Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina 1977/78

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Beagle conflict
South America southern tip pol.png
Main Products: Beagle conflict
1881–1970: Beagle cartography
1958: Snipe incident
1971–1977: Arbitration court in the Beagle conflict
1977–1978: Direct negotiations
1978: Operation Soberanía
1979-1984: Papal mediation
1984: Friendship treaty 1984

The direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina to the Beagle conflict began on May 2, 1977, the date of the promulgation of the international arbitral award by Queen Elizabeth II. The danger of war reached its peak on 22 December 1978, when the Argentine armed forces, the operation soberanía started to occupy the disputed islands by force. Only the papal offer of mediation could stop the junta in Buenos Aires from starting a war at the last minute. On January 8, 1979, this phase ended with the signing of the Montevideo ( Uruguay ) Act and papal mediation began.

Domestic politics

Both countries were ruled by right-wing military dictatorships that severely restricted civil rights and violated human rights in the name of the doctrine of national security. They also had a lot in common in foreign policy. In order to eliminate the opposition in their own countries, they carried out the Operación Cóndor together.

Chile

Augusto Pinochet ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990 . All political parties were either banned or had to cease their activities. In 1978 the country was shaken by the discovery of the bodies of peasants executed after the coup in Lonquén, near Santiago . Since no other independent institution remained in the country, the Catholic Church had to publicly call on the judiciary to solve the crime . No opposition was permitted within the military either. That year the chief of the Chilean Air Force , General Gustavo Leigh , had to leave the Air Force and his post in the junta because of his demands for democracy. With him, 17 of the institution's 21 generals have resigned out of loyalty to him. That weakened the Air Force , which had already been hit by the United States embargo . In foreign policy, Pinochet was an outspoken enemy of the Soviet Union and was isolated from Western and socialist countries because of his human rights violations . The USA had distanced themselves from Pinochet after the murder of Orlando Letelier .

The opposition to the dictatorship gradually began to reorganize around the former President of Chile Eduardo Frei Montalva , a Christian Democrat. Because of the totalitarian nature of the government, there was little in common with the opposition. The conflict with Argentina was an exception. Frei had publicly announced his support for the government: "Se esta alimentando, no por Chile, un conflicto de dramáticas consecuencias" . (Translation: "A conflict is being fueled, not from the Chilean side, with dramatic consequences.")

Pinochet, who was not accountable to anyone, was able to act flexibly and safely during the crisis. But his power was not unlimited because, according to Argentine sources, he had not succeeded in enforcing a solution negotiated with Jorge Videla in Mendoza in Chile. He also did not succeed in placing the ships of the Kriegsmarine under the command of the commanding officers of the southern region of Chile. In spite of this, there was a centralized and hierarchical organization that reduced friction losses and optimized the use of resources.

The main negotiating goal of the Chilean government was to avoid war without losing land. To do this, it was ready to negotiate across the maritime border. Subjected to strong military pressure from Argentina, Chile found it worthwhile to use a mediator. When President Jimmy Carter called on both governments to negotiate, Pinochet asked the US to send military observers to the zone.

Argentina

In Argentina from 1976 to 1983 the process of national reorganization , a military junta of the three argentinean armed forces , ruled . In contrast to the Chilean junta, in the Argentine junta the three branches of arms were given equal rights, a change of power was envisaged and the politicization of the armed forces had been common since the 1930s. With regard to the conflict with Chile, one could distinguish three main currents within the Argentine armed forces: the "doves" (Generals Jorge Videla , R. Viola , R. Bignone ), the "falcons" (Generals José. A. Vaquero, Luciano. B. Menendez, Leopoldo Galtieri , R. Camps, CG Suaréz M. , I. Saint Jean .) And a populist movement around the admiral Emilio Massera , who hoped for domestic political gain from the controversy with Chile.

Despite the many human rights violations in the country, the junta enjoyed in many places abroad a good reputation and has never been through the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations condemned. Argentina was able to bring the soccer world championship to the country in 1978 and became soccer world champion that year. In the early days of his government, Videla was viewed with sympathy by some journalists: Germany was also fighting left-wing terrorists in 1976 and local journalists were impressed by Videla's administration at the time. In 1976, the Rheinische Merkur ruled that he could be exactly the man Argentina needed, and the Stuttgarter Zeitung welcomed the “long overdue putsch against the incompetent predecessor”. The dictator was described as correct, polite, puritanical to excess, a Catholic from the bottom of his heart, and he showed understanding

The Argentine historian Luis Alberto Romero claims:

By that time, a bellicose current of opinion had arisen among the military and its friend, an attitude rooted in a strain of Argentine nationalism, which drew substance from strong chauvinistic sentiments. Diverse ancient fantasies in society's historical imaginary - the "patria grande", the "spoliation" that the country had suffered - where added to a new fantasy of "entering the first world" through a "strong" foreign policy. All this combined with the traditional messianic military mentality and the ingenousness of its strategies which were ignorant of the most elemental facts of international politics. The aggression against Chile, stymied by papal mediation, was transferred to Great Britain ...

Similarly, the December 31, 1978 comment in the New York Times newspaper argues :

Beagle Channel controversy that has brought the military regimes of Argentina and Chile to the brink of war is an expression of the turbulent revisionism underway in Argentina in reaction to frustrations in national life. Argentine policy is made by military men whose nationalist values ​​are mixed with personal ambitions, phobias against politicians, "progressive" ...

The Argentine problem was the inability to make decisions and enforce them, at least within the junta. Alexander Haig said of the negotiations with the Argentine junta during the Falklands War : Nadie podía decir que sí y todos podían decir que no. (Translation: "Nobody could say yes, everyone could say no).

This inability, in the case of the Beagle conflict, was also confirmed by Mark Laudy:

Nevertheless, they were severely constrained in their ability to work toward a peaceful solution by more extreme members of the junta. The military leadership was perpetually concerned that a conciliatory approach toward Chile would be regarded as a face-losing transaction that might destabilize its control and invite challengers from the ranks of the juniors officers. It has been reported, for example, that when President Videla informed the papal nuncio, Pio Laghi, of Argentina's plans to invade the PNL [Picton, Nueva and Lennox (Editor)] island group in December 1978, he justified the decision by saying that if he did not give the orders for invasion, he would be replaced by extremists within the junta.

There have been many instances of lower ranks disobeying or resisting orders from the junta:

  • In 1981, General Galtieri , who was in command of the army at the time, closed the border with Chile without informing the president or the other branches of service.
  • On January 1st, 1979, General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez tried by force to prevent the Argentine Foreign Minister from going to sign the Montevideo Acts and later rebelled against the government over the release of a journalist.
  • Admiral Massera constantly criticized the government of Videla in the hope of coming to power after it was overthrown, undermining the credibility of the government in which he himself participated.
  • President Videla was little more than a spokesman for the junta, for his decisions were often reversed by it. In an interview with the journalist Marina Aizen, foreign correspondent for the Clarín newspaper in New York , the ambassador of the United States of America to Argentina during the crisis, Raúl Héctor Castro , confirmed Videla's inability to stop the war:
M. Aizenk : ¿A quién le pidió los cinco días?
R.Castro : A Videla no. Los que estaban moviendo las cosas eran los comandantes de las diferentes divisiones que había.
...
M. Aizenk : ¿Cuál recuerda que era la posición de Videla entonces?
R.Castro : Francamente, no creo que Videla tuviera una actitud firme en ese asunto. Los que estaban en esto eran los comandantes militares de ciertas zonas: la zona número uno, donde estaba (Guillermo) Suárez Mason; en Rosario estaba Galtieri y en Córdoba, Menéndez.

(Translation:

MA: Who did you ask for 5 days?
RC: Not Videla. The ones who made a difference were the division commanders.
...
MA: What was Videla's position at the time?
RA: To be honest, I don't think Videla would have a firm stance on this. The actors in the matter were the military commanders of some zones: Zone 1, where Guillermo Suárez Mason was; in Rosario was Galtieri and in Córdoba , Menéndez.)

In keeping with this distribution of power, the Argentine government's negotiating goals were contradicting and controversial. Some were inclined to accept the arbitration, others just wanted to prevent Chile's access to the Atlantic, either through an appropriate maritime border or, as others wanted, through the Argentine islands in the Cape Horn archipelago. Some, like Admiral (ret.) Isaac Rojas , considered a division of the Navarino Islands by the Cape Horn meridian as necessary. The extreme demands of the Argentine nationalists ranged from the Picton, Nueva and Lennox Islands to the Chiloé Island.

Believing in its military strength, because of the international isolation of the Pinochet government and in the certain knowledge that a military victory over Chile would be easy to achieve, the Argentine junta declared the judgment of the international arbitration tribunal null and void on January 25, 1978.

Argentine printing

While Chile viewed the judgment as a legal asset, measures in Argentina increased with the aim of forcing Chile to give in.

  1. In October 1978, the presidents of Bolivia and Argentina combined the Bolivian demand for sea access with Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel.
  2. The Argentine Armed Forces prepared Operation Soberanía to invade Chile.
  3. The admiral Emilio Massera organized a "vigilia de armas", a mystical medieval ceremony in Ushuaia to emphasize the determination of the navy to defend the fatherland.
  4. Troops were moved to the border with great sympathy among the population.
  5. Pop singers visited the troops to entertain and cheer them on.
  6. Blackout exercises were carried out in all major cities, even if they were inaccessible to the Chilean air force, such as Buenos Aires
  7. The press accompanied the mobilization with rough headlines.
  8. All means were used to stir up the mood for war:
    1. “Cruzaremos los Andes, les comeremos las gallinas y violaremos a las mujeres” (translation: “We will cross the Andes , eat their chickens and rape their women”).
    2. General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez , commander of the III Army Corps: “Si nos dejan atacar a los chilotes, los corremos hasta la isla de Pascua, el brindis de fin de año lo haremos en el Palacio La Moneda y después iremos a mear el champagne en el Pacífico " (translation:" If [the government] lets us attack the Chileans, we will chase them away to Easter Island , we will celebrate New Year's Eve in La Moneda and then we will pee Champagne on the Pacific coast ")
  9. The Argentine Navy was already preparing the occupation orders ( Instrucciones Políticas Particulares para la Zona Austral para la Etapa Posterior a la Ejecución de Actos de Soberanía en las Islas en Litigio ).
  10. The Argentine border police (gendarmería) closed the border with Chile several times, a step that is seen as a preliminary step to war. As a result, Chile's trade with Brazil was temporarily stopped and otherwise severely hampered by restrictions.
  11. The Chilean ambassador to the Organization of American States announced the expulsion of more than 4,000 Chileans from Argentina.
  12. The President of Argentina Jorge Rafael Videla publicly threatened war in Puerto Montt if Chile continued to adhere to the arbitration ruling of 1977 : “ las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto ” (translation: “direct negotiations are the only peaceful way out to resolve the conflict ")

This sentiment reduced the bargaining power of the Argentine government, which remained trapped in its own rhetoric .

The Chilean response

In a war Chile had nothing to gain because the islands were already under Chilean sovereignty and international law was the basis of the Chilean position. The Chilean government, aware of the imminent danger of war, prepared the defense without turning on the press or alarming the population. The Chilean newspaper El Mercurio wrote: A diferencia de Chile, donde los preparativos de guerra se hicieron en medio de gran reserva para no alarmar a la población, los argentinos se movilizaron en medio de sonoras concentraciones al grito de “el que no salta es un chileno ”, con oscurecimientos en sus principales ciudades, varias de ellas inalcanzables para el rango de vuelo de los envejecidos aviones de guerra de la fuerza aérea chilena, que estaba una generación atrás de la argentina." (translation: "In contrast to Chile, Where the war preparation measures were taken inconspicuously so as not to alert the population, the Argentines mobilized in the midst of loud demonstrations, to the chant 'Who does not jump (join in) is a Chilean', with the most important cities darkened, some of them inaccessible for the outdated aircraft of the Chilean Air Force, which were technically a generation behind the Argentine aircraft ”).

The then Chilean Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos Sallato shared the same opinion about the situation in Chile and even praised the auto- censorship of the Chilean press: En Chile nunca hubo un verdadero ambiente de guerra, mientras que en Argentina ocurría lo diametralmente opuesto: se hacían ejercicios de oscurecimiento de ciudades y las tropas eran enviadas al sur con aspaviento… En Argentina había visto una prensa loca, con un gobierno loco, promoviendo la guerra con Chile, diciendo 'las islas son nuestras', 'el Beagle es nuestro', al punto de que el gobierno argentino tenía poca flexibilidad para moverse dentro de un ambiente que ya le había creado su propia prensa. … A favor de la prensa chilena y de los periodistas chilenos yo tengo que decir que nunca me fallaron. Yo logré que la prensa se portara de una forma excelente sin un decreto de censura nada más que porque ellos sentían la responsabilidad patriótica que había en lo que estábamos haciendo (translation: “In Chile there was never a real war mood, different in Argentina, where the opposite happened: blackout exercises were carried out [in Argentina] in the cities and the troops were sent south with a lot of nagging ... In Argentina I had seen an insane press, with an insane government that wanted to start the war with Chile, them said 'the islands are ours', 'the beagle is ours' to a degree that left them no more room for negotiation, in a mood that created their own press.… For the Chilean press and journalists must I say they never let me down, I got the press to do an excellent job, without a censorship decree, just out of patriotic responsibility out for what we did ”).

The US Ambassador to Argentina at the time of the crisis, Raúl Héctor Castro, also described the situation in Chile in similar words

M. Aizenk: ¿Y la misma presión que ejercieron ustedes en Buenos Aires la ejercieron en Santiago?
R.Castro: No. Yo sentía que en los chilenos había un ambiente más calmado. No había esa decisión de inmediatamente cruzar la frontera. No notaba eso en el ejército chileno .

(Translation:

M. Aizenk: Did you apply the same pressure [against the war] that you exerted in Buenos Aires in Santiago?
R.Castro: No, I found a quieter atmosphere among the Chileans. There was not this determination to immediately cross the border [into Argentina]. I haven't seen anything like it in the Chilean army )

The fleet was preparing for the whole of 1978, but it did not become public, it remained known only to the initiated.

The hierarchy within the Chilean armed forces made it inconceivable that a general or admiral would publicly make demands other than those of the government, especially not to gain political advantages. Pinochet did not allow any competitors. That was also undesirable within the armed forces.

Pinochet saw a long, bloody and total war coming:

Chile pretendía, si era posible, llegar hasta Bahía Blanca y de ahí cortar todos los pasos al sur. Yo tenía 10,000 hombres ahí, en el sur . Según Pinochet, él advirtió al entonces dictador argentino Jorge Rafael Videla. Mira, la guerra no sería allá (en el sur), como dicen ustedes… sería desde Arica, desde Sapaleri (en el extremo norte), hasta el Cabo de Hornos. It was totally. Eso los anduvo frenando un poco, porque les quedó claro que no podrían hacer una guerra allí, -agregó. Pinochet dijo que también tuvo que frenar a muchos, varios de sus propios generales que querían la guerra. El ex dictador reconoció que un triunfo chileno sobre la Argentina hubiera sido muy difícil, y se hubiera enteredado de una guerra de montonera, matando todos los días, fusilando gente, tanto por parte de los argentinos como por nuestra parte, y al final, por cansancio, se habría llegado a la paz . Luego agregó: Llegamos al borde de la navaja. No fuimos a la guerra, pero si hubiéramos entrado en ella nos habríamos empeñado con todos los medios ya lo mejor no nos habría ido tan mal. Me habrían levantado una estatua, que es a lo que aspira todo militar , agregó.

(Translation: Chile had before, if possible until after Bahia Blanca penetrate and cut from there all the way to the south. "I had 10,000 men there, in the South" According to Pinochet, he had the Argentine dictator Jorge Rafael Videla warned.. "Look Well, the war will not only take place there (in the south), as you say ... the war would break out from the Arica , from the Salaperi (in the north) to Cape Horn . The war is total. That slowed them down a bit because it was them it became clear that they couldn't make a local war, " he added. He also said that he had to curb many of their own generals who wanted the war. The ex-dictator admitted that defeating Argentina was very difficult." and that the war had turned into partisan war, “people would have been executed every day , on both sides, and in the end, out of exhaustion, peace would have been made . ” Then he added: “We got up cutting the knife de. We didn't go to war, but if we had gone to war we would have bet everything and maybe we wouldn't have been so bad. A statue would have been dedicated to me, something that every soldier strives for, ”he said.).

The bilateral meeting

For the claims of both countries during the negotiations, see Claims and Wishes

One day after the verdict was pronounced (May 2, 1977), a possible rejection of the verdict emerged in a declaration by the Argentine Foreign Minister: “ningún compromiso obliga a cumplir aquello que afecte intereses vitales de la nación o que perjudique derechos de soberanía que no hayan sido expresamente sometidos a la decisión de un árbitro ” . (Translation: "No compromise obliges [us] to adhere to anything that violates the vital interests of the nation or harms sovereign rights that have not been expressly submitted to the judgment of the judge.")

A series of bilateral meetings then followed in the hope that, despite everything, the problem could be resolved through negotiations. At the same time, the military tension on the 4000 km long border between the two countries increased daily.

Map for Decree No. 416 of 14 July 1977 with baselines

On May 5, 1977, the Argentine government sent the Chief of the Joint General Staff (Estado Mayor Conjunto), Rear Admiral Julio Torti, to Chile to propose that the Chilean government negotiate the consequences of the arbitration ruling directly with one another, in particular the drawing of maritime boundaries. This opening led to two rounds of negotiations, led on the Chilean side by former Foreign Minister Julio Philippi Izquierdo and on the Argentine side by General Osiris Villegas.

The first round took place in Buenos Aires from July 5th to 8th, 1977 and the second round took place in Santiago de Chile from October 17th to 20th. According to Julio Philippi, the negotiations failed because of the Argentine demand to discuss the islands to which they belong.

On June 14, 1977, the Chilean government issued decree n ° 416 on the baselines on the basis of the arbitration judgment, thereby provoking the Argentine government even more.

On December 5, 1977, Julio Torti returned to Santiago with a new proposal. The proposal included the recognition of the sovereignty of Chile over the islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox, but it required a joint sovereignty over three islands south of the "hammer" that Chile clearly saw as Chilean: Evout, Barnevelt and Horn (Spanish: Hornos). For this purpose, the Cape Horn meridian should become the maritime border. The Chilean government saw this as an amendment to the border treaty of 1881, rejected the proposal and suggested direct negotiations between the foreign ministers of both countries to draw the maritime border.

With this new demand, the Argentine government extended the problem to all the islands south of Tierra del Fuego to Cape Horn. Until then, the controversy had been limited to the hammer.

In December, the Foreign Ministers of Chile, Patricio Carvajal , and of Argentina, Oscar Antonio Montes , met twice . Both meetings were unsuccessful.

On January 10, 1978, Chile invited Argentina to refer the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague , but after their legal arguments were rejected by the Arbitration Court in the Beagle Conflict , the Argentine government no longer wanted a tribunal.

The fact that military governments were in power in both countries gave them the idea of ​​negotiating "from military to military" and leaving the diplomatic channels aside. In a secret trip to Buenos Aires, the Chilean general Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda , until recently head of the notorious DINA , unsuccessfully sought a compromise with the Argentine military. This detour, called diplomacia militar in Chile , was later criticized within the Pinochet government because it invalidated the legal arguments of Chile and strengthened the (geo) political and military arguments of Argentina.

On January 19, 1978, the presidents of both countries met in Mendoza as both countries intensified their preparations for war. At this meeting, say Argentine sources, Pinochet would in principle have admitted to ceding at least part of an island to Argentina, but would not have been able to enforce this concession in Santiago.

On January 25, 1978, Argentina declared the arbitration award null and void and did not feel obliged to comply. On January 26, 1978, the Chilean government issued a communique declaring the verdict to be binding and incontestable. On February 20, 1978, the two presidents met again in Puerto Montt and agreed to continue the negotiations, which were unsuccessful until then. Two new groups should be formed, Comix1 and Comix2, which should negotiate one after the other.

In February 1978, Hernán Cubillos took over the post of Foreign Minister in Chile. He had been a naval officer when he was young. But he represented a current within the Pinochet government that advocated giving more responsibility to the civil advocates of the military government, in contrast to the old Patricio Carvajal, who preferred the military.

Comix 1 was successful and within 45 days it achieved its goals, military detente and consensus on navigation in the conflict zone. Comix2 started on May 2nd, led on the Chilean side by Francisco Orrego Vicuña and the General Ricardo Etcheverry Boneo on the Argentine side. They were given the task of solving the core problems in six months: defining the boundaries, economic integration in the zone, finding common interests in the Antarctic, drawing precise boundaries in the Strait of Magellan and drawing the baselines.

The Comix2 deadline expired on November 12, 1978 without finding a solution to the core problems of maritime demarcation, baselines and the Strait of Magellan. Compromises were reached on the secondary issues, but these did not slow down war preparation measures on either side of the border.

Shortly before the end of Comix2, Chile proposed to Argentina again to refer the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Argentine junta's unofficial response was that such a move would be viewed by them as a casus belli .

In early December 1978 the war seemed inevitable, just a matter of days. All bilateral efforts had failed. At that moment, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Hernán Cubillos Sallato, suggested that a friendly power be mediated. Both agreed to ask the Pope for mediation. On December 12, 1978, the Chilean Foreign Minister flew with a delegation to Buenos Aires to fix the details. After a conversation with Carlos Washington Pastor, the Argentine Foreign Minister, everything seemed to be settled, but in the evening the Argentine junta withdrew its support for the mediation.

After this unsuccessful attempt, the Argentine junta held a meeting in the Cóndor building in Buenos Aires, with the conspicuous absence of Jorge Videla and his foreign minister, Pastor. At this meeting the date and time for the war were agreed: On December 22, 1978 at 10 p.m. Operation Soberanía was to begin.

analysis

The Chilean armed forces were unable to enforce the 1977 arbitration ruling with their presence, nor was the Pinochet government able to prevent Argentina from being declared null and void by applying suitable international pressure. It was undoubtedly one of the greatest defeats of the Chilean dictatorship on the international scene.

The Argentine junta, Videla, Viola, Galtieri and Bignone, however, had sustained a problem that they could no longer solve. Neither through the threat of war ( Operation Soberanía ) nor through negotiations could they persuade Chile to renounce land. The tension on the border lasted until after the Falklands War and was one of the reasons for the Chilean support for the United Kingdom in this foreign war in which the Argentine side stood for a longer period of time. Even during the war, the Argentine armed forces felt disturbed by the Chilean defense measures.

In Chile, the breach of contract remained in the memory. Three ministers have publicly linked various situations to the annulment.

See also

literature

  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration (PDF; 4.9 MB), in English.
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), in English.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts , Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: The arbitration award in the Beagle Channel dispute (PDF; 1.8 MB), reports and documents: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle . Geneva 1979, in English and Spanish.
  • Rubén Madrid Murúa: "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978" , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, in spanish language.
  • Andrea Wagner: The Argentine-Chilean conflict over the Beagle Channel. A contribution to the methods of peaceful dispute settlement . Publishing house Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8 .
  • Karl Hernekamp: The Argentine-Chilean border dispute on the Beagle Channel . Institute for Ibero-American Customers, Hamburg 1980.
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle Conflict and Falkland (Malwinen) War. On the foreign policy of the Argentine military government 1976–1983 . Weltforum Verlag, Munich / Cologne / London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3 .
  • Isaac F. Rojas and Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico . Publishing house Nemont, B.As. Argentina 1979, in Spanish.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1st party . Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, in Spanish.
  • Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (read here ), in Spanish.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su SS el Papa Juan Pablo II , Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, in Spanish.
  • Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina . 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, in Spanish.
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century . Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 , in English.
  • Divisional General (retired) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas , in Spanish. (The book is a compilation of several articles on the Beagle conflict that were published in the magazine "Estrategia", Buenos Aires No. 49/50, enero-febrero 1978. The title of the book is, in German, The Beagle Question, direct negotiations or dialogue of arms .
  • General Martín Antonio Balza and Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino . Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 950-49-0813-6 , in Spanish.
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano and Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción . Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 956-258-211-6 , in Spanish.

Web links

Commons : Beagle conflict  - collection of images, videos and audio files
  • Broadcast by Televisión Nacional de Chile: "Informe Especial" - El año que vivimos en peligro , temporarily on YouTube ( Memento from March 15, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), in Spanish.
  • Broadcast of the Argentine television History Channel: Operativo Soberanía , temporarily on YouTube , in Spanish.
  • Special edition of El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, September 2, 2005, in Spanish. It contains u. a., interviews with Ernesto Videla, Jaime Del Valle, Helmut Brunner, Marcelo Delpech and Luciano Benjamín Menéndez. All in Spanish.
  • Interview with the Argentine general Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, commandant of the III Cuerpo del Ejercito in El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, (from an interview for the Argentine magazine "Somos"), in Spanish.
  • Interview with Pío Laghi, Apostolic Nuncio in Argentina, 1978, in Clarín , Buenos Aires, December 20, 1998.
  • Interview with the then US Ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raúl Héctor Castro, in the Clarín Buenos Aires newspaper , December 20, 1998, in Spanish.
  • Interview with the former head of the Secretaría General del Ejército (think tank of the Argentine army), General Reynaldo Bignone , later President of Argentina after the Falklands War, in Clarín , Buenos Aires, on December 20, 1998, in Spanish.
  • Article Historia de la santa mediación en Clarín , Buenos Aires, December 20, 1998, in Spanish.

swell

  1. ↑ See the program "El año que vivimos en peligro", Informe Especial, from Televisión Nacional de Chile. On the internet youtube
  2. ↑ See Cema: Las relaciones con Chile ( Memento from June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ): En una comparación que evidentemente dejaba mal parados a los militares argentinos, el mediador [Antonio Samoré] sostenía que en el caso del régimen chileno hay uno que comanda, dirige.
  3. ↑ See historia secreta de la guerra que no fue ( Memento of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) in the newspaper “La Nación”, Argentina, August 12, 1996
  4. ↑ See interview of the Air Force Chief Matthei in the book “Matthei, mi testimonio” (compiled by Patricia Arancibia e Isabel de la Maza): “A mi juicio, ése fue un factor grave de descoordinación, porque el almirante López [chief of the fleet] le respondía al almirante (Merino) y el general Floody [chief of the southern region] al general Pinochet "
  5. ↑ Ver declaraciones de Ernesto Videla en entrevista con el diario "El Mercurio": Reivindicaciones: Punto de quiebre : "Primero que nada un mando unificado. El poder estaba claro quien lo tenía, y quien resolvía el asunto."
  6. ↑ See Berliner Zeitung of March 5, 2004
  7. ↑ Initially, the USA also assessed Videla as “moderado” (moderate), see La verdad de los archivos in the Argentine newspaper “La Nación”, May 15, 2011.
  8. ↑ Op. cit. (English version) pp. 242–243
  9. ↑ See The New York Times
  10. ↑ See newspaper La Nación  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Argentina, August 10, 1997@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.ser2000.org.ar  
  11. ^ See Mark Laudy, "The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building" ( Memento of May 29, 2008 on the Internet Archive )
  12. ↑ See Informe Rattenbach ( Memento from September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) § 59
  13. ↑ See Cartas desde el abismo in the Clarín newspaper , Buenos Aires, December 20, 1998
  14. ↑ See interview with Raúl Héctor Castro in El papel de la embajada , Clarín de Buenos Aires of December 20, 1998
  15. ↑ Admiral Gastón A. Clement, Chief of the General Staff of the Fleet, later Minister of the Navy of Argentina in 1948, believed that
    "Argentina, desde el punto de vista geopolítico, es dueña de todo el estrecho de Magallanes, de sus canales derivados y de todo el Beagle. Losickets internacionales de 1881 y los protocolos posteriores con Chile no tienen mayor alcance, porque se trata de necesidades de la nación argentina, impuestas a ella por su propia naturaleza geográfica y por la configuración del extremo austral del continente. El cono sur de América es argentino por obra de la naturaleza y las discusiones en que se entered algunos internacionalistas y juristas, tanto de Chile como de Argentina, no pueden destruir los hechos, más poderosos que todas las argumentaciones de la geografía del extremo sur de America. El dominio austral de America lo ha entregado la configuración geográfica del continente a la nación argentina, y resulta pueril que la Marina de Guerra argentina pueda aceptar otra posición que no sea la del imperio irrestricto y absoluto de la sober continanía en el extremo austral de nuestro ".
    (Translation: "Argentina, from a geopolitical point of view, owns the whole Strait of Magellan , its canals and the Beagle Canal . The international [border] treaties of 1881 and the later protocols with Chile are irrelevant because it is [in this." Thing] is about the interests of the Argentine nation, imposed on it by its own geography and by the configuration of the southern part of the continent.The southern cone is Argentine because nature willed it that way and the discussions with which some internationalists and lawyers pass their time Both Chile and Argentina cannot change this fact, geography is more powerful than any argument.The rule over the south of America has given geography to Argentina and it is childish that the Argentine navy should adopt a different attitude than the unconditional and absolute power and sovereignty at the southernmost end of our continent ”).
    Corvette captain José A. Dellepianne, professor of strategy and geopolitics at the Argentine Academy of Naval Warfare, also demanded in July 1947:
    “No podemos negarnos a la realidad. La Marina argentina debe tener dominio absoluto sobre todos los canales del Pacífico al Sur de la isla de Chiloé. La frontera con Chile es el macizo Andino, y la cordillera de los Andes termina al Sur de Puerto Montt. La Armada argentina no tiene, pues, por qué desconocer los hechos de la naturaleza: el cono austral de América del Sur debe pertenecer de modo irremisible, tanto por derecho propio como por indiscutibles razones geográficas, a la más grande patria argentina. "
    (See Oscar Espinosa Moraga, “El precio de la paz Chileno-Argentina”, Editorial Nascimiento, 1969, Vol.III, p. 291, quoted in “Las relaciones vecinales de Chile y la guerra del Atlantico Sur”, Carlos Castro Sauritain, Editorial Mare Nostrum, ISBN 956-8089-13-6 )
  16. ↑ See El belicismo de los dictadores in the Clarín newspaper , Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 20, 1998
  17. ↑ Bolivia lost its coast to Chile in the saltpeter war .
  18. ↑ See article Argentina refuerza militarmente su frontera con Chile Spanish newspaper El País of October 27, 1978: “… En una declaración conjunta, suscrita al finalizar la entrevista de un poco más de cinco horas, ambos mandatarios ratificaron el derecho de una salida al mar for Bolivia, the soberanía de Argentina sobre las islas Malvinas y otros territorios ubicados en el extremo sur de este país.… »
  19. ↑ a b c See broadcast by Television Nacional de Chile “El año que vivimos en peligro”, Informe Especial. On the internet in youtube
  20. ↑ Der Spiegel of November 13, 1978, accessed February 24, 2011, Murderous and crazy
  21. ↑ See book by Martín Balza , 'Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino'
  22. ↑ See Diario El Centro de Chile ( Memento of May 5, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) also in Diario Página / 12 de Argentina
  23. ↑ See "Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la Republica Argentina Cema ( Memento from June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
  24. ↑ See book by Fabio Vio Valdivieso, p. 111
  25. ↑ See General Gugliamelli's book
  26. ↑ See special edition “20 años del Tratado de Paz y Amistad entre Chile y Argentina” in El Mercurio , Santiago de Chile
  27. ↑ See interview with Ambassador Castro in the Clarín newspaper , Buenos Aires, December 20, 1998
  28. ↑ See book La escuadra en acción
  29. ↑ Quotes from an interview with the journalist María Eugenia Oyarzún “Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su Historia. Conversaciones inéditas con María Eugenia Oyarzún “ Editorial Sudamericana. The excerpts appeared on the website El conflicto del Beagle ( Memento from April 25, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
  30. ↑ See The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building. Mark Laudy ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), p. 300.
  31. ↑ Decree No. 416 of 14 July 1977 (1) ( English , PDF) United Nations. Retrieved February 21, 2019.
  32. ^ Mark Laudy, Op. cit., p. 300: “ But the Argentines, having been defeated in the British arbitration, had little appetite for further juridical proceedings. ”
  33. ↑ See also Las relaciones con Chile Cema ( memento of June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ): la Junta Militar rechazó la propuesta chilena, percibiendo que la misma tenía por objetivo presentar a la Argentina como país no respetuoso de los compromisos internacionales ante la Corte de La Haya
  34. ↑ See Hernán Cubillos in El año que vivimos en peligro , Informe Especial de of Televisión Nacional de Chile
  35. ↑ See article Beagle: La guerra que no fue in the newspaper La Nación ( Memento of the original of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Argentina, August 12, 1996. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.ser2000.org.ar
  36. ↑ See The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building. Mark Laudy ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), p. 301.
  37. ↑ See statements by the Chilean Foreign Minister José Miguel Insulza , according to which the Argentine government withdrew a border treaty law ("poligonal") from the parliamentary debate in La Tercera  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as broken . Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. de Santiago de Chile of July 13, 1998: “Enfatizó que, si bien la situación es diferente, lo que hoy está ocurriendo con el Tratado de Campo de Hielo Sur hace recordar a la opinión pública lo sucedido en 1977, durante la disputa territorial por el Canal de Beagle. "@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.latercera.cl  
  38. ↑ See opinion of (not democratically elected) Senator Jorge Martínez Bush in La Tercera  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. de Santiago de Chile of July 26, 1998: "El legislador expuso que los chilenos mantienen" muy fresca "en la memoria la situación creada cuando Argentina declaró nulo el arbitraje sobre el canal del Beagle, en 1978."@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.latercera.cl  
  39. ↑ See statements by the Chilean Foreign Minister es: Ignacio Walker during the gas crisis with Argentina in the Clarin de BA of July 22, 2005: “Y está en la retina de los chilenos el laudo de Su Majestad Británica, en el Beagle, que fue declarado insanablemente nulo por la Argentina. Esa impresión todavía está instalada en la sociedad chilena. "
  40. ↑ See also “Reciprocidad en las Relaciones Chile - Argentina” by Andrés Fabio Oelckers Sainz in PDF ( memento of the original from July 2, 2007) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. : "También en Chile, todavía genera un gran rechazo el hecho que Argentina declarase nulo el fallo arbitral británico y además en una primera instancia postergara la firma del laudo papal por el diferendo del Beagle" @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.uvm.cl
  41. ↑ See the opinion of the Director académico de la es: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales , en Santiago, Chile, Francisco Rojas in La Nación ( Memento of the original from October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked . Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. de Buenos Aires of September 26, 1997: "Desde la Argentina, cuesta entender el nivel de desconfianza que hoy existe en Chile a propósito de la decisión que tomó en 1978 de declarar nulo el laudo arbitral" @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.ser2000.org.ar
  42. ↑ See also the remarks by the Chilean Defense Minister : Edmundo Pérez Yoma in the “Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional del Reino de España” to justify Chile's defense expenditure. They appeared in the Argentine newspaper El Cronista Comercial ( Memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) on May 5, 1997: … Y que la Argentina estuvo a punto de llevar a cabo una invasión sobre territorio de Chile en 1978… . These statements were later put into perspective by the Chilean government. Archivlink ( Memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Archivlink ( Memento of October 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), but could no longer be removed from the world