Democratic deficit in the European Union

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The democratic deficit of the European Union is a common catchphrase that says that the European Union is not sufficiently democratically legitimized in its political work . Among other things, the lack of a European nation is pointed out and a “structural democratic deficit” is derived; in addition, deficiencies in the political system of the European Union are criticized and associated with an “institutional democratic deficit”.

On the other hand, the emergence and expansion of the European Union since the beginning after the Second World War have also been characterized by an increasing shift in the balance within the EU institutional structure, which aimed at strengthening democratic legitimacy. This is particularly evident in the changed role of the European Parliament , which has gradually developed from a not directly elected, merely advisory institution to a legislative body with equal rights in almost all areas with the Council of Ministers .

The complex of EU treaties, which is difficult to understand, seems opaque, however. The multitude and confusion of regulations and norms, also of a very special kind, which are issued by the EU organs for the internal market, arouse criticism of the “Brussels bureaucracy” and nurture reservations and opposition to a “Eurocracy” at national and regional level. With the emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity , with the introduction of Union citizenship , with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and with the strengthening of the opportunities for participation of Union citizens, opposing impulses were also set, but their effectiveness in political practice was influenced by the growing EU skepticism in parts of the Union population there are widespread doubts. This is accompanied by an intensification of the EU finality debate .

Aspects of a structural democratic deficit

According to the critics of the structural democratic deficit, the EU would in any case lack elementary democratic legitimation without a unified nation. The diversity of languages ​​and the lack of “European media” do not allow a pan-European political-public discourse . The existing media are mainly geared towards national issues, not only in terms of language, but also in terms of content. Without a Europe-wide public , however, there could be no common identity of a “European nation”. So far, there have only been a few attempts to counter this problem, for example through the Franco-German broadcaster ARTE or euronews . Even the English language as a lingua franca cannot overcome the problem of linguistic diversity, since many people lack the relevant specialist vocabulary to properly pursue or lead political disputes.

Critics of the structural democratic deficit are strongly represented in the ranks of the so-called intergovernmentalists , who want to limit the EU to pure intergovernmental cooperation and reject further powers for the supranational bodies (such as the European Commission and European Parliament ). An important representative of this criticism is z. B. Prof. Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider , who, among other things, was a complainant at the Federal Constitutional Court in 1993 against the Act of Consent to the Maastricht Treaty . In the so-called Maastricht judgment , the Federal Constitutional Court dealt with the question of whether the participation of the Federal Republic in the European Union is compatible with the democratic principle of the Basic Law and dealt with the problem of the lack of a European nation. The ruling introduces the term “association of states ” for the EU and demands, as a prerequisite for Germany's membership, that “legitimation and influence emanating from the people is also secured within an association of states”. In this context, the Federal Constitutional Court denied the existence of a European state people, but did not see this as a necessary condition for the democratic legitimation of the EU: Rather, the EU received legitimation for sovereign tasks via the national parliaments, which represent the national peoples of the individual member states. The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that democratic legitimation within the framework of the EU could not be established in the same way “as within a state system that is uniformly and conclusively regulated by a state constitution”.

The European Parliament was viewed by the Federal Constitutional Court as a representation of the national peoples, "from which, in addition, a democratic support for the policy of the European Union proceeds". From this point of view, the European Union is not a state that is based directly on a European nation, but is nevertheless compatible with the democratic principle of the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court thus rejected the criticism of a structural democratic deficit in the European Union.

Aspects of an institutional democratic deficit

The influence and interaction of the EU institutions is also the subject of criticism. According to this, a democratic deficit lies in the fact that the representation of interests and the political participation of the Union citizens are not sufficiently guaranteed in the existing institutional structure. In the Toussaint report adopted in 1988, the European Parliament defined the “democratic deficit in the European Community” as a combination of two incompatible phenomena: the transfer of powers based on parliamentary decisions by the Member States to the European Communities on the one hand; the exercise of these powers at Community level by institutions other than the European Parliament.

Executive federalism

The main focus of criticism is the EU's Council of Ministers . Along with parliament, this is the second central legislative body of the EU (comparable to a regional chamber ), but consists of members of the respective national governments. This form of executive federalism means that in the Council the separation of powers between the (supranational) legislature and the (national) executive does not take place completely. This made it possible for national governments, with the appropriate majority formation in the Council of Ministers, to be able to introduce laws through the EU without parliamentary control.

However, this is countered by the fact that similar executive federal systems are common in most international organizations and also exist in numerous states (e.g. in Germany with the Bundesrat ). This institutional form does not necessarily represent a “democratic deficit”, especially since it enables decisions to be made more effectively. It is also stated that this would primarily be a question of national implementation: the member states are free to choose who they send to the council and how these representatives are mandated. Denmark, for example, has established a system in which its representatives in the council have to bring about a vote in the national parliament before far-reaching decisions and accordingly first have to have a mandate issued on a case-by-case basis.

Through the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty , the European Parliament has meanwhile been put on an equal footing with the Council in the legislative branch, so that such a “game over gang” on lawmaking without parliamentary participation is no longer possible in most policy areas.

Right of initiative

Another point of criticism is that neither the European Parliament nor the Council currently have a right of initiative for EU laws. According to Art. 294 TFEU, this lies solely with the Commission. This technocratic element of the legislation is intended to ensure that only draft bills that are drawn up by the Commission as an "independent expert" and serve the European common good (and not just the interests of individual, strong states) are voted on. However, this also means that European parties cannot make their election promises directly in parliament as draft bills, but must formally ask the Commission for a corresponding initiative in accordance with Art. 225 TFEU.

In reality, however, this formal rule no longer plays an important role, since normally every legislative request from Parliament or the Council is answered by the Commission. In a binding declaration from 2010, the parliamentarians also agreed with the Commission to provide the applicable European legal provisions with an aid to interpretation, so that in the future, at the initiative of Parliament, the Commission will present a draft law within twelve months or provide a detailed explanation within three months must be why she doesn't do it. Thus, for the first time, the European Parliament has at least a limited right of initiative. In addition, since the Treaty of Lisbon , EU citizens can also initiate a law directly as part of a citizens' initiative ( Art. 11 EU Treaty and Art. 24 TFEU).

Equality of choice

A third central point of criticism is the violation of the principle of equal voting ( one person, one vote ) in European elections . This results from the fact that the seats in the European Parliament are allocated according to the principle of " degressive proportionality ". This means that the number of seats to which each Member State is entitled is generally greater the more inhabitants a country has, but it is not perfectly proportional. Accordingly, small Member States have more MPs per inhabitant than larger countries. The reason for this is ultimately the protection of minorities . In addition, due to the enormously different population sizes, no other distribution of the seats among the countries would realistically be practicable: Even if the smallest member state Malta were to receive only one seat (instead of the 6 basic mandates ) (which in itself would be a violation of basic democratic principles, since the political diversity of the country could no longer be represented in this way) and the remaining seats would then be distributed proportionally to the states, the parliament would already grow to over 1,100 members.

This criticism is also countered by the fact that similar violations of the principle of electoral equality are also accepted in other democratic states. In principle, these always arise from different population sizes in constituencies , such as in France, Great Britain, the USA or Germany. Since this problem is practically impossible to resolve while retaining national delegations in the European Parliament, various alternative systems are proposed for the solution; for example supraregional constituencies of almost the same size up to EU-wide electoral lists.

Possible solutions

Among the critics of an institutional democratic deficit there are two tendencies that reveal opposing goals. On the one hand, these are the advocates of a strong and effective national representation of interests at EU level: the supporters of intergovernmentalism . Opposed to them are the advocates of continued democratization through a strengthening of the European Parliament in the EU institutional structure: the European federalists and the supporters of the “United States of Europe”. To put it simply, one side calls for “less”, the other for “more Europe” to solve the problem.

Supranationality under a democratic sign - complex problem areas

The association of states united in the European Union, which began as a market and economic community and gradually communitized more and more political fields, has been exposed to various tensions since the financial crisis from 2007 onwards . In the debate about the future development of the EU, the questions of the democratic deficit and how to deal with it have again come to the fore. The solution approaches are partly contrary to each other.

Deficit description from an intergovernmentalist point of view

Representatives of intergovernmentalism, who argue with the institutional democratic deficit, mostly accuse the EU of acquiring competencies in policy areas that should be regulated more sensibly at national level according to the principle of subsidiarity . The following criticisms in particular play a role:

  • too extensive regulation through well-intentioned attempts and / or a pursuit of power. An example here is Directive 2000/9 / EG on cable cars for passenger transport , which was passed on March 20, 2000 , according to which flat countries such as Berlin or Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania must also pass laws for cable cars (see, for example, the State Cable Car Act (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania)) ).
  • the "game about bonds" described above, which, according to critics, makes it impossible for national parliaments to effectively control their own government.
  • So-called package resolutions in the Council of Ministers, in which irrelevant topics are summarized and jointly decided. From the point of view of the intergovernmentalist critics, this results in many resolutions that would otherwise not have found a majority. This also contributes to overregulation.
  • the decisions of the European Court of Justice . This is contractually bound to the "realization of an ever closer union". According to the critics, he therefore tends in his judgments to interpret the EU treaties in a centralist manner and to assign more and more responsibilities to the EU.

As a solution to these democracy and subsidiarity problems, the intergovernmentalist side is proposing to remove the council from its function as “subsidiarity watchdog” and to set up four new subsidiarity watchdogs instead. These would be:

  1. A competency catalog that defines the scope of EU responsibilities.
  2. A competence court that decides on measures taken by the Commission, Parliament and also on the judgments of the European Court of Justice. It would be important that the national parliaments were entitled to sue.
  3. A right of repatriation which would enable the member states through the Council to return certain policy areas to national responsibility. (It would already be possible for the member states to bring competences back to the national level, but only through a - relatively laborious - amendment to the EU Treaty .)
  4. The application of the discontinuity principle , according to which legislative procedures would expire after a legislative period .

Deficit description from a federal perspective

The European federalists , who are striving for a European federal state in the long term , demand above all the consistent democratization of the European decision-making and legislative process . It is criticized that the European Parliament still does not have full participation in all political areas. He also lacks the right of initiative in legislation, which lies solely with the Commission , but which is not to be elected by Parliament, but only to be confirmed (or rejected). The European Parliament therefore only has an indirect influence on the work of the Commission.

The parliament is formed according to the principle of falling proportionality - a frequently mentioned point of criticism.

The distribution of seats in the European Parliament, where each member state is entitled to a certain number of seats, is also partly controversial. In accordance with the principle of “ falling proportionality ”, small, poorly populated countries like Malta have proportionally much more MEPs than populous countries like Germany . A representative from Malta represented around 76,000 Europeans until 2009, while a German representative represented 826,000 EU citizens. This disproportionality factor is generally seen as a breach of the principle of equality and thus one of the four principles of a democratic election (general, free, equal, secret).

A lack of accountability of the decisions is also criticized in the EU legislative process. There are many actors involved in the standard-setting process, but at the same time no decision-making center. This leads to a diffusion of responsibility or a system of organized irresponsibility. The prerequisite for democratic legitimation is that the elected representative can be held accountable (by being voted out or recalled).

As a solution to the democratic deficit, from a federalist point of view it would above all be necessary to develop the European Parliament into a fully fledged parliament. This could be done, for example, within the framework of the establishment of a two-chamber system in which the council would act as a representative of national interests, but the parliament would be on an equal footing in all areas of legislation - for example on the model of the relationship between the Bundestag and Bundesrat in Germany. Further demands would be the election of the European Commission by the parliament and the election of the parliament not according to national seat contingents, but with Europe-wide party lists.

New situation after the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty essentially follows the trend that has been evident since the introduction of direct elections to Parliament in 1979 and the co-decision procedure by the EEA in 1987 to gradually strengthen both the competencies of the EU and the democratic elements within the EU. While federalist critics see some of their demands fulfilled, intergovernmentalist critics fear that the existing deficits will become more entrenched. These fears are also seen as one of the reasons for the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005. With regard to the structural EU democracy deficit, the Lisbon Treaty introduced an instrument of direct democracy into the European Union for the first time with the European Citizens' Initiative .

Intergovernmentalist perspective

From an intergovernmental perspective, the Lisbon Treaty threatens further centralization of the EU. The catalog of EU competences listed in the contract is not clear enough; through the “mixed competences” a dynamic acquisition of competences by the EU is possible. The demand for a court of competence was not included in the Lisbon Treaty; the problem of pro-European partiality of the European Court of Justice, seen by intergovernmentalist critics, therefore persists.

The EU's commitment to the principle of subsidiarity , which is included in the treaty, does not go far enough for most intergovernmentalist critics, even if the national parliaments can now defend against violations of the principle of subsidiarity. Another point of criticism is the so-called passerelle regulation , which should make it possible in future to convert unanimous decisions into majority decisions in the Council of Ministers. The national parliaments, however, have a six-month right of objection; however, it is feared that the practical implementation of this right will be difficult.

Finally, it is criticized that, apart from Ireland, no referendum on this essential EU reform has taken place in any EU member state.

Federalist perspective

The lack of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is also a major criticism of the federalists; however, instead of a large number of national referendums, these mostly demanded a joint Europe-wide vote through which the treaty would have to be ratified.

In terms of content, it brings numerous advantages from a federal point of view. The renewed expansion of the powers of the European Parliament is usually seen as decisive. The co-decision procedure (henceforth: “ Ordinary legislative procedure ”) is now being used in more policy areas, in particular in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which was previously organized on a purely intergovernmental basis . In addition, the Lisbon Treaty does away with the distinction between “compulsory” and “non-compulsory” expenditure; Parliament thus has full co-determination rights over the entire EU budget, including agricultural expenditure.

Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty was intended to increase the transparency of decisions in the Council of Ministers: this must now meet in public whenever it takes legislative action. Other federalist demands, such as the right of initiative for the European Parliament, the election of the Commission by the Parliament or the election of the Parliament according to Europe-wide lists in order to overcome the degressive proportionality of the distribution of seats, are not found in the Lisbon Treaty.

View of the Federal Constitutional Court

In its judgment of 30 June 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty ( Lisbon judgment ), the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed and limited the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to integrate into the European Union. On the one hand, it underscores the constitutional mandate to achieve a united Europe (preamble and Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law) and states that, in accordance with this principle of friendliness towards Europe , it is not at the discretion of the constitutional organs to participate in European integration or not. On the other hand, it reaffirms the line already laid out in the Maastricht ruling , according to which the EU is not and should not become a federal state as long as the Basic Law applies and the German people have not legitimized such a step in a constitutional referendum, which alone replaces the constitutional order could be. The Basic Law, however, with its " eternity guarantee" does not permit the surrender of the state principles of democracy, the rule of law, social and federal statehood, as well as the substance of fundamental rights that are indispensable for the respect of human dignity:

“The non-transferable and insofar integration-proof identity of the constitution (Article 79.3 of the Basic Law) corresponds to the obligation under European law to respect the constituent power of the member states as masters of the treaties. The Federal Constitutional Court has to examine, if necessary, within the scope of its jurisdiction whether these principles are observed. "

Even as an association with its own legal personality - as provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon - the European Union remains the work of sovereign states. "With the current level of integration, it is therefore not necessary to design the European institutional system democratically in a state-analogous manner." The prerequisites for a democratic legitimation of the Union's organs that can be derived from the entirety of Union citizens are not given for the time being. The decisive factor for the Federal Constitutional Court is a democratic deficit of the European Parliament, which is perceived as structural:

“In terms of constitutional requirements, even after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the European Union lacks a political decision-making body with the ability to uniformly represent the will of the people through the equal election of all Union citizens. In connection with this, there is also a lack of a system of ruling organization in which a European majority will supports the formation of a government in such a way that it goes back to free and equal electoral decisions and a real and for the citizens transparent competition between government and opposition can arise. Even after the reformulation in Art. 14 para. 2 Lisbon TEU and contrary to the claim that Art. 10 para. 1 TEU Lisbon seems to make according to its wording, the European Parliament is not a representative body of a sovereign European people. This is reflected in the fact that, as the representation of the peoples in the respective assigned national contingents of MPs, it is not designed as a representation of the Union citizens as an indistinguishable unit according to the principle of equal elections.

The degressive proportional representation of the citizens in the European Parliament has even increased somewhat again with the Treaty of Lisbon. According to the Treaty of Nice, Spain and Luxembourg formed the two extremes: In Spain there were 50 seats for every 46 million inhabitants. H. 917,000 inhabitants per seat, in Luxembourg 6 seats per 0.5 million inhabitants, i.e. 82,000 inhabitants per seat (disproportionality factor: 11.2). Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the extreme cases have been Germany (with 96 seats per 82 million inhabitants) and Malta (with 6 seats per 0.4 million inhabitants). A German MP now represents approx. 854,000 residents, a Maltese approx. 67,000 (disproportionality factor of 12.8).

Neither in terms of its composition nor in terms of the European structure of competencies is the European Parliament suitable for making representative and attributable majority decisions as uniform political key decisions. This also applies to the supranational balance of interests between the states. Likewise, under these conditions, the European Parliament could not hold a parliamentary EU government or organize itself politically in the government-opposition scheme in such a way that a directional decision by European voters could have a politically decisive effect.

Since the legitimation of the EU organs and their decisions is therefore mainly derived from the democratic legitimation of the individual national parliaments, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, important decision-making powers must also remain at the national level, for example in the areas of criminal law, monopoly on the use of force, basic fiscal decisions, welfare state structuring of living conditions, School and education system as well as dealing with religious communities. Also with regard to the subsidiarity principle structurally required by Article 23.1 sentence 1 of the Basic Law, it is necessary to limit the transfer and exercise of sovereign rights to the European Union, especially in "central political areas of personal development and social shaping of living conditions ".

The Federal Constitutional Court wants to counteract the fact that the EU organs are gradually expanding their powers. Specifically, reference is made to the extensive interpretation of competencies in the sense of the implied powers doctrine and the effet-utile rule . "The Basic Law does not authorize the German state organs to transfer sovereign rights in such a way that they can independently establish further competencies for the European Union."

At the same time, however, the Federal Constitutional Court also states that the Treaty of Lisbon “is compatible with the requirements of the Basic Law, in particular with the principle of democracy”. Likewise, precisely because the EU does the above. Do not have competencies, do not violate the (same) right to vote from Article 38.1 of the Basic Law. Although, from the point of view of the Federal Constitutional Court, the European Union "at the current level of integration [...] has not yet achieved a design that corresponds to the level of legitimation of a state-based democracy", it is sufficiently democratically legitimized as an association of states :

"With the election [...] of members of the European Parliament [...] an opportunity to participate in the European organ system is opened up, which [...] conveys a sufficient level of legitimation."

- Federal Constitutional Court

Intensified debate in the wake of the phenomena of the EU crisis

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union is exposed to a series of crisis phenomena with the euro crisis , the refugee crisis and the Brexit referendum , which have promoted growing EU skepticism and the rise of right-wing populist trends in the population of the member states. Problems of a democratic deficit in the Union were thereby raised even more, and the debate on this is renewed intense.

Non-contractual self-authorization of crisis management actors

One of the features of the European integration process that was characteristic of the early days is that it is not democratic processes and powers that determine what happens, but the initiatives and actions of a political and technocratic elite of experts. According to Antoine Vauchez, the main responsibility lies with the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), while electoral legitimacy only plays a minor role. Dieter Grimm sees the ECJ as an autonomous engine of integration effects that came about without a recognizable mandate: “According to general practice, the will of the contracting states was decisive for the interpretation of international treaties. Norms restricting sovereignty had to be interpreted narrowly. The ECJ broke with this principle and interpreted the treaties like a state constitution, based on an objective purpose instead of the intentions of the founders. He saw himself neither as the protector of the rights of the contracting states nor as a neutral arbitration body between the states and the community, but as the driving force of the integration program. He was a court with an agenda. "

Gesine Schwan complains that the democratically illegitimate troika made up of the ECB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU Commission imposed a drastic economic program on the elected Greek government in the summer of 2015, against which practically no objection was possible. In the course of the financial and euro crisis, so Hennette and others, a new, democratically illegitimate center of power emerged with the “government of the euro zone”, in which the management levels of the German and French finance ministries, the ECB's board of directors and economic officials exert decisive influence on the EU Commission. There is an urgent need to increase "democratic vigilance" and to strengthen representative democracy in European economic policy. To this end, the authors propose a “treaty to democratize the governance of the euro area”, which includes the creation of a parliamentary assembly of the euro area.

European representation of the people remote from the citizenry

The establishment of a purely parliamentary system of government at EU level would not be suitable for Dieter Grimm to remedy the democratic deficit of the European Union. On its own, it does not have sufficient sustainable legitimation resources, but is dependent on those emanating from the democratic member states: "A parliamentarization based on the state model would cut the flow of legitimation from the member states without being able to replace the gap with sufficient self-legitimation. The distance from the citizens of the Union would increase instead of shrinking. "There must be a" permanent interrelationship between the electorate and the political organs so that the ideas and needs of the public are expressed in Parliament and are included in the political decision-making process of the organs. " In European elections, however, the legitimacy potential that can be achieved is not exhausted, because voting takes place in accordance with national electoral law and under the influence of country-specific election campaign topics, while in the European Parliament other topics are mostly dealt with by the European parliamentary groups. This view in the tenor in the affirmative, it says at Heinrich August Winkler : "The European Parliament may not have the same democratic legitimacy claim for themselves how the Bundestag or the French National Assembly. Consistent parliamentarization of the EU would therefore not contribute to its democratization. "

According to Grimm, only a parliament can be regarded as democratically legitimized if it is “involved in a lively process of forming opinions and expressing interests.” This requires mediating bodies such as parties, associations, citizens' initiatives and communication media. However, the EU still lacks such a social substructure to a large extent and has no prospect of rapid change. For the politicians responsible at the national level, in turn, the dilemma arises from some resolutions at the European level that, as a result of the basic political constellation, they would be held accountable by the population for decisions made by others that they would only have made without their own decision-making - as a result, a contribution to delegitimization of state democracy. “State and European democracy are interrelated, but not in the manner of communicating tubes. The losses of state democracy do not count as gains for European ones. As long as European self-legitimation cannot replace the state's supply of legitimation, the EU must be concerned with it. "

In the interest of transparency , the EU has been running the EU transparency register since 2011 , in which interest representatives who seek contact with commissioners of the European Commission or members of the European Parliament can register. All registered lobbyists commit themselves to a code of conduct. Entered are u. a. Company representatives, consulting firms, law firms, professional associations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, universities, churches and regional or municipal representatives. According to the media, an entry in the transparency register is voluntary: It is a "formal, if not mandatory, requirement to be able to meet a representative of the EU Commission at all". In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker enforced “that all lobbyists who meet with commissioners and MPs must register in a lobby register”. It was critically noted that the proportion of meetings with company representatives clearly outweighed meetings with civil society associations.

A matter of interpretation, principle of subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity laid down in the EU treaties is intended to safeguard decentralized political competencies and opportunities for participation in the European Union, which is made up of member states and various regions . It limits the EU's regulatory competence outside of its defined area of ​​responsibility solely to those areas that “can be better implemented because of their scope or their effects at Union level.” Regulating everything else should be left to political actors at national, regional and local level. For Thomas Schmid , the idea is an important means of securing more approval for the EU among EU citizens: “Even the smallest success in empowering“ lower ”levels could help to restore loyalty to the political system. "

The national parliaments are responsible for checking subsidiarity, and they have the right to initiate a subsidiarity complaint and to bring subsidiarity action if necessary. You can assert these intervention options at the beginning of a European legislative process and thus prevent adoption. If there is a majority of at least 55 percent for the subsidiarity objection in the European Council or Parliament, the Commission must withdraw the project. In fact, a subsidiarity complaint in 2012, which came about with a majority of 68 percent, overturned a regulation affecting, among other things, the right to strike across Europe. Schmid sees it as a "nice side effect" that the national parliaments have to go beyond themselves in order to obtain the necessary majorities at EU level.

Dieter Grimm sees the principle of subsidiarity in practice as ineffective or as a failure. It has been in effect since 1992, "because it has not been possible to win legal content from it." It is a legal policy maxim for the creation of a federal order, but not as a standard for assessing specific conflicts of jurisdiction. "The right of action for national parliaments, which has existed since the Lisbon Treaty, cannot compensate for the vagueness of the content."

For Claus Offe, on the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity is proving to be a major obstacle that stands in the way of a European social security policy. Because of the subsidiarity requirement, the EU does not have the means to operate its own social and distribution policy. The strengthening of macroeconomic demand and the maintenance of social peace in the EU required in the course of the financial and euro crisis, however, made it necessary for EU citizens to meet social demands from EU funds. "This time, these funds would not be dedicated to the rescue of banks and states, but to those of employees, the unemployed, young people, pensioners and other citizens who - individually or as clients of public services - were and are primarily the victims of the crisis."

Ideas for a Europe from below

According to Gesine Schwan , it is not central decision-making institutions that have to be democratically legitimized that are needed for the progress of the European integration process. Rather, it is important to promote practical communication and participation, “in order to voluntarily come to an understanding on the matter and thus ultimately to more easily come to democratically legitimized decisions. In view of the serious power imbalance in the EU and the (economic) political contradictions, democratic legitimacy cannot be enforced centrally. ”The foundations of European economic and financial policy must be made the subject of public debate across borders. The revival and decentralized deepening of EU democracy can be achieved by strengthening the political participation of cities and municipalities. "Here citizens, organized civil society, but also companies can have a say in an area that they oversee and for which they are competent." More direct financial support from the Union, as sought by Eurocities , could help European citizens identify more strongly with the EU.

The signatories of the 2012 appeal by Ulrich Beck and Daniel Cohn-Bendit , We are Europe! Manifesto for the re-establishment of the EU from below . It calls on the politically responsible at the EU level and in the member states to create the framework for a Voluntary European Year , which allows those involved to deal with transnationally significant problem areas and with European cultural life, which is not limited to language and nation. It is about “democratizing the national democracies in a European way and in this way re-establishing Europe.” A project that Emmanuel Macron presented in his Initiative for Europe in September 2017 at the Sorbonne aims in the same direction : “Europe should be that space in which every student speaks at least two European languages ​​by 2024. Instead of complaining about our fragmented areas, we prefer to strengthen the exchange! By 2024, half of an age group should have spent at least six months in another European country by the age of 25. Be it students or trainees. "

Brendan Simms and Benjamin Zeeb emphasize that democratization presupposes a political structure capable of democratization, which is precisely not given with the dysfunctional current system. "A real European civil society that is able to express the majority will of the people of Europe will only be able to develop after the creation of structures that are able to act in their interests." gradual progress, but rather on one of the great leaps that Europe would have often advanced in the past. The various current crisis phenomena and challenges facing the EU, urged action. Simms and Zeeb place their hopes - after a brief phase of intense debate - in “simultaneous referendums in all member states and regions of the Eurozone”, on the basis of which the United States of Europe would be constituted.

Ulrike Guérot and Robert Menasse are the initiators of a project to build a European republic committed to the European community of the res publica . In their “Manifesto for the Establishment of a European Republic” they explain why transnational democracy is to be further developed through a post-national European project, which, by the way, was already anchored in the Treaty of Rome during the time of the first Commission President Walter Hallstein .

The Union as a democratically founded community of values

In addition to the legitimation deficit at the transnational EU level, a democracy problem with regard to the internal development of the member states has recently been discussed. In Hungary, for example, this applies to the attacks on judicial independence and the rule of law, carried out by the Orbán government with a constitution-amending majority, or the interference by the PiS leadership in Poland with the constitutional judiciary and other independent institutions. For Jan-Werner Müller, this raises the question of the extent to which the EU is required to intervene to protect the democracies in the member states.

In view of the mutual dependencies of the Union members on each other, he advocates an active role for the EU in maintaining the structures in the member states. In order to be able to respond earlier and more effectively than before to developments with which democracy and the rule of law are jeopardized, Müller proposes the creation of a special Copenhagen Commission , which routinely reports, if possible, annual reports on the situation regarding the rule of law and democracy - based on the Copenhagener EU admission criteria - submitted for all member states. "The intention of such reports would not be to legitimize criticism of every aspect of national institutions or to realize an ultimately apolitical dream of a completely homogeneous rule of law, but rather to try to bring systematic problems up as quickly as possible." In order to become negatively conspicuous in the absence of reactions To be able to influence Union members effectively, Jan-Werner Müller advocates sanctions up to and including exclusion from the EU. For this, however, the contractual basis would first have to be established.

Heinrich August Winkler sees the European Union in its current constitution in view of the conditions in Hungary and Poland no longer as the community of values ​​that it has always claimed to be. The renewal of the EU must begin with saving its normative basis. To do this, the liberal member states must work together in partnership. In the asylum and refugee policy in 2015/16, much of what was heard from Germany sounded like the attempt to create a German Europe, at least in this area. After Emmanuel Macron's electoral success in May 2017, agreements with France were "at a higher level and more comprehensive" than previously possible. If both countries proceeded constructively, liberal democracies from Finland to the Netherlands and the Baltic states would join. “A normative core Europe would not have to result in a new east-west divide in the old continent. But such a core is needed if the Europe project is not to fail. "

literature

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  • Stéphanie Hennette, Thomas Piketty , Guillaume Sacriste, Antoine Vauchez: For another Europe. Treaty to Democratize the Eurozone. Munich 2017.
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  • Florian Sander: Representation and distribution of competencies. The multi-level association's system of forms of action as an expression of a legitimacy-oriented balance of competencies between the European Union and its member states. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2005, ISBN 978-3-428-11515-0 . (Hamburg Studies on European and International Law, 38)
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Web links

Remarks

  1. ^ Johannes Pollak: Representation without democracy. Springer, Vienna 2007, p. 22. ISBN 978-3-211-69915-7
  2. ↑ More on this, Democratic Legitimation of the Activities of International Organizations (PDF; 899 kB) , p. 11 f. with further evidence.
  3. ↑ a b Reinhold Zippelius , Allgemeine Staatslehre, 16th edition, § 40 V 2
  4. ^ Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on October 12, 1993: BVerfGE 89, 155 ( Memento of July 3, 2006 in the Internet Archive )
  5. ^ Ines Härtel: Handbook of European Law-making . Springer Science & Business Media, 2006, ISBN 978-3-540-30664-1 ( google.de [accessed on June 23, 2016]).
  6. ↑ EU Parliament gets more power , EurActiv.de, January 28, 2010.
  7. ↑ Art. 1 and Art. 5 Treaty on European Union
  8. ↑ Melanie Piepenschneider: Contractual bases and decision-making procedures ( Memento of May 2, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) , in: Information on political education (Issue 279), bpb , 2005, p. 23.
  9. ↑ From the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon : "In view of the continued validity of the principle of limited individual authorization and a literal, meaningful and appropriate interpretation of the powers newly granted by the Lisbon Treaty, the composition of the European Parliament does not have to be in the Be equitable in such a way that differences in the voting weight of Union citizens depending on the population of the member states are dispensed with. "(BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of June 30, 2009, Rn. 279 ff. [1] )
  10. ^ Frank R. Pfetsch, The European Union - History, Institutions, Processes, Munich 1997, p. 254.
  11. ↑ “The authorization for European integration allows a different form of political will formation than the Basic Law determines for the German constitutional order. This applies up to the limit of the unavailable constitutional identity (Art. 79 Para. 3 GG) ”. BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., Rn 219.
  12. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., marginal number 225.
  13. ↑ BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of June 30, 2009, Rn. 179: "According to the Basic Law, those entitled to vote have the right to decide 'freely' about the change of identity of the Federal Republic of Germany, as would be effected by transforming it into a member state of a European federal state, and the associated replacement of the Basic Law. […] Art. 146 GG confirms the pre-constitutional right to give oneself a constitution from which the constitutional authority arises and to which it is bound. [...] It is only the constitutional power that is entitled to release the state constituted by the Basic Law, but not the constitutional power. "
  14. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., Rn 217.
  15. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. loc. cit., Rn 235.
  16. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. loc. cit., para. 278.
  17. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., Rn 280.
  18. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., Rn 251 f.
  19. ↑ BVerfG, judgment of June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 u. a., Rn 233.
  20. ^ Antoine Vauchez: The government of the »independents«: considerations for the democratization of the EU. In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 182.
  21. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 12.
  22. ^ Gesine Schwan: New forms of governance as an extension of European democracy. In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 149.
  23. ↑ Hennette et al. 2017, pp. 10–12.
  24. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 8.
  25. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 24 f.
  26. ^ A b Heinrich August Winkler: Without values, Europe is nothing. Farewell to an illusion: only the liberal democracies can save the European project. In: Die Zeit , November 30, 2017, p. 8.
  27. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 92.
  28. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 94.
  29. ↑ How the EU strives for transparency. In: tagesschau.de. April 29, 2019, accessed February 2, 2020 .
  30. ↑ In Brussels, the chemical industry is lobbying in particular. In: The time. April 29, 2019, accessed February 2, 2020 .
  31. ↑ Art. 5, Paragraph 3 of the EU Treaty
  32. ↑ Thomas Schmid: Europe is dead, long live Europe! A world power has to reinvent itself . Munich 2016, p. 228.
  33. ↑ Thomas Schmid: Europe is dead, long live Europe! A world power has to reinvent itself . Munich 2016, p. 230.
  34. ↑ Grimm 2016, p. 23.
  35. ↑ Claus Offe: Europe in the trap. Berlin 2016, pp. 176–180.
  36. ^ Gesine Schwan: New forms of governance as an extension of European democracy. In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 155.
  37. ^ Gesine Schwan: New forms of governance as an extension of European democracy. In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 160.
  38. ^ Wording of the manifesto , in: Zeit Online of June 12, 2012, accessed on January 11, 2018.
  39. ^ Translation of the speech in full, p. 15
  40. ↑ Brendan Simms , Benjamin Zeeb: Europa am Abgrund. A plea for the United States of Europe. Munich 2016, p. 103, quotation p. 122.
  41. ↑ Brendan Simms , Benjamin Zeeb: Europa am Abgrund. A plea for the United States of Europe. Munich 2016, p. 100 and p. 128. "If we do not seize the opportunity now to prevent our continent from falling into the political abyss, we will not get another opportunity to do so." (Ibid. P. 130)
  42. ↑ Brendan Simms , Benjamin Zeeb: Europa am Abgrund. A plea for the United States of Europe. Munich 2016, pp. 126–128, quoted on p. 104.
  43. ↑ [2] europa.blog: The Proclamation of a European Republic: The European Balcony Project
  44. ↑ [3] Manifesto for the establishment of a European Republic by Ulrike Guérot and Robert Menasse
  45. ↑ [4] The end of the nation states - ways out of the crisis Law Faculty of the Humboldt University in Berlin
  46. ↑ Jan-Werner Müller: Europe's other democracy problem, or: Is Brussels the guardian of democracy in the member states? In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (eds.) 2017, p. 133.
  47. ↑ Jan-Werner Müller: Europe's other democracy problem, or: Is Brussels the guardian of democracy in the member states? In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 143 f.
  48. ↑ Jan-Werner Müller: Europe's other democracy problem, or: Is Brussels the guardian of democracy in the member states? In: Jürgen Rüttgers / Frank Decker (Ed.) 2017, p. 145 f.
  49. ↑ Macron said in his Initiative for Europe on September 26, 2017: “First and foremost, I propose a new partnership to Germany. We will not always agree on all things, or not always immediately, but we will talk about everything. To those who say it is an impossible task, I answer: You have got used to giving up, I haven't. To those who say it's too hard, I answer: Think of Robert Schuman, only five years after a war, the blood barely dried. We can give decisive and concrete Franco-German impulses on all of these topics that I have touched on. ”( Full text translation of the speech, p. 21 )
  50. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: Without values, Europe is nothing. Farewell to an illusion: only the liberal democracies can save the European project. In: Die Zeit , November 30, 2017, p. 9.