Operation Tidal Wave
The Operation Tidal Wave ( Engl. "Tidal wave") was one of the air raids on Ploiesti in the Second World War . On August 1, 1943, 177 USAAF B-24 Liberator bombers flew an air raid to destroy or damage the oil production facilities and oil refineries controlled by the German Reich , so that the Wehrmacht would get less fuel and other oils.
After the first American attack on June 6, 1942, a strong Romanian-German air defense had been built in Ploiesti . The air defense shot down many of the US bombers; the attack resulted in "no reduction in general production".
history
prehistory
Ploieşti has been known for its oil fields since the 19th century . The world's first large oil refinery was built here between 1856 and 1857 with the help of the United States. For the German Empire, Ploieşti was one of the most important sources of crude oil during World War II. The Ploiestis oil industry developed into a war industry under German domination, which mainly served to supply the Wehrmacht with fuel .
Allied economic analysts advocated an attack against the center of the Romanian oil industry. On June 12, 1942, 13 B-24 bombers had already bombed refineries in Ploiesti. Although the American attack was seen as a failure, both the Romanian and German leaders recognized the danger posed by air strikes on Ploiesti. Before the attack, the air defense around the city had been extensively reinforced with 237 anti-aircraft cannons of all calibres, several hundred machine guns , blocking balloons and fighter squadrons with 89 German and Romanian fighters. The weak resistance of the German-Romanian air defense in the first attack in 1942 led the US leadership to suspect that the oil plants in Ploieşti could be successfully approached and destroyed from a low altitude.
Planning
During Operation Tidal Wave under the command of the 9th Air Force General Lewis H. Brereton in Benghazi , Libya , the element of surprise was said to be the decisive advantage for dropping a bomb load of over 300 tons; American expectations were high. In order to take down the refineries in Ploiesti with ground troops, Brereton assumed the need for a massive invasion that could last up to a year. A classic strategic mission with long-range bombers, on the other hand, could “do the job in one day” with less man and material.
Ploiesti was too far from Great Britain ; an attack by the Allied air forces from there was impossible. From Benghazi in Libya, the Liberators could barely reach the target area. Due to the great distance, the bombers could not be secured by their own escort fighters ; their only protection was their defensive armament, each consisting of ten 12.7 mm machine guns .
The former fighter pilot Colonel Jacob Smart had worked out the plan to bomb the refineries at low altitude . An attack by high-flying bombers would have alerted the enemy's defense early on and reduced the accuracy of the bombs. According to Smart's plan, the Liberators should undermine the enemy location by flying low and use the element of surprise. The accuracy was also much higher in low flight than in a mission flown from a great height. The bomber crews had practiced this over and over again using a scale model of Ploieşti built in Libya. All crews received maps of the target area in preparation, the approach and return flight options were repeatedly explained.
Winston Churchill was pleasantly surprised by the US plans and supported this initiative. However, military experts from the Royal Air Force viewed the planned approach at low altitude rather critically and predicted heavy losses during the mission due to the known fortification of Ploiestis.
The 9th Air Force had mostly discarded B-24 bombers of the 8th Air Force and had to overtake them before use. To increase the range, additional fuel tanks were built into some of the bomb bays, so the planes could only carry a bomb load of two tons each. The prescribed maximum take-off weight of the aircraft was nevertheless exceeded. The association consisted of the groups Eight Balls (44th Bombardment Group), Traveling Circus (93rd Bombardment Group), Sky Scorpions (389th Bombardment Group) of the 8th Air Force, which were equipped with new Liberators, and two groups named Liberando (376th Bombardment Group) and Pyramiders (98th Bombardment Group) of the 9th Air Force, which was equipped with old Liberators.
The crews were trained for the mission for several weeks. The tactic of the deep attack was rehearsed in attacks on Italian bases. A model of Ploesti built in Libya with its full-size refineries was also used for rehearsals.
On the evening of July 31, 1943, the last briefing took place under the direction of Lewis Brereton. The crews were expressly made aware of the importance of their commitment. The flight groups received their orders to destroy the following refineries:
- White 1 - Româno-Americană
- White 2 - Vega , Concordia
- White 3 - Orion , Speranța , Standard , Petrol Block
- White 4 - Astra Română
- White 5 - Columbia Aquila
- Blue - Creditul Minier
- Red - Steaua Româna , Câmpina
commitment
On August 1, 1943, at 6 a.m., a total of 177 planes with a crew of 1,765 took off at two-minute intervals. The already ascended machines circling in a holding pattern until the dressing completely in the air was. One machine failed after starting. On landing at the airfield, she hit a telegraph pole and exploded. This meant that 177 aircraft were on the seven-hour approach to the target area. The first three hours of the flight led across the Mediterranean . An absolute radio silence had been imposed over the entire unit in order to prevent the enemy from targeting the machines. The distance between the groups should be about 500 meters during the approach, but soon the 98th Bombardment Group could no longer keep up and fell further and further behind.
As the Liberators approached the island of Corfu , the command machine with the chief navigator on board suddenly fell into the sea for unknown reasons. Another machine was looking for survivors and later flew back to Libya. Another ten aircraft had to turn back over the sea due to engine problems.
The association now flew towards its goal without a guide until a B-24 with a young and inexperienced navigator took the lead of the association for further guidance. Over the Albanian coast, the association finally dissolved into two parts; the distance between the two groups was now 100 km. As a result, it was no longer possible to carry out a joint, ordered approach to the target. A total of three changes in the association's management took place.
The Liberators have already been sighted over the Mediterranean by a German ship and over Corfu by an airspace observer. Via Albania, they were recorded by a German eavesdropping post near Athens , unknown to the Allied secret services . The German side was now informed that a large bomber formation had risen in North Africa and had reported this to the responsible authorities. An approximate course could be derived from the information now available, although the actual destination was still unknown. In the meantime the first department, consisting of two groups, had arrived via a navigation point southwest of Belgrade ; from here the approach to Ploiesti began. Without waiting for the second division, the machines went low , causing the German control centers to lose their location.
After flying over the Danube , the attackers were spotted by a Romanian reconnaissance aircraft. Gradually the German leadership began to guess the possible target and took precautionary measures for the affected areas. In Ploieşti, all troops were put on high alert and the anti-aircraft guns made ready for action. Barrier balloons to ward off low-flying planes were released. Only the associations which were supposed to produce artificial fog with mist acid were not informed. Therefore, the fogging of the refineries only started during the air strike and this defensive measure was practically ineffective. A total of 69 German interceptors were ready to launch the alarm at the nearby airfields .
The three Romanian cities of Piteşti , Târgovişte and Floreşti had to be recognized in order to find a safe destination , only then could the approach to Ploieşti begin. About 80 km from Ploieşti, the Liberators flew over the small town of Piteşti, their first landmark. The landmarks Târgovişte and Floreşti were difficult to spot due to their small size. After a navigation error, the 93rd bomber group turned towards the capital Bucharest .
The bandage was now torn into three parts. The first group flew to Ploieşti as planned, the second group against Bucharest, and the third group lagged the first more than 100 km behind. Shortly after the groups were divided, the radio silence was broken. Some pilots had noticed that their guide had taken a wrong course and tried to draw his attention to his mistake. However, he flew on unimpressed and made no answer. Only when he reached the outskirts of Bucharest did he correct his mistake and fly back in the direction of Ploiesti. The approach to the target did not take place in a closed formation, but in three thrusts. The surprise effect was thus nullified for over two thirds of the machines . The German air defense was able to adapt to the groups approaching one after the other and receive them with flak fire .
The bombers approaching Bucharest have meanwhile been reported at the Air Force headquarters . Then Romanian fighter planes were assigned to defend their capital and German fighter planes to protect Ploieşti. The German leadership was now of the opinion that the Americans faked an attack on Bucharest with some machines, while the main force would attack Ploiesti as the actual target. A total of 69 Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters took off from various airfields to intercept the enemy bombers. Only when they were already in the air did they find out about the attack by the Liberators on Ploiesti.
The first group of Liberators was now close to the goal with 34 machines. They flew at a height of only about 15 meters at about 400 km / h in the direction of Ploieşti. During this first wave of attacks, parts of the refineries were hit. More than 30 Liberators were torn apart by anti-aircraft shells in midair or fell to the ground while burning. German fighters shelled the remaining B-24s and shot down two of them.
The German fighter control center had meanwhile also recorded the third group and reported them to the fighter planes. These then turned away from the rest of the aircraft in the first group and went on an interception course in waiting position in order to be able to receive the third group on the approach to the dropping area. In fact, initially only a single B-24 appeared from the southwest, and not as originally planned from the northwest. It was a straggler of the first group. This machine had recognized the navigation error of the second group in good time and had not turned in the direction of Bucharest. She flew with a few other machines after the first group, but lost contact with the people in front because of her too low speed. This machine now attacked the target alone, with its dense defensive fire struck. She received a large number of hits. The crew got rid of the bomb load in an emergency drop and turned from Ploieşti. At the edge of the anti-aircraft lock belt, the machine was shot down by a German fighter.
The third group with its 77 Liberators was at that time still above the third marker point Floreşti. Here, as planned, she made a 90 ° turn to the southeast in the direction of Ploieşti. The railway line Floreşti - Ploieşti served them as ground orientation. After the first air alarm, the German side had set up a camouflaged anti-aircraft train on this railway line . As a result, the Liberators came into heavy flak fire of many different weapons on their flight along this line, which resulted in several B-24s being shot down. The Liberators fired at the anti-aircraft train with their on-board weapons, damaging it to such an extent that it was unable to drive. Shortly afterwards, the remaining bombers in the third group reached their assigned target area. Some of the bombs dropped by the first group had time fuses ; just as the Liberators of the third group flew over the dropping points of these bombers, they exploded and damaged some of their own machines with their detonations . In addition, the smoke from the bombs dropped in the first group impaired the orientation of the third group.
The bombs of the third group were dropped in the target area, but did not hit their intended targets. Their effect was little or no meaning. Shortly before the Liberators of the third group left the target area, the second group from Bucharest suddenly appeared in the wafting smoke. These machines were exactly on the opposite course, so that both groups flew into each other like a fan. However, the skill of the pilots avoided collisions. The German defense considered this flight maneuver to be an ingenious tactical move by the bomber groups. When the bombers finally flew over the outer anti-aircraft barrier belt of the city, they were decimated again. The remaining formation was now attacked by the waiting German fighters, who rushed from a great height on the departing B-24 and shot some machines out of the formation.
The remaining B-24 now tried to fight their way through the Romanian area that was still to be overflown. One machine fell far behind because it could only fly at a speed of 200 km / h. The pilot therefore changed course and tried to reach the British base on Cyprus . In order to get over the Balkan Mountains , they dropped weapons and other ballast. The nose wheel broke when the machine landed, but the crew was not harmed.
On the return flight, 44 B-24s were shot down by the air defense, one crashed over the Mediterranean Sea, and some landed in neutral Turkey (where another 78 crew members were interned) or in Cyprus. A B-24 bomber landed in Libya with 365 bullet holes 14 hours after take-off.
Use of the Bulgarian Air Force
On its flight over Bulgaria, the bomber formation was attacked by a squadron with ten Messerschmitt Bf 109s and six Avia B-534s , which had ascended from the airports of Vrashdebna near Sofia and Karlovo . Due to the weak armament of the Avia B-534 (four 7.92 mm machine guns), the Americans suffered only a few total losses; however, many bullet holes and injuries were the result.
The Bulgarian pilots Peter Bochew (five aerial victories ), Tschudomir Toplodolski (four aerial victories), Stojan Stojanow (five aerial victories) and Hristo Krastew (one aerial victory) scored the first kills of the war for the Bulgarian air force . They were by Tsar Boris III. awarded the Military Order for Valor, awarded for the first time in 25 years. Four weeks later they were awarded Iron Crosses with a personal certificate in the name of Adolf Hitler .
By Notabwürfe of bombs on secondary targets were the cities of Byala , Russe , Boitschinowzi , Veliko Tarnovo , Plovdiv , Lom and Oak Tulowo and villages Drenta and Elena damaged.
rating
In the relatively short but fierce air battle on the side of the Germans and Romanians, 101 soldiers died and 97 others were wounded. There were 101 dead and 238 wounded among the civilian population. The Allies lost 54 aircraft and 446 soldiers (133 were wounded and 108 soldiers were captured). Only 88 aircraft returned to Benghazi, two thirds of which were badly damaged. These were the heaviest losses the Allies suffered in air raids during the war to date.
Some of the targets were not hit in the attack. The Liberando group missed White 1 completely. This fact confirmed Joseph Goebbels in his view that the American air forces had omitted the facilities of the American Standard Oil and instead only attacked British, Belgian and French assets . The targets Red and White 4 were hit and then showed a degree of destruction of 20 to 30 percent, the target Blue it was 75 percent. The distillation capacity of the refineries sank to 40 percent after the air raids, but the Romanian workers and around 10,000 slave laborers succeeded in repairing the plants by August 18 so that production could rise to 80 percent of the level before the attack The use of previously idle capacities also contributed to this. Despite the destruction of 52,537 tons of oil stocks, 121,265 tons were saved. The total financial damage was put at six billion lei (26.4 million US dollars worth 1942, about 360 million US dollars worth 2011).
After Operation Tidal Wave , the head of the Wehrmacht High Command Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel repeatedly gave instructions on measures to minimize the effects of Allied bombings. The German presence in Ploiesti increased as a result, an additional fighter squadron and another unit of heavy anti-aircraft guns (10.5 cm to 12.8 cm), a camouflage brigade for the production of artificial fog and some radar stations were brought into position.
The US Army Intelligence Service's assessments of the effectiveness of Operation Tidal Wave were extremely optimistic in its first report, but were "reinterpreted" after viewing stereoscopic images of the area of operation. Due to the strong defense on site and the associated expected high losses in attacks as well as the long and difficult to secure flight route from Africa to Romania, further American attacks on the Romanian oil region were stopped by April 1944. August 1, 1943 was later given the nickname Black Sunday .
After the coup d'etat and change of sides in Romania , King Michael of Romania released the Allied soldiers in Romanian captivity.
Five Medals of Honor , three of which were posthumous , were given to pilots and a co-pilot. This was the majority of Medals of Honor ever awarded for a single Air Force mission. Numerous Distinguished Service Crosses were awarded to participants in Operation Tidal Wave .
literature
- Dietrich Eichholtz : End with horror: German oil policy and oil industry after Stalingrad . Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig 2010, ISBN 3-86583-476-0 .
- Dietrich Eichholtz: War for Oil. An oil empire as a German war target (1938–1943) . Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig 2006, ISBN 3-86583-119-2 .
- Andreas Hillgruber : Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu: German-Romanian Relations 1938–1944 (= Institute for European History, Mainz. Publications. ). F. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1954.
- Edward Jablonski: Airwar . tape 1 : Tragic Victories , Book II: The Big League . Doubleday, New York 1979, ISBN 0-385-14279-X (English).
- Duane Schultz: Into the Fire. Ploesti, the Most Fateful Mission of World War II . Westholme Publishing, Yardley, PA 2008, ISBN 978-1-59416-077-6 (English).
- Jay Stout: Fortress Ploesti. The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil Supply . Casemate Pub & Book Dist Llc, Havertown, PA 2010, ISBN 978-1-935149-39-2 (English).
Video material:
- Hell ride of the Liberators - air raids against the supply lines of the Axis powers. Operation Tidal Wave. Av Medien Produktion, 2010, EAN 4-260110-581677, US archive film, 60 minutes, in German and English
Web links
- Sorin Marin: The Social Consequences of the 1944 Anglo-American Bombing of Ploiești: A Grassroots Perspective. Central European University , Budapest 2008, p. 104. (PDF; 2.20 MB, accessed on March 26, 2011)
Video links:
- 1943 Daily Life in Ploesti Before the Bombing on YouTube
- The Bombing of Romanian Oil Fields in WWII on YouTube
- vimeo.com , Drew White: Raid On Ploiesti [sic!], 8:44 minutes, without comment
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i Hell ride of the Liberators - air raids against the supply lines of the Axis powers. Operation Tidal Wave. Av Medien Produktion, 2010, EAN 4-260110-581677, US archive film, 60 minutes. (German English)
- ↑ Enemy Oil Committee, Western Axis Committee: Estimated Oil And Refinery Output In Axis, Europe, 1943. fischer-tropsch.org ( Memento of March 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF, 2 MB, accessed on March 26, 2011)
- ^ A b c d e Marin Sorin: The Social Consequences of the 1944 Anglo-American Bombing of Ploieşti: A Grassroots Perspective. Central European University , Budapest 2008, etd.ceu.hu (PDF; 2.20 MB) accessed on March 26, 2011. (English)
- ↑ a b c d e James Dugan, Carroll Steward: Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 August 1943 . Potomac Books Inc., London 2002, pp. 31-47, 196, 222 (English).
- ^ Rainer Karlsch , Raymond G. Stokes: Factor oil: the mineral oil industry in Germany 1859-1974 . CH Beck, 2003, ISBN 3-406-50276-8 , pp. 239 .
- ↑ Eugen Bantea: Miza petrolului in vâltoraea războiului . Edition Militară, Bucharest 1983 (Romanian).
- ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: Air War 1939–1945. Südwest-Verlag, Munich 1978, ISBN 3-517-00605-X , p. 270 ff
- ↑ a b c d e f g Gheorghe Buzatu: A History of Romanian Oil Vol Ii . Editura Mica Valahie, Bucharest 2004, ISBN 973-7858-68-9 , p. 243 ff . (English).
- ^ A b c Jay Stout: Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil Supply . Casemate Pub & Book Dist Llc, Havertown, PA 2010, ISBN 978-1-935149-39-2 , pp. 76 (English).
- ↑ Slovakia and Bulgarian Asses of WW-II. Osprey Publishing, 2004, p. 75.
- ^ A b Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, Detlef Vogel: German Reich on the Defensive (= The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 7 ). Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001, ISBN 3-421-05507-6 , pp. 53 .
- ↑ Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator ( Memento of May 12, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed on March 26, 2011.
- ↑ Istoria şi artileriei ratchetelor antiaeriene române . Ed. Modelism, Bucharest 1996 (Romanian).
- ^ Donald L. Miller: Masters of the air: America's bomber boys who fought the air war against Nazi Germany . Simon and Schuster, London 2006, ISBN 0-7432-3544-4 , pp. 187-192 (English).