Operation U-gō
date | March 1944 to June 1944 |
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place | Manipur (British India) |
output | Allied victory |
Parties to the conflict | |
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Axis Powers : Japan Azad Hind ( INA )
|
|
Commander | |
Troop strength | |
7 infantry divisions 1 tank brigade 2 infantry brigades |
5 infantry divisions 1 tank regiment Approx. 85,000 men |
losses | |
17,000-21,500 |
30,000 dead, |
Japanese conquest 1941/42
Bilin - Sittang - Pegu - Toungoo - Taukkyan - Yunnan-Burma - Shwedaung - Prome - Yenangyaung
1942/43
Arakan I - The Hump - Chindits
1944
Arakan II ( Ngakyedauk ) - U-gō ( Imphal - Sangshak - Tennis Court - Kohima ) - Myitkyina - Mountain Song
1944/45
Meiktila / Mandalay - Pokoku -
Arakan III ( Kangaw and height 170 - Ramree ) - Operation Dracula ( Elephant Point ) - Sittang
The Operation U-gō (Japaneseウ号作戦) was by the Japanese against the spring of 1944 Indian British Army during the Burma campaign in World War II out. The offensive, which began on March 8, 1944, took place in the northeastern Indian regions of Manipur and in the Naga Hills (part of the Assam province ). The aim was to cut off the Allied supply routes from British India that were running there and that supplied the Allied forces in Assam and brought supplies to China . The offensive culminated in the Battle of Kohima , where the Japanese and their Indian allies were repulsed with heavy losses until the end of June. Most of the approach and fighting took place in the inaccessible jungle area of Northern Burma.
prehistory
In mid-1943 the Japanese command organization in Burma was reorganized. The previous General Iida Shōjirō was recalled to Japan and set up a new headquarters for the Burma Regional Army under Lieutenant General Kawabe Masakazu .
After a council of war on December 23, 1943, Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi , Commander in Chief of the Japanese Southern Army in Singapore , approved a new plan of attack against British India. Lieutenant General Kawabe was assigned to Operation U-gō in Northern Burma. The Japanese 15th Army under General Renya Mutaguchi was designated for the attack, which was planned in the border area with the province of Assam . General Mutaguchi strongly endorsed this invasion and ordered five infantry divisions to cross the Indian border. The commander of the Japanese 5th Air Force Division , Lieutenant General Tazu, however, had no confidence in the planned attack plan and rightly feared the counter-operation of the Chindits , who operated as guerrilla troops behind the lines after air landings and threatened supplies.
In August 1943, the British and Chinese set up the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), whose leadership was taken over by Lord Louis Mountbatten at the end of 1943 . The British ground forces were continuously strengthened and placed under the command of General William Slim as part of the 14th Army established in October 1943 . In Ledo , the headquarters of major reaction from Chinese troops and by the US General was Joseph Stilwell led Northern Combat Area Command, the end of 1943 with their own attacks begin in Central Burma wanted. Through his military intelligence service, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones , the commander of the British-Indian IV Corps, had learned of the general attack intentions of the Japanese and immediately received reinforcements from the Army High Command of the 14th Army.
Japanese attack planning
General Sakurai , commander of the 28th Army commanded the 55th Division (Major General Hanaya ) in early February a diversionary attack in Arakan , the operation Ha-gō (5 and 23 February 1944) to start. This attack was intended to withdraw the Allied reserves from Assam and give the impression that the Japanese were attacking in the direction of Chittagong . By the end of February 1944, the Allies had moved 6 divisions, a paratrooper brigade and a command brigade to the Arakan area ; these forces were able to successfully repel Hanaya's offensive everywhere.
The Japanese 15th Army planned to launch the main attack on Manipur in the first week of March. The opposite British-Indian IV Army Corps was distributed on a 320-kilometer front line from Tiddim northwards via Imphal to Kohima , which ran roughly parallel to the Chindwin . Three Japanese divisions were supposed to drive the Allied units from their front positions and throw them back on Imphal. Another aim of the Japanese, with the help of the Indian National Army under Chandra Bose, was to exert political pressure on the anti-British groups in India in order to induce them to commit acts of sabotage against the British.
The Japanese 33rd Division under Lieutenant General Motoso Yanagida had to bypass the 17th Indian Division at Tiddim and then threaten Imphal from the south. The Japanese 15th Division under Major General Tsunoru Yamauchi had to attack the 20th Indian Division at Tamu and capture Imphal from the east. General Yamauchi's troops were supported by the 14th Tank Regiment, which was supported with 66 tanks under Lieutenant Colonel Nobuo Ueda and the 3rd Heavy Artillery Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Kazuo Mitsui. In a later phase, the Japanese 31st Division under Lieutenant General Satō Kōtoku had to seek the occupation of Kohima on the Imphal-Dimapur road. Units of the 1st National Indian Division covered the left flank of the Japanese 33rd Division. The special services group Bahadur acted as scouts and was hired to infiltrate the British lines in order to disintegrate the units of the British Indian Army . In a separate side operation, the 31st Division had to encompass Imphal in order to occupy the Allied supply base in the Brahmaputra Valley and Dimapur . Due to the persistence of Chandra Bose, the two brigades of the Indian National Army (about 7,000 men) concentrated in the Rangoon area were assigned to the attacks at Imphal. The most important goal was to control the border town of Kohima, which was located on a 1,200 meter high pass between Dimapur and Imphal.
Allied plans
The Allies wanted to start their own offensive in early 1944. The military commanders in Assam and Arakan sought to improve the health, training, and morale of units in the 14th Army. These efforts were largely successful, particularly in terms of communication, administration in the hinterland and, above all, the supply of fresh rations and medicines. The Allies had developed methods to successfully counter the Japanese tactics, which operated with mobile, comprehensive combat groups. In particular, the dependence of the Japanese on their supply lines was recognized and this was severely disturbed by targeted commandos by the Chindits . The British Indian XV. Corps under Lieutenant General Philip A. Christison advanced in the coastal province of Arakan, while the British IV Corps under General Geoffrey Sconnes advanced between Tamu and Tiddim to Tschindwin. These two divisions were widely separated and therefore susceptible to enemy attack.
The British-Indian IV. And XXXIII. Corps numbered almost 120,000 men and 120 tanks with the supply troops. Opposite the Japanese 15th Army developed 84,280 Japanese and 7,000 Indians. General Mutagutchi directed overall operations from his headquarters in Maymyo , a town 300 kilometers east of the front. General Giffard , the commander in chief of the British 11th Army Group in North India, ordered the 14th Army to move its troops from the Arakan Mountains as quickly as possible to the threatened area.
Participating forces of the 14th Army
IV Corps (Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones)
- Indian 7th Infantry Division (Geoffrey Charles Evans)
- Indian 17th Infantry Division (David Tennant Cowan)
- Indian 20th Infantry Division ( Douglas Gracey )
- Indian 23rd Infantry Division (Ouvry Lindfield Roberts)
- 50th Paratrooper Brigade (MR Hope-Thompson)
- Indian 254th Tank Brigade
XXXIII. Corps (Lieutenant General Sir Montagu Stopford )
- British 2nd Infantry Division (John Grover later Major-General Cameron Nicholson)
- Indian 5th Infantry Division (Harold Rawdon Briggs)
- Indian 19th Infantry Division (Thomas Wynford Rees)
- 50th tank brigade
3 Chindits Brigades (Major General Orde Wingate from March 24th Brig. Gen. Walter Lentaigne)
- 14th, 16th and 23rd Brigade (Thomas Brodie, Bernard Fergusson , Lancelot Perowne)
The enterprise
![](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/89/Soldiers_of_IJA_15th_Army_are_carrying_a_Type_92_battalion_gun.jpg/220px-Soldiers_of_IJA_15th_Army_are_carrying_a_Type_92_battalion_gun.jpg)
Already in the night of March 7th to 8th 1944 the Japanese 33rd Division under General Yanagida began the attack from the bridgehead on the border river Chindwin near Kalewa. The Japanese 214th Regiment marched on to Tongzang, while in the south the 215th Regiment crossed the Manipur sector via Fort White. The front of the British-Indian 17th Division (General DT Cowan) between Tiddim and Tongzang was breached in a few days and, from March 13, was pushed back northwards west of the Manipur to Imphal. There the Japanese tried to interrupt the east-west connection from Bishnupur to Silchar . A separate combat group under General T. Yamamoto was directed from Kalemyo through the Kabaw valley, then swung north to clear the way for the supplies of the 15th Division. The British-Indian 20th Division (Major General Gracey) was concentrated south of Palel and near Tamu and forced to retreat to Imphal. The Japanese 31st Division had the task of proceeding from Homalin and Tamanthi over 110 to 160 kilometers long footpaths and several mountain ridges into Nagaland . The British-Indian 23rd Division (Major General Roberts) acted southwest of Imphal as the reserve of the threatened IV Corps. In Imphal, the 50th Paratrooper Brigade under Brigadier General MR Hope-Thompson was flown in and advanced to Ukhrul , two brigades of the Indian 15th Division followed on the same route to Imphal. General Sconnes threw units of the Indian 23rd Division into Torbung and covered the retreat of the Gurkha regiments of the 17th Division by counter-attacks by his tank detachments . On March 11, the Yamamoto combat group reached the battle line of the British-Indian 20th Division at Maw and Witok with a few tanks. General Gracey withdrew his units south of Palel to the plateau of Shenam, entrenched his units on the so-called "Nippon Hill" and allowed himself to be circumvented and enclosed.
On March 15, further northeast on the upper reaches of the Chindwin, the offensive of the Japanese 15th and 31st divisions between Sittaung and Paungbyin began and advanced quickly in the direction of Ukhrul. The 31st Division under Lieutenant General Sato had orders to cross the upper reaches of the Chindwin at Homalin and Tamanthi and then to advance over a mountain range to Jessami on Imphal. On the night of March 16, the 15th Division under Lieutenant General Masafumi Yamauchi was able to unite with the Yamamoto Combat Group, which was approaching from the south.
The left wing of the 31st Division, Major General Shigesburo Miyazaki's combat group, which advanced on Ukhrul, came into engagement with the Indian 50th Parachute Brigade on March 19 at Sheldon's Corner and on March 22 at the Battle of Sangshak was almost completely exploded. The Miyazaki combat group reached Maram by March 27, erected a roadblock there and blocked the way to Kohima. The 58th Regiment of the Japanese 31st Division occupied Jessami on April 1st after the weak Allied Assam detachment had been crushed.
Battle for Kohima and Imphal
General Slim had the Indian 5th Division (Major General HR Briggs) flown in from the Arakan area to Kohima as reinforcement from March 19 after the Japanese attack. The high command in the Dimapur section took over the newly introduced XXXIII. Corps under General Montagu Stopford . The important supply line to the north should definitely be kept here. The British 2nd Division (Major General Grover ) was already available as support, the Indian 7th Division was expected as reinforcement. The threatened traffic junction Imphal was defended by the Indian 20th and 23rd Divisions and the 161st Brigade (Brig. General Warren).
On April 4th, the first troops of the 31st division, exhausted by marching and fighting, reached Kohima, which was completely enclosed by April 7th. The Allied troops hurriedly consolidated their positions on the ridge of the Naga Hills. The Japanese immediately began firing with their light mountain guns. By April 16, the Japanese tried to conquer the mountain ridge at Kohima, a height that dominated the road from Dimapur to Imphal, on which the supplies of the IV Corps depended. On April 14, a counterattack by the British 2nd Division threw back the Japanese advance guard at Zubza and shocked the 161st Brigade, which had been trapped by the Japanese at Jotsoma. Then the 4th Brigade bypassed the Japanese positions in the south and advanced from the south against Kohima until the end of April, but was initially stopped in front of the heights of Aradura. Until April 17th, the Japanese 31st Division was able to tighten the ring around Kohima, although its own supply was no longer guaranteed. The flagging Japanese attack enabled the British to bring supplies and relief to Kohima on April 18, including some Lee Grant tanks. From April 20, the British 2nd Division was able to unite with the defenders. On April 23, Satō ordered in a last-ditch effort to take Kohima, but it failed. From the end of April 1944, the 23rd Tschindits Brigade marched across all communication routes of the Japanese and visibly weakened their fighting power off Kohima.
Between April 18 and June 30, the isolated troops under General Sconnes were reinforced and supplied with supplies by the Allied 14th Air Fleet (Lieutenant General Claire Chennault ) on 29,660 flights with those of the Indian 5th and 7th divisions flown in Time on the return flight, around 13,000 wounded and 43,000 unfit supply personnel flown out. In the middle of May the IV. Corps from the Imphal area began a counter-offensive with the Indian 5th Division, which pushed north in order to connect with the troops that General Stopford was sending south from Kohima. North of Kohima, on April 28th, a northern encirclement of the Japanese defense line began by the 5th Brigade of the British 2nd Division, which took Merema on May 3rd and broke through against the heights to the south near the village of Naga. Between May 15 and 31, all Allied attacks on Naga were successfully repulsed by the Japanese. On June 1, parts of the Indian 7th Division, which had followed in this section, managed to break through to the south. This success enabled the 5th Brigade to bypass the strong enemy position on the heights north of Aradura and to roll up the Japanese front. On May 31, Satō withdrew his 31st Division from Kohima, which had shrunk to 8,000 men, and ordered the withdrawal.
Meanwhile, the fighting raged on for Imphal. Although the Allied progress is slow, the Japanese 15th Division fighting at Ukhrul also had to decline because of its catastrophic supply situation. The Indian 19th Division had joined the action of the British 2nd Division. At the same time the further south operating Japanese 33rd Division (now under General Nobuo Tanaka) could be pushed back. The Japanese combat group Miyazaki remained behind with 750 men to continue to block the road. The British 2nd Division (now under Lieutenant General Nicholson) finally succeeded in reopening the road from Kohima to Imphal on June 22nd and lifting the siege of Imphal. General Mutaguchi ordered new attacks, but by the end of June it was clear that the starving and sick Japanese formations were no longer effective. When Mutaguchi realized that none of his units was capable of attacking, he had the operation canceled on July 3. On July 7th, in desperation because of its hopeless situation, Mutaguchi went to a hill overlooking Imphal and said a ritual prayer. The next day, July 8th, the Japanese received orders to retreat from the Manipur section to Burma.
Result
The defeat at Kohima and Imphal was one of the greatest defeats in Japanese history up to that time. Victory would not have been possible without the absolute mastery of the air by the Allies. The British and Indian forces had lost 16,987 dead, missing and wounded. The Japanese lost about 53,000 men, including 13,376 dead. Most of these losses were due to hunger, illness and exhaustion. The defeat led to changes in command within the Japanese army in Burma. General Mutaguchi took over from several of his division commanders during operations before being discharged himself on August 30th. General Kawabe, whose health was in poor health, was also removed from his post. On July 5, General Sato was replaced by Lieutenant General Kawada Tsuchitarō. Many of the senior staff officers from the 15th Army Headquarters and the Burma Regional Army were appointed as new divisional or regimental commanders.
literature
- Peter Young (Ed.): Atlas for the Second World War. Südwest Verlag, Munich 1974, pp. 178-186.
- Eddy Bauer: The Hell of Burma (= The Second World War. ). Lekturama et al., Rotterdam et al. 1979, pp. 107-122
- Robert Lyman: Kohima 1944 Osprey Publishing, 2010, ISBN 978-1-84603-939-3