Intervention of the military in Turkey 1997

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The February 28 process ( Turkish 28 Şubat süreci ), also known as the “ post-modern coup” ( Turkish post-modern darbe ), “gentle” , “soft” , “quiet” or “cold” coup, was a political intervention by the Turkish military leadership against the elected government under Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party . It was initiated by a memorandum of the General Staff adopted during a meeting of the National Security Council of Turkey on February 28, 1997 , which contained a bundle of measures directed against the Islamist movement. As a result of the conflict with the military and mounting pressure, Prime Minister Erbakan and his government were forced to resign four months later.

Since the government was ousted without a state of emergency , the Grand National Assembly (Turkish parliament) was dissolved or the constitution was suspended, Turkish admiral Salim Dervişoğlu called the event a postmodern coup .

background

After the military coup in 1980 , a constitution had been in force in Turkey since 1982 that severely restricted political and social rights. Their ideological background was the " Turkish-Islamic synthesis ", a mixture of Turkish nationalism and Islamic values ​​and traditions. Among other things, religious education was introduced as a compulsory subject. This represented a departure from the strict secularism introduced in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk . The synthesis of Islamic and Turkish national identity should lead to political stability and avoid ideological divisions according to the ideas of the rulers installed by the coup. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was represented in particular by Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, "Motherland Party") , who were dominant in the 1980s , and Turgut Özal , during whose reign (1983-89) Islam was given an increased role in social life. At the same time, the government pursued a radical liberalization of the Turkish economy, which led to rapid economic growth, industrialization and increased exports, but also polarized society. The vacancy created by the dismantling of the welfare state and social interest groups was filled in many cases by religious communities and orders.

In this environment, the Islamist movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan and operating with the terms Millî Görüş (“national view”) and Adil Düzen (“just order”) and its political arm, the Welfare Party ( Refah Partisi , RP), strengthened. It entered the Turkish parliament for the first time in 1991. In 1995, a major amendment was made to the 1982 constitution, which eased its restrictive provisions and expanded political activity. In the parliamentary elections in December of that year , the RP became the strongest force with 21.4% of the vote. The formation of a government proved difficult. First, the second and third placed ANAP and the Party of the Right Way (DYP) formed a coalition, which soon broke up. In June 1996 the RP and DYP agreed to form a coalition government and Erbakan became prime minister.

Preparation and development up to the intervention

The military operation was planned by the Turkish generals İsmail Hakkı Karadayı , Çevik Bir , Teoman Koman , Çetin Doğan , Necdet Timur and Erol Özkasnak .

In 2012 Hasan Celal Güzel said that General Teoman Koman had approached him in September 1996 with a plan to appoint Güzel or former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz of the ANAP as Prime Minister after the military coup . Güzel declined to participate, and Yılmaz was named prime minister after the coup.

On January 17, 1997, President Suleyman Demirel (DYP) requested a briefing on general military problems during a meeting with the Turkish General Staff . Chief of Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı , Chief of General Staff listed 55 matters. Demirel said that half were hearsay only and encouraged Karadayı to come to terms with the government and defuse the words of the memorandum.

On January 31, 1997, the Sincan city ​​administration near Ankara organized protests against alleged Israeli human rights violations, which took the form of a so-called " al-Quds night ". The building in which the event took place was decorated with posters of the radical Islamic terrorist organizations Hamas and Hesbollah . In response to the demonstration, tanks rolled across the streets of Sincan on February 4, allegedly on their way to an exercise. This intervention was described by General Çevik Bir as a "balance regulation for democracy".

The resolutions of February 28th

At the National Security Council (MGC) meeting on February 28, 1997, the government generals gave their views on the issues of secularism and political Islam in Turkey. During this meeting, the military drew up a catalog of 18 demands and provided them with an “ultimate order of implementation”. These were supposed to protect the secular principles introduced by Ataturk from “ reactionary activities” or “religious reaction”. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was forced to consent and signed the memorandum on March 6th. Among the demands were:

  • eight years of compulsory education (instead of five previously)
  • the reduction in the number of religious Imam Hatip schools (these were only intended to train religious scholars, but the need was far exceeded; the military leadership feared that the schools would instead produce RP supporters and their loyal officials)
  • Closure of schools run by religious communities or transfer to state sponsorship; Attending Koran schools only after completing eight years of compulsory schooling
  • Subordination of all offers for Quran lessons under the control of the Ministry of Education
  • Reduction of the financial resources of all non-state religious communities and Sufi fraternities ( Tarikat )
  • Exclusion of religious activists and people who openly display their religiosity from public services (as a result, the headscarf ban is tightened , especially at universities)

To implement and monitor the process, the military set up the “Western Working Group” (Batı Çalışma Grubu) as an intelligence department . This observed the activities of religiously oriented people and groups, especially in authorities, schools and universities, and was supposed to inform government agencies and academia about the dangers posed by the Islamist movement.

Effects

Erbakan initially tried to avoid an open conflict with the military leadership. Together with his RP ministers, however, he practically refused to implement the demand points, in particular the 8-year compulsory education, in order not to alienate his own constituencies. The military put continued pressure on the government in additional monthly sessions of the National Security Council. Other secular forces in the judiciary, political opposition and media also went on the offensive. In May, the public prosecutor's office initiated a ban proceedings against the RP on the grounds that it had violated the constitution by instrumentalizing Islam for political purposes. On June 30, 1997, Erbakan was ultimately forced to resign.

Although the Right Path Party (DYP), the Welfare Party (RP) and the Great Unity Party (BBP) agreed to form a new government under Prime Minister Tansu Çiller , President Demirel instructed the leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Mesut Yılmaz, with the Formation of the new government. On June 30, 1997 he formed a new coalition government with the chairman of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Bülent Ecevit , and Hüsamettin Cindoruk , the founder and chairman of the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), a party that changed after the trial of the 28th .February split from the DYP. The Welfare Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in January 1998 for violating the constitutional clause separating state and religion . Erbakan was banned from politics for five years.

The measures of February 28th meant a departure from the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the de facto state ideology of the 1980s and early 1990s and a return to the strict Kemalist secularism. At the same time, they were a severe blow to the Islamist movement, which consisted not only of banning its political party, but also of tightening control over its related civil society organizations and foundations, companies organized in the Islamic business association MÜSİAD and their financial transactions. The military boycotted companies whose owners were involved in Islamist activities or organizations by stopping purchasing products from them. Hundreds of officers accused of fundamentalist activity were fired from the army.

In anticipation of the judgment, former MPs and mayors of the RP founded the Virtue Party (FP) as a successor organization in December 1997 . In the 1999 parliamentary elections in Turkey , the Virtue Party won over 100 seats in parliament, but was not as successful as the Welfare Party in the 1995 elections . In June 2001 the Virtue Party was also banned for violating the laicism clause. The Millî-Görüş camp then split up : the reform-oriented Party for Justice and Recovery (AKP) of the former Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan , who was actually banned from politics, and the traditionalist happiness party (SP) emerged. The AKP, which respected the principles of Kemalism in its party program, distanced itself from demands for an Islamic order and acknowledged Turkey's membership of the Western community, won the parliamentary elections in 2002 and took over the government.

Legal processing

General Çevik Bir, jointly responsible, and 30 other officers from the Turkish army were arrested in April 2012 for their role in this bloodless military coup.

literature

  • Ulrike Dufner: Military versus Islamism. In: Science and Peace , No. 4/1998.
  • Judith Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. Series Middle East Studies, Volume 5, Verlag Hans Schiler, Berlin 2003. Section of the “28. February Trial ”: The Fall of the RP , pp. 76–82.
  • Tanja Scheiterbauer: Islam, Islamism and Gender in Turkey. Perspectives in social movement research. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2014. Section 2.5 The “silent coup” 1997: On the reconfiguration of Turkish laicism , pp. 98-101

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 76.
    Bülent Küçük: Turkey and the other Europe. Phantasms of identity in the accession discourse. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld 2008, pp. 95, 178.
  2. ^ "Soft coup" in Turkey: Generals in court. Taz.de, September 2, 2013.
  3. ^ Sezer Esra: The Turkish military and Turkey's accession to the EU. In: From Politics and Contemporary History , No. 43/2007, p. 28.
  4. ↑ a b c Scheiterbauer: Islam, Islamism and gender in Turkey. 2014, p. 98.
  5. ↑ Brigitte Moser, Michael Weithmann: Country studies of Turkey. History, society and culture. Buske Verlag, Hamburg 2008, p. 112.
  6. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, pp. 77-79.
  7. ↑ a b Cengiz Çandar : Post-modern darbe. In: Sabah . June 27, 1997, archived from the original on November 23, 2010 ; Retrieved July 27, 2008 (Turkish).
  8. ^ Seth Rosen: Reforms curb Turkey's armed forces. In: Washington Times. July 27, 2008, accessed June 5, 2005 .
  9. ↑ kitap - Generalinden 28 Şubat İtirafı "Postmodern Darbe" - Hulki Cevizoğlu, generalinden 28 şubat İtirafı "postmodern darbe", GENERALINDEN 28 ŞUBAT İTIRAFı "Postmodern DARBE". kitapyurdu, January 26, 2004, accessed August 18, 2010 .
  10. ↑ Metehan Demir: 'Post-modern darbe' tanımının 10 yıllık sırrı. In: Sabah. February 27, 2007, accessed July 27, 2008 (Turkish).
  11. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, pp. 23-26.
  12. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 38 f.
  13. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 27 f.
  14. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 41.
  15. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 51.
  16. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 115.
  17. ↑ Şamil Tayyar: Tolon, Dalan'ı neden aradı? In: Star. January 9, 2009; Archived from the original on January 17, 2009 ; Retrieved January 9, 2009 (Turkish).
  18. ↑ Today's Zaman , November 1, 2012, Güzel: Coup plotters planned to appoint me as prime minister after Feb. 28 ( Memento from November 9, 2013 in the Internet Archive )
  19. ↑ Sabah , November 1, 2012, 'Teoman Koman darbeyi Eylül 1996'da söyledi'
  20. ↑ Faruk Mercan: Karadayı ikili oynamadı muhtemel darbeyi önledi Archived from the original on May 4, 2009. In: Feza Gazetecilik A.Ş. (Ed.): Aksiyon . No. 636, February 12, 2007. Retrieved January 6, 2009.
  21. ↑ Politika - Kudüs Gecesi'ndeki tiyatro hataydı 28 Şubatçıların eline koz verdim. In: Zaman.com.tr. Zaman , February 28, 2005; archived from the original on February 29, 2012 ; Retrieved August 18, 2010 (Turkish).
  22. ↑ a b c Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 77.
  23. ↑ February 28 period still maintains its grip on Turkey. Todayszaman.com, archived from the original on February 28, 2009 ; Retrieved August 18, 2010 .
  24. ^ A b Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 79.
  25. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 104.
  26. ↑ Scheiterbauer: Islam, Islamism and Gender in Turkey. 2014, pp. 98-99.
  27. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, p. 103.
  28. ^ Hoffmann: Rise and Change of Political Islam in Turkey. 2003, pp. 103-104.
  29. ↑ Cemal Karakas: Democracy and Islam in Turkey. The 'Kemalist trinity' of republicanism, nationalism, secularism and the politics and work of the AKP. In: Democracy and Islam. Theoretical and empirical studies. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2014, p. 362 f.
  30. ↑ Sebnem Arsu: Turkish Military Leaders Held for Role in '97 Coup. In: The New York Times . April 12, 2012, Retrieved April 13, 2012 .