The consolation of philosophy
The consolation of philosophy ( Latin Consolatio philosophiae; also De consolatione philosophiae "On the consolation of philosophy") is the main work of the late ancient Roman philosopher Boethius . It comprises five books and is considered to be the last significant philosophical work of antiquity . Boethius wrote the Consolatio around the mid-1920s after he was arrested at the behest of the Ostrogoth king Theodoric on suspicion of treasonous relations with the Eastern Roman emperor.
The work is conceived as a dialogue between the author and the personified philosophy that comforts and teaches him. As a supporter of Neoplatonism , Boethius draws his ideas primarily from the works of Plato , Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. He often refers approvingly to the teachings of Plato. In addition, the influence of stoic ideas can also be seen .
In the Middle Ages the Consolatio philosophiae was extremely widespread. It was part of the school reading and was one of the most commented texts of the Middle Ages. Numerous translations have been made in a number of languages.
Time and circumstances of writing
At the time of Boethius, whose birth probably falls in the early eighties of the 5th century, Italy was ruled by the Ostrogoths. In 476, Odowakar , a Germanic officer in Western Roman service, had brought about the fall of the Western Roman Empire and assumed the title of king. In 488 the Ostrogoths set out for Italy under their King Theodoric; they eliminated Odowakar and established their own rule. Theodoric acted on behalf of the Eastern Roman emperor; the Eastern Roman Empire formally recognized him as ruler of Italy.
Traditional institutions of the Roman state continued to exist after the end of the Western Empire; there were still consuls and a senate in Rome, while Theodoric resided in Ravenna . The Eastern Gothic administration continued the Roman one without interruption. Romans (or Italians, as the Romansh population of Italy is also called after the end of the Western Roman Empire) entered the service of the Ostrogothic king and were able to rise to top positions. One of them was Boethius, who came from a respected senatorial family and had distinguished himself as a scholar. After he had officiated as consul in 510 with Theodoric's consent, the king placed him at the head of the imperial administration in 522 by appointing him Magister officiorum . Boethius thus reached the peak of his political career.
Already after a short period of office Boethius came under suspicion of a conspiratorial connection with the Eastern Roman emperor against the rule of the Ostrogoths. His opponents, who accused him of high treason, were Italians who were loyal to Theodoric. The suspicion was unfounded, but the king believed. Boethius' misjudgment of the situation and his clumsy demeanor contributed significantly to his being removed from office, arrested and charged. The Senate refused to stand up for him. Theodoric handed the case over to a senate court, which made the guilty verdict desired by the king. Boethius, who was not given an opportunity to defend himself in court, was sentenced to death and executed.
The Consolatio shows that it originated between the arrest and the execution. The determination of the time it was written thus depends on the controversial chronology of the dramatic events which led to the fall of the Magister officiorum and which followed him. The traditional dating, according to which Boethius was arrested in 523 and executed in 524 or 525 at the latest, continues to have supporters. Researchers argue against them who find a late dating more plausible (arrest 525, execution of the death sentence 526 shortly before Theodoric's death).
It is unclear whether the writing was created before the conclusion of the legal proceedings or only after the death sentence was imposed. According to the conventional view, which has prevailed since the Middle Ages, the author was in dungeon, where he awaited his imminent execution. However, this is not expressly stated in the Consolatio ; Boethius expresses himself vaguely about his whereabouts, speaks of an exile to which he has been banished, and laments the loss of his home environment and above all of his library. The mention of chains in one of the poems of the Consolatio is to be understood as a poetic metaphor and not to be interpreted literally in the sense of a real bondage. Therefore, recent research suggests that the author was not in jail, but in relatively comfortable house arrest. In support of this assumption, the argument is put forward that a work with such an abundance of literary references as the Consolatio could not have been written without access to books; it could in no way be all about quotations from memory.
Reinhold F. Glei pointed out that the Consolatio is a literary work and the author of such a work does not have to feel obliged to be autobiographical and realistic. Rather, the possibility of fictional elements is to be expected. The narrator's perspective is not necessarily the same as that of the author.
Language and literary form
In terms of form and content, the Consolatio can be assigned to various literary genres. In terms of form, it is a prosimetrum (prose with inserted poems), whereby a regular sequence of prose and verse is observed. The Consolatio consists of 39 prose texts and 39 poems; the beginning is a poem. The term “prosimetrum” is medieval, it is only attested in the High Middle Ages ; in antiquity one spoke of a menu satire . With the choice of this form Boethius takes up a presentation style popular in late antiquity. The metrical form of the poems is extraordinarily varied; Boethius uses 28 different meters.
In terms of content, the Consolatio , as its title shows, belongs as a consolation to the tradition of ancient Consolation literature. In this genre, it is a special case insofar as it is not about the death of a relative or friend, which requires the consolation of the bereaved, but the author threatens his own death, which is not the focus as a thought. Boethius does not relate primarily to the subject of death but to the subject of exile in consolation literature; a considerable part of the ancient consolation writings concerned the fate of exiles. It is not unusual that the consolation is not addressed to someone else but is intended to comfort the author himself; even Cicero had written to himself as a first letter of consolation.
Apart from the consolation theme, the Consolatio is also a protrepticos , a script that encourages philosophy. The author is a philosopher, but under the impression of his difficult fate has forgotten fundamental philosophical insights; the work describes how he is led back to them. It should also show the reader a way to the knowledge presented. In contrast to other protreptic literature, the addressee should not be won over to philosophy for the first time, but should return to occupation with it. In the background stands the Platonic principle that all learning is a memory of something that the soul already knows and is familiar with ( anamnesis theory); the art of didactic conversation should evoke such memories in the learner. With regard to the structure of the dialogue in his work, Boethius follows the tradition of Plato.
The last book seems to be linguistically less structured and refined than the first four, the end seems abrupt. Therefore, some researchers have suggested that the author could not complete his work. This hypothesis is very controversial.
The linguistic form of the Consolatio is strongly influenced by classical Latin, but numerous phenomena of the late Latin use of the language can also be recognized. The orientation towards classical models is clearer in the poems than in the prose parts.
content
The Consolatio describes the healing of the author who is mentally ill in the distress of captivity. His healing takes place under the expert guidance of philosophy, which appears to him as an allegorical figure. In a didactic dialogue, it helps him to gain the knowledge he needs in order to escape despair and accept his fate.
The work can be divided into two halves. Approximately in the middle is the famous ninth poem of the third book, which is usually called O qui perpetua after its opening words ( incipit ) . It forms the transition and turning point between the two halves. In the first, negative part of the Consolatio , philosophy describes the transience and nullity of earthly goods and the futility of striving for them. In the second, positive part, she presents the alternative to these futile efforts: the search for the only true good, the good par excellence.
Striking and in need of explanation is the fact that Boethius, as a Christian, in view of his misery and impending death, nowhere refers to Christian doctrines, but seeks and finds his consolation exclusively in philosophical considerations. Different explanations have been proposed for this. Some approaches are based on the assumption that he was only superficially Christianized and basically - at least in his last phase of life - thought and felt like a Pagan Neoplatonist. Another possibility is that he wanted to show how, on the basis of reasoning alone, one can arrive at an attitude that is basically consistent with that of a believing Christian. A third interpretation says that he thought syncretistically , that is, represented a comprehensive religious philosophy as a synthesis of different teachings. In such an overall system, Christianity, like Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, could find its place without necessarily playing the central role of the only, indispensable path to salvation.
first book
The first book begins with a lamentation poem. The prisoner laments his sad fate and the faithlessness of the luck that once favored him. He hates life, but in vain he longs for redemptive death. When he tries to record his complaint, philosophy appears to him as a venerable female figure. First of all, she drives out the poet's muses that have gathered around the prisoner's sick bed. She accuses them of being "stage whores" who nourish sterile passions and instill their "sweet poisons" in the philosopher, thereby stifling the seeds of reason. Then she turns to the sufferer, promises him a cure and dries his tears with her robe. Only now does he realize who she is. She reminds him that philosophers have always been persecuted, pointing out, among other things, the fate of Socrates and Seneca , who were sentenced to death . Let him express what his grief consists of.
He then describes in detail the events that have brought him into his current misery. He is actually a scientist, but out of a sense of duty he has taken on a political task to prevent criminals from ruining the state. Since he has always stood up for justice, he has drawn hostility from evildoers. Malicious detractors would have plunged him into disaster. The Senate, for which he had selflessly campaigned, let him down and the poorly informed public consider him guilty.
Philosophy rebukes him. He did indeed lose his homeland, but not because he lost his usual place of residence and is in custody, but because he left his real fatherland of his own accord. From this fatherland - meaning a kingdom of spiritual values - no one could be expelled; one could only leave it voluntarily, and that was what he had done.
When asked, he professes the belief that the world is subject to divine guidance and care. It turns out, however, that he lacks knowledge of himself and the end of the world, and that he does not understand the work of Providence. Philosophy promises to eliminate this ignorance.
second book
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In the second book, the two interlocutors deal with Fortuna , the goddess of luck and fate in Roman mythology . The prisoner longs for his lost happiness; he says that Fortuna changed her attitude towards him. Philosophy draws his attention to the fact that this is not the case because Fortuna is inherently impermanent and faithless; this is precisely her constant attitude, this variability constitutes her essence and is the only reliable thing about her. In addition, philosophy reminds him that he voluntarily submitted to the rule of Fortuna. He has chosen this faithless goddess as his mistress, so he must now accept the consequences of his decision.
Then philosophy takes on the role of Fortuna in dialogue; as Fortuna, she defends herself against the allegations made. She argues that she has done the plaintiff no injustice as she is under no obligation to him. He could not make a claim on anything he asked of her. They “turn the wheel” through whose swing the deepest and the highest change places again and again; that is their game. Whoever wants to play and move up has to accept the condition that he has to step down again later. You have already given him plenty of presents.
He is shown the gifts he has already received: he received an excellent upbringing in one of the leading families, had a happy marriage, had a brilliant political career, and his two sons became consul. In his life the good has predominated, so his lamentation about his fate is unjustified. However, all such goods turn out to be transitory, unsatisfactory in nature and therefore not really worth striving for. Even those who have a part of them suffer from the lack of what they lack. All sweetness is strewn with bitterness. Added to this is the constant fear of losing what one has; At the latest with death you lose everything.
Philosophy deepens these considerations by describing the individual goods one after the other and showing their questionability. Wealth, the splendor of precious stones, natural beauty, beautiful clothing, the disposal of servants, dignity, power and fame turn out to be sham goods. You can tell that possessions are not real goods by the fact that they can also harm their owners; a real good can never harm its owner. If dignities and offices were true goods, they could not fall to the unworthy.
Such insights are more likely to come under adverse conditions than under favorable conditions. Therefore, what appears outwardly as unhappiness is even advantageous. It is to Fortuna's merit that she shows people as she really is and thus offers them the opportunity to see through the deceptive sham luck.
Third book
The starting point of the considerations in the third book is the observation that all human endeavors, however different they are, are ultimately directed towards a single goal, happiness ( beatitudo ). Since nature has planted the desire for this goal in the human mind, everyone searches for it, even if mostly on the wrong track. Philosophy defines happiness as a state of perfection consisting in the union of all goods; it is the highest good that contains all goods. The distinguishing feature of the highest good is that it leaves nothing to be desired. Captivity is also part of its perfection . Whoever has it cannot be withdrawn; thus he is needless, fearless and carefree.
The earthly goods are examined again from the point of view of whether they can help to achieve the goal. Eligible for consideration are wealth, honor, power, fame, amusements, physical virtues, friendships, and family. It turns out that all happiness that such goods produce lacks the defining characteristic that distinguishes happiness. Those who have obtained the desired goods still need more and different things, and they do not relieve people of fear and worry. There are also other disadvantages and inadequacies, which the philosophy describes in detail.
The dialogue has thus reached the point at which the alternative to the sham solutions, the true and perfect happiness as the highest good, can be considered. Their existence is deduced from that of the inadequate goods, for the incomplete and inferior must have its origin in the complete and perfect and not the other way around.
The origin of all things is God. Hence God is necessarily the highest good ( summum bonum ), for nothing can be better than its origin. If there were anything better than God, he would not be his origin, for the better would be superior to him and thus ontologically superior. This would result in an infinite regress .
Now that, in the course of philosophical considerations, both God and happiness have been determined as the highest good, it turns out that there can be no difference between them, for there can only be one highest and absolutely perfect good. To attain happiness is thus to attain God, and through the attainment ( adeptio ) of Godhead man becomes happy. Just as one becomes righteous through the attainment of righteousness and wise through that of wisdom, so through the attainment of bliss and thus of Godhead man becomes divine; “So everyone who is blessed is God” ( Omnis igitur beatus deus ). Since God, as the supreme principle, is a unit, it cannot be a matter of a plurality of gods, but of the deity of happy people through participation ( participatio ) in the one God.
All living beings want to survive by nature, none of them voluntarily pushes for its extinction. Physical survival is based on the union of body and soul and on the interconnectedness of the parts of the body with one another, i.e. on unity, while separation means decay and decline. Thus the survival instinct is a striving for the continuation of unity, and unity is good for the living being. Since God himself as the one is the unity par excellence, the efforts of living beings to preserve their own unity as a good and to avoid annihilation are ultimately an expression of their striving for the highest unity and universal good. Thus it also shows here that everything is directed towards God as the ultimate goal.
Fourth book
The prisoner is convinced of the truth of the instruction he has received so far, but now the question of theodicy arises . He is concerned that the perfectly good God not only allows evil but also makes it flourish and rule, while virtue is not only unrewarded but even punished. How this is possible is incomprehensible to him.
Philosophy explains to him that all people, good and bad alike, have the same goal. They are all looking for happiness. Since - as already shown - bliss is identical with good, everyone strives for good. To get what is good means to become good yourself. Thus only those who are good themselves can achieve the goal. The wicked can only either give up their wickedness or fail in their efforts. Thus the good are powerful and successful, the bad are weak and unsuccessful. Everyone is inevitably given what is due to them: the good has its own reward, just as badness is its own punishment. A bad person even forfeits his humanity and assumes an animal nature, assimilating a certain animal species according to the nature of his vices. If he succeeds in realizing his intentions, then he will only sink even deeper into misery. In this context, philosophy recalls the famous principle from Plato's Dialogue with Gorgias that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice. The injustice inflicted does not make the victim miserable, but the perpetrator. The wickedness of the perpetrator is a mental illness. Hence it is unreasonable to hate him because of it, but he is to be treated like a sick person, and if he is punished the punishment is to be taken as a cure.
The philosophy explains in detail that Divine Providence also uses the inadequate and the bad for good purposes and always takes into account the special circumstances in its dispositions. Nothing happens arbitrarily or for no reason. However, people lack insight into the totality of the complex relationships. Therefore, they can only understand the order of fate to a limited extent. Basically, however, from the argumentation of philosophy one can gain the insight that every fate is entirely good.
Fifth book
In the fifth book the prisoner asks about the role of chance. Philosophy explains to him that “coincidence” is an empty word, since all events are categorized into chains of causes. Only the ignorance of people who do not know the context leads to the belief that something unexpected happened by chance. The prisoner sees this, but now asks whether there could be human free will in this determined world . Philosophy affirms this with the argument that man has by nature the reason with which he can distinguish what is desirable from what is harmful; But this ability only makes sense if it is linked to the freedom to want or not.
On the other hand, the prisoner objects that God looks into the future and knows the future without error. Therefore it is necessary now to know what will happen, including people's intentions and decisions. No future act of will could change that. Thus there is no freedom of human will. But then all evils are also a direct outflow of the divine will, which is incompatible with God's goodness.
Philosophy explains that it is a pseudo-problem that arises from the fact that God's knowledge is wrongly understood as human foreknowledge. You get on the wrong track. Everything that is known is known not according to its own nature, but according to that of the knower. Thus the divine knowledge corresponds to the nature of the divine substance. Let this be characterized by eternity. God's knowledge is not a grasping of the future from the perspective of a present moment in the context of the passage of time; rather, in contrast to human foreknowledge, it is timeless. For God there is no future, only an eternal present. Therefore, future-related terms such as “foreknowledge” and “foresee” are not at all appropriate.
reception
Editions and translations
Critical Editions
- Claudio Moreschini (Ed.): Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae, opuscula theologica. 2nd edition, Saur, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-598-71278-2 .
- Ludwig Bieler (Ed.): Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Philosophiae Consolatio (= Corpus Christianorum , Series Latina. Volume 94). 2nd edition, Brepols, Turnhout 1984, ISBN 978-2-503-00941-4
Non-critical editions and translations
- Ernst Gegenschatz, Olof Gigon (ed.): Boethius: Consolation of Philosophy. Consolatio philosophiae. 6th edition, Artemis & Winkler, Düsseldorf and Zurich 2002, ISBN 3-7608-1662-2 (edition with translation).
- Ernst Neitzke (Ed.): Boethius: Consolation of Philosophy. Insel, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, ISBN 978-3-458-32915-2 (edition with translation).
- Karl Büchner : Boethius: Consolation of Philosophy. Reclam, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 978-3-15-003154-4 (translation only, with an introduction by Friedrich Klingner ; first published in Leipzig 1926).
literature
- Matthias Baltes : God, world, man in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius. In: Matthias Baltes: Dianoemata. Small writings on Plato and Platonism. Teubner, Stuttgart 1999, ISBN 3-519-07672-1 , pp. 51-80.
- Joachim Gruber : Commentary on Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae. 2nd, expanded edition. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2006, ISBN 978-3-11-017740-4 .
- Frank Regen : Praescientia. Foreknowledge of God and free will of man in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius. Duehrkohp & Radicke, Göttingen 2001, ISBN 978-3-89744-163-7 .
- Helga Scheible: The poems in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius. Winter, Heidelberg 1972, ISBN 3-533-02246-3 .
- Volker Schmidt-Kohl: The Neoplatonic theory of the soul in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius. Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1965.
Web links
- Philosophiae consolationis libri quinque in the Bibliotheca Augustana
- Consolatio philosophiae German
- The Consolations of Philosophy , translation by Richard Scheven, 1893
Remarks
- ↑ Bernd Bastert: Continuities of a »Classic«. On the late medieval German reception of the ›Consolatio Philosophiae‹ of Boethius. In: Manfred Eikelmann, Udo Friedrich (eds.): Practices of European tradition formation in the Middle Ages: Knowledge - Literature - Myth , Berlin 2013, pp. 117–140 ( limited preview in the Google book search).
- ^ Charles Henry Coster advocates late dating : Late Roman Studies , Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1968, pp. 66–85; This approach is approved by Catherine Morton: Marius of Avenches, the 'Excerpta Valesiana', and the Death of Boethius . In: Traditio 38, 1982, pp. 107-136 and John Moorhead: Theoderic in Italy , Oxford 1992, pp. 224-226 (hesitantly). See Joachim Gruber: Boethius 1925–1998 . In: Lustrum 39, 1997, pp. 307–383, here: 329. Andreas Goltz presents a detailed argument for early dating: Barbar - König - Tyrann , Berlin 2008, pp. 363–373.
- ↑ On the research opinions see Joachim Gruber: Boethius 1925–1998 (2nd part) . In: Lustrum 40, 1998, pp. 199-259, here: 223f. Reinhold F. Glei pleads for mere house arrest: In carcere et vinculis? Fiction and Reality in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius . In: Würzburger Yearbooks for Classical Studies 22, 1998, pp. 199–213.
- ↑ Reinhold F. Glei: In carcere et vinculis? Fiction and Reality in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius . In: Würzburger Yearbooks for Classical Studies 22, 1998, pp. 199–213, here: 204–206. Joachim Gruber: Boethius 1925–1998 (2nd part) . In: Lustrum 40, 1998, pp. 199-259, here: 224 Glei agrees.
- ↑ Bernhard Pabst: Prosimetrum , Vol. 1, Cologne 1994, pp. 194f.
- ↑ Joachim Gruber: Commentary on Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae , 2nd edition, Berlin / New York 2006, pp. 24-27.
- ↑ An overview of the research opinions is provided by Joachim Gruber: Boethius 1925–1998 (2nd part) . In: Lustrum 40, 1998, pp. 199-259, here: 222f. Cf. Christine Hehle: Boethius in St. Gallen , Tübingen 2002, pp. 33–35.
- ↑ Joachim Gruber: Boethius 1925-1998 (2nd part) . In: Lustrum 40, 1998, pp. 199-259, here: 232-234 (research overview). See Danuta Shanzer: Interpreting the Consolation . In: John Marenbon (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Boethius , Cambridge 2009, pp. 228–254, here: 240–244.
- ↑ Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 3 pr. 10.23-25. See Michael V. Dougherty: The Problem of Humana Natura in the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius . In: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, 2004, pp. 273–292, here: 283–285, 292.
- ↑ Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 4 pr. 7.1-2.
- ^ Paul-Bernd Lüttringhaus: God, freedom and necessity in the Consolatio philosophiae of Boethius . In: Albert Zimmermann (ed.): Studies on medieval intellectual history and its sources , Berlin 1982, pp. 53–101, here: 85–101.