Eurotrain (joint venture)

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Eurotrain was a joint venture between GEC-Alsthom and Siemens for the marketing of high-speed trains and routes on non-European markets.

The company was founded in 1996 and later, after the failure of several joint projects, dissolved.

history

The company was founded in March 1996 by Siemens and GEC-Alsthom. Both groups each sent a representative to the management of the new company. The company was seen more as a marketing company than a comprehensive operation; the operative business continued to be managed from the offices of the two partners. There should also be no joint production or technology exchange. GEC-Alsthom's share in the joint subsidiary was 60 percent, and Siemens 40 percent

In the future, interested parties should be able to combine trains from ICE and TGV components as they wish. The sales cooperation focused on the Asian market and did not apply to Europe and North America, where both train systems remained in competition. The projects for which an application was sought included the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail in Taiwan and a high-speed line between Beijing and Shanghai .

A key goal of the cooperation was also to improve margins in a highly competitive market. When GEC-Alsthom prevailed against a Siemens offer in Korea in 1993 , with a total order volume of around 13 billion euros, the Siemens CEO von Pierer later (1995) spoke of a competition that "if at all possible will not repeat itself" should.

Application in Taiwan

Initial success

After many years of research, the Bureau of High Speed ​​Rail (BOHSR), an authority subordinate to the Taiwanese Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (MOTC), launched the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail project in October 1997 , a 345 km long new line between the Taiwanese capital Taipei and the Port city of Kaohsiung , tendered as a concession based on the Build Operate Transfer - Operator Model (BOT). In addition to the construction (around five years of construction), the operation of the line should be guaranteed for over 30 years. Then, after around 35 years, the project should become the property of the state.

In August 1997 there were offers from two applicants: the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Consortium (THSRC), a consortium made up of five Taiwanese companies and the Evergreen Group, which Eurotrain selected as its technology partner; and the Chungwa High Speed ​​Rail Consortium (CHSRC), which has allied itself with the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium (TSC), the Japanese Shinkansen technology provider led by the Mitsui Group . The offer of THSRC stood at 11.77 billion US dollars far below the 18.48 billion of CHSRC. THSRC also pledged to carry out the project at no net cost to the state and to use 10% of its revenues to fund local transportation systems. Although the competitor was favored politically, THSRC was declared the “preferred provider” on September 25, 1997 “because of the significantly better financing proposals” and began to negotiate the concession agreement with BOHSR. In May 1998 the consortium changed its legal form to a stock corporation, and was called Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Corporation (with the same abbreviation); In the course of the realignment, THSRC gave its technology partner Eurotrain the status of “sponsor”.

The BOT concession included the construction of the line and its operation for 35 years. The European partners accounted for the construction of the track, the electrical systems and the trains for around four billion dollars. As trains, THSRC favored a mixture of Siemens power cars for 300 km / h and double-deck intermediate cars from GEC-Alsthom. a. a German Re 330 overhead contact line and the LZB train protection system were to be received, while the interlocking technology was to be supplied from the French side.

Eurotrain's train concept consisted of two power cars derived from those of the ICE 2 , as well as twelve intermediate cars with Jacobs bogies, which were based on the intermediate cars of the TGV Duplex , with a total length of 271.8 m. 190 seats in the first and 670 seats in the second class were provided for each train. In addition, a dining car as well as telephone and fax facilities should be offered. Around 70 Eurotrain multiple units should be required for the planned operating concept (train headways of up to three minutes).

During the negotiations, THSRC and Eurotrain organized a presentation trip with a test train specially put together for the occasion in order to convince BOHSR of the technical feasibility of the ICE-TGV hybrid train (see # Presentation trip in Germany ).

The ICE accident in Eschede on June 3, 1998 had not reduced the chances of THSRC (and thus those of Eurotrain) for the final contract: although the BOHSR expected detailed information from Germany about the causes of the accident, the authorities recognized that this A special type of bike with broken tires on the Eschede train is not used on the Eurotrain. The government and the THSRC finally signed the concession agreement on July 23, 1998.

Presentation trip in Germany

For demonstration purposes, a train made up of ICE-2 power cars and a TGV duplex intermediate car ran temporarily in 1998 . Here: in mid-April 1998 in Munich.

On May 4th, 1998 the Eurotrain test train was officially presented in Göttingen . On the same day, the Eurotrain reached a speed of 316 km / h on the Hanover – Würzburg high-speed line between Hanover and Göttingen (north of Orxhausen ). The presentation run with the provisionally assembled train should precede the signing of the contract for the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Project . The journey took place under a green wave , which led to timetable changes in regular traffic.

The train consisted of the ICE 2 powered end cars 402 042-6 and 402 046-7 and eight intermediate cars of the TGV set 224. The 200 m long train received some technical changes. Since both power cars could not run with the pantograph raised due to their short length, the power cars were connected to each other via the high-voltage roof line of the TGV power cars. Two fiber-optic cables and two 110-volt cables to connect the power cars were newly installed on the roof . A rectifier was installed in an intermediate car to feed the TGV intermediate car (550 V direct current ) from the power cars ( 1000 V alternating current ) . The central buffer couplings of the power cars were replaced by an adapter coupling so that they could be coupled with the TGV cars, which had a push-and-pull device according to the UIC standard. The brakes of the intermediate cars were controlled purely pneumatically, without the electropneumatics (ep) common on the ICE.

For the presentation run, the power cars were transferred to the Siemens plant in Krefeld - Uerdingen on March 9, in order to receive mechanical adjustments for the TGV carriages at the rear. On April 2, the wagon association was transferred to the Munich- West railway depot . This had previously received the additional rectifier at the GEC Alsthom plant in La Rochelle . In Munich, the cars were combined with the ICE powered end cars that had already arrived in Munich on March 27th. After the train was put together, the train was covered with a new design over several days. After static tests, the train set off for test drives on April 9, 1998 for the first time. The train was then equipped with monitoring equipment. On April 25, 1998, at 7:30 a.m., the train left Munich and drove via Ansbach to Würzburg, where it was transferred at 250 km / h via the high-speed line and finally to Minden . On April 27, high-speed rides began at speeds between 250 and 280 km / h. On April 28, 310 km / h were reached. On April 29, further test drives at 300 and 310 km / h followed. Pressure measurements on the train (comfort aspects) and noise measurements on the route were also taken. On May 3, the train was transferred to Hamburg, where it was presented to 100 invited guests from politics and business as well as 100 media representatives as part of a dinner. On May 4th, after various speeches, the train started from Göttingen station to Hanover.

According to media reports, the Taiwanese delegation traveled on to France after the presentation trip, where they were invited to order the trains entirely in France.

Leave the project

As a result of the Asian crisis, the concessionaire THSRC had difficulties putting together the financing of the project. In May 1999, the Japanese government promised to grant the consortium discounted loans if it switched to Shinkansen technology in return. The president of the defeated CHSRC consortium, which was a main sponsor of the ruling Kuomintang party , also promised help. THSRC announced in the same month that the choice of technology supplier was open, and on June 15, 1999, it officially started the new tender. Both Eurotrain and TSC submitted offers.

To offset the supposed financial advantages of TSC's offer, Eurotrain offered in September 1999 to buy a 10 percent stake in THSRC. (In the following year TSC also signed a contract for the purchase of 10 percent of the shares.) The applicants were also politically supported: the above-mentioned intervention by the Japanese government was countered by a letter from the European Union's trade commission . A visit by France's transport minister was only canceled because of the frigate scandal, which led to suspicions that Eurotrain also had connections to the interest group at the center of the scandal. However, shortly before the decision was made, both France and Germany planned further visits at ministerial level.

After the two applicants had submitted their final bids on December 3, 1999, THSRC surprisingly announced on December 28 that they wanted to negotiate the final contract with the Japanese TSC consortium instead of the Eurotrain consortium. According to a spokesman for the operator, a comparison of the offers showed that the Shinkansen technology was superior to the European solution in terms of technology, price, financing and maintenance. The Japanese consortium would have presented more flexible maintenance concepts. Japanese banks announced that they would support the project with a loan for the route and the necessary trains amounting to the equivalent of DM 5.6 billion. THSRC has also highlighted the role of expected exchange rate fluctuations, noting that TSC have offered a newer Shinkansen than previously in CHSRC's unsuccessful concession bid.

According to reports in the Taiwanese and German media, the motives behind the change of course were primarily political: the choice of the technology provider was intended to pave the way for an official trip to Japan by the then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui . THSRC has rejected these reports. However, the media recalled that Lee - in a book published in May 1999 - campaigned for Japanese technology: He wrote of a small price advantage of the Eurotrain, but in terms of safety it is reminiscent of the Eschede accident and in terms of political considerations the hopes of support for Taiwan by the Japanese government.

Litigation

Eurotrain understood the clauses of its agreement with the legal predecessor of the operating company THSRC from 1997, in which Eurotrain is named as the preferred provider, as a binding contract, which has now been violated by the THSRC, which is why Eurotrain has filed an action against the decision in the Taiwanese courts. Siemens boss Heinrich von Pierer also asked President Lee Teng-hui to intervene in the matter, but this was rejected. Meanwhile, the trade representatives of Germany, France and Great Britain visited the president of THSRC to ask them about the award.

Eurotrain's lawsuit against the award was rejected in the first instance at the beginning of February 2000. The court emphasized that the plaintiff consortium had not been able to provide sufficient facts for the intended interim injunction . The appeal to the Taiwan Supreme Court also failed in June of the same year. After lengthy negotiations, THSRC and TSC finally signed the contract for the delivery of the technology on December 12, 2000.

As part of a civil suit brought before the International Court of Arbitration in Singapore in March 2001, the two consortium companies demanded compensation of DM 1.7 billion for the lost order. THSRC, as the defendant, again insisted that the decision was purely business, with only "price, financial planning and maintenance" making the difference. After a lengthy arbitration process, the court ruled in March 2004 for compensation payments in the millions: US $ 32.4 million for Eurotrain's development expenses, and an additional US $ 35.7 million for unjust enrichment. In November 2004, THSRC finally agreed to pay Eurotrain $ 65 million (with interest of $ 89 million).

aftermath

A French trainer and a train driver explain and show a group of Taiwanese trainees the coupling process in September 2006.

Despite being awarded to the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium , THSRC insisted on the use of some European standards, technologies and specialists that emerged from the cooperation with Eurotrain, so that in the end a mixture of Japanese, German and French technology emerged.

  • The larger tunnel cross-section required by THSRC compared to the Shinkansen with escape routes on both sides, as well as the stronger bridges compared to the Shinkansen, corresponded to European standards.
  • THSRC has also stipulated European standards for the part of the track superstructure built by the Japanese track builders.
  • The THSRC operating plan concept provided for track-changing operations based on the European model, in contrast to the strict facility operation on the Shinkansen, which forced TSC to design a new train protection system.
  • Rail One from Germany supplied switches with a moving core on a firm track for higher speeds for the track-changing operation again .
  • Moxa, the Taiwanese supplier of the system integrated with the communication system for monitoring the environment and the systems and for controlling the latter ( Environmental Control System ), relied on Siemens components. In July 2010, after unsuccessful attempts to solve a persistent problem with the turnout motion sensors, THSRC reached out to Siemens to find the basic problem.
  • THSRC sent its Japanese trains into regular service with 40 French and 13 German drivers. The plan was to replace them with newly trained local train drivers in 18 months.

Other projects, the end

The idea was to offer Eurotrain technology for the 1,300 km high-speed Beijing – Shanghai line . However, that did not materialize.

After a meeting between the newly appointed DB boss Hartmut Mehdorn and SNCF boss Louis Gallois on December 17, 1999, both called on the European rail industry to develop a joint high-speed train in order to save costs. The spokesman for DB referred to the German-French joint project Eurotrain and asked, "Why shouldn't it be possible in Europe what is already practiced in Asia?"

The proposal, referred to in the media as “Euro-Train”, was initiated as a joint project between European state railways and manufacturers, with the latter only remaining with Eurotrain partners Alstom and Siemens after September 2000. The project was officially named Highspeed Train Europe (HTE) and Italy’s FS was won as an additional rail operator partner. After evaluating 10,000 detailed questions, there were 500 left in which the partners were unable to find a compromise, which is why the HTE project was put on hold in September 2009.

The Eurotrain joint venture, which was not already directly involved in HTE, was also dissolved.

Individual evidence

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  2. ↑ a b c Shinkansen in front of Eurotrain. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. No. 26, 2000, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 26.
  3. ↑ a b 台湾 高速 鉄 道 プ ロ ジ ェ ク ト ／ 日本 連 合 受 注 経 緯. (No longer available online.) Nippon Export and Investment Insurance , May 2003, archived from the original on April 29, 2008 ; Retrieved October 9, 2010 (Japanese).
  4. ↑ a b c d e f g »Eurotrain« drives 316 km / h. In: Railway courier . June 1998, ISSN  0170-5288 , p. 6 f.
  5. ↑ a b c Low bidder gets nod on high-speed rail. (No longer available online.) In: Taiwan Journal. October 3, 1997, formerly in the original ; Retrieved October 9, 2010 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw
  6. ↑ a b c The Euro-Train wins an express train race for the first time in Asia. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. No. 229, 1997, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 25.
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