Japanese conquest of Burma

General Stilwell retreating to British India, early May 1942

date	January 1942 to July 1942
place	Burma (today's Myanmar)
output	Japanese victory
Territorial changes	Japan occupies large parts of Burma
consequences	Japanese occupation of Burma , closure of the Burma Road

Parties to the conflict
United Kingdom United Kingdom, British India, China (from spring 1942) United States (material support, American Volunteer Group ) British India China Republic 1928 United States 48	Japanese Empire Japanese Empire Thailand (from May 1942) Burmese Independence Army Thailand
Commander
United Kingdom Archibald Wavell Thomas Hutton Harold Alexander William Slim Luo Zhuoying Joseph Stilwell United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom China Republic 1928 United States 48	Japan Iida Shōjirō Charun Rattanakun Seriroengrit Aung San Thailand
Troop strength
United Kingdom About 60,000 (1941) China Republic 1928 42,000 (from spring 1942)	JapanAbout 31,000 (December 1941) About 80,000 (April 1942) Thailand 35,000
losses
United Kingdom 13,463 dead, wounded and prisoners of war	Japan 2,143 dead

Overview - Pacific War

The Japanese conquest of Burma was part of the Burma campaign during the Pacific War in World War II . Allied units fought against troops of the Japanese Empire and its allies. The fighting in Burma (now Myanmar ) began in January 1942, a few weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent entry into the war by the United States . The Japanese troops of the 15th Army , commanded by Lieutenant General Iida Shōjirō , crossed the border between Thailand , which they occupied in 1941, and British Burma in mid-January 1942 . They managed to reach the Burmese capital, Rangoon, within a few weeks . The aim of the Japanese attack on Burma it was that on the eastern foothills of the Himalayas extending replenishment and supply lines between British India (British Raj) and the Chinese Kuomintang Troops in Chongqing cut-held northern territory in order in this way to 1937 End the ongoing Second Sino-Japanese War . During the rapid Japanese advance, the British and Indian troops of the British Commonwealth , as well as some Chinese units of the national Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek , who took part in the fighting from March 1942, were almost completely wiped out within a few months. In doing so, they had to retreat to the Chindwin River and thus give up Burma.

background

British-Indian troops had captured Burma in 1885 as a result of the Third Anglo-Burmese War . The country was incorporated into the Crown Colony of British India a year later . The ruling Konbaung dynasty was overturned and the country was taken over by a British Governor General who was under the Secretary of State for the Colonies . Several minor uprisings in the country were put down by the British colonial powers between 1895 and 1932. The largest rebellion, the Saya San uprising , broke out in 1930 and was not crushed until two years later with the subsequent execution of Saya Sans. After the uprising, British rule was no longer challenged. In 1937, Burma was officially separated from British India. A new constitution and the status of a crown colony should give the Burmese greater opportunities to participate in the administration of their country.

Simultaneously with the separation from British India, however, nationalist activities also grew in Burma, especially under the student Dobama-Asiayone movement (“We Burmese Association”; informally called Thakins ). The movement had been in close contact with the Japanese since 1940. At the end of 1941, under Japanese protection, a 1,000-strong force of Burmese in exile was set up in Bangkok . It served as a cadre forge for the later expansion of the Burmese collaboration forces. In 1941, the nationalist Prime Minister of Burma U Saw tried to achieve Burmese independence in talks with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt . After being rejected by both sides, U Saw tried to contact the Japanese to agree on the country's independence after a Japanese invasion. However, he was bugged and arrested by the British secret service.

Commonwealth military situation

At the end of the 1930s, the British armed forces in Burma, which had previously been part of the Indian Army, were combined into a single unit, the Burma Army, which consisted of British and Indian soldiers. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 was seen by Burmese nationalists as an opportunity to force concessions from the British colonial powers in return for support for the war effort. Others, including the anti-colonial Thakin movement under Kodaw Hmaing , refused to support the war, and the Thakins were already awaiting an imminent Japanese invasion that would liberate Burma from British rule. After the German occupation of France in 1940, the British Governor General Archibald Cochrane tried to get more arms and ammunition , artillery pieces , tanks and planes for the Burma Army, believing they would be in the event of a Japanese invasion unable to withstand enemy troops. However, deliveries from the United Kingdom decreased noticeably as all weapons produced were needed to defend against the expected German invasion of the British Isles. Governor Cochrane could therefore only fall back on the material of the India Army.

Commonwealth troop strength

At the end of 1941 the Burma Army consisted of only one infantry division with three brigades:

1st Burmese Infantry Division
- 1st Burmese Infantry Brigade
- 2nd Burmese Infantry Brigade
- 13th Indian Infantry Brigade

The divisional headquarters were stationed in Toungoo , and their brigades were spread across southern Burma and Shan State . The division was commanded by Major-General James Bruce Scott .

The Japanese invasion of Thailand in December 1941 (which eventually led to the signing of a secret alliance treaty between Japan and Thailand) made the military situation in Burma much worse. Now the entire eastern border of the country was threatened by an invasion.

In January 1942, shortly before the Japanese invasion, a second infantry division, the 17th Indian, was transferred from India to Burma. This was set up in the summer of 1941 and was originally intended for use in Iraq. Due to the Japanese invasion of the Malayas , the 17th division was split up before they left: two brigades were shipped to Malaya, the third remained in Burma to defend the country. She was stationed in Moulmein and took command of all troops in southern Burma. Its commanding officer was Major General John Smyth .

The units, which were stationed in Burma in early 1942, consisted of around 50,000 soldiers, including 4,621 officers. Around 30,000 soldiers were of Indian (mostly Sikhs and Gurkhas ) or Burmese origin. The rest of the soldiers and almost the entire officer corps were, as was customary at the time, British. Except for the British units, however, the rest of the troops were insufficiently trained and armed.

In November 1941, the Royal Air Force in Burma had only 69 P-40 Warhawks , 28 Hawker Hurricanes and about 30 Brewster Buffalos available on modern fighters . Not all machines were operational and many were inferior to Japanese aircraft. After the first Japanese air raids on Rangoon and other cities, more hurricanes and a squadron of Bristol Blenheim bombers were moved from the Middle East to Burma. The No. 221 Group combined units of the RAF were under the command of Air Vice Marshal Donald F. Stevenson. In addition, a squadron of the American Volunteer Group was deployed from Rangoon.

Great Britain and, under the Lend Lease Act , also the USA promised Governor Cochrane to ensure adequate armaments by March 1942, and the first deliveries from India arrived in early January.

Since January 1942, Burma has been part of the defense area of ABDACOM under the direction of the former British Commander in Chief in India, Archibald Wavell . Wavell installed his previous Chief of Staff in India, Lieutenant-General Thomas Hutton , as Commander-in-Chief in Burma, whose headquarters were in Rangoon.

Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma

The British troops in the country in 1941 were joined in February and March 1942 by the Chinese troops of the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma, sent from Chiang Kai-shek . This force was supposed to help the British defend Burma against invasion in order to maintain China's supply and supply route from northern Burma to Chongqing . The soldiers who came to Burma in the spring of 1942 were reinforced by two other national Chinese armies in the course of the campaign. The Chinese Expeditionary Force was under the command of Chiang Kai-shek until the beginning of March 1942, then under the American military envoy General Joseph Stilwell .

Japanese preparations

Oil wells near Yenangyaung, 1910

Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war, plans for the invasion and conquest of Southeast Asia were formulated in the Imperial Army Ministry in Tokyo . The Imperial General Staff set the final plan of conquest as early as February 1941. The Philippines , several American bases in the Pacific such as Wake Island and the Mariana Islands , the Dutch East Indies , British Malaya , Singapore , British Borneo and Burma were to be attacked a few days after the declaration of war. Burma had numerous oil wells around the city of Yenangyaung . They were an important resource for the Japanese war industry. Burma also produced linen , rubber and large quantities of rice . Since Burma borders directly on French Indochina and Thailand , occupied by Japanese troops in 1940, the British bases in Burma were in the direct area of the Japanese armed forces. The attack on Burma had to take place as soon as possible after the declaration of war, before the British themselves could launch an attack on Indochina. It was also crucial to cut off enemy troops in Burma from the British fortress of Singapore in order to cut off the supply and supply lines of the defenders of Singapore. Therefore, the invasion of Burma shortly after the start of the war was an inevitable consequence.

Attack plan

The Japanese General Staff had already drawn up a detailed plan of operations in October 1941. This provided for the following:

First, the British units in the south were to be attacked. They were to be cut off from the rest of the soldiers in the north by a pincer movement . After that, Rangoon was to be taken.
After the capture of Rangoon, the remaining British troops were to be forced on the defensive by a series of coordinated attacks and air strikes and dispersed by a further advance. After that, the main cities of the north, such as Mandalay and Sagaing , should be captured.
After all, the fleeing British were to be pursued and completely smashed near the Indian border.

The plan was endorsed by War Minister Tojo and Emperor Hirohito. In order to interrupt communication with Singapore, the border area between Burma and Malaya should also be taken by Japanese troops. At the same time as the Japanese advance, heavy bombing raids were to take place on Rangoon, Mandalay and the important Burma Road .

Intended troops

The 15th Army was planned for the conquest of Burma , which at the beginning of the invasion consisted of the 33rd and 55th Infantry Divisions , a total of around 31,000 men. In March 1942, the 18th and 56th Divisions joined them, bringing the strength to around 80,000 men. The 15th Army was under the command of Lieutenant General Iida Shōjirō . They were well-trained soldiers, mostly veterans, most of whom had been transferred to Thailand from China and Manchukuo . Most of the soldiers were armed with relatively simple Arisaka Type 99 rifles, however, and the number of artillery pieces and machine guns was particularly small. Supply problems also arose as there were few trucks and motorized units. There was a lack of telecommunications equipment, tanks, telephones, large-caliber ammunition and other goods, and the shortage of radios meant that the connection between the individual units was very prone to interference. In addition, the Thai Northwest Army fought on the side of the Japanese invaders in Burma . Their troops were supplied by the Japanese with weapons and ammunition, means of transport and artillery.

course

The Japanese invasion of Burma can be divided into two different phases according to the Japanese plan of attack. The first phase included the first Japanese offensive. The Japanese troops were able to conquer the entire south of Burma ( Tenasserim ) and secure several important cities, such as Moulmein and Kawkareik . They defeated the British and Indian troops in a battle near the river Bilin and in another battle at the bridge of the Sittang , but could not encircle them and destroy them completely. On March 7, 1942, Rangoon was taken by the Japanese. In the second phase, the British troops withdrew to northern Burma and were finally driven out of the country after several skirmishes by the Japanese troops that followed them.

First phase

Advance on Rangoon

Entry of Japanese troops

Troops of the 15th Japanese Army on the Burmese border shortly before the invasion, January 1942

The 33rd Division began its attack on January 16 at 7:00 p.m. with an attack on the left wing of the British defense line. The British commander in the area, General James Bruce Scott , was surprised by the Japanese advance; his troops could not withstand the attack for long and retreated that night in complete disorder. The 33rd Division then went in pursuit to catch the British at the few crossings of the Salween and to encircle them. Scott managed to gather his troops and organize a counterattack only the following day, but it failed. Scott then finally decided to withdraw and completely cleared the area with his two troubled divisions. On January 19, the British reached one of the few bridges over the Salween and withdrew to the other side of the river. The Japanese had thus achieved a breakthrough through the left wing of the British.

The 55th Division launched its attack against the British right wing, held by the 17th Division, on the morning of January 19th. At first she met bitter resistance and suffered heavy losses in some cases. Only after the tactical successes of the 33rd Division on the evening of the same day did these troops also manage to break up the British front and conquer Victoria Point with a battalion . In the next few days, the first Japanese airfield on Burmese soil was built on Victoria Point by Japanese pioneers and Chinese forced laborers . The important city of Tavoy fell on the night of the 19th. With the capture of Tavoy, the Japanese cut off all routes of retreat for the British, so that escape by land was no longer possible. Panic broke out among the soldiers of the 17th Division, and the following day they were ordered to go to safety by sea. 4,700 soldiers had escaped to Rangoon on several transport ships by January 23.

There was great confusion on the British side these days. The first Japanese air strikes against Victoria Point and the towns of Mergui and Moulmein had cut telephone connections. The only source of information was the operational aircraft of the two RAF reconnaissance squadrons in Rangoon. After the heavy defeats of his troops, General Thomas J. Hutton , commander of the English armed forces in southern Burma, asked the General Staff in Rangoon for permission to switch to flexible warfare. He even considered a complete retreat in the Moulmein area. However, this request was refused; Hutton was instructed to defend every yard south of the Salween.

Japanese advance on Rangoon

The Burma Strait, the main military artery between Burma and southern China.

After the British withdrew from Victoria Point and Mergui, the British General Staff in Rangoon decided to build a new line of defense (Main Line of Resistance) in the Moulmein- Kawkareik area . General Hutton was given the task of keeping this line with his troops at all costs. This put him in a conflict with his chief of staff Smyth, who was of the opinion that one should retreat further as far as the Sittang River, in order to calmly gather and reorganize the forces there for a later counterattack. In this conflict, Hutton, supported by the English General Staff, prevailed with his uncompromising attitude. The British troops now withdrew from southern Burma to the new line of defense. There were considerable casualties among the retreating units due to the uninterrupted bombing of the Japanese air force. The 16th Indian Brigade, which was already stationed in Kawkareik, was attacked by the Japanese on February 22nd and driven out of the place. Their withdrawal turned out to be chaotic and could not be stopped by the commanding officers. All other Japanese attacks, however, initially failed due to the fierce resistance of the British. Despite the desperate defense by General Hutton's soldiers, Moulmein finally fell on January 30th. About 11,000 British soldiers were able to leave the city on cargo ships, but 4,000 more soldiers were killed or taken prisoner.

Battle of the Bilin River

With the conquest of Moulmein and Kawkareik, the British line of defense finally collapsed. General Hutton ordered his troops to cross the Salween and retreat to the Bilin River . The Indian soldiers, who were supposed to hold their position on the Bilin River against the soldiers of the 33rd Division, who had crossed the river via a pontoon bridge , could not long withstand the overwhelming force of the Japanese. After three days of fighting, the position had to be finally given up. The remnants of Hutton's troops then withdrew to Sittang in complete dissolution . Due to the long fighting, however, there were also signs of exhaustion on the Japanese side, and the 33rd Division had to be replaced by the 55th. Due to these delays, the advance on Rangoon could not be continued as planned. There were also other difficulties. The dense jungle and heavy rains hampered rapid progress; an orderly and regular supply of the Japanese troops was soon no longer possible. This brought the Japanese advance on Rangoon to a standstill.

Battle of the Sittang Bridge

After the Battle of Bilin, Hutton Smyth had given permission to retreat across the Sittang and the exhausted troops of the 17th Indian Division began a forced march to reach the last intact bridge as quickly as possible. The almost 800-meter-long steel railway bridge over the Sittang was prepared by pioneers for military vehicles to cross and, as a precaution, charged with explosives. However, two Japanese regiments managed to advance quickly the following day. They threatened to reach the bridge earlier than the British troops and cut them off. The British also suffered from severe water shortages and were bombed by enemy aircraft and, by mistake, by their own aircraft, which led to the failure of numerous vehicles. On February 21, General Smyth's British headquarters near the village of Kyaikto came under fire. But the Indian 48th Brigade was able to reach the bridge on the same day and began to cross it. Since Smyth feared an intervention by Japanese airborne troops , he ordered a Gurkha regiment to the west side of the bridge to protect it from attacks. In the meantime, the Japanese had reached the eastern area in front of the bridge and began with heavy fire, which killed several Indian medics at the end of the bridge. The bridge itself was not hit.

General Smyth now faced a difficult decision. If he ordered the bridge to be blown up, two of his brigades, which were still involved in retreat battles along the road, would no longer be able to cross it. In the other case, the bridge threatened to fall into the hands of the Japanese, who would then have a free run to Rangoon. The fight became more and more confusing. The individual soldiers now tried to get through to the bridge on their own. There was chaos in the British ranks. After it seemed impossible to defend the bridge, General Smyth gave the order to blow it up at 5:30 a.m. on February 23, believing that a second brigade had now safely crossed the river. The charges detonated shortly afterwards, causing the structure to collapse. After all the boats suitable for crossing had been destroyed as a precaution, the soldiers who stayed behind had no choice but to cross the Sittang by swimming or on self-made rafts, which only a few succeeded in doing. Individual Britons were shot or taken prisoner of war. After this “disaster”, Smyth was replaced by Brigadier David “Punch” Cowan as division commander.

After the battle, the 17th Infantry Division only consisted of 3,484 soldiers, about 40% of its original strength. Although the Japanese troops could have destroyed the enemy division, a quick advance on Rangoon was more important to them. The blown bridge could be repaired by the Japanese pioneers within only six hours, whereby the Japanese were able to cross the Sittang in full strength briefly within a few days. During the subsequent advance towards Rangoon, the Japanese troops carried with them about a third of the material left behind by the British soldiers on the Sittang.

Conquest of Rangoon

Battle for Pegu

Japanese troops of the 55th Division in front of the Shwethalyaung Buddha near Pegu, March 1942

Meanwhile, General Wavell had left ABDACOM and returned to his post as Commander-in-Chief in India. General Harold Alexander had taken over Hutton's post and Smyth had been replaced by Cowan. Two fresh brigades, the 63rd Indian and British 7th Panzer Brigades, had landed in Rangoon. In view of the Japanese superiority, Alexander had decided not to defend Rangoon, but he wanted at least to show the Japanese a strong defensive readiness by means of a secure and only resisting retreat.

On the afternoon of March 2, all combat-ready troops, reinforced by M3 Stuart tanks of the 7th Panzer Brigade ( Brigadier John H. Astice ) and troops of the 63rd Infantry Brigade , were able to take their positions in the new Main Line of Resistance off Rangoon . Several Indian formations that had already been attacked by Japanese troops supported by Type 95 Ha-Go tanks were unable to occupy their positions. In this way the Japanese achieved a breakthrough; British infantry and tank units tried to wipe out the Japanese troops at Pegu . Firefights broke out, with poor visibility and radio communications. The battle, however, was quite confusing: the British troops were ultimately ordered to retreat through Pegu to Hlegu in order to meet the other units of the 7th Panzer Brigade there. Meanwhile, Pegu had been completely destroyed by the Japanese, and the advancing British infantry that passed through the town came under fire from isolated Japanese snipers .

Alexander's main goal, however, of making the Japanese believe that Rangoon would be defended, was achieved. On March 6th, the evacuation of Rangoon was ordered; The aim of the British was to withdraw via the crossroads at Taukkyan in the direction of Prome , around 300 kilometers north of Rangoon.

Conquest of the capital

Following this battle, the Burma Army was ordered to evacuate Rangoon on March 7th . The British RAF squadrons and the American planes of the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) had been embroiled in fierce aerial battles in the previous weeks, destroying many. Japanese bombers had carried out successful air strikes against the city since early February, destroying or damaging many facilities. In particular, the port facilities on the Irrawaddy delta were destroyed by the enemy attacks. General Alexander and General Wavell ordered on March 7th, when about 4,000 soldiers had already left the city, a mining of the most important military installations. About 400 Allied pioneers stayed in town to set up the cargoes. All retreating soldiers of the Burma Army were punished with death on March 7th, deserting the enemy .

On the same day, the Japanese major attack on Rangoon began with bombing by dive bombers and fighter planes. There was also massive fire from field artillery and smaller mortars . The broad-based ground offensive began at 9:00 a.m. The motorized units of the 55th Division immediately advanced against the city center, while the infantry secured the surrounding hills against light resistance. On March 8, the first Japanese tanks, accompanied by infantry and motorcycles, reached the docks on the banks of the Irrawaddy and were able to secure the entire city center. In the afternoon Iida also arrived in the city, occupied some buildings with the staff in the center and established his headquarters there.

Japanese pursuit operations

General Iida then ordered several units to weaken the enemy marching on the only still passable road in the direction of Prome by means of minor attacks. Several mines were installed on the road and air strikes against the British increased during March 7th. Most of the British vehicles were destroyed as a result, killing several hundred men. On the evening of March 6th, the Japanese troops of the 214th Infantry Regiment had set up a heavy roadblock north of Taukkyan. Now the entire Burma army evacuating Rangoon could be stopped. Smaller skirmishes near the barrier on the morning of March 7th killed around a hundred Indian soldiers. The Japanese troops have been able to hold the lock so far. General Iida hoped that the advance of the 33rd Division would encircle the entire enemy force on the flanks of the road. Meanwhile, however, Alexander had ordered various attacks to avoid the encirclement. About 5,500 soldiers from the 7th Tank Brigade, 7th Hussars and Gloucestershire Regiment were moved to the front to take the barrier by frontal assault . Other reserves also arrived there. When about 6000 soldiers and sixteen tanks were finally gathered in front of the barrier, they began the first attack. The tanks and about 400 infantrymen attacked first, but suffered heavy losses and had to retreat after a few minutes of fighting. The Japanese troops at the lock probably did not suffer any losses. The British troops could attack again only after a few hours. These troops too were repulsed and suffered heavy losses; some British were several enemy foxholes take, without being able to proceed. On the evening of March 7th, two British companies attacked the enemy positions, but this attack too was repulsed.

On March 8, the British troops were able to carry out further attacks on the enemy barrier. The tanks of the 7th Panzer Brigade could not be used due to operational failures, constant fire from Japanese artillery and enemy air attacks, which is why the Allied infantry troops of the 1st Sikh Infantry Regiment had to attack without any support from the tracked vehicles. But even this British advance could be stopped by the Japanese troops, whereby the Indian soldiers suffered further losses. A little later there was a very short-term but precise bombardment of the barrier by the British artillery, whereby several defenders were killed and some enemy defensive positions could be taken by the attacking Gurkhas and Sikhs. A few hours after this successful advance by the Indian soldiers, more fresh British troops were also able to reach the front line. A final attack on the enemy barrier was carried out by further units of the Sikhs, and ultimately the enemy positions around the Strait of Taukkyan were secured. The Japanese troops were ordered to retreat and then fled into the jungle.

Second phase

Resistance in central Burma

British march to Prome

Chiang Kai-sheks meet with General Stillwell in Maymyo, April 9, 1942, in the middle of Madame Chiang

The Japanese leadership was aware of the difficult circumstances of the broken British troops around Rangoon. After the breakthrough around Taukkyan, Alexander had decided to march with his tired and demoralized soldiers to the city of Prome in order to take up position there and to regroup the Burma army. The American C-47s were able to supply the Allies at Prome with weapons, ammunition, food and fuel from India, with which General Alexander could re-equip his units and possibly start a counterattack. In addition, the Flying Tigers had a runway close to the city, and thus granted the British constant aerial reconnaissance and protection against enemy attacks.

On March 6, US General Joseph Stilwell held his first conference in Chongqing with Chiang Kai-shek , the generalissimo of the Chinese armed forces. The US had previously decided to combine its activities in Asia under a single commander and entrusted the former military attaché in Beijing with this office. Chiang entrusted Stilwell almost immediately with the command of the Chinese troops sent to Burma. Such an arrangement was far more acceptable to him than having Chinese troops serve under a British commander in chief. Stilwell's American staff set up quarters in Maymyo .

Japanese advance into Burma by March 19th

To protect the rights of the Allies in Prome from flank attacks, Alexander asked General Stilwell to occupy the city of Toungoo and fortify it. On March 8, 1942, the 200th Chinese Division marched into Toungoo and immediately began the fortification work. In order to strengthen the combat strength of the 200th division and thus to hold the right flank of the Allies, the Chinese were equipped with new weapons, pioneering material and tanks in a very short time by means of hump planes. A fortified line of defense was established with the help of Burmese civilians, and the 200th Division set up mobile reserves. Several Chinese and British engineers have since improved the condition of the supply route to Mandalay and the railway line, which had been badly damaged by Japanese air raids.

The six regiments of the 200th Division under General Dai Anlan defended a 40 km section around the city, including holding the railway line and the road to Mandalay. Each unit had only 600 men in the first line and another 900 in reserve, making the front line around Toungoo far too thin. In the event of an enemy attack, which everyone expected, holding this perimeter therefore seemed almost impossible.

In the meantime the British had also decided to equip their units in Burma with a corps headquarters. On March 16, General William Slim arrived at the airfield in Magwe to take command of the newly formed Burma Corps . In this the Indian 17th Division, the Burmese 1st Division and the British 7th Panzer Brigade were combined. Slim took command of the corps on March 19 at Allanmyo . Under the new arrangement, Slim was in charge of the defense of the Irrawaddy Valley, while the Chinese under Stilwell were to defend the Sittang Valley .

Japanese operations along Bago-Toungoo Road

On March 7, troops of the 33rd Division were able to advance on the Bago-Toungoo road, and found no resistance. The first rain fell the following day, quickly silting up the roads and slowing the Japanese advance. At the headquarters of the 15th Army near Rangoon, the following was recorded on March 9th: "A fast movement of the motorized units away from the main roads is not possible because of poor and groundless roads due to the bad weather." From mid-March the 33rd Division came only a few Miles an hour ahead while the formations of the 55th Division marching towards Prome were pinned down. On March 17th, the 33rd Division reached the Toungoo area and was immediately involved in minor skirmishes with Chinese troops. On the morning of March 18, Chinese units first opened fire against Japanese scouts near the town of Tachiao . After a few hours, three Chinese armored vehicles intervened and drove away the Japanese soldiers, who attacked again that same evening. The national revolutionary troops withdrew and withdrew to the village of Tachiao that evening. The Japanese troops entered Tachiao the next morning. After capturing the village, the Japanese units, protected by the motorized troops in the lead, were able to march on towards Toungoo. The place Pyu was also taken. The Japanese set up a military hospital and a supply post in Pyu and reinforced the troops that were already on the way to Toungoo with additional units.

Battle for Octwin

Map of Japanese operations in the South Asian theater of war and Allied retreat movements from January to May 1942.

The Chinese units near Oktwin, a few kilometers from the fortified city of Toungoo, were attacked on the morning of March 20 and rolled over almost immediately. After the minor skirmish, the Japanese soldiers advanced against the enemy positions around Oktwin, and after a few hours of exchange of fire they launched a banzai attack. In doing so, they broke through the Chinese lines and a little later were also able to push in the last line of defense around Oktwin. By noon on March 23, the Japanese troops finally took the village and drove the Chinese troops in the direction of Toungoo. On the same day, the already badly battered 1st Battalion of the 600th Chinese Regiment was almost completely destroyed in the intense fighting. The fighting had resulted in heavy casualties, both for the Chinese and the Japanese, but despite the deaths, the Japanese troops pushed on towards Toungoo.

Towards the end of March, the Japanese succeeded in driving the Royal Air Force units out of the country through continued air strikes on their bases in Burma. Although some British bomber squadrons continued to intervene in the fighting from Assam , the air superiority of the Japanese was now overwhelming thanks to the reinforcements received after the fall of Singapore.

Battle for Toungoo

The Japanese troops had been reinforced by the arrival of the troops of the 56th Infantry Division, as a result of which the 33rd Division returned to Rangoon as a garrison force. The troops remaining at the front, units of the 55th and 56th Divisions, began their attack on the city of Toungoo on March 24th. After two unsuccessful and loss-making attacks, the 56th Division was able to push in the Chinese lines on March 28 and cut several holes in the enemy defense. This jeopardized Chinese control of the important Sittang Bridge, which was the only free route of retreat for General Dai Anlan's exhausted troops, and the 200th Division was in danger of being encircled. General Dai Anlan decided in a briefing together with several high-ranking Chinese officers to delay a withdrawal of his troops in order to hold the position. If Toungoo were evacuated, the right flank of British troops at Prome would have been crushed and General Alexander's soldiers would have had to leave the city, despite their exhaustion. Still, after another unsuccessful attempt to resist to get the British soldiers to rest at Prome, the Chinese forces had to evacuate almost the entire city. General Dai Anlan finally ordered a breakout on March 29, and the Chinese were able to retreat through a successful counterattack. The Japanese soldiers were driven from near the bridge while the 200th Division crossed the river under heavy fire. The bridge had been so badly damaged by enemy salvos that it could not carry the Chinese trucks and heavy artillery; therefore the heavy equipment and a large part of the artillery ammunition were left behind in Toungoo. The British troops, whose right flank had thus fallen, evacuated the city of Prome on the same day and also withdrew to Yenangyaung.

Operations around Yenangyaung

The Japanese operations after the capture of Toungoo. The black arrow on the left shows the Japanese advance towards Yenangyaung, the other two arrows the advance towards Mandalay and Lashio.

The exhausted British troops who had fled Rangoon had, after a long march north, settled in Prome, where a line of defense against the pursuing Japanese troops had again been established. In the meantime, the Japanese had received reinforcements ( Operation U ) who had arrived from Singapore by ship between March 25 and April 14 in Rangoon. Alexander and Wavell hoped to hold the city for a few weeks in order to reorganize the troops under their command. But the Chinese defeat in the Battle of Toungoo moved the two commanders to relinquish their position in Prome in order to march on towards Yenangyaung. The 33rd Division was only a few kilometers behind the British rearguard and there were several exchanges of fire during the retreat. It was not until the afternoon of April 10 that all British units were able to take their positions at Yenangyaung.

However, an Indian brigade backed away under the Japanese attacks that night. After a few hours, the Japanese pressure became so strong all over the front that other British units were also pushed back. On April 13, almost the entire left flank of the British Army was rolled up and the Japanese began to fire heavily at the oil wells, which began to burn with heavy smoke. The fighting soon ended in wild scuffle or bayonet attacks. Japanese artillery launched heavy bombardment of the British defenses and Japanese dive bombers attacked the British motorcades and troop concentrations behind the lines. Soon the British operations center sank into complete chaos. Some radio operators and telephone operators gave wrong orders, causing several units to fall back by mistake or even to be attacked and wiped out. The burning oil wells obstructed the view of the British soldiers and the Japanese attacks that day drove back almost all enemy units. On April 15, General Slim decided to set fire to the still intact oil wells to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. His troops began a slow retreat, which was made very difficult by Japanese artillery fire.

Soon several British units were attacked by the Japanese, had to stop and were surrounded. General Slim and his staff were among those troops. All telephone connections had been cut and the various units could only reach each other with runners. Chinese units under General Sun Li-jen (38th Division) intervened in the battle, while some British infantry and tank formations of the now almost completely encircled Burma army tried to push back the broken-in Japanese troops near the village of Thadodan .

Gun battles broke out between the tanks and Japanese PaK batteries, and after another brief exchange of fire by the Chinese infantry trying to free the village of Magwe from the Japanese in order to clear a retreat corridor for Slim's troops, some British tanks managed to fill a gap to open the right flank of the Japanese units, while the tanks and other British units secured the corridor. Two Japanese counter-attacks were thrown back with high enemy losses. Although the battle was quite confusing, the encircled British managed a little later to deviate through the free corridor to the northeast and thus to evade the enemy pincer attack. When the Japanese troops closed the gap in the right flank with a final, coordinated attack and drove out the last British tanks, only two battalions of Indian infantry and four battalions of Burmese troops remained in the Yenangyaung pocket, which surrendered a few hours later. The British troops of the Burma Corps, which had been able to leave the cauldron, withdrew in the greatest disorder towards Mandalay . General Slim tried unsuccessfully to rally his troops and set up a new line of defense north of Yenangyaung, but his units no longer obeyed the British officers and so gave the order on April 19, a week after the Japanese attack on Yenangyaung began to withdraw for good to Mandalay to meet the other units of the dispersed British Burma Army.

The Burmese army had had to leave all their heavy equipment behind in battle, including their batteries of obsolete Ordnance QF-18 pounders and three Stuart tanks, as well as several trucks and some anti-tank guns and large quantities of ammunition and explosives from the engineering department.

Retreat to Mandalay

After the evacuation of the Yenangyaung Pocket, the Burma Army and Slim's Burma Corps were fragmented into smaller units by Japanese air strikes and artillery fire. Only the 1st Division of the Burma Corps was able to set up a uniform defense against the advancing enemy, but General Slim received the order to have his troops still capable of fighting immediately march towards Mandalay. General Slim protested, believing that his exhausted and scattered units would not be able to go to Mandalay, but General Alexander ordered him to make a forced march and on the evening of April 21 the column of the 1st Division sat down , the only still operational formation in the Burma Army, moving towards Mandalay. Japanese air strikes destroyed almost all of the trucks and the British and Indian units were forced to walk. The Japanese artillery of the 33rd Division, which was positioned in Yenangyaung, began intensive shelling of the enemy troops' route on the same day, with the 1st Division suffering heavy losses and suffering terribly from the lack of water , food and medicine . The Japanese artillery bombarded the road to Mandalay for two days, during which air strikes were also carried out against the enemy units: the 1st Division and the remaining troops of the Burma Corps suffered enormous losses and were in some cases attacked by Burmese guerrillas of the National Burmese Army , although these attacks did not result in heavy losses. However, several Burmese soldiers of the Burma Corps deserted after fighting with the guerrillas and returned to their villages.

After two days of bombardment, the Japanese guns, which in the meantime had advanced to a few kilometers from Meiktila together with the main units of the 33rd Division, stopped their fire and the British and Indian troops of the Burma Army were able to reach Mandalay on April 26th. But they had lost around 500 men as a result of the enemy air raids, another 200 had deserted and around 300 soldiers had died of dehydration or beriberi , which reduced the strength of the 1st Division and thus the entire Burma Corps to around 3,000 operational but completely exhausted soldiers had been. These troops had lost most of their ammunition, as well as all remaining artillery batteries and trucks. Most of the soldiers had also lost their infantry weapons, in most cases Lee-Enfield rifles.

Japanese attack against 66th Army

General Joseph Stilwell, his staff and a minor escort crossing a river during the retreat into British India, early May 1942.

The Chinese 66th Army, to which the 200th Division was subordinated, came to Burma in mid-February and was immediately ordered to Toungoo by General Stilwell. However, only General Dai Anlan's 200th Division could reach Toungoo, and after all hope of victory in the battle was lost and General Anlan asked for permission to evacuate the city, the 66th Army was tasked with providing the only line of defense Mandalay and Lashio , which ran in Shan State , to hold against enemy attacks. On April 24, the 56th Japanese Division, which had reached the front in full strength after the victory of Toungoo, and the motorized reconnaissance columns of the 55th Division launched an offensive against the Chinese 66th Army in Shan State. The formations of the 66th Army were very extensive through the dense jungle and, according to Japanese assumptions, could not withstand a coordinated attack against the left wing of the Chinese troops. The main force of the Chinese reserve, about 4,000 men in three regiments, was stationed in Taunggyi , where General Stilwell also set up his command post and a communications center. The Chinese artillery and a motorized battalion were stationed behind the main line of defense as an operational reserve, but the poor infrastructure of the area prevented rapid troop movements. A division of the Chinese infantry, six regiments of the reserve that had been detached from Taunggyi a few days earlier and some formations of the dispersed 200th division dug a static defense system along the main roads, and were coordinated by British and Indian military engineers and engineering departments, as in Toungoo. The main Chinese troop concentrations were in the towns of Mawchi , Bato and Loikaw .

The attack by the first Japanese combat group, an independent unit of Colonel General Masao Watanabe's 56th Division, broke through the Chinese defense lines of the last units of the 200th Division a few kilometers from Loikaw on the morning of April 24 at 7:30 a.m. The 4th Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion advanced to the rear and on the same day was able to take several villages near the village with the remaining units of the 56th Division. On the following day the 1st Combat Group destroyed two Chinese battalions of the 200th Division, which were attacked by the Japanese Chi-Ha tanks and several armored vehicles and fled because they had no anti-tank guns. On the same day a smaller position of the 200th Division fell and was set on fire by the Japanese troops. General Stilwell initially remained in Taunggyi without any news from the front. The break-in of the 56th Division was in the area of General Liao Yaoxiang's Chinese reserve front . After he had used his few reserves early on, he reported to Stilwell on April 25 that the situation was extremely serious and that several Chinese units had already been destroyed or had fled. General Watanabe was therefore able to operate relatively freely and initially turned some sections of the motorized troops to the northeast in the direction of Taunggyi, in order to meet the troops of the 55th Division, which are fighting against the right wing of the Chinese and reach Loikaw after a few hours. On the left wing, units of the 56th Division advanced against stronger Chinese resistance, but losses remained small and the Chinese units were forced to retreat by artillery fire and air strikes. The motorized units could not advance because of the poor infrastructure and the condition of the muddy roads and only the infantry could advance. Loikaw and several smaller towns were taken by the 55th Division on April 26th and the Chinese front finally collapsed. The Japanese troops marched in the direction of Taungyyi and drove the dispersed Chinese units, which started only single counterattacks, in front of them. The Chinese 66th Army suffered enormous losses and Japanese artillery began bombarding Taungyyi on April 27; General Stilwell and his staff then left the city. Chinese units of the 200th Division attacked the Japanese forces a few kilometers from the city, but they were thrown back with heavy losses. On the same day the Japanese troops captured Taunggyi and destroyed two Chinese battalions at Loilem : the 66th Army was almost completely destroyed. The operational reserve and the surviving soldiers of the front units were able to retreat towards Lashio under Stilwell's command, but they were destroyed by Japanese air raids and only Stilwell, a few members of his staff and a few senior officers, with about 150 men of the 66th Army, could Reach Lashio four days later. The entire 66th Army lost 23,690 men out of around 25,000 in less than a week and had to leave all its artillery, ammunition, trucks and technical equipment in Loikaw or Taunggyi. The Japanese troops suffered less heavy losses and lost around 350 people. They took some bridges over the Irrawaddy on May 1st and a few hours later they were able to continue their advance towards Lashio. The 55th Division, whose headquarters were set up in Taunggyi, was responsible for securing and clearing the conquered area and which in the following weeks destroyed some smaller Chinese groups.

End of the campaign

The right flank of the Allied front in front of Lashio and Mandalay at Taunggyi and Loikaw was breached by the complete annihilation of the 6th Army. The resulting gap broke the entire 56th Division and some regiments of the 55th Division. These troops were divided as follows: about 8,000 troops of the 56th Division, supported by a motorized reconnaissance column from the same unit, were to advance on Lashio, while the remaining two regiments of the 56th and the troops of the 55th Division were against the Chinese bases of the 66th Division Army advanced north of Taunggyi, near the Chinese border with Yunnan . The task of these units was to encircle the Chinese 66th Army, which had been weakened by the destruction of the 6th Army and also suffered from a lack of fuel and ammunition, thus taking the starting points of the Yunnan-Burma Strait and following the Allied supply route To interrupt China. The units of the 56th Division encountered no enemy resistance, as the entire Chinese troops in the area had been wiped out, and were able to reach Lashio on April 30th. Some of the dispersed Chinese and British troops that had gathered in the city attempted to stop and defend the advancing Japanese by a coordinated counterattack against the advancing Japanese left flank, but their attack was broken by artillery fire and a Japanese advance failed Push survivors back into town. Due to a short house-to-house fight and constant artillery bombardment, however, the last defenders were thrown back from the buildings and fell into Japanese captivity . In this brief skirmish around Lashio, the Japanese troops of the 56th Division suffered losses of around 100 men, while the Chinese and Allied troops lost well over 600 men. The surviving soldiers were driven into the jungle by Japanese chase troops and after a few days were able to form a larger group that marched to the Indian border.

Conquest of Mandalay and withdrawal of the Burma army

The British forces of the Burma Corps (Gen. Slim) who were able to leave Yenangyaung were ordered by the Burma Army's Operations Staff in Mandalay to man new defenses in front of the city to repel a Japanese advance. But the English troops had already lost all vehicles and guns and a large part of the ammunition when they withdrew. Therefore, the completely exhausted Indian and British soldiers could not hold the well-fortified position in front of the city against some attacking Japanese units of the 33rd Division, which were supported by aircraft, and had to retreat into the city after three hours of fighting. The Japanese high command tried to relieve the 33rd Division during the fighting by the infantry forces of the 18th Division in order to free the former unit for a possible advance towards India. But the 18th Division made slow progress due to tough British resistance in the greater Mandalay area, which had not yet been evacuated by all British units stationed there, and the first units could not infiltrate into the city until May 2nd. The most important buildings were bombarded for hours and the Japanese troops slowly worked their way towards the city center under the protection of machine guns and tanks. But the British resistance proved particularly weak and the Japanese troops were able to advance much faster from the following morning. The last organized units of the 1st Burma Division, Burma Corps, two Indian battalions, stayed in the city to attempt a defense, but had to evacuate the last quarters on May 3rd and joined the rest of the Burma Army. who marched along the Burma Road towards Assam. Hardly any of the British and Indian soldiers in the army had a weapon, only forty motor vehicles survived; the dispersed troops suffered from water and food shortages and several men died of beriberi, sunstroke and malaria . After the fighting for British positions at Mandalay was over, the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo and the High Command of the 15th Army were of the opinion that the enemy no longer had essential forces to defend Burma, as all British troops in the country had been crushed. The following day in Japan the conquest of Burma was proclaimed by various magazines, above all by the Asahi Shimbun .

consequences

Japanese occupation begins

General Iida was visited by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi , Commander of the Southern Army , and his staff at his headquarters in Rangoon. Terauchi congratulated him on the success of the campaign and it was discussed whether an attack against the Indian and British troops who fled to Assam or even a new campaign to take northern India were possible. But the beginning of the rainy season and the subsequent silting up of all passable roads to Assam and India, as well as some disruptive air attacks by the Flying Tigers, prevented a Japanese advance against India. There was now disagreement on the Japanese side over the question of how Japanese control over Burma could be secured in the future. Ultimately, the Imperial Japanese Army gave Prime Minister Ba Maw the task of forming a fascist government in Burma. Ba Maw then organized a cabinet and the new government of Burma was soon recognized by several countries, including the Third Reich , the Japanese Empire and various Japanese satellite states such as Thailand and Vietnam .

The Burmese people initially welcomed the Japanese troops as liberators from British colonial rule. A few months later, the ruthless exploitation of the country as part of the Japanese war economy had caused great resentment among the population.

The Burma Independence Army (BIA), a paramilitary resistance organization that had fought alongside the Japanese in the course of the campaign against British troops, had grown uncontrollably since the beginning of the conquest in January 1942, and in some areas important officials or even declared criminals or warlords members. Under the Japanese occupation it was reorganized as the Burma Defense Army (BDA), it was given the status of a National Army and it was financed by the Japanese puppet government of Ba Maw. The associations of the BDA, which had grown to 18,000 men in August 1942, consisted in most cases of Burmese deserters from the Burma Army, Thai soldiers and criminal gangs that appeared under the name of BDA. The army continued to be under the command of the Thirty Comrades , an elite of Burmese resistance leaders trained by Japanese troops. The most important of the Thirty Comrades was Aung San , who took over the military command of the troops of the BDA, negotiated with the Allies in 1945 and then switched sides.

losses

The British Army suffered great losses during the fighting. After the campaign was over and after the Burma Army fled to Assam, General Slim, commander of the Burma Corps, reported the losses of his unit to General Alexander in a staff report. This report listed the extermination of an entire unit: the 1st Burmese Division, which was disbanded on May 4th after heavy losses. It was set up again a few weeks later by General Slim. The report also reported the loss of a total of 160 guns, 193 trucks and motor vehicles, and all ammunition. In the course of the campaign, 23,121 men were killed and more than 9,000 Burmese troops deserted or were captured by Japanese troops. Some British and around 200 Indian soldiers were also taken prisoner by Japan. Most of the Indian prisoners joined a few months after their internment of Azad Hind of Subhash Chandra Bose on. In view of the fact that, according to British data on the protection of the Assam and Manipur borders , fewer than 15,000 British and Indian soldiers would have been available in the event of a Japanese offensive in mid-May, General Slim's report does not seem entirely unlikely. In Imphal , capital of the Indian state of Manipur and now the headquarters of the Burma Army, the events led to a crisis. On May 19, General Alexander publicly announced that the capital was threatened and asked for military reinforcements in Delhi and Calcutta . Industrial companies and small towns directly on the border with Burma were evacuated. Panic then broke out in the capital Delhi and some residents fled. The state of siege and martial law had to be declared in Imphal on May 25 , but after the start of the rainy season it became clear that Japanese troops would not attack until next summer . Instead, the Japanese advance on Imphal and Kohima took place in the spring of 1944.

The Chinese army also suffered enormous losses during the Japanese conquest of Burma. In the absence of precise Chinese information, one has to rely on the information in the American report by General Joseph Stilwell, who reported the destruction of 2 Chinese armies, the 6th and 66th, hundreds of guns and vehicles after the fighting was over. According to the report, about 100,000 Chinese soldiers were killed in the fighting, 30,000 were wounded and 2,000 were taken prisoner by Japan, but details are missing. On the Japanese side, a total of about 8,000 soldiers were killed in the six-month operation, but the exact number of casualties is also unknown here.

Around 40,000 Burmese civilians also died, mainly from Japanese artillery fire and air strikes, but also from starvation, especially in the cities of Toungoo and Rangoon, and from some Japanese massacres . The British troops destroyed numerous infrastructure objects in the course of the retreat in order to slow the advance of the Japanese. The Chinese troops disbanded in places after the defeat and operated as bandits in Burma. The Burmese BIA plundered on a massive scale and sparked a small ethnic war with the Karen, who were preferred by the British during the colonial era .

literature

Piers Brendon: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997. Cape Jonathan Childer, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-224-06222-0 .
Daniel Marston: Phoenix from the ashes. The Indian army in the Burma Campaign. Greenwood Press, 2003, ISBN 0-275-98003-0 .
Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. Yale University Press, 2011.
William Slim: Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945. Yale University Press, 1957
Donald Bertke, Gordon Smith, Don Kindell: World War II Sea War, Vol 6: The Allies Halt the Axis Advance Bertke Publications, 2014, ISBN 978-1-937470-09-8 .

Web links

Commons : Japanese Conquest of Burma - Collection of Images, Videos and Audio Files

Remarks

↑ General Joseph Stilwell was personal military advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who handed him command of the troops after the Chinese expeditionary army was dispatched to Burma.

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t M. PW Stone, Secretary of the Army: India-Burma: The US-Army Campaigns in World War II . December 13, 2003, accessed October 17, 2010 .

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t ^u M. PW Stone, Secretary of the Army: Burma, 1942: The US Army Campaigns in World War II, General Stillwell in Burma . December 13, 2003, accessed October 17, 2010 .

^ ^A ^b Piers Brendon: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997. 2007, p. 431f.

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d Burma 1930–1947 - Divisional Formations 1939–1943 - British Military History ( Memento of the original from April 15, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2
↑ Stillwell's Mission to China: US-Forces Organize and Prepare for New Tasks, p. 191.
^ William Slim: Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945. 1957, p. 20
↑ Japanese 15th Army, April 20, 1942. (PDF) (No longer available online.) United States Army Combined Arms Center, archived from the original on July 12, 2015 ; accessed on July 9, 2015 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2
^ ^A ^b Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, p. 24
^ ^A ^b Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005, p. 35
^ Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-1945. 1957, p. 25
^ ^A ^b ^c ^d ^e Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, p. 35
^ Robert Farquharson: For Your Tomorrow: Canadians and the Burma Campaign. , 1995, p. 27
^ Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005, p. 100
^ ^A ^b Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005, p. 37
^ History of the 16th Indian Brigade at www.ordersofbattle.com
^ ^A ^b ^c Steve Rothwell: The 1942 Campaign: The Japanese Invasion of Burma . March 25, 2012. Retrieved October 17, 2012 .
↑ Battle Studies: SITTANG DISASTER ( Memento from January 29, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), on TETAP29, a page that was compiled by employees of the Malay Army.
↑ ^a ^b Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005, pp. 37-38
↑ ^a ^b ^c J. Rickard: Japanese conquest of Burma, December 1941 – May 1942 . September 2, 2009, accessed October 17, 2012 .
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d The 7th Armored Brigade - Engagements - 1942 (Withdrawal to Rangoon) ( Memento of August 28, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) at www.desertrat.brigades.btinternet.co.uk; last amended on December 23, 2010, accessed October 17, 2012
^ Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-1945. 1957, p. 29
^ ^A ^b Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005, p. 34
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g Daniel Marston: Phoenix from the Ashes , 2003, p. 69
^ ^A ^b Steve Rothwell: Burma Military Police. October 21, 2001. Retrieved October 17, 2012 .
^ ^A ^b ^c ^d Alan Warren: Burma 1942: The Road from Rangoon to Mandalay , 2011, p. 170
↑ ^a ^b ^c Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, p. 56
^ The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume 2. HMSO, London 1954, pp. 63 ff.
^ Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-1945. 1957, p. 57
^ ^A ^b ^c ^d Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, pp. 32-33
↑ Bertke, Vol. 5, p. 397
↑ ^a ^b ^c Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, p. 34
^ Donovan Webster: The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater , 2005.
↑ ^a ^b ^c Frank McLynn: The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942–1945. 1957, pp. 51-54
^ ^A ^b Stillwell’s Mission to China, Air Power Rather Than Army Reform
^ Frank Gibney: Senso: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War - Letters to the Editor of Asahi Shimbun
^ Piers Brendon: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire - 1781–1997 , London, 2007, p. 433
^ ^A ^b ^c R. Ernest Dupuy , Trevor N. Dupuy : The Encyclopedia of Military History , 1970, p. 1136
^ Piers Brendon: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781–1997 , London, 2007, p. 432

[1] General Joseph Stilwell was personal military advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who handed him command of the troops after the Chinese expeditionary army was dispatched to Burma.

[USA-C-India-2] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t M. PW Stone, Secretary of the Army: India-Burma: The US-Army Campaigns in World War II . December 13, 2003, accessed October 17, 2010 .

[USA-C-Burma-3] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s ^t ^u M. PW Stone, Secretary of the Army: Burma, 1942: The US Army Campaigns in World War II, General Stillwell in Burma . December 13, 2003, accessed October 17, 2010 .

[Brendon431-4] A ^b Piers Brendon: The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997. 2007, p. 431f.