Japanese invasion of Java

Japanese invasion of Java

Part of: Pacific War

The Japanese landings on Java

date	1. bis 10. March 1942
place	Java
output	Japanese victory
Territorial changes	Fall of the Dutch East Indies to Japan

Parties to the conflict
Netherlands	Japan
Commander
Hein ter Poorten	Imamura Hitoshi

Overview - Pacific War

The Japanese invasion of Java (Operation "J") took place from March 1 to 10, 1942 as part of the Pacific War in Southeast Asia and led to the fall of the entire colonial possessions of the Dutch in this area.

prehistory

On January 11, 1942, the Japanese Empire declared war on the Netherlands. The capture of Palembang and the occupation of South Sumatra destroyed the Allies ' last hope of being able to adequately defend Java. The invasion was expected within a very short time and the civilian refugee flows from Surabaya and Batavia grew steadily. In Tanjung Priok , the port of Batavia, they met soldiers, pilots and survivors who were translating from Sumatra and Singapore . As a result, the quays and surrounding streets were littered with the unloaded armaments and other goods and often completely blocked. The city was quickly overcrowded with the newly arrived soldiers and refugees. Then there were the Dutch troops, who were preparing to defend the island. Between February 12 and 18, 1942 alone, around 12,000 refugees from the Air Force arrived. Those who boarded ships with many civilians from Singapore had been forced to abandon all their equipment and heavy Japanese air strikes. Most of the time the individual units had been driven completely apart. Those who had arrived from Sumatra had to leave the airfields near Palembang in a hurry and hardly any equipment with them when they boarded the ships in Oosthaven .

In addition, however, a considerable number of aircraft had arrived at the airfields in West Java. But the time was far too short to set up the ground staff again. The fighters and bombers were hastily grouped into squadrons according to type and stationed on airfields in Tjililitan near Batavia, Semplak near Buitenzorg and in Tjikampek and Kalidjati north of Bandung . In addition, two radar stations were quickly set up in the Batavia area, anti-aircraft guns were set up and temporary operations control centers were set up. Despite the newly arrived machines, of which only about a third were operational, the Japanese had a 10: 1 advantage.

After ABDACOM was dissolved on February 22nd, Winston Churchill and Sir Archibald Wavell came to the joint conviction that Java should not fall to the Japanese without a fight. Nonetheless, the British focused their attention on supplies for Burma and India. The main command for the defense of Java passed to the Dutch. Churchill sent Vice Air Marshal Sir PC Maltby , who was on Java, the message the following day:

“I send you and all ranks of the British forces who have stayed behind in Java my best wishes for success and honor in the great fight that confronts you. Every day gained is precious, and I know that you will do everything humanly possible to prolong the battle. "

The main task of Maltby was to maintain the air defense as long as the material was sufficient and to do everything possible to evacuate as many soldiers and personnel as possible to Ceylon or Australia.

Stationed units

A total of 25,000 KNIL members were available for the defense of Java . They were divided into four infantry regiments, each of which consisted of three battalions with artillery, auxiliary and garrison troops. The only trustworthy local troops were made up of Ambonesian and Menadonese (Northern Celebes) soldiers who had been loyal to the Dutch for decades. Since the supplies from the Netherlands had been torn down since their defeat by Hitler in 1940 and the Allies almost exclusively supplied their own units, the KNIL had hardly any tanks, armored cars or other modern weapons. In addition to the regular units, around 40,000 Home Guard soldiers were of relatively questionable value. Although armed with rifles and Tommy guns , they were very poorly trained and had little experience in tactical matters.

Glen Martin bomber of the ML-KNIL on the Andir airfield near Bandung

The first Australian corps to return from the Middle East was scheduled to be stationed on Java. It was supposed to arrive via Oosthaven on Sumatra at the end of February, but could then reach its partial operational readiness at the earliest in mid-March and not even reach full combat strength until April.

British units were also represented on Java. They had 25 light tanks and five anti-aircraft regiments, two of which had no weapons at all. In total there were about 3,500 British soldiers and 2,500 Indian servants on Java.

The Americans had only a smaller unit stationed on Java. It consisted of 750 men of the 2nd Artillery Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment of the Texan National Guard . They arrived in Surabaya on January 11th. There were also some B-17 bombers who had fled from the Philippines and were manned by other pilots and co-pilots, as well as ground personnel.

Attempts to strengthen the island's air defenses by relocating fighter planes from Australia were largely unsuccessful. Several transfer flights failed due to bad weather or Japanese countermeasures (see air raid on Darwin ) and on February 27 the seaplane carrier USS Langley was sunk with 32 Curtiss P-40s on board Japanese aircraft.

Operation "J"

To occupy Java, the Japanese divided their forces into a western and eastern task force, both of which were under the command of Vice Admiral Ibo Takahashi , who was heading south on his flagship , the heavy cruiser Ashigara . On February 19, the 48th Division left Jolo in 41 transports in the southern Philippines and set course south. They were accompanied by the light cruiser Naka and six destroyers under Rear Admiral Shōji Nishimura . After they had taken up the 56th regimental group in Balikpapan on February 23, they were joined by another escort group at the end of Makassar Strait , which consisted of two heavy cruisers and the 2nd destroyer flotilla. Under the command of Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi , this escort group sat at the head of the convoy towards East Java.

The western convoy set sail from Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina on February 18 . The headquarters of the 2nd Division of the 16th Japanese Army directly from the Japanese main islands and the 230th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division from Hong Kong were on 56 transporters . The 5th Destroyer Flotilla served as an accompanying group, which was supplemented on February 26 by the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla and a light aircraft carrier under Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita .

To make it impossible for Allied ships from the Indian Ocean to intervene, a cover fleet under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo lay at the southern exit of the Lombok Strait . It consisted of four aircraft carriers and four battleships, which in the following days sank thirteen Allied transports at Tjilatjap, shot at Christmas Island , a British possession about 480 kilometers southwest of Java, and then returned to Staring Bay on Celebes for refueling. Together with the two battleships, four aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers and a large number of destroyers of the Kidō Butai under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo , she set course for the Indian Ocean on February 25 to control the Allied escape route south of Java.

Just a few days after the fall of Palembang , reports of a 90-ship fleet reached Jolo's headquarters in Java on February 20. Muntok on Bangka off Sumatra was specified as a further collection point for an invasion fleet . Four days later the signs became more certain when a large fleet of transporters with escort in Malakka Street was reported to be heading south. Their arrival was calculated for the evening of February 27, and the Allies suspected the invasion sites in West Java to be the bays west of Batavia to the Sunda Strait and in East Java the beaches north of Surabaya. A landing in Central Java was considered possible, but largely ruled out. The Dutch defense plan for the island was based on these assumptions. The available bombers were to attack the Japanese transporters as far as possible at sea. A put together maritime response fleet , consisting of the former ships of the ABDA fleet , was intended to attack the convoys when they arrived off the coast. Most of the forces on the island were concentrated in the west. There mainly to defend the important port of Batavia and the parliamentary seat in Bandung. Only a few smaller units were stationed in Central Java, while in East Java particular attention was paid to defending the military port of Surabaya. The relatively untrained Home Guard had been posted at strategically important points to defend them. Should the Japanese not be stopped on the beaches after their landing, lines of retreat had been prepared, which were protected from a rapid advance by the Japanese by bridges prepared for demolition. These were the bridges in the east on the road from Surabaya to Malang and in the west the two roads leading to Batavia and from there to Bandung, where the final defensive battle was to take place.

The British concentrated their units around the airfields, as their largest contingent still available consisted of the fighter planes that had fled Sumatra. Only the 77th Heavy Air Defense Regiment was assigned to defend Batavia. Two Australian battalions and a hastily assembled third battalion, along with a squadron of the 3rd Hussars , an Australian engineering group and a British reporting section, formed a mobile reaction group under the command of Brigadier A. S. Blackburn ; the so-called " Blackforce ". An American field artillery unit and 450 RAF servants who were hastily trained as infantrymen were added later. The reaction group was ready on February 28 in the Badung area. Shortly thereafter, General Hein ter Poorten transferred them to Buitenzorg so that they were supposed to defend the rubber plantations there. So they came under the high command of Major General Wijbrandus Schilling , the commander of the West Java units.

The naval battles off Java

On February 25, the destroyers of Admiral Nishimura managed to land a small task force on Bawean , an island around 135 kilometers north of Surabaya. They set up a radio station there. On the same day at around 11:25 am, Admiral Helfrich ordered all available cruisers and destroyers to join the Admiral Doorman's "Eastern attack fleet" in Surabaya. Doorman set sail with three cruisers and seven destroyers that evening to intercept the Japanese ships reported to Bawean. However, since he could not discover them, the fleet returned to Surabaya the next morning. After the British cruiser HMS Exeter had also joined the ships, the fleet was renamed "Allied Intervention Fleet".

On the following day, further reconnaissance reports increased the suspicion that a Japanese invasion fleet was on a south-south-west course in the eastern Java Sea. However, it has not yet been confirmed that the Japanese transporters were also on their way to Java before Muntok. The American submarine S-38 fired at the newly built Japanese radio station on Bawean on the same day.

At 8:00 p.m., three cruisers left Batavia to spy on the transporters off Muntok and also to attack them. They returned the next morning without having achieved anything because they couldn't make out the Japanese. After the cruisers had been refueled, they ran through the Sunda Strait to Ceylon on the morning of February 28 .

In the east of Java, meanwhile, the battle in the Java Sea developed , in which the Allied fleet under Admiral Doorman suffered a severe defeat. Doorman himself was killed on the cruiser De Ruyter . Two more cruisers and a destroyer were sunk by the Japanese fleet in western Java when they tried to escape south via the Sunda Strait (→ Battle of the Sunda Strait ).

Japanese landings

West Java

The vans for the invasion of West Java, which left Cam Ranh Bay on February 18, reached the western Java Sea on February 27. There the transports separated with the units under Colonel Shōji Toshishige , whose landing site Eretan Wetan was about 125 kilometers east of Batavia. The next day at 10:00 p.m. the remaining transporters were at a position north of Merak at St. Nicolaas Point and the units intended for the landing there left the convoy. The two infantry detachments on board under Major General Yumio Nasu and Colonel Kyusaku Fukushima landed on the beaches at around 2:00 a.m. on March 1. The nearby KNIL infantry battalion under Colonel Harterink was overwhelmed by them in a very short time.

The other transporters ran a little further east into Bantam Bay , which they reached around 10 minutes after separating from the other transporters. The destroyers Harukaze and Hatakaze ran into the bay and a cover formation of cruisers and destroyers patrolled the bay. At 10:30 p.m. the sea battle broke out with the two cruisers USS Houston and HMAS Perth in front of the bay, in which the two ships managed to fire at the transporters, but caused only minor damage. In the course of the battle, however, the Japanese cruiser Mogami shot six torpedoes at the Houston at 11:27 p.m. , all of which missed their target but sank four of its own transporters and a mine sweeper in the bay. Another transporter was damaged. Although some Allied warplanes also caused confusion among the Japanese, there were few casualties among the soldiers, who had all disembarked by 2:00 a.m. on the morning of March 1st. This was the department under Colonel Hanshichi Sato , consisting of an infantry and tank regiment, an artillery unit and engineers .

Meanwhile, the Nasu division advanced rapidly to the Tjoedjoeng River . About 200 KNIL soldiers tried to stop them there, but they only succeeded for a short time. As early as 7:00 a.m., a vanguard of the department entered the outskirts of Serang . The KNIL regiment withdrew further and was followed by the Japanese along the river bank to Kopo . There was a fight with the Dutch at the Pamarajan Bridge just before the bridge was about to be blown up. The Japanese succeeded in taking the bridge and after the main unit had arrived in Serang in the afternoon, they left the place again at around 9:00 p.m. and advanced over the Pamarajan Bridge to Rangkasbitung .

The advance of the Fukushima and Sato departments, on the other hand, was severely hindered by the blown bridges over the rivers and destroyed roads. The Fukushima department could advance as far as Serang, but the Sato department only as far as Bodjanegara . Therefore, the commander of the 2nd Japanese Division, Maruyama Masao , ordered all crossing points over the Tjidoerian River to be occupied and the main force of all departments to be set up on the banks of the Tjoedjoeng.

The transporters of the Shoji division were attacked by Allied bombers, which had taken off from the Kalidjati airfield, about 80 kilometers from their destination on their way to Eretan Wetan . However, the attack turned out to be too harmless to cause severe damage. At 1:30 a.m. on March 1, the transporters anchored off the coast and the Japanese infantry landed two hours later on the beach at Eretan Wetan, where they did not meet with any resistance. However, allied warplanes repeatedly attacked the landing craft and the landed units at low altitude. In several waves, the machines tried to prevent the landings and the formation of a bridgehead. They caused high losses among the Japanese and there were considerable delays in landing. It was only around 6:10 a.m. that a smaller company with vehicles was able to leave for the Kalidjati and Tjikampek airfields . After driving for more than four hours, they became involved in fighting with KNIL troops who were on their way to blow up the bridge at Pamanukan - one kilometer west of Soebang. Another unit left the landing beach at around 8:00 a.m. and was able to catch up with the advanced company. With the support of light tanks, they took Soebang and reached the airfields, which they took under fire with mortars. The Allies tried to start a few more fighter planes, but only one machine could intervene in the fighting. Shortly after noon the defenders were defeated and the airfields were occupied by the Japanese. Since they were in good condition, the conquerors notified their headquarters so that Japanese planes could be stationed there immediately.

More Japanese troops moved from Eretan Wetan in the direction of Batavia. On their way, Allied planes launched from the Tjililitan airfield bombed the Japanese, further delaying the advance. But at nightfall they were able to assemble their units at Pamanukan . The next morning, the airfield near Andir came under heavy Japanese air raids, which caused the remaining Allied planes to take off for Australia. On the same day, KNIL units tried to retake Soebang with tanks. Although the Dutch initially had the element of surprise on their side, since the tanks operated without infantry support and the Japanese gathered more troops in Soebang during the day, the recapture was unsuccessful.

Japanese units on Java

Further to the west, on March 2, parts of the Nasu division pursued the defenders almost as far as Buitenzorg, while the main Japanese armed forces gathered in the area around Rangkasbitung. From there they moved south to Buitenzorg and during the night they reached the outskirts of Djasinga and Tangerang . After removing many of the anti-tank barriers on the streets, the Nasu department succeeded in pushing the KNIL units, which had meanwhile also received British support, back behind Boenar . The next morning the Japanese stood in front of Leuwiliang , where they found the bridge over the river destroyed. The Australian troops of the "Blackforce" had positioned themselves in bunker positions on the east side of the bridge. Behind Leuwiliang, several kilometers north and south of Tjibatok, there were also units of the "Blackforce" .

Together with Dutch troops, the "Black Force" was supposed to hold Djasinga so that the southern route to Bandung would remain open. A counterattack against the Japanese flank there was planned for March 2, when the Dutch command suddenly withdrew its own units to attack the Japanese Shoji detachment that had landed at Eretan Wetan . On their departure, however, the Dutch blew up the bridge that led across the river in Djasinga, thus preventing an effective defense of the city. Only a smaller division was to be left behind and the main part of the "Blackforce" should go to Leuwiliang to take part in a counter-attack with the main force of the Dutch on the next day. This would have meant a forced march of 200 kilometers, which would have been followed by a completely unprepared attack in previously unexplored terrain. After the "Blackforce" commander Brigadier Arthur S. Blackburn protested violently against the order, it was subsequently withdrawn and most of the soldiers of the "Blackforce" returned to Leuwiliang on March 2.

When the first Japanese light tanks reached the city, the defenders from across the river opened fire and a significant number of the Japanese lost their lives. Although they tried to evade over the flank, an Australian battalion with heavy machine guns pushed them back again. The Japanese infantry arriving later attempted a river crossing during the night, but were discovered by the Australians and taken under fire. A small bridgehead was able to hold out until early morning, but then the main forces of the "Blackforce" appeared with tanks and artillery. The now beginning battle for Leuwiliang raged until the evening of March 3rd. The Australian field artillery made every effort to eliminate the advancing Japanese vehicles on the western bank, while the Japanese prevented any further river crossing by means of machine gun fire. On the part of the "Blackforce" only five soldiers were killed, while the Japanese had an unknown but significantly higher casualty rate. However, an attack by the Japanese on March 4 led to the crossing of the river. Only under difficult circumstances did the "Blackforce" manage to retreat to Sukabumi .

The Fukushima division left Serdang in the early morning of March 2 and reached Pamarajan that afternoon . Some groups marched on to Madja . After the Sato department had taken the bridge over the Tjidoerian near Kopo on the night of March 2, they succeeded in taking the bridge at Parigi on March 3 , but the Dutch pioneers had already broken the bridge at Balaradja before them. So the Japanese remained well behind their schedule and the division commander ordered the Fukushima division and a battalion from the Sato division to the road to Buitenzorg. At the same time he activated the divisional reserve to cover east of Pamarajan.

In the north, the KNIL troops tried several times to recapture the airfield near Kalidjati, but were repeatedly beaten back by the Japanese. On March 3, the Shoji detachment attacked the Allied units at Purwakarta and Tjikampek to secure the bridges between Batavia and Bandung. At around 6:30 p.m. the Japanese arrived in Krawang and the KNIL units stationed there had to move away.

Graphic of a Japanese presentation of the entry into Batavia (Tropenmuseum Amsterdam, Netherlands)

On March 4th, Lieutenant General Ter Poorten made the decision to withdraw all troops from Batavia and Buitenzorg to Bandung in order to better defend the capital. The "Blackforce" was given the task of keeping the road to Buitenzorg clear for the troops to pass through. There were repeated skirmishes with smaller Japanese groups in the surrounding area. Very heavy rain made communication difficult on both sides, so that some groups started completely independent actions and often got into enemy ambushes.

Colonel Shōji Toshishige decided on March 5 to destroy all Allied fortifications north of Bandung in order to then gather his troops for the advance on the city. With the support of the 3rd Air Brigade, now stationed on the Kalidjati airfield, the Japanese fought their way to Lembang in the northern outskirts of Bandung by the afternoon of March 7th. The other troops of the 2nd Division approached from the west, so that Bandung was literally gripped by the Japanese. Around 10:30 p.m., the Dutch commander in Bandung, Major General Pesman , sent a ceasefire offer to Colonel Shoji. Shoji met with Perman the next morning at a hotel in Bandung to negotiate the details. The Japanese then marched into Bandung without further resistance.

Meanwhile the Sato department reached the road to Batavia and was able to quickly take the outskirts of the city. By dusk on March 5, the defenders surrendered and at around 9:30 p.m., Batavia was completely in Japanese hands.

On the night of March 6th, the Japanese launched an attack on Buitenzorg in several waves. Shortly before, more than 3,000 allies had left the city for Bandung and the Japanese took Buitenzorg around 6:00 a.m.

Panorama of the Puncak Pass today - view to the north, towards Bogor

At the same time, parts of the Nasu department chased the Allies to the Puncak Pass , while the main unit chased the Allies by rail. On March 6, there was a confrontation at Tjibadak . Since the river bridges were destroyed, the track had to be given up by train and continued on foot. The Japanese reached the suburbs of Tjimahi on March 8th.

East Java

After the battle in the Java Sea, which was costly and fatal for the Allies, the Japanese transporters anchored off Kragan at 12:10 a.m. on March 1st . The commander-in-chief of the 48th Division, Major General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu , had drawn up an attack plan against Surabaya , which envisaged attacking the city on the one hand with fewer forces from the northwest, since he suspected the main forces of the Allies there, and on the other from the south with his own Main forces. The latter not only applied to the city's weakest point of defense, but was also intended to prevent the Allies from retreating. Therefore he divided his troops into two departments. The first was led by Colonel Imai Hifumi and the second by Major General Abe Koichi .

The other groups under Colonel Tanaka Tohru and Lieutenant Colonel Kitamura Kuro were to take the cities of Tjepoe and Bodjonegoro .

The Sakaguchi division under Major General Sakaguchi Shizuo also landed at Kragan shortly afterwards with the aim of conquering the southern seaport of Tjilatjap .

Major General Tsuchihashi, who had already fought in the Philippines and had seen the difficulties there in advancing without heavy artillery, needed the port of Rembang to unload his guns and ammunition . Therefore he ordered the soldiers under Colonel Imai to go to this area first. Even during the landings, the Japanese came under heavy defensive fire from the air, which led to heavy losses among them. Nonetheless, they quickly managed to establish a bridgehead and advance inland by noon.

Meanwhile, the soldiers of the Sakaguchi detachment had gathered at Blora after two scouting parties had investigated the situation there. They left Blora on March 2 at around 3:00 p.m. and received a report of strong Dutch troop concentrations at Semarang behind them. A smaller group of Japanese moved towards Godong and wiped out the KNIL garrison stationed there. She then took over covering the right rear of the Sakaguchi Division.

The troops under Colonel Tanaka Tohru reached the city of Tjepoe in the early evening of March 2nd. The target there were the oil fields , the access bridges of which, however, had already been destroyed by the retreating KNIL units. When the Japanese finally reached the oil fields, they also found them destroyed. Therefore, the Japanese soldiers marched to the east bank of the Brantas until the next day , where they encountered slight resistance from the Dutch, which was quickly overcome. On their further way towards Surabaya they broke through Dutch positions at Ngawi , Tjaroeban , Ngandjoek , Kertosono , Kediri and Djombang by March 5th .

Parts of the Sakaguchi division fought meanwhile with KNIL troops near Purwodadi , which consisted mainly of local soldiers of the Sultan of Jogjakarta . Their resistance was quickly broken and the city of Surakarta was captured. On March 5, Jogjakarta also fell to the Sakaguchi Department and the KNIL garrison of around 700 soldiers stationed there under Lieutenant Colonel D. van Kempen surrendered to the Japanese after a brief skirmish and were disarmed.

Many bridges that were supposed to be destroyed by the Dutch had been prepared so hastily for the demolition that some of the charges did not explode or could not be detonated at all. For example, the bridge at Kertosono sank only about half a meter below the surface of the water, so the Japanese had no difficulty crossing it. There was also a breakdown at Porong when the railway bridge could be blown up but the nearby road bridge could not. The Japanese were therefore able to advance on Surabaya on their vehicles and bicycles at such a speed that the Allied units began to retreat headlong.

After the Allies withdrew from Batavia, General ter Poorten called a conference at which he analyzed the extremely difficult situation and came to the conclusion that even a guerrilla war against the Japanese in Java would be impossible. He justified this with the hostile attitude of the local population towards the Dutch and that due to the very poor communication structure the Dutch could only operate from their headquarters in Bandung, which could not be the case for much longer. In addition, Ter Poorten instructed all commanders not to obey any order he might have issued to stop the fighting.

On March 7, all Japanese troops had reached the positions planned by Major General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu to attack Surabaya. The Allies had meanwhile withdrawn from the city and gathered their units in the Lumajang . Only the local guards were still in Surabaya.

The Japanese secret service had meanwhile received information that the Dutch had begun to damming the river south of the city with sunk old boats and other obstacles. Japanese soldiers were dispatched to remove the obstacles.

In good weather, Major General Tsuchihashi ordered the city to be attacked on the afternoon of March 8th, but at 11:00 a.m., reconnaissance planes spotted a white flag hoisted on the southern access bridge to Surabaya. Half an hour later the Japanese divisional headquarters had been informed that a Dutch delegation with a white flag had arrived at the front line. Tsuchihashi had them taken to headquarters at 3:00 pm, where they were interrogated. Among the delegates were the governor of Ostjavas, Charles Olke van der Plas , and other Dutch officials. Since it was not clear during the interrogations who commanded the troops in Surabaya, Tsuchihashi attacked his units and occupied the city, which continued until 6:00 p.m. The next afternoon, the commanding officer of the East Java KNIL units in Surabaya, Major General Gustav A. Ilgen , surrendered to the Japanese.

The end of the fighting

After the fall of the cities of Tjilatjap and Bandung on March 7, General ter Poorten radioed the end of the resistance against the Japanese across Java at 9:00 a.m. the next day. Thereupon the Dutch first stopped the fire and surrendered to the Japanese. The British, Australians and Americans fought on for another day and only decided on March 9, after repeated calls by Ter Poorten, to join the other defenders.

General Imamura and his staff went to Bandung on March 10th. Two days later, the Allied commanders gathered there and signed the formal declaration of surrender in the presence of the Japanese commander of Bandung, Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama. On the same day a division of the Imperial Guard crossed from Singapore to Java and by March 28th the Japanese troops occupied the entire island without encountering any significant resistance. Allies who fled to the mountains near Malang were tracked down and captured with the help of the Japanese secret police until the end of April. They were subsequently massacred in which they were locked in narrow bamboo cages and transported to the coast on freight cars in very high temperatures. The Japanese then threw the prisoners in their cages into the shark-teeming water. Lieutenant General Imamura was charged with the crime in a Dutch court after the war, but was acquitted for lack of evidence. A corresponding lawsuit in an Australian court brought him ten years in prison.

consequences

With the fall of Java, the Dutch lost their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. The Japanese had not only broken through the so-called Malay Barrier , but also opened up access to the Indian Ocean and Australia. The rich natural resources, above all the oil and rubber deposits, could now be exploited for military production.

Along with the Dutch, many Allied soldiers were also taken prisoner in Japan. Most of them were employed as workers on Japanese construction projects such as the Death Railway in Thailand and Burma , or the Sumatra Railway . Many did not survive the prevailing conditions there.

From March 10th, Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi held the office of governor of Java and Madura , making him the highest authority in the former Dutch colonies. He held the post until November 11, 1942, when he was assigned to Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi in Saigon, who became governor of the so-called southern territories and was directly subordinate to the headquarters in Tokyo.

See also

• Blackforce
• HMAS Yarra

literature

• Tom Womack: Dutch Naval Air Force Against Japan: The Defense of the Netherlands East Indies, 1941-1942 , McFarland & Company, 2006, ISBN 0-7864-2365-X
• Nicholas Tarling: A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of South East Asia , C. Hurst & Co, 2001, ISBN 1-85065-584-7

Web links

• The conquest of Java Island, March 1942 (English)
• East Indies (English)
• Loss of the Netherlands East Indies (English)
• The Netherlands East Indies and the Pacific War (English)
• Indonesia under Japanese occupation (English)

Individual evidence

1. ^ Quote from Winston Churchill at: http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/java.html
2. ↑ The Army Air Forces in World War II , Volume I . P. 384ff.