Beagle conflict

Beagle conflict
Main Products:	Beagle conflict
1881–1970:	Beagle cartography
1958:	Snipe incident
1971–1977:	Arbitration court in the Beagle conflict
1977–1978:	Direct negotiations
1978:	Operation Soberanía
1979-1984:	Papal mediation
1984:	Friendship treaty 1984

The Beagle Conflict was a dispute between Argentina and Chile from 1904 to 1984 over territorial claims in the Beagle Channel .

During the Spanish colonial period, the area around Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego remained almost untouched by European colonization and the geographical details of the southern tip of America were still unclear even after the independence of the South American countries from 1810. The Beagle Channel was discovered by Robert FitzRoy in 1829 on a survey trip by HMS Beagle along the South American east coast to the islands around Tierra del Fuego .

The initial agreement between the two young South American states on the colonial administrative borders therefore left much unclear. Chile and Argentina signed a border treaty in 1881 to definitively regulate the border from the north to Tierra del Fuego. But Argentina remained dissatisfied with what had been achieved.

The difficulties of marking the border and the resulting clashes reached their most dangerous phase in 1978, when Argentina declared the judgment of a jointly called international tribunal null and void and on December 22, 1978 ordered the military occupation of the islands. The crisis was defused through the mediation of Pope John Paul II in the same year. However, the two countries only reached an agreement on May 2, 1985. Since then, the long controversial three islands of Lennox, Picton and Nueva at the eastern end of the Beagle Channel have also been recognized by Argentina as Chilean.

The 1978 Argentine threat of war is one of the reasons Chile gave its support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War .

The islands south of the Beagle Channel

From colonial times to the treaty of 1881

→ Main article : Border Treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina

During the colonial period and immediately after the independence of Argentina and Chile from the Spanish crown, the southernmost region of America was uninhabited by new settlers. Only indigenous people lived in this region.

The Spanish King Philip II attempted to colonize this region in 1584 in order to prevent it from being taken over by other European powers. This attempt ended miserably. Only one of the residents could be saved from starvation. Henceforth this failed foundation was called Puerto del Hambre .

During the colonial period, the administrative boundaries of each of the administrative centers of the Spanish Crown in America were established, but due to the lack of geographical knowledge of the distant and uninhabited regions, these could only be given in general terms. In addition, there was no need for the owner of these territories, the King of Spain, to limit them all precisely and systematically. In fact, the Beagle Channel was only discovered by Robert FitzRoy in 1829 and named after the ship's name, HMS Beagle .

When Chile and Argentina became independent states, both sides started from the principle of the uti possidetis : everyone should keep what the (corresponding) former Spanish administrative center owned. After a stable government was gradually able to establish itself in Chile, it took care of its southern border and in 1843 founded the settlement " Fuerte Bulnes ", later relocated to Punta Arenas , on the north bank of the Strait of Magellan . Four years later, the Argentine government protested against this act.

The embrace of Maipu. National independence heroes José de San Martín of Argentina and Bernardo O'Higgins of Chile embrace after defeating the royalist army in the Battle of Maipu . Both countries share language, culture, religion, history and also family ties.

At that time Argentina was in a state of internal struggle for power between Unitarians and Federalists .

As the problems of defining borders increased over time, a border treaty was concluded between the two states in 1855, in which the foundations for solving the problems were laid down, but not the problems themselves. Their solution was postponed. The main points of the contract were:

• The limits should be determined according to the Uti possidetis principle.
• If no agreement can be found, a mediator should be employed.
• Problems should be solved peacefully.

When Argentina began to colonize its southern regions in 1876 after the native people had been expelled, tensions with Chile increased again. However, after long efforts, both countries were able to conclude a border treaty on July 23, 1881. This is still valid today and defines the border between the two countries:

• (Article I) From the north to 52 degrees of latitude, the border runs "over the highest mountain peaks ... that divide the waters"
• (Art. II) Defines the boundary of the northern region of the Strait of Magellan as an east-west line, roughly from Punta Dungeness to the point that Art. I regulates.
• (Article III) concerns Tierra del Fuego and the islands around Tierra del Fuego: Starting from Cape Espiritu Santo at latitude 52 degrees 40 minutes south, the border line runs south at longitude 68 degrees 34 minutes west "until you touch the Beagle Channel" (hasta tocar el Canal beagle). About the surrounding islands, the treaty says that the state island and the surrounding archipelago should belong to Argentina, plus "... and the other islands there may be on the Atlantic to the east of Tierra del Fuego and of the eastern coast of Patagonia" . Chile should include "... all the islands to the south of the Beagle Channel up to Cape Horn, and those there may be west of Tierra del Fuego" .

The validity of the treaty of 1881

Summary of Argentine cartography in the Beagle Channel since 1881. The named maps can be viewed in the article Beagle Cartography from 1881 .

→ Main article : Beagle cartography from 1881

Immediately after the treaty of 1881, it was interpreted in both Argentina and Chile to mean that the three islands of Lennox, Picton and Nueva belong to Chile.

This view is supported by Argentinean, Chilean and other cartographers . Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros in their work Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina say on this subject:

«De acuerdo con una serie de fuentes, la actitud de la clase política argentina parece haber coincidido, entre 1881 y 1902, con la interpretación del treadado de 1881 that tienen los chilenos y que luego adoptarían la Corte Arbitral y el Papa en la cuestión del Beagle. In otras palabras, que la intención de los signatarios del tetradado de 1881 fue la de otorgar las islas a Chile. "

"Several sources agree that between 1881 and 1902 the Argentine political (ruling) class apparently interpreted the 1881 border treaty in the same way as the Chileans and later the (jointly called) tribunal and the Pope on the Beagle Canal issue . In other words, the signatories' intention was to award the islands to Chile. "

The Argentine main representative in the Chilean-Argentine commission on the drawing of borders according to the treaty of 1881, Francisco P. Moreno , considered the Argentine position to be unfounded. In a memorandum to the British ambassador in Buenos Aires in 1918, he foresaw a defeat for his government should it continue to claim the islands:

“No atino a explicarme por qué el Gobierno argentino pretende hoy soberanía sobre las islas Picton, Nueva, Lennox, etc., fundándose en los tetradados vigentes, es decir, en el de 1881 y en el protocolo de 1893, cuando el primero de ellos lo invalida para tal pretensión y el segundo nada tiene que ver con la demarcación en el canal de Beagle. Insisto: la mención en el Tratado de 1881, con excepción de la isla de los Estados, le hará perder un pleito tan malamente planteado… También repetiré que la excepción que hace el Tratado de 1881 con la isla de los Estados, que reconoce como argentina , no permite poner en duda la propiedad chilena de las tierras situadas tanto al sur de la isla de la Tierra del Fuego como al sur del canal de Beagle. »

“I cannot explain why the Argentine government today claims sovereignty over the islands of Picton, Nueva, Lennox, etc., on the basis of the current treaties, that is, the treaty of 1881 and the additional protocol of 1893, although the the first makes them incapable of this endeavor and the second has nothing to do with drawing the boundaries on the Beagle Channel. I repeat: the mention in the Treaty of 1881, with the exception of the State Island, will make [the Argentine Government] lose the dispute that had begun so badly ... I must also repeat that the exception made by the Treaty of 1881 with the State Island is when he she awards Argentina, not allowed to doubt the Chilean affiliation of the lands south of both the island of Tierra del Fuego and the Beagle Channel. "

Chilean cartography constantly and continuously showed the three islands as Chilean territory.

As time went on, more interest in the islands began and in 1904 Argentina first asked Chile to find a compromise on this issue.

Several attempts have been made to find a solution to this issue through direct, bilateral diplomatic channels , but although some serious incidents (such as the Snipe incident in 1958 or the Quidora incident), the parties were unable to reach an agreement.

International Court of Arbitration 1971–1977

→ Main article : Arbitration court in the Beagle conflict

In 1971, Chile and Argentina agreed to submit the dispute to an international arbitration tribunal. The Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration confirmed Chile's sovereignty on all the islands south of Tierra del Fuego and its maritime sovereignty based on international law. This reached deep into the Atlantic and thus ran counter to the efforts of Argentina (especially its nationalist circles) to be recognized as a regional power.

The direct negotiations

Map showing the Chilean baselines in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego

→ Main article : Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina 1977/78

Chile recognized the judgment on the day it was promulgated and had it implemented into Chilean law by decree n ° 416 on July 14, 1977 in the form of baselines .

On January 25, 1978 Argentina annulled the judgment. Argentina gave several reasons to justify the rejection, but did not request a revision of the judgment. Argentina thereby committed a breach of international law. In parallel with intensified preparations for war, both governments tried to negotiate directly to reach a mutually acceptable compromise, but the talks were unsuccessful.

Operation Soberania

→ Main article : Operation Soberanía

After the annulment, Argentina exerted military pressure on Chile to force a change in the status quo .

An operation was planned by the Argentine General Staff, which aimed at the military occupation of the disputed islands and also the invasion of Chile. On October 5, 1978, the reservists were mobilized in Argentina .

On December 22, 1978, Argentina began Operation Soberanía with the intention of militarily occupying the islands; a few hours later, however, the order was withdrawn and papal mediation accepted.

The mediation of the Pope

→ Main article : Papal mediation in the Beagle conflict

Only the papal offer of mediation could stop the junta in Buenos Aires from starting a war at the last minute. On January 8, 1979, the papal mediation obtained the signing of the Montevideo Act , which averted the imminent danger of war.

The Falklands War

In Argentina, the domestic political situation worsened to such an extent that the Galtieri government struggled to survive. On March 30, 1982, the largest demonstration to date against the military government, against wage policy and for human rights took place in Buenos Aires .

On April 2, 1982 Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands, triggering the Falklands War with Great Britain . The Argentine plans provided for military conquest of the islands south of the Beagle Channel after a successful capture of the Falkland Islands. These plans were at least considered possible by the government in Chile. Armed forces were again transferred to the border with Argentina, and the Argentines, for their part, posted strong troops on the border with Chile.

Before the Falklands War, Chile had supported Argentina's rights to the Falkland Islands. It continued to do so but, along with the US , Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, abstained from voting on the application of the TIAR (which provides military support to an American country in the event of aggression). The formal justification was that Argentina had failed to comply with United Nations Resolution 502 , but it was evident that Argentina had long viewed Chile as an enemy. The ship Piloto Pardo of the Chilean Navy took part in the rescue of the shipwrecked cruiser General Belgrano .

Great Britain received information from Chile during the war about Argentine military activities in the south of the country. This information was important, but not essential to the British victory.

On June 14, 1982, the Argentine troops surrendered in the Falkland Islands.

The return to democracy and the referendum in Argentina

In the presidential election on October 30, 1983, Raúl Alfonsín was elected president with 51.75% of the vote in the first ballot . Alfonsin's most ambitious foreign policy goal was to end the Beagle conflict. In order to refute the accusation of selling out national interests, he had a referendum carried out on November 25, 1984 on the solution to the Beagle conflict that had been negotiated up to then. A referendum was not provided for in the Argentine constitution ; Alfonsín only gave the result a consultative value.

Voted in the referendum:

alternative	Votes in percentage
Yes to the Pope's proposal	81.13%
No to the Pope's proposal	17.24%
Zero votes	1.1%

The peace and friendship treaty

→ Main article : Friendship and Peace Treaty of 1984 between Chile and Argentina

The treaty includes the drawing of maritime boundaries, a set of rules to resolve interstate controversies, stipulates shipping rights and specifies the border on the Strait of Magellan. He also excludes any impairment of the rights of both states to the Antarctic by this treaty.

Consequences

In Chile, the breach of contract and the acute threat of a war of aggression on the part of the Argentine government remained impressed on the memory. In Argentina he was a forerunner of the Falklands War

The consequences of these events were:

• The increased spending on arms purchases, which was certainly one of the reasons for the economic problems in which both states were embroiled.
• Its foreign policy led Argentina into the Falklands War.
• The intervention of Chile in a foreign war.
• The consolidation of two military dictatorships .
• Generations of neighbors who grew up dislike and fearful of one another.

After the Falklands War, Argentina reorganized its foreign policy and abandoned violence as a means of resolving international controversies. On this basis, both states were able to peacefully resolve their problems.

• Argentina received most of the marine areas allocated to the islands under international law (which had been allocated to Chile in the Laudo Arbitral).
• Both states exchanged maritime rights.
• Argentina recognized the Laudo Arbitral of 1977 and with it the Chilean sovereignty over the then disputed islands.

As a legacy of the conflict, minefields created by the Chilean navy remain on some of the then disputed islands. As a signatory to the Ottawa Convention , Chile has committed to clearing these minefields.

The then Andean Pass, Paso Puyehue , was renamed Paso Internacional Cardenal Antonio Samoré in memory of the person who contributed so much to the resolution of the conflict. It is the second most important Andean pass between the two states.

See also

• List of territorial disputes

literature

• Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration (PDF; 4.9 MB), in English.
• Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), in English.
• Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts , Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003
• Karin Oellers-Frahm: The arbitration award in the Beagle Channel dispute (PDF; 1.8 MB), reports and documents: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.
• Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle . Geneva 1979, in English and Spanish.
• Rubén Madrid Murúa: "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978" (PDF) Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003 , in Spanish.
• Andrea Wagner: The Argentine-Chilean conflict over the Beagle Channel. A contribution to the methods of peaceful dispute settlement . Publishing house Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8 .
• Karl Hernekamp: The Argentine-Chilean border dispute on the Beagle Channel . Institute for Ibero-American Customers, Hamburg 1980.
• Karl Hernekamp: The Argentine-Chilean agreement in the Beagle dispute: episode or model? Europa-Archiv 40 (1985), pp. 551-562
• Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle Conflict and Falkland (Malwinen) War. On the foreign policy of the Argentine military government 1976–1983 . Weltforum Verlag, Munich / Cologne / London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3 .
• Isaac F. Rojas and Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico . Publishing house Nemont, B.As. Argentina 1979, in Spanish.
• Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1st party . Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, in Spanish.
• Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (read here ), in Spanish.
• Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su SS el Papa Juan Pablo II , Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, in Spanish.
• Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina . 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, in Spanish.
• Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century . Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 , in English.
• Divisional General (retired) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas , in Spanish. (The book is a compilation of several articles on the Beagle conflict that were published in the magazine "Estrategia", Buenos Aires No. 49/50, enero-febrero 1978. The title of the book is, in German, The Beagle Question, direct negotiations or dialogue of arms .
• General Martín Antonio Balza and Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino . Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 950-49-0813-6 , in Spanish.
• Francisco Bulnes Serrano and Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción . Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 956-258-211-6 , in Spanish.

Web links

• Broadcast by Televisión Nacional de Chile: "Informe Especial" - El año que vivimos en peligro , temporarily on YouTube ( Memento from March 15, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), in Spanish.
• Broadcast of the Argentine television History Channel: Operativo Soberanía , temporarily on YouTube , in Spanish.
• Special edition of El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, September 2, 2005, in Spanish. It contains u. a., interviews with Ernesto Videla, Jaime Del Valle, Helmut Brunner, Marcelo Delpech and Luciano Benjamín Menéndez. All in Spanish.
• Interview with the Argentine general Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, commandant of the III Cuerpo del Ejercito in El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, (from an interview for the Argentine magazine "Somos"), in Spanish.
• Interview with the then US Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raúl Héctor Castro, in the Clarín Buenos Aires newspaper , December 20, 1998, in Spanish.
• Interview with the former head of the Secretaría General del Ejército (think tank of the Argentine army), General Reynaldo Bignone , later President of Argentina after the Falklands War, in Clarín , Buenos Aires, on December 20, 1998, in Spanish.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Michael Morris, “The Strait of Magellan” , ISBN 0-7923-0181-1 , 248 pages, on p. 120: “Rearguard Argentine efforts has been made to gain recognition for some kind of shared management regime for the strait, in order to mitigate what was perceived as the striking diplomatic defeat for Argentina in the 1881 treaty granting Chile control over the strait. ”(Translation: Subsequent efforts were made by the Argentine side to gain recognition of joint responsibility for the Strait of Magellan and so that to alleviate what was perceived as Argentina's striking diplomatic defeat in the Treaty of 1881, namely relinquishing control of the Strait of Magellan to Chile)
2. ↑ Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros, in "Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina", chapter El carácter ambiguo del texto delertrado de 1881 ( Memento from June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
3. ↑ In Article 4 ° of the Protocol of 1893 (Protocolo Adicional y Aclaratorio de 1893) this information was corrected to the west, namely to 68 ° 38.5 minutes W
4. ↑ See Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros, Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (can also be read here ( Memento from June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )) The authors Karl Hernekamp (p. 13), Annegret I Haffa (p. 96) and Andrea Wagner (p. 106) share this opinion.
5. ↑ Quoted in Fabio Vio Valdivieso, page 111.
6. ↑ Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration ( Memento of April 10, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 4.9 MB)
7. ↑ Decree n ° 416 (PDF; 100 kB)
8. ^ "Clarin" newspaper from Buenos Aires from December 20, 1998 Clarin
9. ↑ See the most detailed military analysis of planning based on the publicly known data from Colonel of the Chilean Army Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , the in Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, page 62 in the web archive link ( Memento from June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
10. ↑ The head of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands War, Basilio Lami Dozo, confirmed these plans in an interview ( Después de Malvinas, iban a atacar a Chile ( Memento of February 26, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) on November 22, 2009, accessed on November 22 2009) with the Argentine newspaper Perfil :

    Para colmo, Galtieri dijo en un discurso: "Que saquen el ejemplo de lo que estamos haciendo ahora porque después les toca a ellos".

    (Translation: "Galtieri said in a pronunciation: The Chileans should see exactly what we are doing now, because it will be their turn later." )

    This has already been stated by the former (the last before the war, from March 29, 1981 to December 11, 1981) Foreign Minister of Argentina Óscar Camilión in his book “Memorias Políticas”, Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1999, page. 281 expressed:

    “Los planes militares eran, en la hipótesis de resolver el caso Malvinas, invadir las islas en disputa en el Beagle. Esa era la decisión de la Armada ... "

    (Translation: "The military plan was to occupy the disputed islands on the Beagle Channel in the event of a solution to the Falklands question. That was the decision of the Navy." )

    Also Kalevi Holsti came to this conclusion, in The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 0-521-57790-X . See also here On page 160:

    Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" according to which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed.

    The idea had often been expressed in the Argentine press, for example by the reporter Manfred Schönfeld from La Prensa (Buenos Aires) on June 2, 1982 about the course of the war after the Falklands march (at that time the war was still considered won in Argentina ):

    Para nosotros no lo estará [terminada la guerra], porque, inmediatamente después de barrido el enemigo de las Malvinas, debe serlo de las Georgias, Sandwich del Sur y de todos los demás archipiélagos australes argentinos, ...

    (Translation: "For us it will not [the war be over] because as soon as the enemy is swept away from the Falkland Islands, he must also be [swept away] from [South] Georgia, South Sandwich and all the other southern Argentine archipelagos. " )

    All articles by Manfred Schönfeld published in “La Prensa” from January 10, 1982 to August 2, 1982, see “La Guerra Austral” , Manfred Schönfeld, Desafío Editores SA, 1982, ISBN 950-02-0500-9
11. ↑ See article Chile teme que Argentina pueda repetir una acción de fuerza en el canal de Beagle in the Spanish newspaper El País , April 11, 1982
12. ↑ See Informe Rattenbach
13. ↑ See Informe Rattenbach ( Memento of September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), § 718
14. ↑ See Informe Rattenbach ( Memento of September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) § 580 paragraph 10
15. ↑ See The Falklands Campaign - the Chilean connection ( Memento April 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed August 2, 2010
16. ↑ See The New York Times, November 26, 1984.
17. ↑ for more detailed figures see en: Argentine Beagle conflict dispute resolution referendum, 1984
18. ↑ See statements by the Chilean Foreign Minister J. M. Insulza after the Argentine government withdrew a border treaty law (“poligonal”) from the parliamentary debate in “La Tercera” de Santiago de Chile on July 13, 1998: ( Memento des original from January 1, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. "Enfatizó que, si bien la situación es diferente, lo que hoy está ocurriendo con el Tratado de Campo de Hielo Sur hace recordar a la opinión pública lo sucedido en 1977, durante la disputa territorial por el Canal de Beagle." 
19. ↑ See opinion of the (not democratically elected) Senator Jorge Martínez Bush in La Tercera , Santiago de Chile from July 26, 1998: ( Memento of the original from September 7, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and still Not checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. "El legislador expuso que los chilenos mantienen 'muy fresca' en la memoria la situación creada cuando Argentina declaró nulo el arbitraje sobre el canal del Beagle, en 1978." 
20. ↑ See statements by the Chilean Foreign Minister Ignacio Walker during the gas crisis with Argentina in the Clarin de BA of July 22, 2005: “Y está en la retina de los chilenos el laudo de Su Majestad Británica, en el Beagle, que fue declarado insanablemente nulo por la Argentina. Esa impresión todavía está instalada en la sociedad chilena. "
21. ↑ See also Reciprocidad en las Relaciones Chile - Argentina by Andrés Fabio Oelckers Sainz in PDF ( memento of the original dated July 2, 2007) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF): "También en Chile, todavía genera un gran rechazo el hecho que Argentina declarase nulo el fallo arbitral británico y además en una primera instancia postergara la firma del laudo papal por el diferendo del Beagle" 
22. ↑ See opinion of the Director académico de la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Flacso), en Santiago, Chile, Francisco Rojas in La Nación ( Memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) de Buenos Aires of September 26, 1997: “Desde la Argentina, cuesta entender el nivel de desconfianza que hoy existe en Chile a propósito de la decisión que tomó en 1978 de declarar nulo el laudo arbitral "
23. ↑ See also the remarks by the Chilean Defense Minister Edmundo Pérez Yoma in the Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional del Reino de España to justify Chile's defense spending. They appeared in the Argentine newspaper El Cronista Comercial ( Memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) on May 5, 1997: … Y que la Argentina estuvo a punto de llevar a cabo una invasión sobre territorio de Chile en 1978… . These statements were later put into perspective by the Chilean government ( memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) ( memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), but could no longer be eradicated
24. ^ Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 0-521-57790-X . On page 160: Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" according to which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed.
25. ↑ See Argentina in the twentieth Century by Luis Alberto Romero (Translated by James P. Brennan) Pennsylvania State University Press (Originally published in 1994 by Fondo de Cultura Economica as Breve Historia Contemporanea de la Argentina , ISBN 0-271-02191-8 ) ISBN 0-271-02192-6 : "... the conflict with Chile, which served as a prelude to the Falklands-Malvinas War ..."
26. ^ The Argentine air force officer Ruben Moro claims in his book La guerra inaudita. Historia del Conflicto del Atlantico Sur , Editorial Pleamar, Buenos Aires, 1986, 8th Edición: (Galtieri was ready to do this) "hacer suya la frustración profesional que casi todos los oficiales de las Fuerzas Armadas, pero en especial los de su arma, sentían por no haber combatido versus Chile. Ese resentimiento acumulado es una clave descifradora muy importante, porque ayuda a entender como se desembocó, en abril de 1982, en el dislate Malvinas “ (translation: Galtieri was ready for the professional frustration of almost all officers of the armed forces, especially the army, which had arisen because they did not wage war with Chile as his own. This pent-up resentment is one of the keys to understanding how the April 1982 disaster came about. )