Battle of the Java Sea

Map of the Java Sea

date	February 27 and 28, 1942
place	Java lake north of Java
output	Japanese victory, loss of the ABDA fleet
consequences	Japanese occupation of Java

Parties to the conflict
United Kingdom United Kingdom Australia Netherlands United States Australia Netherlands United States	Japan Japan
Commander
Netherlands Karel Doorman † Conrad Helfrich Netherlands	Japan Takeo Takagi
Troop strength
5 cruisers 12 destroyers	4 cruisers 14 destroyers transport convoy
losses
5 sunken cruisers 5 sunken destroyers 2,300 dead	2 damaged ships 4 transport ships sunk

Overview - Pacific War

The Battle of the Java Sea in Southeast Asia between Japanese and Allied naval units took place in World War II during the Pacific War on February 27-28, 1942. American , British , Dutch and Australian ships were involved on the Allied side ( ABDA fleet ). The Japanese emerged victorious from the sea battle . Almost the entire Allied fleet was damaged, sunk or had to withdraw.

As a result, the Japanese occupied Java and had access to the island's mineral resources .

prehistory

After the Japanese had successfully conquered the Southeast Asian areas and islands in late 1941 and early 1942, the Dutch colonial possession of Java was the only significant place that was still in Allied hands. The central importance of the island as the economic center of the Dutch East Indies with the capital Batavia , the island's mineral resources such as sulfur from the volcanic rock and ores as well as the fertile soil for rice , tobacco , maize and cinchona bark cultivation and palm oil as well as the strategically important Location as a defensive position for the archipelago with proximity to Australia made Java an extremely worthwhile destination. In addition, Bandung was the seat of government of the Dutch for the Dutch East Indies. After the fall of South Sumatra west of Java and the landing of the Japanese on Bali around February 20, it was clear to the defenders that the island would soon be invaded.

The Japanese invasion fleets

To occupy Java, the Japanese divided their forces into a western and eastern task force, both of which were under the command of Vice Admiral Ibo Takahashi , who was traveling south on his flagship , the heavy cruiser Ashigara . On February 19, the 48th Japanese Infantry Division left Jolo in 41 transports in the southern Philippines and set course south. They were accompanied by the light cruiser Naka and six destroyers under Rear Admiral Shōji Nishimura . After they had taken up the 56th regimental group in Balikpapan on February 23, they were joined by another escort group at the end of Makassar Street, which consisted of two heavy cruisers and the 2nd destroyer flotilla. Under the command of Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi , this escort group sat at the head of the convoy towards East Java.

The western convoy set sail from Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina on February 18. The headquarters of the 2nd Division of the 16th Japanese Army directly from the Japanese main islands and the 230th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Japanese Infantry Division from Hong Kong were on 56 transporters . The 5th Destroyer Flotilla served as an accompanying group, which was supplemented on February 26 by the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla and a light aircraft carrier under Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita .

To make it impossible for Allied ships from the Indian Ocean to intervene, a cover fleet under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo lay at the southern exit of the Lombok Strait . It consisted of four aircraft carriers and four battleships. In the following days, she sank thirteen Allied transports at Tjilatjap , shelled the Christmas Islands , a British possession about 480 kilometers southwest of Java, and then returned to Staring Bay on Celebes for refueling. Together with the two battleships, four aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers and a large number of destroyers of the Kidō Butai under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo , she set course for the Indian Ocean on February 25 to control the Allied escape route south of Java.

The Allies

Just a few days after the fall of Palembang in South Sumatra, reports of a 90-ship fleet reached Jolo's headquarters on Java on February 20. Muntok on Bangka off Sumatra was specified as a further collection point for an invasion fleet . Four days later the signs became more certain when a large fleet of transporters with escort in Malakka Street was reported to be heading south. Their arrival was calculated for the evening of February 27th. The Allies suspected the invasion sites in West Java to be the bays west of Batavia to the Sunda Strait and in East Java the beaches northwest of Surabaya. A landing in Central Java was considered possible, but largely ruled out.

Secret services informed Vice Admiral Conrad EL Helfrich about the invasion fleets. On February 21, he put together two defense flotillas , based in Tanjung Priok , the port of Batavia, and Tanjung Perak, the port of Surabaya .

On February 25, the destroyers of Admiral Nishimura managed to land a small task force on Bawean , an island around 135 kilometers north of Surabaya. They set up a radio station there. On the same day at around 11:25 am, Admiral Helfrich ordered all available cruisers and destroyers to join Admiral Doorman's "Eastern attack fleet" in Surabaya. Doorman set sail with three cruisers and seven destroyers that same evening to intercept the Japanese ships reported to Bawean. However, since he could not discover them, the fleet returned to Surabaya the next morning. After the British HMS Exeter had also joined the ships, the fleet was renamed "Allied Intervention Fleet".

The following day, further reconnaissance reports confirmed the assumption that a Japanese invasion fleet was on a south-south-west course in the eastern Java Sea. However, it has not yet been confirmed that the Japanese transporters were also on their way to Java before Muntok. On the same day, the American submarine USS S-38 (SS-143) fired at the newly built Japanese radio station on Bawean with its on-board gun.

At 8:00 p.m., three cruisers left Batavia to spy on the transporters off Muntok and also to attack them. They returned the next morning without having achieved anything because they had not been able to spot the Japanese. After the cruisers had been refueled, they ran through the Sunda Strait to Ceylon on the morning of February 28 .

Ship positions

At 10:20 a.m. on February 26, the eastern invasion fleet was only 60 nautical miles north of Surabaya. The convoy consisted of 41 transport ships, which were escorted by two light cruisers and 14 destroyers . Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi was on the cruiser Nachi , which was accompanied by another three warships, about 150 nautical miles behind the convoy.

He hardly expected any resistance, which was evident from the way the convoy drove. Many ships emitted great clouds of black smoke, the crews were barely experienced seafarers, and the ships accompanying them drove slowly.

When a Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted the Allied fleet, Rear Admiral Takagi immediately ordered the transporters to turn north so that his ships could catch up. But when it became clear at about 1:40 p.m. that the Allied fleet was returning to the port, he had the south course laid again.

At 13:57 a Dutch reconnaissance aircraft reported the exact position of the invasion fleet. She was only 50 nm north. Admiral Helfrich immediately gave the order to intervene accordingly. The fleet entering the port at that time immediately left on a north course. However, the Japanese noticed this maneuver and responded immediately. Takagi allowed his ships to take off and the convoy headed north again.

State of the Allies

Two days before the start of the battle, a decline in the morale of the units on Java was reported to the American leadership. This may have been an exaggeration, but the Americans had little success against the Japanese advance. There were also repeated air strikes that did not allow the Allies to calm down. In addition, the condition of their ships was not the best. Repairs were not possible due to a lack of supplies. All of this was on the nerves of the sailors and made the situation seem less than hopeful. The nightly search for the enemy also depressed the mood.

To make matters worse, the Allied fleet was composed of units from three nations with two languages. It was difficult to coordinate with each other, if only because the code and flag signals partially contradicted each other .

The battle

Course of the battle

In three parallel lines, the Allied fleet advanced north-northwest, led by the three destroyers Electra , Encounter and Jupiter of the Royal Navy. The cruiser Hr. Ms. De Ruyter , USS Houston , HMS Exeter , HMAS Perth and Mr. Ms. Java . The two Dutch destroyers Mr. Ms. Kortenaer and Mr. Ms. Witte de With and the four American destroyers USS Alden , USS John D. Edwards , USS Pope and USS Paul Jones followed behind the cruisers.

A Japanese air raid at 3:30 p.m. broke the formation. When it was restored about twenty minutes later, the Japanese, namely the Jintsū , Yukikaze , Tokitsukaze , Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze , sighted the masts of the fleet. The Japanese already knew the position from reconnaissance planes that reported sightings at 3:00 p.m. and 3:10 p.m. At about 3:30 p.m. the convoy was north of the Jintsū and the Allied ships were 17 nautical miles south. The Jintsu immediately set course for the Allies. Nine minutes later, reinforcements came into view. The heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro , accompanied by the destroyers Ushio , Sazanami , Yamakaze and Kawakaze , had turned. In addition, the light cruiser Naka , which led the destroyers Murasame , Samidare , Harukaze , Yudachi , Asagumo and Minegumo , was eight nautical miles south of the heavy cruisers and was approaching quickly. At 4:00 p.m., the Jintsū and her group turned west to get on a parallel course to the Allied fleet. Five minutes later the heavy cruisers were only eight nautical miles north of the Jintsu .

The British destroyer Electra sighted the Jintsū at 4:12 p.m. This opened fire four minutes later from a distance of ten nautical miles. The Nachi also began to fire, but their volleys were far too short. In the meantime, both groups were heading west on a parallel course. The cruisers Houston and Exeter opened fire on the Japanese at 4:20 p.m. Since the shells of the Houston were provided with red dye in order to be able to distinguish their impacts from those of the guns of other ships, the concentration of the red dye in the water in front of the Japanese ships slowly increased. This was an extremely unusual practice. Usually, the problem of determining hits was solved by coordinating artillery fire within a fleet, but the heterogeneous allied force was unable to do so because of its communication difficulties. The red color caused nervousness among the Japanese leadership, who couldn't explain the red color straight away (the use of chemical warfare agents in artillery shells can produce similar color effects). For the trained submarine tactician Takagi, it was also the first surface action.

The first hits in the battle were received by De Ruyter at 16:31 and at 16:53 . However, both projectiles were duds.

Admiral Nishimura on the light cruiser Naka decided that his flotilla was not equipped for such a long-distance duel. For this reason, he ordered his ships south-south-west course in order to reduce the distance to the Allied ships. At 16:33, the Naka fired four torpedoes from a distance of eight nautical miles. The following destroyers also fired 27 torpedoes between 4:40 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. from distances of seven to eight nautical miles in the direction of the Allied ships. The Haguro followed with eight torpedoes at around 16:52 from a further distance of twelve nautical miles. In contrast, the Nachi could no longer build up pressure on the launch tubes due to an accidentally opened valve and the air that had escaped and therefore did not participate in the torpedo barrier.

The USS Houston

Meanwhile the gun duel continued. The Houston fired five to six volleys a minute. The De Ruyter and the Exeter seemed to be the preferred targets of the Japanese. From the Houston , Exeter and Perth it was thought to be observed how the Japanese cruiser Haguro received several hits, caught fire and finally sank; in fact, however, he was able to continue to intervene in the battle.

The Japanese torpedo attack, the first massive of its kind in the Pacific War, was a failure. Only one of the torpedoes fired hit a target at 5:30 p.m., the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer .

Shortly before 5 p.m., three Douglas A-20 bombers, accompanied by eight Brewster F2A Buffaloes, attacked the Japanese transporters. However, they did not score any hits. On the contrary, all machines were shot down by Japanese Zero fighters . Rear Admiral Doorman asked for more air support, but the British were of the opinion that the air force had very different focuses of attack than the navy. No further assistance was given.

Shortly after 5:00 p.m. Rear Admiral Takagi saw the forest of masts of the convoy he was guarding in the north. The battle was badly going in that direction. Since his heavy cruisers were still less than eleven nautical miles from the Allied cruiser association and had fired large amounts of ammunition without success, he ordered all ships to attack the enemy. At the same time, Doorman made the same decision and started his fleet heading north.

HMS Exeter under attack

Japanese light cruiser Jintsū

Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro

First the Houston was hit by a dud, which meant that she could only run at half power. The turning point of the battle came a few minutes later: at 5:08 p.m. the Nachi hit the cruiser Exeter very hard. The shell hit the engine room and put six of the eight steam boilers out of operation. As the speed decreased, the Exeter then swerved out of the formation to return to port. The three cruiser commanders who followed her believed that she would obey a new order as the Japanese began firing torpedoes again. So they turned away too. The De Ruyter operated so for some time alone.

The commander of the Perth , who in contrast to the other ships still had a special communication channel with the Exeter , knew of the severe damage and had his ship circled around the battered Exeter to cover it with heavy smoke. In the sea around the Allied ships, there were severe explosions when the errant Japanese torpedoes automatically detonated at the end of their life. The destroyer Kortenaer was hit by a torpedo amidships at 5:30 p.m., broke apart and sank. The formation of the Allied fleet was at this point in complete dissolution. The De Ruyter took South course to catch up with the other ships. Takagi now believed that he had won the battle and also set his ships on a south course.

It took Doorman about twenty minutes to restore command of all the ships in his fleet. The Exeter , accompanied by the Dutch destroyer Witte de With and the three British destroyers, ran south at just under five knots . The De Ruyter sat at the head of the crowd, hoisted a flag signaling the other ships to follow her, and at 5:25 p.m. started again on a north-east course. Visibility was very poor because of the smoke, the burning ships and the approaching dusk. The Japanese ships, which were less affected by the poor visibility thanks to their scouts, could not be made out by the allies. At around 5:45 p.m., the Japanese attack formation emerged from the smoke and opened fire from a distance of eleven nautical miles. Doorman ordered the British destroyers to return fire immediately. Three minutes later, the Naka and shortly thereafter the Jintsū opened the next torpedo attack. The Japanese destroyers followed immediately, firing torpedo after torpedo before turning off and heading in the opposite direction. Some even ran within four nautical miles and then shot their torpedoes.

Japanese bombers attack allied ships (photo taken from Hobart )

The British destroyers Encounter and Electra were the first to turn south, then east and finally northeast to attack the two Japanese light cruisers and 14 destroyers out of the smoke. The Minegumo and the Encounter came within 1.5 nautical miles. For ten minutes they ran on a parallel course and shot each other, but without effective hits. The destroyer Electra scored a hit in the engine room of the Asagumo , which then lost speed. The Jintsū was also hit by an Electra shell , which only caused minor damage. When the Asagumo was almost at a standstill, their gunners scored at 18:00, two heavy hits on the Electra . It sank burning at 6:16 p.m. 54 survivors were rescued from the American submarine S 38 the next morning . The Tokitsukaze was also hit by grenades during these actions.

Dutch cruiser De Ruyter - flagship of Rear Admiral Doorman

After a full turn, the De Ruyter and her escort ships were now heading south-east. Doorman instructed the four American destroyers to cover the retreat. This was interpreted by the commanders as an offensive order, and so they ran towards the Japanese. From a distance of around 5.5 nautical miles, they released their starboard torpedoes, turned and also shot the torpedoes on the port side, so that 24 torpedoes ran towards Takagi's fleet.

Immediately the Japanese turned north. The Haguro was hit by a Perth shell that set her catapult on fire. When sunset set in at 6:20 p.m., it looked like the battle was over. The Japanese ran north, the Allies south.

Japanese heavy cruiser Nachi

Takagi's ships ran out of fuel and he turned back to his main task. So he ordered the convoy, located 16 nautical miles north, to return to a south course. Doorman didn't want to give up Java so easily either. He sent the Exeter back to Surabaya accompanied by the Witte de With . After the Japanese ships had disappeared in the haze of the evening, he turned his ships back on north course and hoped to be able to surprise the Japanese.

In fact, he did so when the Japanese came into view at 7:20 p.m. The Nachi and Haguro had stopped to take their seaplanes back on board and came within nine nautical miles of the firing range of the Allied cannons, which immediately began to fire. The Jintsū responded with four torpedoes, and the Allies turned to starboard. The Japanese also picked up speed and disappeared towards the northeast. The brief exchange of fire ended at 7:37 p.m. and left no damage.

Knowing that he would get no more chance to defend Java, Doorman decided to bypass the Japanese by leading his ships along the coast and then swiveling north. At 9:00 p.m., the four American destroyers, with low fuel and no more torpedoes on board, returned to Surabaya, interpreting Doorman's orders accordingly. When the order was given at 21:25 to swing north, the Jupiter drove to a coastal Dutch mine , exploded and sank within four hours. At around 10:00 p.m., Kortena survivors were spotted and the Encounter recorded 113 of them. All of these actions cost Doorman the entire destroyer escort.

Dutch light cruiser Java

Without escort, the four Allied cruisers drove northward until they were sighted from aboard the Nachi at 11:02 p.m. at a distance of nine nautical miles. At that time Nachi and Haguro were on a south-south-west course. However, they then turned to port on a parallel course heading north. The Allies opened fire on the Japanese heavy units at around 11:10 p.m., while the Japanese did not fire back until 11:21 p.m. Then the Nachi fired eight torpedoes; the Haguro did the same a minute later with a quadruple. The distance at that time was 8.5 nautical miles. In contrast to the hundreds of torpedoes previously fired in combat, the volley hit its target: at 23:32, the De Ruyter was hit aft by one of the four torpedoes of the Haguro . Her ammunition chamber exploded, killing Doorman and 344 of his men. The ship sank very quickly. Two minutes later, a Nachi torpedo hit the Java , which sank an hour and a half later. The last instruction from Doorman to the remaining cruisers Houston and Perth was: "Retreat to Batavia, regardless of any survivors".

After the battle

The Houston and Perth were heading for Batavia. The following day, they were sunk in the Sunda Strait by the Japanese cruisers Mogami and Mikuma and other units protecting the western landing forces in Bantam Bay (→ Battle of the Sunda Strait ). During the landing operations, the Japanese cover fleets sank twelve other Allied warships and 71 merchant ships, or these were sunk by their crews themselves when Japanese ships approached. In addition, six ships were captured and later used by the Japanese under their flag. During the Java landings, the Japanese lost only two ships of their own.

Java was completely occupied by the Japanese army in the next few days . The allied land units remaining on Java, as well as survivors of the sunk and damaged ships, were captured by Japan.

The fate of the USS Langley

Whipple's torpedo hits Langley on Feb. 27, 1942

The Langley also belonged to the ABDA fleet . It was converted from the US Navy's first aircraft carrier into an aircraft tender in 1936 and was now used as an aircraft transporter. It took off on February 22, 1942 with a load of 32 Curtiss P-40 aircraft on board from Fremantle, Australia, to Tjilatjap on Java, in order to strengthen the air defense of the Allies. Five days later, on February 27, the ship with its two companions, the destroyers USS Whipple and USS Edsall , was attacked by three waves of Japanese bombers about 50 to 75 miles from their destination. The first two waves brought no hits for the Japanese, but by the third wave the USS Langley was badly hit five times, so that it had to be abandoned two hours later. Shortly afterwards she was torpedoed by her escort ships and sunk. Sixteen crew members were killed in the Japanese attack.

The consequences

After the conquest of Java, the Japanese had full access to the rich mineral resources of the islands of the southwestern Indonesian archipelago. In addition, they were able to build an effective defense ring from the south to Rabaul in the east. The loss of their fleet made the Allies aware that for the time being they had nothing to counter the Japanese expansionist efforts by sea. Admiral Helfrich withdrew to Colombo on Ceylon on March 2, 1942 and collected the remaining ships there. Although he was used as the new commander of the armed forces East, but had no influence on the tactical approach to fighting the Japanese. It was not until the beginning of May 1942, when Japanese and American naval units fought the battle in the Coral Sea near the Solomon Islands , that the Japanese advance could be stopped.

literature

David Arthur Thomas: Battle of the Java Sea. André Deutsch, London 1968, ISBN 0-233-96072-4 .
FC van Oosten: The Battle of the Java Sea. Sea battles in close-up. Vol. 15. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1976, ISBN 0-87021-911-1 .
Anne Doedens: Slag in de Javazee, 1941-1942. Oorlog tussen Nederland en Japan. Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2017, ISBN 978-94-6249-138-0
Mark Stille: Java Sea 1942. Japan's conquest of the Netherlands East Indies. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2019, ISBN 9781472831613

Movie

The Battle Of The Java Sea . English documentary. 138 minutes. Black & White, VHS 1989, DVD 2004

Web links

Commons : Battle of the Java Sea - collection of images, videos and audio files

Battle Description of Vincent P. O'Hara - other battles (English)
Battle Description - other battles (English)

This version was added to the list of excellent articles on April 13, 2005 .