Operation Soberanía

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Beagle conflict
South America southern tip pol.png
Main Products: Beagle conflict
1881–1970: Beagle cartography
1958: Snipe incident
1971–1977: Arbitration court in the Beagle conflict
1977–1978: Direct negotiations
1978: Operation Soberanía
1979-1984: Papal mediation
1984: Friendship treaty 1984

The Operativo afianzamiento de la soberanía ( Spanish Operation Securing Sovereignty ), briefly Operation Soberanía , was a military invasion prepared by Argentina against Chile to conquer the Beagle Channel . It started on December 22, 1978, but was canceled a few hours later. This escalation of the Beagle conflict on the part of Argentina is seen as one of the reasons Chile supported the United Kingdom during the Falklands War .

initial situation

→ Main article: Arbitration court in the Beagle conflict

In order to end the Beagle conflict over the islands and maritime rights south of the Beagle Channel, Chile and Argentina decided in 1971 to negotiate the dispute before a jointly called tribunal. Together they elected the five judges from the International Court of Justice of The Hague and agreed that international law should be used. For historical reasons, the Tribunal should judge on behalf of the British Crown. On May 22, 1977, Queen Elizabeth II pronounced the verdict, essentially adopting the Chilean position. On January 25, 1978, Argentina declared the verdict null and void and began to exert military pressure on Chile to have the verdict annulled and to draw a border in line with Argentina's interests.

The military imbalance

Chile, a country with long and narrow territory, had to stand up to a country that had twice the population, twice the per capita income and huge geographical advantages.

The tension persisted until after the Falklands War , causing enormous costs on both sides of the Andes.

After the murder of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC in 1976, the United States of America distanced itself from Chile and prohibited the sale of weapons to Chile by law ( Kennedy Amendment , later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976) .

Austria and Germany did not deliver weapons to Chile. On March 6, 1978, Der Spiegel stated:

"... since 1974 Bonn has also helped the armed forces of almost all South American coastal countries (exception: Chile) to become more seaworthy ..."

The United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and France sold arms to Argentina even during the hottest period of the conflict, and the United States maintained good relations with the junta in Buenos Aires, thanks to Argentine aid to the United States in Central America . However, the Kennedy Amendment was later applied to Argentina as well.

In December 1978, when the outbreak of war seemed inevitable, Blohm + Voss and the Argentine junta agreed to build four destroyers ; a deal that some observers in Germany considered unconstitutional:

"Basically, the willingness of Thyssen and B + V to support the Argentine policy of aggression was unconstitutional under Article 26 of the Basic Law and should have been punished."

In 1978 France sold and delivered two D'Estienne D'Orves A-69 corvettes armed with Exocet missiles, originally built for the apartheid regime in South Africa . The "Good Hope" and "Transvaal" allowed because of the UN - embargo not be extradited. In Argentina they were renamed ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico . The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to its future enemy : on September 19, 1977, the “ARA Hércules” (built and equipped in the UK) was opened in the Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Limited (VSEL) shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness November 28, 1981 in Portsmouth the "ARA Santísima Trinidad" (built in Argentina, equipped in the UK) handed over to the Argentine Navy.

All of these arms sales were agreed or carried out at the time when Argentina had already rejected the internationally binding arbitral award (Laudo Arbitral) (January 25, 1978) and the purpose of arming Argentina (at least the "Spiegel") was known:

“... to demonstrate military strength off the coast of the (Chilean) Tierra del Fuego or the British Falkland Islands. "

The adjacent table with the military expenditures of both countries gives an overview of the imbalance.

Military spending before and after Operation Soberania
Country \ year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Chile
Military spending 487 566 713 951 1,128 949
Percentage of GNP 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.2
Argentina
Military spending 2,702 2,225 2,339 2,641 2.126 2,241
Percentage of GNP 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0
* Military spending is in millions of dollars in 1979.

This numerical imbalance was partially mitigated by the following factors:

  • Chile used a higher proportion of its gross national income for national defense
  • Defense implies fewer risks than attack
  • The constant interference of the Argentine armed forces in daily politics since the 1930s had significantly reduced their professional skills.
  • The Andes are a natural and mostly difficult to access barrier.

The Argentine superiority did not reach the 3: 1 level that is considered necessary for a high probability of victory.

One could only speculate in advance about discipline, morality, motivation, skills, supply, maintenance, the abilities of the officer corps and political leadership, which are more important than mere numbers.

In an interview, the then Ambassador of the United States to Argentina, Raúl Héctor Castro , assessed the opinion of the Argentine military on the planned war in the following words:

“Ellos suponían que iban a invadir Chile, Santiago, especialmente. Les parecía algo muy fácil; una cuestión de cruzar la frontera y que los chilenos se iban a dar por vencidos. Y yo les decía: No, no, se equivocan. Ellos tienen una armada mejor que la de ustedes. Están bien armados, son muy fuertes "

(Translation: "They thought they could invade Santiago mainly, just cross the border and the Chileans would lay down their arms. I told them no, you are making a mistake, they are well armed and their navy is better than yours. ")

Augusto Pinochet , on the other hand, foresaw a long and bloody war. In an interview he said: "una guerra de montonera, matando todos los días, fusilando gente, tanto por parte de los argentinos como por nuestra parte, y al final, por cansancio, se habría llegado a la paz" . (Translation: "A war between partisans, every day people would have been murdered, executed, both on our side and on the Argentine side, in the end one would have made peace out of wear and tear.")

The action plan

Although there are no official statements or documents about the planning of the war of aggression, there are so many reports on the plan from all walks of life in Argentine society that its existence cannot be questioned.

The attack was to be preceded by an Argentine complaint before the UN Security Council about the military occupation of the disputed islands by Chile.

Thereafter, troops were to occupy the islands, although no Chilean resistance or only symbolic resistance was expected from the government in Buenos Aires. If necessary, the Argentine army would invade the continental territory of Chile and cut the country in several places.

On December 21, 1978, the Argentine junta gave the order to occupy the disputed islands militarily. After more than 20 days on the high seas and at least one postponement, the Argentine fleet set off on the night of December 21-22, 1978 to put the islands on Cape Horn under Argentine sovereignty.

"Operation Soberania" was carried out by the General Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces (Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas) under the name "Joint Plan of Operations Planned Against Chile" (Planeamiento Conjunto de Operaciones Previstas contra Chile).

The strategic concept with which the political goals (sovereignty over the islands) were to be achieved was based on two premises

  1. As a result of the military actions in preparation, Chile was soon to surrender, and
  2. Chile should cede the required areas to Argentina, after which the Argentine troops would be withdrawn from the other areas occupied during the offensive.

The planning was carried out according to the general staff. The (new) foundations of military policy (Directiva Estratégica Militar), which were adopted by the junta, contained the war aims (concepto general de la guerra), political aims (objetivo político de guerra bélico) and basic personnel planning (organización de las fuerzas) , as well as a mobilization plan (Plan de Movilización), an information plan (Plan de Inteligencia) and an operation plan (Plan de Intrusión).

Argentina expected an immediate response to the invasion from the UN, the US and other countries. For this reason, the military planned to gain the greatest possible land gain from Chilean territory as quickly as possible in order to accept a ceasefire after a few days , with this status quo as the starting point. Then the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations would have been brought in to keep the warring armies apart. Argentina would then have negotiated from a position of strength.

The planning also took into account the possibility that Peru, ruled by a left-wing military dictatorship under Juan Velasco Alvarado in the early 1970s , could participate in the attack. Peru was the first South American country to buy Soviet T-55 and MIG-21 , which made the US very suspicious. There is said to have been a plan by Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, retired General and Foreign Minister of Peru, which envisaged a Peruvian offensive in northern Chile as soon as the fighting broke out in southern Chile. Officials at the Argentine embassy in Lima tried to obtain a secret promise from the then Peruvian Foreign Minister José de la Puente Radbill that Peru would participate in the war. De La Puente refused and reminded the Argentines that 100 years earlier Argentina had not participated in the saltpeter war against Chile and had even taken advantage of the situation to come to an agreement with Chile on the border issue. De La Puente Rabdill later made this known to the Chilean Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos and assured him that Peru would not take part in a war against Chile. Nevertheless, the tension in northern Chile remained.

A participation of Bolivia (against Chile), Brazil (against Argentina) or Ecuador (against Peru) could not be ruled out a priori .

By December 14, 1978, the Soberania plan had already carried out the phases of mobilizing the regular armed forces and the partial mobilization of the reserve.

Operation Soberania: Formation of the Argentine forces for the attack on Chile on December 22, 1978

The Argentine attack was planned as follows:

  1. From 8:00 p.m. on December 22, 1978, the Argentine navy with the marine infantry (Batallón N ° 5 ) was to occupy the islands of Cape Horn Freycinet, Hershell, Deceit and Wollaston (a few kilometers north of Cape Horn).
  2. At 10:00 p.m. on December 22, 1978, the Argentine navy and marine infantry (Batallones N ° 3 and N ° 4) were to occupy the islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox and thus gain control of the Beagle Channel.
  3. The land offensive would begin at midnight on December 22, 1978. The V Army Corps would attack from Santa Cruz (Argentine province) and occupy Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas , the two largest Chilean cities in Patagonia.
  4. Later, from 06:00 on December 23, 1978, the Argentine Air Force was supposed to destroy the Chilean Air Force . (This delay can be explained when one knows that as a result of the arms embargo, the Chilean air force did not pose a threat to the Argentine operations).
  5. Finally, an offensive with the III. Army corps (in Mendoza ) start to invade Chile through the Andean passes Los Libertadores , Maipo and Puyehue (today Paso Fronterizo Cardenal Samoré ) and to separate the country several times.

The following forces were provided for this purpose:

Army (under the orders of Roberto Viola ):

  • II Army Corps under the command of Leopoldo Galtieri . Task: Protect the border with Brazil and repel a possible invasion of Brazilian troops in Argentina.
  • III. Army corps under the command of Luciano Benjamín Menéndez. Task: To penetrate Chile from Mendoza and, if possible, occupy Santiago de Chile and Valparaíso militarily.
  • V. Army Corps under the command of José Antonio Vaquero. Task: to march into Chile from Santa Cruz and occupy Puerto Natales and Punta Arenas. The V Army Corps was later to support the II Army Corps in central Chile.
  • The II. Tank Brigade, belonging to the II. Army Corps, was supposed to stay in Comodoro Rivadavia to repel a possible Chilean attack against Río Mayo (Chubut).

Navy (Under the command of Rear Admiral Humberto Barbuzzi):

Task: to oppose the Chilean navy and force the occupation of the islands around Cape Horn. To do this, she divided into two combat groups (Grupos de Tarea, GDT)

  • GDT 1: The aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo , with its entire GAE (Grupo Aéreo Embarcado): 8 Douglas A-4Q , 4 Grumman S-2 trackers, 4 Sikorsky S-61D4 Sea King and one Alouette, the destroyer ARA Hércules with MM -38 Exocet and the corvettes ARA Drummond and ARA Guerrico, newly arrived from France, as escort ships.
  • GDT 2: The cruiser General Belgrano and the destroyers Rosales , Bouchard and Piedra Buena . The task of this group was to provide cover for the landing ships Cįndido de Lasala and Cabo San Antonio . This group also included the oil tanker Punta Médanos and other supply ships of the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales , the then state-owned Argentine oil company.

GDT1 should support the landing in the islands and GDT2 should wait at the eastern mouth of the Strait of Magellan to later take part in the occupation of a Chilean port.

Air Force (Under the command of General Ramón Agosti)

It was initially planned to use the Argentine Air Force against targets in Punta Arenas and Puerto Williams and to destroy the Chilean Air Force, but in November 1978 the Navy requested the support of the Air Force because of the danger posed by the Chilean helicopters from the Chilean ships , was too big.

losses

The plan estimated the death toll at 5,100 on the Argentine side and 3,200 on the Chilean side if the Chileans took a defensive stance. The Spanish newspaper El País and the Argentine newspaper La Nación estimate between 30,000 and 50,000 deaths in the course of the war.

The guidelines for the time after the invasion

For the phase after the occupation of the islands, the Argentine Navy issued the Instrucciones Políticas Particulares para la Zona Austral para la Etapa Posterior a la Ejecución de Actos de Soberanía en las Islas en Litigio (Special political guidelines for the phase after the exercise of sovereign acts on the disputed islands). These provided for:

  • The definition of the geographical zone in which Argentina would enforce its sovereignty by force of arms.
  • The new navigation rights Argentina would grant Chile.
  • Procedure in case of a Chilean refusal:
    • (literally) "You will not give in to any threat, and you will not accept Chilean protests, even if gun violence is threatened".
    • (literally) "3.2) If, in the event of an Argentine refusal (in front of a Chilean threat), an attack is carried out with weapons, one will set free fire and one will stop immediately when the enemy is incapacitated".
    • (literally) "3.3) Chilean shipwrecked or injured persons are to be recovered, treated and transported to the places where the naval zone headquarters has provided".
    • (literally) "3.4) If other Chileans are captured as a result of the action, they are to be transported to where the naval zone headquarters has provided it".
  • Should a Chilean ship violate the new navigation rights, it was planned:
    • to help if no intention of the injury.
    • to issue a warning in case of deliberate violation
    • (literally) "4.2.5) If the violation continues despite a warning, one should use weapons as much as necessary to prevent the enemy from completing his intention or to incapacitate him."
    • (literally) "4.2.5) If you come under enemy fire during the incident, you should use your own weapons and stop when the enemy is out of action".

Chile's preparation

Minefield in Tierra del Fuego , photographed in 2006

The Chilean military was informed of the movements of the Argentine fleet and the locations of the Argentine troops on the border and was already waiting for the attack. The Chilean fleet, previously distributed in the fjords of the islands around Cape Horn, was waiting for the Argentine landing on December 22, 1978, divided into two groups. It could no longer be a surprise attack . Vice-Admiral Raúl López, chief of the Chilean fleet, was asked about his plans years later in an interview for the book La Escuadra en accion , but he kept the definitive answer to himself, whether to wait or attack first.

In the 1970s, Chile mined some sectors of its border with Peru, Bolivia and Argentina and blasted Andean passes.

Chile's plans to defend it are not publicly known.

The abort command

On December 22nd, 1978, a strong storm made the landing of the Argentine forces, who had been at sea for 20 days, impossible. At the same time, an offer from Pope John Paul II to mediate in the conflict arrived in Buenos Aires . After a joint mediation request to the Pope had failed due to the refusal of the Argentine government on December 12, 1978, the Pope launched a new mediation offer.

This time the Argentine junta withdrew the marching orders.

Whether the Argentine troops crossed the border or were just waiting for the order can no longer be definitely determined. Argentine sources claim that troops invaded the neighboring country, but that would contradict the theory that the invasion should only take place as a second phase in the battle for the islands.

The Argentine Navy did not get to the landing sections, 4 or 10 hours (depending on the source) before operations began, they made a U-turn and moved away from the conflict zone.

Why Argentina did not take the decisive step into the war has not been definitively answered. Undoubtedly, the Pope's moral authority was a reason. The certainty of international ostracism as an aggressor (as the US ambassador in Buenos Aires unmistakably informed them) may also have played a role in the decision to cancel. In addition, the certainty of “symbolic” resistance and quick victory faded over time when Pinochet did not give in despite the massive threat of military violence.

Alejandro Luis Corbacho says:

“The newspaper Clarín explained some years later that such caution was based, in part, on military concerns. In order to achieve a victory, certain objectives had to be reached before the seventh day after the attack. Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through the passes over the Andean Mountains. "

- Predicting the probability of war during brinkmanship crisis: The Beagle and the Malvinas conflicts , p. 45

and in footnote 46:

"According to Clarín, two consequences were feared. First, those who were dubious feared a possible regionalization of the conflict. Second, as a consequence, the conflict could acquire great power proportions. In the first case decisionmakers speculated that Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil might intervene. Then the great powers could take sides. In this case, the resolution of the conflict would depend not on the combatants, but on the countries that supplied the weapons. "

literature

  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration (PDF; 4.9 MB), in English.
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), in English.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts , Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: The arbitration award in the Beagle Channel dispute (PDF; 1.8 MB), reports and documents: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle . Geneva 1979, in English and Spanish.
  • Rubén Madrid Murúa: "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978" , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, in spanish language.
  • Andrea Wagner: The Argentine-Chilean conflict over the Beagle Channel. A contribution to the methods of peaceful dispute settlement . Publishing house Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8 .
  • Karl Hernekamp: The Argentine-Chilean border dispute on the Beagle Channel . Institute for Ibero-American Customers, Hamburg 1980.
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle Conflict and Falkland (Malwinen) War. On the Foreign Policy of the Argentine Military Government 1976-1983 . Weltforum Verlag, Munich / Cologne / London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3 .
  • Isaac F. Rojas and Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico . Publishing house Nemont, B.As. Argentina 1979, in Spanish.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1st party . Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, in Spanish.
  • Carlos Escudé and Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (read here ), in Spanish.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su SS el Papa Juan Pablo II , Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, in Spanish.
  • Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina . 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, in Spanish.
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century . Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 , in English.
  • Divisional General (retired) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas , in Spanish. (The book is a compilation of several articles on the Beagle conflict that were published in the magazine "Estrategia", Buenos Aires No. 49/50, enero-febrero 1978. The title of the book is, in German, The Beagle Question, direct negotiations or dialogue of arms .
  • General Martín Antonio Balza and Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino . Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136 , in Spanish.
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano and Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción . Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116 , in Spanish.

See also

Web links

  • Broadcast by Televisión Nacional de Chile: "Informe Especial" - El año que vivimos en peligro , temporarily on YouTube ( Memento of March 15, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), in Spanish.
  • Broadcast of the Argentine television History Channel: Operativo Soberanía , temporarily on YouTube , in Spanish.
  • Special edition of El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, September 2, 2005, in Spanish. It contains u. a., interviews with Ernesto Videla, Jaime Del Valle, Helmut Brunner, Marcelo Delpech and Luciano Benjamín Menéndez. All in Spanish.
  • Interview with the Chief of the Argentine Army Martín Balza in El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, on September 2, 2005, in Spanish.
  • Interview with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Ambassador of Chile to Argentina 1978 to 1982 in the Chilean newspaper La Tercera of March 17, 2002, in Spanish.
  • Interview with the Argentine general Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, commander of the III Cuerpo del Ejercito in El Mercurio de Santiago de Chile, (from an interview for the Argentine magazine "Somos"), in Spanish.
  • Interview with the then Ambassador of the United States in Buenos Aires, Raúl Héctor Castro, in the Clarín Buenos Aires newspaper , December 20, 1998, in Spanish.
  • Interview with the former head of the Secretaría General del Ejército (think tank of the Argentine army), General Reynaldo Bignone , later President of Argentina after the Falklands War, in Clarín , Buenos Aires, on December 20, 1998, in Spanish.
  • Article Beagle: historia secreta de la guerra que no fue en La Nación , Buenos Aires, August 12, 1996, in Spanish.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See The Chilean connection ( Memento April 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed August 26, 2008:
    When the Falklands War broke out, Chile still had a long-standing dispute with Argentina over access to the Beagle Channel, making the chance of military co-operation between Britain and Chile a distinct possibility
  2. ↑ See David R. Mares, Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone , May 2004, Working Paper # 29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, accessed August 26, 2008:
    Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims.
  3. ↑ a b c See Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur ( Memento of May 29, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) by Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45).
  4. ↑ See Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina por Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé en cema.edu.ar ( Memento of June 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ): “... en el mismo mes de junio de 1981 , la Argentina adquirió 57 tanques austríacos, operación que generó los recelos del lado chileno, pues en 1980 el mismo país proveedor de esos tanques les negó a los militares trasandinos la compra de 100 unidades "
  5. ↑ See “Clarin” Los secretos de la guerra sucia continental de la dictadura of March 24, 2006
  6. ↑ See "How lubricated - arms production and arms trade in the Hamburg area" nadir.org ( Memento from May 1, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
  7. ↑ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/argentina/navy-history.htm
  8. ↑ WEAPONS EXPORTS: Bad conscience . In: Der Spiegel . No. 10 , 1978, p. 31 ( online ).
  9. ↑ a b See interview with General Martín Balza , Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army, in the newspaper La Tercera , Chile, on December 21, 2001 ( seprin  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. )@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.seprin.net  
  10. ^ David R. Mares, "Violent Peace", Columbia University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-231-11186-X , página 142: "And even if one were to grant Argentina equal quality on the ground, it only had a 1.6- 1 advantage "
  11. ↑ See interview with the then US ambassador to Buenos Aires, Raúl Héctor Castro in Clarín , Argentina, on Sunday, December 20, 1998.
  12. ^ Entrevista con la periodista María eugenia Oyarzún en "Augusto Pinochet, diálogos con su historia", 1999
  13. ↑
    • See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts , page 6, accessed August 26, 2008:
    "When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the [Court of Arbitration] resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory"
    • During a meeting in Puerto Montt , February 1978, the President of Argentina Jorge Videla threatened (General Juan E. Gugliamelli: "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas", compiled from articles in magazine "Estrategia", Buenos Aires No. 49/50, January-Frebuary 1978 :)
    "... las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto ..."
    • See Raúl Madrid Murúa, "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", page 55:
    "Al no llegar a un acuerdo entre ambos países, comienza durante las diversas negociaciones, la tercera fase de su maniobra, pasando a una estrategia de la disuasión directa, efectuando para lo anterior actitudes de amedrentamiento, desplazistemátesumentos de fuerz violas viola a los espacios aéreos y marítimos chilenos. "
    • See Clarín of December 20, 1998 … la mediación del papa Juan Pablo II for providencial para la Argentina: no sólo evitó una guerra de agresión contra Chile…
    • See Clarín of December 20, 1998: “De hecho, Chile no iba a ser el país atacante. Lo tenía todo: las islas y más aún. Era el generalato argentino el que auspiciaba el estallido. "
    • See La Nación ( Memento of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), Argentina of August 12, 1996: "Se tomó, por tanto, la decisión de invadir a Chile y se puso en marcha el reloj de la cuenta regresiva."
    • See pages 242 to 243 of the English edition of “Argentina in the twentieth Century” - “Breve Historia Contemporanea de la Argentina” by Luis Alberto Romero, 1994, Pennsylvania State University Press or Fondo de Cultura Economica, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 or ISBN 0-271-02192-6 : "The aggression against Chile ..."
    • See Pacho O'Donnell, “Historias Argentinas”, 1st edition, Buenos Aires, Sudamerica, 2006, ISBN 950-07-2749-8 , the chapter: Se necesita una guerra (page 315)
    • See interview with Pio Laghi, Nuncio in Argentina in 1978 in Clarín of December 20, 1998: “El ministro de Economía, Martínez de Hoz, y el jefe del Ejército, general viola, que no querían que estallara el conflicto, me informaron en una cena diplomática que se había tomado la decisión de desencadenar la guerra "
    • See warning from Bob Pastor, Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the US State Department, to the Argentine junta: “Si ustedes toman una sola roca, por minúscula que sea, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la OTAN los van a calificar de agresores. Le pediría que transmitiera este mensaje con claridad absoluta a Buenos Aires. El presidente Carter está al tanto de nuestra conversación… “ La Nación , Argentina, of December 21, 2003
    • See the comment “En su lógica” in the newspaper Río Negro ( Memento of July 24, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) of September 5, 2005: “Ahí, Argentina rompió reglas y apuró la guerra con el país vecino.”
    • See interview of Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Ambassador of Chile to Argentina in 1978, in the newspaper La Tercera ( Memento of December 2, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), Chile: “Había una campaña muy odiosa contra Chile a través de la prensa y los medios de comunicación, que demostraba cuál era la actitud del oficialismo. "
    • See article “Cartas desde el abismo” in the Clarín newspaper , Argentina, of December 20, 1998: “el drama que se estaba por abatir sobre la Argentina y Chile en 1978, impulsado por el afán belicista de los halcones del régimen militar argentino”
    • See interview with General Reynaldo Bignone in Clarín , Argentina, December 20, 1998: “Si hay tipos que pensaban que no había otra solución que la cachetada, allá ellos.” . “Cachetada” (slap) is a euphemism for war of aggression
    • See interview by Augusto Pinochet with María Eugenia Oyarzún en “Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su historia”, Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, Chile, 1999. (p. 127): “Usted comprenderá que uno llega a estos grados pensando los pro y los contra de las cosas. Una guerra significa una detención o retroceso para un país de a lo menos 20 años. Hay que comenzar de nuevo. ¡No quiero guerra yo !; por lo demás, nosotros no habríamos peleado por ambiciones expansionistas sino defendiendo lo que teníamos, nada más. Ello, a pesar de que en el otro lado, había deseos de agresión y vientos de guerra "
  14. ↑ See article El belicismo de los dictadores in the Clarín newspaper , Buenos Aires, December 20, 1998, in Spanish:
    Según afirma Passarelli en su libro, la acción militar iba a estar precedida de una ofensiva diplomática del embajador argentino en Naciones Unidas, Enrique Ros, que denunciaría ante el Consejo de Seguridad la existencia de fuerzas militares chilenas en las tres islas en las en islas Deceit, Freycinet, Herschel, Wollaston y Hornos.
  15. ↑ The most detailed military analysis of the planning based on the publicly known data is by Colonel of the Chilean Army Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , the published in Memorial del Ejército de Chile , Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, pages 50 to 70 and posted on the Internet: - ( Memento of June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  16. ↑ See Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, p 59 - ( Memento from June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive ):
    Que Chile se rindiera en breve tiempo ...
  17. ↑ See Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, p 60 - ( Memento from June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) .:
    se tenía previsto iniciar la guerra en la forma más rápida y violenta, ...
  18. ↑ See The state, war, and the state of war by Kalevi Holsti , page 159 [1]
  19. ↑ See article El verdadero maestro de Ollanta Humala ( Memento of May 3, 2007 in the web archive archive.today ) en diario chileno in La Tercera of April 8, 2008
  20. ↑ See article Perú y Chile estuvieron a punto de ir a una guerra en los 70 in [ http://www.diariocritico.com/peru/
  21. ↑ See El Pais newspaper of December 8, 1978 Reunión militar secreta entre Perú y Bolivia
  22. ↑ See Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, p 62 - ( Memento from June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive ):
    c. Curso de Acción Estratégico
  23. ↑ See Rubén Madrid Murúa in La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978 , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, p 63 - ( Memento from June 29, 2006 in the Internet Archive ):
    3. Misiones y Tareas ...
  24. ↑ See El Pais newspaper of October 6, 1984 Satisfacción de los Gobiernos argentino y chileno al confirmar oficialmente la existencia de un acuerdo sobre el canal de Beagle
  25. ↑ See El Pais newspaper of January 25, 1984 Los militares involucionistas argentinos consideran una traición el acuerdo sobre Beagle
  26. ↑ See La Nacion of April 13, 2005 La guerra que no ocurrió
  27. ↑ See article “El belicismo de los dictadores” in Clarin newspaper , Argentina, December 20, 1998
  28. ↑ See Landmine Monitor Chile (in English)
  29. ↑ See Newspaper El Centro ( Memento of September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), Chile, November 1, 2004 (in Spanish)
  30. ^ Alejandro Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises. The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts . Universidad del CEMA Documento de Trabajo No. 244. Buenos Aires 2003. Abstract .