art. 1 (1)
  63. ↑ "Act in such a way that you use humanity both in your person and in the person of everyone else at the same time as an end, never just as a means." ( Immanuel Kant in Metaphysics of Morals ).
  64. ↑ Taylor 1981.
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  66. ↑ K. Ott: Ipso facto. 1997, p. 640.
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  69. ↑ Hampicke (1997), quoted in R. Piechocki: Landschaft Heimat Wildnis. 2010, p. 194.
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  72. ↑ Axel Montenbruck: Democratic preamble-humanism. Western civil religion and universal triad “nature, soul and reason”. (= Civil Religion Series. A Philosophy of Law as Philosophy of Culture, Volume I: Foundation). 5th, again considerably enlarged edition. 2015, ISBN 978-3-944675-27-5 and online on the website of the University Library of the Free University of Berlin, pp. 309 ff., 327 ff, ("Gerechtigkeits - Naturalismus"); 342 ff., 376 ff., Summarized on p. 529 ff.

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