Eschede railway accident

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The Eschede railway accident occurred on June 3, 1998 on the Hanover – Hamburg line at kilometer 61 in the municipality of Eschede ( Lower Saxony ). As a result of the derailment of the ICE  884 " Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen " 101 people were killed and 88 were seriously injured. It is the worst railway accident in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany and of all high-speed trains worldwide.

Accident site in Eschede
Memorial at the accident site

Chronology of the accident

Course of the accident

On Wednesday, June 3, 1998, the ICE  884 "Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen" (multiple unit 151 of the ICE 1 ) was traveling from Munich to Hamburg at route kilometer 55.1, about six kilometers before the Location Eschede, when at 10:57:28 a tire broke on a wheel of the third axle of the first car after the power car (passenger car 1) due to material fatigue. The chipped tire unwound, bored through the floor of a compartment between two seats in this car, and got stuck there.

After the accident, a notch about 20 cm long and 4 cm deep in a threshold was discovered around six kilometers from the scene of the accident at route kilometer 55.1, and the line conductor had torn at kilometer 55.2 . Significant damage to the concrete sleepers was recorded from km 56.4.

When the train drove at 10:59:01 a.m., about 200 meters from a road bridge on the outskirts of Eschede, over the first of two successive points (point 2) in the south head of Eschede station, the wheel tire still stuck in the floor of the train rolled over 10:59:06 against a wheel guide of the switch and tore it from the sleepers; He too bored his way through the floor of the train, shot up into the ceiling in the anteroom (in the door area) and in doing so lifted the axle body from the tracks . One of the derailed wheels hit the switch tongue of the second switch (switch 3, km 60.591) and switched it over so that the rear axles of car 3 were steered onto the track branching off to the right in the direction of travel. The laterally deflected car could not hold itself on the turnout radius, which was designed for much lower speeds, and threw its end over the siding and against the pillars of the flyover of Kreisstraße 20, which collapsed as a result; two railroad workers standing under the bridge were killed. Car 4, which had also derailed due to the sudden veering of car 3 at 200 km / h, still crossed undamaged the collapsing bridge, but fell sideways to the right down an embankment and came to rest in front of a group of trees. When the main air line ruptured and the resulting loss of compressed air in the braking system, the automatic brakes responded and the largely undamaged wagons 1 and 2 and wagon 3, which was severely damaged at its end, remained on the track a few hundred meters behind the bridge in the direction of Eschede station .

With the train separation, an electrical safety loop responded, which initiated an emergency braking of the car and the trailing power car within half a second and lowered the pantograph of the trailing power end. The front powered end car braked independently from 10:59:21 to 11:00:32 from a speed of around 170 km / h to zero. When the dispatcher at Eschede station, who was stationed around 600 m from the scene of the accident, noticed the power car driving alone, he stopped the station's signals .

The approximately 200-ton bridge collapsed over the second half of the fifth car and damaged the rear of the car. The sixth car was buried under the rubble. The following wagons zigzagged together in a narrow space, about the length of a single wagon. Cars 6, 7, the service car, the dining car (on-board restaurant) , which was hit by the falling rubble of the bridge and partially squeezed to a height of approx. 15 cm, and the three first class cars 10 to 12 were badly damaged; the rear drive head also derailed and pulled into the Trümmerberg on.

The rear power car 401 551 after it was retired from the Nuremberg AW

A DB VW Golf III Variant was also found in the rubble, which was standing on the bridge before the accident and fell into the wreckage with it. It was parked there by the two DB signal technicians who were killed in the accident. Media reports from the same evening that the car had fallen from the bridge and thus triggered the accident turned out to be untenable after the examination of the front powered end car, as it showed no signs of such a collision.

The front powered end car stopped two kilometers behind the Eschede station building due to automatic braking. The driver , who was slightly injured in the accident, later stated in court that he only felt a sudden jolt in front of Eschede and noticed a drop in performance. After the standstill, he initially assumed a technical defect and tried in vain from the driver's cab to restore the power supply that had failed. He only found out about the accident from the dispatcher at Eschede station, who informed him by radio that the powered end car had passed without a car.

A train in the opposite direction (from Hamburg in the direction of Hanover ) had passed the scene of the accident less than two minutes earlier. The ICE 787 “Karl Adam” drove through Eschede one minute ahead of schedule on June 3rd; the ICE "Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen", on the other hand, was one minute late - actually the trains should have met here at the symmetry minute 10:57.

Start of rescue operations

At exactly eleven o'clock the first emergency call on 110 reached the police. At that point it was unclear what had happened. At 11:02 and 11:03, the police passed on the report of a "train accident in Eschede". At the same time, the first emergency calls to the fire and rescue services followed . The first helpers at the scene of the accident were the residents of the nearby housing estate, alarmed by the noise of the accident.

At 11:03 a.m., a full alarm was triggered by a siren in Eschede . The Rescue Coordination Center of the Red Cross replied at 11:06 PM the medical service Celle and the emergency services of the neighboring counties Hannover , Gifhorn and Uelzen in alarm condition.

The first fire engine to arrive at the scene of the accident was an emergency vehicle from the Eschede fire brigade , which acts as a base fire brigade . From the first situation report from the community fire chief at 11:08 a.m. it became clear that an ICE was affected and a bridge had collapsed. On the way to the scene of the accident, the district fire supervisor arranged for all seven rescue vehicles to be deployed in the Celle district. At the same time, two rescue helicopters from Celle and Hanover and a helicopter squadron of the Army Aviation Troops were requested from the Faßberg military airfield . After the feedback from the first emergency services to arrive on site, the rescue control center in Celle assumed a mass casualty and triggered a major alarm. The control center, which was manned by only one person, asked the surrounding control centers for support; So the Hanover control center took over the dispatching of the rescue helicopter. Residents led light and uninjured people down from the embankment, while others brought blankets and sheets.

At 11:18 a.m., Deutsche Bahn confirmed that the contact line had been switched off . A transport stop for injured persons was imposed at 11:25 a.m. This was to ensure that seriously injured people could be removed first. Since employees accidentally overheard the radio traffic, the state fire brigade school in Celle also sent professional fire fighters trained in emergency medicine to the accident site at 11:42 a.m. At 11:45 a.m., the construction of the operations management began , at 11:56 a.m., the Hanover Fire Brigade was called in .

Tents were set up for the injured, and the slightly injured were looked after in a gym around 300 meters away. In the first hour after the accident, more than 50 doctors arrived at the scene of the accident. At 12:05 p.m., the first injured person was taken away in one of the rescue helicopters . A Bundeswehr relay helicopter coordinated the arrivals and departures.

Starting at 12:15 p.m., staging rooms for emergency forces who were advancing were set up along the federal road 191 . Deutsche Bahn offered to send the tunnel rescue train from Hildesheim . At 12:25 p.m., the technical operations control (TEL) with the two sections east and west was put into operation. At 12:30 p.m., the district director triggered a disaster alarm. At around 1 p.m. it was clear that there were enough rescue personnel on site. All injured people discovered up to that point were rescued and first aid was provided at this point.

After 1 p.m., three armored recovery vehicles from the Bundeswehr arrived, which later pulled the rubble apart, and a 40-tonne crane from the Hanover professional fire brigade. At 1:45 p.m., the control center announced that there were no more injured people to be treated. The assembly and first aid station for the injured was then closed and converted into a collection point for fatalities. The recovery of the corpses began. The first helicopters were withdrawn shortly after 2 p.m.

At around 3 p.m. it was clear that a total of 87 injured had been cared for and taken to clinics. The disaster alarm was lifted at 3:15 p.m. As a result, a large part of the volunteer fire and rescue services in the neighboring districts were withdrawn. At 3:30 p.m. there was a first briefing with all section heads. Preparations then began to demolish the first parts of the collapsed bridge, under which three wagons had been buried. 78 bodies had been recovered by midnight. The prosecution ordered that each body be autopsied .

Most of the victims died instantly due to the abrupt deceleration from 200 km / h to zero, which roughly corresponded to an unchecked fall from a height of 160 meters.

Crisis intervention teams were set up to look after the helpers .

The further development

At a first press conference at 6 p.m., 100 deaths were expected. On the same evening, numerous relatives who were looked after in a nearby hall arrived; Cranes began clearing away the debris. In the light of searchlights, the rescue work continued throughout the night.

Around 7:30 p.m., the first corpses arrived at the forensic medicine department of the Hannover Medical School for identification. The autopsy began the following day .

On June 4th, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Lower Saxony's Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder came to the scene of the accident. In the evening there was an ecumenical service with Bishops Horst Hirschler and Josef Homeyer . 93 dead were recovered in the evening. Initial indications indicated a broken wheel tire as the cause of the accident.

By June 5, 98 dead had been recovered. On June 6th, the sand of the embankment was sifted because parts of the train had bored into the earth. The tracks on the line had largely been restored by this time. At 06:42 a.m., the fire brigade handed over the site to the police. On the same day, the forensic investigation on the track was ended.

On June 8, Federal President Roman Herzog set June 21 as the date for the central memorial service. The route was released on June 9; an Interregio was the first train to pass the scene of the accident at 17:35. On the same day, low loaders transported the first ICE wagon to RWTH Aachen University , where research into the cause was continued.

One week after the accident, on June 10, the death toll had risen to 99. Two other people died of serious injuries later in the hospital. On June 21, the central funeral service for the victims of the accident took place in the town church in Celle . In his speech, Federal President Herzog thanked the numerous helpers in particular; Top politicians laid wreaths at the accident site. More than 2,000 people attended the central funeral service, including Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Schröder.

Course of the rescue

Most of the survivors were in the first three cars, which were able to pass the bridge undamaged and were braked comparatively gently after it derailed. The hardest part was recovering the bodies from the dining car and a first- class car that had been squeezed under the bridge.

The conditions of the rescue were considered to be extremely good: With good weather and sufficient light as well as free access to the accident site, rescue workers could be brought in and the injured could be brought away in a short time. All seriously injured people who could be reached could be transported away within an hour and a half. There were 24 helicopters in action (other source: 39 helicopters), 60 doctors and over 150 non-medical rescue workers. The difficulties encountered during the rescue included the sometimes difficult identification of those responsible, insufficient radio capacities and overloaded cellular networks. Critics also criticized deficits in forensic evidence.

In the first operational phase, both the BOS radio of the aid organizations and the commercial mobile radio networks ( D1, D2 and C network ) were completely overloaded. Communication was not possible with one another or with the outside world. Field cable construction and the disconnection of cell phones, which were in vain looking for a network anyway, made it possible to solve the problems as the deployment progressed.

With the activation of the GAST / EPIC at Munich Airport, a central information and missing person point was operated under a single telephone number away from the disaster site.

Around 1900 helpers from the rescue service , fire brigade , technical aid organization , police and armed forces as well as around 500 fire brigade forces with around 100 vehicles were on duty. The rescue service was 274 rescue specialists, 19 helicopters, 42 health and 46 ambulances involved. The Bundeswehr was represented with 190 soldiers, 3 armored recovery vehicles, 3 Transall transport aircraft and 18 helicopters. 40 doctors and 39 emergency doctors as well as 268 employees of the non-medical rescue service were also involved in the rescue. A total of 17 fire brigades from the Celle district and 10 from neighboring districts were in action. In addition, forces from the state fire brigade school in Celle, the plant fire brigade of the Rheinmetall Unterlüß site, the Bergen training area fire brigade and two railway fire departments were involved. British soldiers stationed nearby also went out to provide assistance.

Situation of victims and identification

The train crew was down to a train conductor and the driver killed in the accident. The ICE was only around 44% full.

Total number of passengers:
(ICE 1: max. 651) 		287
Deceased:
(including train crew and two line workers) 		101
Seriously injured: 088
Light and uninjured persons: 106

96 dead were rescued from the rubble, 5 people later died of serious injuries in hospital. There were 12 children among the dead. Of the 18 surviving children, 6 lost their mother. Most of the fatalities lost their lives immediately at the moment of the accident. The most common injuries included traumatic brain injuries , internal bleeding and multiple fractures . The majority died of a combination of several injuries ( multiple trauma ) by the from the abrupt delay released high kinetic energy caused ( Rasanztrauma ). Many people were crushed by being pushed together . A traumatic brain injury was found to be the cause of death in 67 of the 96 autopsied victims.

Identifying the dead proved difficult. In contrast to air traffic, there was no passenger list and many victims had no papers with them; in one case false papers were found. Another problem was the condition of the bodies. Although four teams worked almost around the clock on the assignment of the body parts, only 19 of the 98 people who had died by then could be identified by the weekend (three days after the accident). Hans Dieter Tröger , then head of the Institute for Forensic Medicine at the Hannover Medical School (MHH), said that he and his team were only able to take “reasonably presentable photos” in 15 percent of the cases. Among the most common causes of death determined include ruptures (cracks) the main artery , the cerebral arteries and abdominal organs and massive chest -Injuries to complete the body destruction. The victims were identified by employees of the MHH and employees of the identification commission of the Federal Criminal Police Office . It was completed in a week and a half. A total of 96 of the 101 dead could be identified. With one exception, no relatives were used for identification.

Root cause research

On the part of the Federal Railway Authority , Hans-Heinrich Grauf led the investigation into the accident. On June 17, the then Transport Minister Matthias Wissmann reported to the Transport Committee of the German Bundestag on the preliminary results of this investigation.

Technical causes

The ICE 1 was originally equipped with full wheels, so-called monobloc wheels , which are manufactured in one piece. In practical operation, it quickly became apparent that under certain circumstances there could be resonance phenomena due to uneven wear, material fatigue and imbalances . In the dining car in particular, travelers repeatedly complained about loud vibrations of the dishes and "wandering glasses". In September 1991, Bahn board member Roland Heinisch turned to the then chairman of the board, Heinz Dürr, and pointed out the humming noises. In addition to the negative reactions from customers, he also highlighted the risk of damage to the car.

In the search for a remedy, it was suggested, for example, to change the lane, to use air suspension or to improve the suspension of the chassis with rubber-sprung single-ring wheels, as they have already been successfully used in the slowest type of rail transport, in local transport on trams . For cost reasons, it was decided to switch to wheel tires, which was cheaper.

At the end of 1991 the board of directors of the Deutsche Bundesbahn decided to test rubber-sprung wheel tires under seven ICE-1 dining cars. With a resolution of January 21, 1992, this resolution was extended to a "large-scale test" to 45 dining cars, and in the following month it was decided to convert 15 more cars. The director responsible for the approval of passenger coaches pointed out in November 1991 that numerous trials and tests were necessary before approval in series production, which would take about two years. In February 1992 a crack was found on one of the tires tested. After further tests, the responsible engineers agreed in the summer of 1992 to regard the previous tests as sufficient. According to a telephone message, the decision was ultimately based on a decision by the railway board member Heinisch. On October 5, 1992, the board member presented the committee with a draft resolution for the introduction of the new type of wheels in the entire ICE fleet.

The wheel Bochum 84 / series 064 was a new development of the DB. The special thing about these wheels is that a 20 mm thick intermediate layer of hard rubber is embedded between the outer metal wheel tire and the wheel core , so that, in contrast to the classic wheel tire with no play, a dampened movement between tire and wheel is possible. This design, which is new for high-speed traffic, was not tested in simulators at speeds of over 200 km / h before it was used in series production in the ICE.

Since no system had been built in Germany up to that time to practically measure the breaking limit of a wheel , one had to limit oneself to theoretical considerations when dimensioning and determining the wear limit. Before and after the market launch, no laboratory or driving tests were carried out up to the wear limit or up to the breakage of the wheel tire. Over the course of several years, the wheels have proven their basic suitability for practical use without any problems. However, several months before the accident , the Hanoverian transport company üstra AG discovered broken tires on its trams well before the expected wear time and then shortened the replacement intervals. At the same time, all users of identical tire wheels, including Deutsche Bahn AG, were warned of premature signs of fatigue in this design. However, since there were considerable structural differences in the details between the local transport bikes and the bikes of the ICE, a system-related connection was not recognized by the railway and no consequences were drawn from the warning for high-speed traffic. In addition, the Fraunhofer Institute had already warned the railway management board of broken tires in 1992.

After the accident, the Fraunhofer Institute for Structural Durability and System Reliability (Darmstadt) , which was commissioned with the disaster analysis, carried out a load test that estimated the wear time. As it turned out later in the course of this investigation, the static calculation of the wheelsets did not pay enough attention to dynamically occurring, recurring forces, so that the wheels and the maximum permissible wear were not dimensioned with a sufficient safety margin. The following effects play a role (list without qualitative evaluation):

  • The tire is flexed with every revolution (500,000 times per day on the ICE), which puts additional stress on the material.
  • In contrast to the monobloc wheel , even the smallest cracks can form on the inside of a wheel tire, which are difficult to diagnose, but lead to voltage peaks in the wheel tire.
  • The thinner a wheel tire becomes due to wear , the greater the tension and cracks in the tire.
  • Flat spots and notches increase the effective forces in the wheel tire considerably due to the uneven running of the wheel and wear it out even faster.

Broken tires led to railway accidents as early as the 19th century, as the example of the Timelkam railway accident on October 19, 1875 shows. August Wöhler's experiments on the fatigue strength of alternately stressed materials or components in the railway industry (compared to lower static loads) helped to uncover these relationships for the first time.

As a replacement for the rubber-sprung wheel tires, Deutsche Bahn tested an active vibration reduction system on an ICE 1 intermediate car in 2002.

Structural problems

  • The mechanical specifics of tires were not sufficiently considered and explained, therefore, the wheels were used in the parties as a fatigue-resistant and break-proof , track internally why roundness as treated little urgency.
  • It was not sufficiently transparent which requirements were for safety and which were only for the comfort of the passengers.

Maintenance failure

After the introduction of rubber-sprung wheels, no regular checks were carried out. With the ultrasound checks carried out, it is not possible to detect cracks in the interior of the new wheels, although the highest internal stresses were found in tests before the wheels were approved for series production.

During the last inspection of the train on the day before the accident, a radial runout of 1.1 mm was found on the affected wheelset, almost double the permitted limit. Furthermore, the wheel tire in question had too great a height deviation (0.7 mm with a maximum permitted 0.6 mm), which was also determined and recorded. Despite this, contrary to the repair guidelines, the wheelset was not replaced, as no safety risk was suspected here. In addition, train attendants on the affected train had reported a flat spot eight times in the previous weeks. These defects were stored in the on-board diagnostic system. However, this data was not automatically assessed and evaluated as a security problem.

Before the accident, a wheel tire with an outer diameter of 920 mm (new condition) was allowed to be driven down to 854 mm. The tire, which was broken as a result of a fatigue fracture , had a mileage of 1,789,000 km and an outer diameter of 862 mm. After the accident, the Darmstadt Fraunhofer Institute came to the conclusion as part of an expert opinion that only a wheel tire with 890 mm and an annual inspection for internal cracks is still durable. In 1997, test reports for other wheels showed many errors such as out-of-roundness after a mileage of 60,000 km. The wheel that triggered the accident ran almost 30 times as long.

The responsible ICE depot in Munich only inspected the wheels of the ICE trains using fluorescent lamps . This traditional inspection method only reveals major damage and has already been used on slower trains. However, fine cracks and signs of fatigue can only be detected in wheel tires with the originally prescribed ultrasonic , light profile and measuring beam test (ULM). This method was no longer used from 1994 because the ultrasonic measuring devices very often incorrectly indicated defects, although none were present. Experts in non-destructive testing with ultrasound accuse the railway of having neglected the use of higher-quality ultrasound devices for years because they were more expensive than the ULM devices.

The wheels causing the accident were shown to be defective in three independent measurements and were nevertheless not replaced. After the accident, the wheels of ICE trains that were still in operation were examined and at least three other tires with cracks were discovered. Experts now claim that internal cracks do not arise from the outside in, but from the inside. Therefore, they can only be determined at an early stage by taking measurements from inside the wheel.

Human error

After the accident, the question arose as to whether or to what extent human error contributed to the course. A passenger from car 1, in which the wheel tire that had come off had shot through the ground, reported the incident to a train attendant in car 3, but gave only a very imprecise description. Both the train attendant and the passenger could have prevented the accident by pressing the emergency brake immediately . For this reason, the bereaved filed a complaint against the train conductor. But his actions were in accordance with the regulations, as he had to convince himself of the damage first.

Consequences

Legally

On February 18, 1999, the Lüneburg public prosecutor's office confiscated files from the Minden Research and Technology Center on the development, approval and testing of rubber-sprung wheels in order to reconstruct the process of introducing rubber-sprung wheels. On May 20, 1999 files were confiscated from DB headquarters in Frankfurt am Main. A total of more than 600 folders of material were viewed by mid-2000, including all documents about the ICE 1.

In August 1999, the case against the only surviving train attendant of the accident was dropped. He did not have enough time between the perception of noises and the impact (a period of 101 seconds) to recognize the extent of the problem and to react accordingly.

In May 2000, investigations were started against four suspects who, as employees of the former Federal Railway Central Office in Minden and the United Schmiedewerke (VSG) Bochum, were responsible for the design, approval and manufacture of the rubber-sprung wheel tires. These investigations continued on March 23, 2001, when the Lüneburg public prosecutor's office closed the investigation against three employees of ICE maintenance in Munich after criminally relevant allegations had not been substantiated. According to the public prosecutor's office, the three employees followed up on reports of a restless wheel arch, but could not have seen the cracks visually. The ultrasonic devices required for this were not intended for the wheels, which were assumed to be durable. In July 2001, the public prosecutor's office in Lüneburg closed the proceedings against an employee of the wheel manufacturer who had no managerial or planning function in the development and approval of the wheels. Three public prosecutors and 17 police officers were involved in the investigation as the “Eschede” special commission. The procedural files filled around 100 folders.

On November 7, 2001, the prosecution brought charges . With a decision of June 13, 2002, the First Criminal Chamber of the Lüneburg Regional Court admitted the indictment and opened the main proceedings . A department president of the Deutsche Bahn, a technical board member of the Federal Railways and an operations engineer at the wheel tire manufacturer were charged with bodily harm of 105 people and negligent killing of 101 people. (In Germany only natural persons can be prosecuted, not legal persons like DB.) They were accused of not having tested the bikes sufficiently. The indictment was based essentially on an expert opinion by the Fraunhofer Institute Darmstadt. The more than 300-page report was submitted to the Lüneburg public prosecutor's office in early 2000.

The public prosecutor's office had found serious failures in the approval and maintenance of the railway. According to a criminal investigation officer , almost half of the wheel measurements before the accident were not plausible. The defendants did not speak out during the trial.

The chamber was composed of the presiding judge Michael Dölp , two assessors and two lay judges . Due to the expected high level of public interest, the proceedings did not take place at the seat of the court in Lüneburg, but in a hall of the district council building in Celle. 93 witnesses were heard on 52 trial days in eight months . The first day of the trial took place on August 28, 2002. At the beginning of the proceedings, Deutsche Bahn submitted a 500-page statement and was convinced of the innocence of the accused engineers. Ten co-plaintiffs appeared. From the 4th day of the trial, those affected were heard. Over 70 surviving dependents were represented by a Berlin lawyer. Initially, five experts were heard; their number rose to 16 in the course of the proceedings. A number of experts, including representatives from Japan , South Africa and Sweden , questioned the opinion submitted to the prosecutor.

On October 4, 2002, the 12th day of the trial was reached. From January 15, 2003, the 32nd day of the negotiations, the experts were heard on the question of the predictability of the wheelset breakage. For this purpose, booths for simultaneous interpreters for English and Japanese were set up in the courtroom . On the 49th day of the hearing, February 27, 2003, the last reports were given. On the 54th day of the trial, April 28, 2003, the presiding judge proposed that the proceedings be discontinued against payment of the three defendants of 10,000 euros each, since the question could only be clarified through further attempts (lasting around one to two years) whether the defendants should have recognized the risk of the wheel tires breaking. In this way, so the judges, the public interest in the criminal offense was taken into account; a serious guilt of the employees could be excluded in any case. This proposal was criticized in many ways. The proceedings ended on the 55th day of the trial, on May 8, 2003. Relatives protested against the attitude . On August 27, 2003 , the Federal Constitutional Court did not accept a constitutional complaint by co-plaintiffs in the Eschede proceedings against the termination of the criminal proceedings , as no violation of fundamental rights could be ascertained.

criticism

The then head of the legal department at the Federal Railway Authority, Hans-Jürgen Kühlwetter , highlighted serious violations of organizational and traffic safety obligations. He demanded that Bahnvorstand Heinisch also indict him because of his joint responsibility. According to undisputed press reports, the board of directors intervened directly in the examination procedure of the Federal Railway Central Office and was also responsible for this. He also criticized the fact that almost all experts had been appointed by the defense and that they had only carried out tests on the stationary bike. After the presiding judge was unable to follow one of the reviewers, he should have appointed a senior reviewer.

The victim's lawyer, Reiner Geulen , criticized Deutsche Bahn AG's strategy for “paralyzing” the process. For example, the appointment of a Japanese expert led to hours of discussion about the translation. The criminal justice system and the railway had failed against the Eschede victims. At a meeting with Hartmut Mehdorn , he and other victim representatives were "literally dispatched" . A complaint against the discontinuation of the proceedings by eleven survivors was not accepted for decision before the Federal Constitutional Court on June 4, 2003. A criminal complaint from two victims against the railway board member Heinisch was also rejected; a breach of duty cannot be proven. A civil suit brought before the Berlin Regional Court in 2002 was also dismissed.

Care of those affected

Deutsche Bahn AG appointed Otto Ernst Krasney - according to its own statements, a novelty in Germany - as ombudsman for those affected and provided him with emergency aid amounting to five million Deutschmarks. In addition, 800,000 D-Marks were received in two donation accounts set up by Deutsche Bahn. The federal government and the state of Lower Saxony also provided emergency aid, which was given in agreement with the ombudsman. According to their own statements, these services were not offset against the compensation to be paid ; For the first time, extensive psycho-social care was possible after such an accident. According to the railway, the more than 500 claims for compensation were settled amicably and finally. In addition to the relief fund, the company provided, according to its own information, 32 million euros in compensation payments up to 2008. This includes in particular costs for medical treatment (three million euros), compensation for pain and suffering (four million euros), maintenance claims, as well as purchase, maintenance and property damage (around 20 million euros). The compensation for pain and suffering paid per family in almost 200 cases was 30,000 D-Marks per person killed, while correspondingly lower sums were paid for injured persons; In individual cases, the compensation payments reached millions. Deutsche Bahn expects further payments in the double-digit million range in the future, especially for maintenance and pension payments. The company emphasizes that the payments made have far exceeded the benefits awarded by the case law in similar cases.

After the accident, the self-help Eschede, an interest group for those affected by the train accident, was formed . The association negotiated with the railway about compensation for pain and suffering, with 500,000 D-Marks per fatality reported. According to Ombudsman Krasney, the compensation for pain and suffering was a purely voluntary service by Deutsche Bahn, which was also above the usual rates. The amount of compensation for pain and suffering remained the only point of conflict. With all material damage compensation claims, however, there was never a dispute. Courts confirmed that DB paid significantly more than is customary under German law. Attempts by some victims to sue the railway for higher compensation for pain and suffering failed. An announced lawsuit against Deutsche Bahn for 500 million dollars in the USA did not materialize.

Survivors report that the DB AG was stingy with the victims. Hotel costs were only paid by relatives of the injured at the hospital when a doctor's certificate confirmed the positive influence on the treatment. The chain of a deceased child was only replaced for the bereaved when possession was proven. Many survivors sharply criticize the company for never honestly apologizing for the accident. The company sees itself wrongly in the criticism, refers to the unbureaucratic help and a multiple expression of deep concern. The then chairman of the board, Johannes Ludewig, personally condoled the bereaved and met with many families. On the first anniversary, the then railway boss Johannes Ludewig apologized for mistakes.

Deutsche Bahn paid millions of euros to various insurance companies to avoid civil litigation.

Technical consequences

On June 5, 1998, the wear limit of the wheel tires was raised from 854 to 890 mm running circle diameter (new condition: 920 mm).

After the Deutsche Bahn had not completely submitted the documents on which the approval of the wheelsets was based and further findings had emerged, the DB was forbidden by order of June 13, 1998 from using the wheelsets of the type 064 concerned until proof of operational safety was provided.

Deutsche Bahn has not yet reintroduced the rubber-sprung wheels, despite their technical advantages. In addition, the entire rail network in Germany was examined to determine the extent to which there are switches in front of critical bottlenecks.

On June 8, 1998, the DB's board of directors set up a commission chaired by Roland Heinisch to review the safety of the rail system as a whole. As a consequence of the accident, Deutsche Bahn presented a new safety concept in mid-1999. Accordingly, switches and crossings in front of bridges and tunnels should be avoided on future new lines. The driving performance should take the place of time intervals in the ultrasonic test intervals. In addition, a four-eyes principle was introduced for important tests.

Emergency exit window with emergency hammer and predetermined breaking point in ICE 1

The most noticeable change in many ICE 1 trains is the large number of additional emergency exit windows that were increasingly built into the cars after the accident in Eschede (since the second half of 2003); For example, there is now such an emergency exit window in every compartment (previously only in the open-plan area). These can be smashed from the inside with an emergency hammer at their predetermined breaking point (red dot) and are intended to enable rescue workers to get into the car from the outside without heavy axes and diamond cutting discs - as was previously necessary. Originally, the oval windows on the four doors of each ICE 1 seat car were intended for emergency exits. The conversion of 6195 windows in the ICE 1/2 fleet was completed on October 31, 2004.

A new, column-free bridge was built at the accident site in Eschede. The old bridge had pillars on the outside, left and right of the tracks. The overhead lines and tracks were repaired over 1.5 km. The siding is still there and accordingly the three turnouts are in almost the same places as before.

Various technical solutions were considered for the ICE-1 trains converted to monobloc wheels in order to get the structure-borne noise problem under control. Converting to air-sprung MD-530 bogies was also discussed as the most expensive solution. In order to get the problems with running smoothness under control, it was initially decided to overwind the wheels after 240,000 km and to install 10 mm thick intermediate plates between the rail and sleeper on the new lines within a year. The DB initially hoped to be able to switch back to rubber-sprung wheels in the long term. In addition, continuous monitoring of the wheelsets, in particular using microphones, was also considered, as was fixed monitoring systems.

Effects on helpers / emergency pastoral care

The processing of the accident meant an extraordinary psychological burden even for experienced helpers. The Eschede railway accident was the first major accident in Germany in which post-deployment care and emergency pastoral care were carried out systematically and on a large scale . Numerous pastors were on site in the days after the accident to support and accompany those affected, relatives and rescue workers. Through this commitment, this concept for the prevention of mental trauma has become known to a wider public. The leading psychologist couple Hartmut and Sybille Jatzko from Kaiserslautern , who also worked after the Ramstein flight accident, were in charge .

In a three-year program, surviving dependents were given just as much psychological support as members of the rescue teams. 700 emergency services took advantage of the offers of help. 100 had long-term problems.

Disruption to rail traffic

In the first few days after the accident in particular, there were constant changes in emergency schedules and train cancellations. Several ICE lines and individual train routes have been shortened. A large number of locomotive-hauled replacement trains (mainly with series 101 , 103 and 120 ) ran with an average of four to eight cars. In addition to trains from ÖBB and SBB , ICE 2 half trains were also used instead of ICE 1 block trains.

On June 4, 1998, Deutsche Bahn decided to reduce the maximum speed of the ICE-1 trains to 160 km / h until the wheelsets were thoroughly checked. These checks should be completed by the following morning, after which the maximum speed should be increased to 280 km / h. On June 5, 1998, the Federal Railway Authority (EBA) ordered that the speed limit should be left at 160 km / h even after the controls. The authorities considered the visual inspections observed during special inspections to be insufficient to detect cracks, which typically originated from the inside of the wheel.

On June 6, 1998, the DB withdrew all ICE 1s from traffic on the notice of the EBA and only put them back into operation after a complete ultrasonic inspection of the wheel tires. By June 9, 1998, around a dozen ICE 1 trains had passed this inspection and could be used again. After the accident, the Federal Railway Authority ordered the replacement of all 2880 rubber-sprung wheelsets of the remaining 720 intermediate cars with monobloc wheels. This led to delivery bottlenecks; DB ordered a total of 2,400 monobloc wheels at the end of June, and industrial production increased from 200 to 300 per week.

On June 6, 1998, the driver stopped the ICE 91 "Prinz Eugen" in the afternoon on its journey from Vienna to Hamburg in Seubersdorf after he noticed loud rattling noises. After a visual inspection by the driver of an oncoming train, the train drove on to Neumarkt in der Oberpfalz almost at walking pace . There the passengers were asked to get off and continue the journey with other trains. The ICE was transferred empty to Nuremberg . According to the subsequent investigation, however, there was only one damage to the power car. The same thing happened a few days later on the ICE 682 “Amalienburg”, whose passengers switched to a subsequent InterRegio . After a further examination of the train, damage to the powered end car was suspected again.

From mid-June 1998 , all trains on the ICE line 3 (Hamburg – Stuttgart / Basel), which was broken in Mannheim towards Basel , were replaced by replacement trains. ICE 2 trains were mainly used on ICE line 4 (Hamburg – Würzburg – Munich). The use of wagons with emergency brake bridging was concentrated on the high-speed routes through shortened train runs (with switching to replacement trains). After a wheelset investigation, the ICE 1 trains were increasingly being used again. On June 12, 1998, according to the replacement timetable, around 30 percent of the services were served by replacement trains and 20 percent by ICE-2 half-trains. After vehicles were recalled again on June 13 and 14, 1998, the timetable and vehicle schedule were changed again. At the end of June 1998, 16 fully-wheeled ICE 1 trains were available.

On July 2, 1998, 17 ICE-1 sets shortened to eight intermediate cars and equipped with monobloc wheels were in use. Together with the ICE 2 and IC and IR replacement trains, the regular timetable could largely be offered again. On July 27th, 31 shortened ICE 1 trains were available. A new operating program was introduced on the same day. In the course of the shutdown, the interior and exterior of the trains were revised; the trains received the pure red vertical stripe that they still wear today.

After a slump in sales in June 1998, passenger numbers in DB long-distance traffic were already above the level of the previous month in July 1998.

On September 1, 1998 ICE traffic to Basel and Zurich was resumed, and ICE traffic to Vienna followed on September 28, 1998 . On October 12, 1998, the last international ICE trains were operated again with the pair of ICE trains 72/73 (Berlin – Interlaken). By November 1, 1998, the exchange of the wheelsets on all 59 ICE-1 trains was completed, and the scheduled traffic could thus be fully resumed.

Train number and train name

After the ICE accident, Deutsche Bahn deleted both train number (ICE) 884 and the assigned name "Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen" from the timetable on June 11, 1998 . It was replaced by ICE 982, which, together with the counter train ICE 885, was given the name " Justus Freiherr von Liebig ". The fact that, after the day of the accident, other ICE trains in the time slot of the ICE 884 with this train number ran, initially caused irritation among passengers who thought they would be on the unlucky train. A few days after the accident, the old train designation “ICE 884” was temporarily pasted over in the station timetables. This change was based on major aircraft disasters, in which flight numbers of failed flights were not reassigned for psychological reasons so as not to trigger negative memories in the passengers. In 2002, Deutsche Bahn started naming its ICE trains with the names of cities . With a few exceptions, the individual train connections no longer have personal names. This also applies to the ICE 886, which was in service at the time of the accident at that time. Since then, the train number 884 has been skipped in the timetable, the ICE 886 is followed one cycle later by the ICE 882, while the ICE trains continue to run continuously from 881 in the opposite direction can be numbered through 887.

Location and use of the wagons

The power car 401 051-8, which was leading and still in operation during the accident, in August 2007 in Munich Central Station

Of the cars and power cars of the ICE involved in the accident, only the front power car (401 051-8) is used for passenger traffic . The second power car (401 551-7) served as a spare parts donor until it was retired on November 1, 2001. It was parked for a long time on the premises of the Deutsche Bahn repair shop in Nuremberg (storage location in the Nuremberg plant: 49 ° 25 ′ 15.2 ″  N , 11 ° 5 ′ 11.8 ″  E ). In 2007, it and parts of the damaged and no longer operable ICE 1 power cars 401 020-3 (fire in Offenbach ) and 401 573-1 ( accident in Switzerland ) were reassembled into a functioning ICE 1 power car. This now runs as 401 573-1 (as of December 2007).

The damaged to completely destroyed intermediate cars were deleted from the inventory on June 30, 1998 (with the exception of car 1). Car 1 (802 808-6) was only released to the press at the end of 2005, after the court proceedings and investigations had been concluded (condition: hardly damaged, inside as in 1998). He served in the THW Federal School in Hoya for training purposes. After the hole torn through the tire in the car was filmed in November 2007 while filming a documentary shown in 2008, Deutsche Bahn replaced it with another car. It was used in the Nuremberg repair shop as a spare parts donor. The rest, car 2 (802 609-8) , car 3 (802 311-1) , 4 (802 374-9) , 5 (802 340-0) , 6 (802 373-1) , 7 (802 037 -2) , the service car (803 008-2) , the on-board restaurant (804 010-7) , car 11 (801 009-2) , 12 (801 014-2) and 14 (801 806-1) are mostly involved in the accident destroyed or scrapped upon completion of legal proceedings and investigations.

Financially

Deutsche Bahn put the loss in sales for June 1998 at 45 million Deutschmarks. Up to the beginning of July there were ten million DM in costs for special examinations, the wheels to be exchanged cost a total of 30 million DM. The damage to the train and route was estimated at 55 million Deutschmarks.

In addition, 199 liability claims were asserted against DB by the beginning of July 1998, which by then had made 403,000 DM in liability payments for emergency aid. The company set up a fund for psychosocial care for five million DM. Overall, liability benefits of 150 million D-Marks were expected.

From a local political point of view

In the first weeks after the accident, Eschede became a destination for disaster tourists . The structural development of Eschede is still clearly slowed down more than a decade after the train accident.

traffic

The accident required the road bridge to be rebuilt. It was opened to traffic on May 22, 2000. The costs amounted to 4.2 million Deutschmarks.

Processing in the media

"The death ride of the ICE 884" from 1999 was the first large television documentary about the accident in Eschede, broadcast on ZDF on the first anniversary. The one-hour documentation by Mona Botros offered the first meticulous reconstruction of the course of the accident with 3D animation. She was nominated for the German Television Award. In 2004, a documentary film in the series “Blueprint for Disaster” entitled “Crash at Eschede” was broadcast on Discovery Channel in many countries, which traces the course of the accident with simulated scenes and computer graphics simulations.

The 60-minute documentary television film "Eschede - Die Todesfahrt" by Hanna Legatis was broadcast on German television in 2006.

On May 23, 2008, VOX showed a two-hour Spiegel TV documentary by the filmmakers Nicola Burfeindt and Alexander Czogalla about the accident, which was nominated for the German TV Prize and the Golden Prometheus .

On May 30, 2008, a few days before the tenth anniversary of the catastrophe, a 90-minute documentary television film entitled " Eschede Zug 884 " was shown in the first .

On June 1, 2008, the NDR broadcast a radio feature by Roman Grafe, which appeared shortly afterwards in an expanded version as an audio book: “Time is money. The Eschede railway disaster. "

The episode "The Eschede Train Disaster" (1x05) of the documentary series Seconds Before the Accident also deals with the Eschede train accident.

At the Lima Film Festival 2006, the band Silberschauer won first place in the youth film category with the video for the song Eschede , which is dedicated to the victims of the accident.

Eschede Memorial

A memorial was inaugurated at the site of the accident on May 11, 2001 in the presence of around 400 relatives, guests of honor as well as numerous helpers and many citizens of Eschede . 101 cherry trees , one for each deceased, were planted next to the tracks in front of the bridge. A staircase leads from there up to the street. The path leads through a gate at the top, across the street and continues on the other side in a few steps that lead to nowhere. A plaque with the names of all victims is in the middle between the trees. Self-help Eschede was involved in setting up and renovating the memorial.

In 2013 a memorial plaque with an inscription as well as the names and dates of the victims was erected
Memorial stone as a gate on the road bridge
Inscription in the gate:
It crashed on June 3, 1998 at 10:58 a.m.
at this point the ICE 884 "Wilhelm-
Conrad-Röntgen ". 101 people lost
their lives, entire families were destroyed;
more than a hundred travelers became difficult
injured, many wear them for life
Consequences. The misfortune has the human
Fragility, impermanence and
Inadequacy shown. Exemplary and
have rescuers, helpers and self-sacrificing
Citizens of the place selflessly a difficult one
Accepted the task, helped
and comforted. Through their use is
Eschede is also a place of solidarity and
become a lived humanity.
Inscription on the plaque:
The life path of these 101 people
ended in the train disaster of
Eschede.
And crossed in unfathomable ways
their fates came to an end here.
In the suffering and sorrow for them
loved one mingles
Gratitude to be close to them in life
to have been.
Hope is consolation:
You rest in God's hands.

Since the train disaster, those affected and their bereaved have met every anniversary in Eschede. On the tenth anniversary, on June 3, 2008, the then Lower Saxony Prime Minister Christian Wulff spoke alongside victims' representatives . Two ICEs that would have passed the accident site at 10:59 a.m. were diverted. For the rest of the traffic there was a speed limit of 60 km / h during the funeral services.

In mid-2012, Deutsche Bahn announced that it would renovate the memorial. The previous memorial had been damaged by the weather. In 2013 the memorial wall made of Belgian granite (a limestone) was replaced because it had individual defects and crumbling joints and algae and moss had accumulated. The foundation had also proven to be insufficiently stable. The new wall is made of Bavarian granite . The inscriptions, names and dates were adopted unchanged. Deutsche Bahn bore the costs.

In 2013, on the 15th anniversary of the Eschede railway accident, railway boss Rüdiger Grube apologized on behalf of the railway victims and their relatives for the resulting human suffering. Grube was the first railway boss to be invited to such a commemoration. The new memorial wall was inaugurated at this event. Also Johannes Ludewig , Deutsche Bahn CEO at the time of the accident participated.

See also

literature

  • Christian Brauner, Willi Stadler (eds.): Coping with major damage incidents - the ICE accident in Eschede . Villingen-Schwenningen 2002, ISBN 3-931778-28-2 .
  • Jutta Helmerichs, Jürgen Bengel, Kay Leonhardt, Matthias Stalmann, Regina Zingiser: Aftercare for emergency services in the event of an ICE accident in Eschede. In: trauma victims or heroes . Edited by Knud Eike Buchmann and Max Hermanutz. Proceedings No. 27 of the Villingen-Schwenningen University of Applied Sciences, Police University.
  • Jürgen Hörstel, Hans-Joachim Ritzau a. a .: Error in the system. Railway accidents as a symptom of a railway crisis . Ritzau Verlag Zeit und Eisenbahn, Pürgen 2000 (Shadows of Railway History, Vol. 5), ISBN 3-921304-33-4 .
  • Ewald Hüls (Hrsg.), Hans-Jörg Oestern (Hrsg.): The ICE disaster of Eschede. Experiences and lessons. An interdisciplinary analysis . Springer, Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-540-65807-6 .
  • Ewald Hüls: The Eschede ICE disaster; Facts - Experiences - Consequences , Civil Defense Research - 45th, 46th and 48th Annual Meeting of the Protection Commission at the Federal Minister of the Interior, pp. 275–289.
  • Erich Preuß: Eschede, 10:59 am. The story of a railway disaster . GeraNova Zeitschriftenverlag, 2002, ISBN 3-932785-21-5 .
  • Markus Reiter: Eschede and after that. Experience from the work of the ombudsman of Deutsche Bahn . Schäffer-Poeschel, Stuttgart 2005, ISBN 3-7910-2406-X .

Web links

Commons : ICE accident at Eschede  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

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  2. ↑ a b c d e Jörg Soinerczyk, Birte Sturm, Bernd Uhlenhut: The process of the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 12/2002, pp. 561-563.
  3. ↑ a b c d e f g Visitation in the high-tech country . In: Der Spiegel . No. 23 , 1998, pp. 22-34 ( online ).
  4. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s The ICE crisis . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 9, 1998, pp. 352–355.
  5. ^ Christian Tietze: The premiere of the ICE 3 . In: Eisenbahn Magazin , issue 12/1998, pp. 20 ff, ISSN  0342-1902 .
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j Jan-Erik Hegemann: The ICE disaster of Eschede: The use . In: Feuerwehr Magazin , September 1998, pp. 32–41, ISSN  0943-027X .
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  10. ^ Werner Mathes: The death ride of the ICE 884 . In: Stern . No. 25, 1998, pp. 16-23.
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  18. ↑ a b The death train . In: Stern . Issue 34/2001, pp. 21-36.
  19. ↑ cf. Fritz Stüssi: The theory of fatigue strength and the experiments of August Wöhlers , Zurich 1955, passim ; also: Portrait of August Wöhler and his research in the railway sector on the website of the TU Berlin (with further literature); also: When train wheels get tired Article by Karl-Eugen Kurrer in Friday of April 2nd, 2004.
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  21. ^ Report ICE files confiscated . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 4, 1999, p. 117.
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  23. ↑ a b Report of investigations after the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7/2000, p. 307.
  24. ↑ News update shortly . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10, year 1999, p. 396.
  25. ↑ Report Eschede: Investigations are partly suspended . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 5/2001, p. 197.
  26. ^ Report to the indictment in the Eschede case . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/2001, p. 429.
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  29. ↑ Hans Jürgen Kühlwetter, Jörg Sölnerczyk, Bernd Uhlenhut: The process of the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 11/2002, pp. 510-515.
  30. ↑ Hans Jörg Kühlwetter, Beate Sturm: The process of the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , 3/2003, pp. 112–117.
  31. ↑ Hans Jürgen Kühlwetter, Jörg Sölnerczyk: The process of the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 5/2003, pp. 224–228.
  32. ^ A b Hans Jürgen Kühlwetter, Jörg Sölnerczyk: The trial of the accident in Eschede . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 6/2003, pp. 254-256.
  33. ↑ Report of constitutional complaint against the termination of the Eschede criminal proceedings unsuccessful . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/2003, p. 448.
  34. ↑ «It's never too late» . German dispatch service , May 17, 2008.
  35. ↑ a b Deutsche Bahn AG: The accident in Eschede (DOC file, four pages; 255 kB, no longer available online). Topic service , April 2008.
  36. ^ Otto Ernst Krasney: Balance: Ten years after Eschede . In: DB Welt , June 2008 edition.
  37. ↑ Udo Ludwig: A certain risk . In: Der Spiegel . No. 8 , 2001, p. 72-73 ( Online - Feb. 19, 2001 ).
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  40. ↑ "to help the victims" . ( Memento from February 22, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) In: Kölnische Rundschau , June 1, 2008.
  41. ^ Message Eschede: Lawsuit is threatened . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 1/2003, p. 6.
  42. ↑ a b The anger of the Eschede victims on Deutsche Bahn . In: Die Welt , May 30, 2008.
  43. ↑ a b “The railway wants reconciliation” . In: The world . No. 124 , May 31, 2013, p. 36 ( online ).
  44. ↑ Roman Grafe: condolences is only valid ticket . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . No. 125 , June 3, 2013, p. 27 ( online ).
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  46. ↑ Announcement New security concept . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 7, year 1999, p. 282.
  47. ^ Horst J. Obermayer: The series vehicles of the InterCityExpress . In: Hermann Merker (Ed.): Eisenbahn-Journal special 1/91. ICE - InterCityExpress at the start . Verlag Hermann Merker, Fürstenfeldbruck 1991, ISBN 3-922404-17-0 , pp. 28–51.
  48. ↑ Electrical operation at Deutsche Bahn in 2004 . In: Elektro Bahnen , Volume 103 (2005), Heft 1–2, pp. 27, 31.
  49. ↑ On the way to solving the ICE problems . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 10/1998, pp. 446–447.
  50. ↑ Frank Wenzlow, employee of the medical management, said: "Anyone who claims to be a professional here must be able to pee ice cubes, it has to be that cold". Quoted after the visitation in the high-tech country . In: Der Spiegel . No. 23 , 1998, pp. 23 ( online ).
  51. ↑ a b c Hans-Joachim Gilbert, Friedhelm Weidelich: On the trail of the cracks . In: Eisenbahn Magazin , Issue 8/1998, pp. 14-18, ISSN  0342-1902 .
  52. ↑ Message solution for ICE 1 problems . In: LOK Report , Issue 11, 1998, pp. 17-18.
  53. ↑ message semiannual financial statement of the DB AG . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , issue 10/1998, p. 441.
  54. ↑ Message ICE 1 complete again . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 12, 1998, p. 506.
  55. ^ ICE “Osnabrück”: What was left of the disaster in Eschede. In: HasePost.de. August 11, 2017, accessed May 4, 2020 .
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  57. ↑ We just can't find peace: three months after the ICE accident, Eschede has become an excursion destination . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . No. 203 , September 2, 1998, pp. 10 ( online for a fee ).
  58. ↑ Great disaster, small town - Eschede ( Memento from April 19, 2016 in the Internet Archive ). In: Authorities Spiegel (online edition), April 12, 2011.
  59. ^ Chronicle of the community of Eschede ; accessed: January 26, 2018.
  60. ↑ Blueprint for Disaster: “Crash at Eschede” ( Memento from January 15, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ). Release info for Discovery documentary series on ctvmedia.ca , December 21, 2004.
  61. ↑ Seconds before the accident: The train disaster in Eschede. In: Fernsehserien.de. Retrieved May 4, 2020 .
  62. ↑ Background to the Silberschauer song
  63. ↑ Announcement Eschede memorial inaugurated . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International , Issue 8–9 / 2001, p. 341.
  64. ↑ Hartmut Reichardt: Eschede memorial is being renewed. In: Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung . May 31, 2012.
  65. ↑ North Compact . In: Die Welt (Hamburg Department) . No. 127 , June 2, 2013, p. 44 .
  66. ↑ 15 years after Eschede: Grube apologizes . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 7 , July 2013, p. 326 .
  67. ↑ Kerstin Schwenn: "I will apologize to the Eschede victims" . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . No. 119 , May 25, 2013, p. 9 ( online ).
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 27, 2006 .

Coordinates: 52 ° 44 ′ 4 ″  N , 10 ° 13 ′ 13 ″  E