East Prussian Operation (1914)

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East Prussian Operation (1914)
Part of: First World War
Course of the battle on the Eastern Front, August / September 1914.
Course of the battle on the Eastern Front, August / September 1914.
date August 14 to September 15, 1914
place East Prussia
output German victory
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Russia

Commander

German EmpireThe German Imperium Paul von Hindenburg Erich Ludendorff Maximilian von Prittwitz
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Paul von Rennenkampff Alexander Samsonow † Jakow Schilinski
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire
Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire

Troop strength
At the beginning:
around 220,000 men
11 infantry divisions
1 cavalry division
1,194 guns
56 aircraft
Reinforcements at the beginning of September:
around 80,000 men 		At the beginning:
about 420,000 men
22 infantry divisions
8.5 cavalry divisions
1428 guns
54 aircraft

Reinforcements at the beginning of September: another 5 Inf. And 2nd Cavalry divisions

losses

about 63,000 dead, wounded and prisoners

around 250,000 - 310,000 ?? Dead, wounded and prisoners

Major military operations on the
Eastern Front (1914-1918)

The East Prussian Operation of 1914 is the name given to the invasion of East Prussia by two armies of the Imperial Russian Army in the early phase of the First World War from August 14 to September 15, 1914. The operation met with strong resistance from the German 8th Army , which succeeded in to defeat the two separately operating Russian armies in the battles near Tannenberg and on the Masurian Lakes and thus temporarily calm the situation on the German eastern front .

prehistory

Before the First World War , the Franco-Russian alliance , which had existed since 1894, helped shape the balance of power in Europe. In the event of a war with Germany, it provided for jointly coordinated warfare. A key point of this alliance was the granting of considerable French credits for the expansion of the Russian army and its supply organization in the Russian western regions as a deployment area against the Central Powers . According to the terms of this alliance, in the event of a German attack against France, the Russian Empire had to mobilize 800,000 men within 15 days and initiate the attack against the German Empire. On August 4, 1914, German troops entered neutral Belgium . Following the alliance obligations, the troops of the Russian Northwest Front (1st and 2nd Army) invaded East Prussia. General of the cavalry Jakow Schilinski , who also acted as governor general of Warsaw , was in command of the front .

According to the plan approved by the Russian General Staff on August 14, the operations of the 1st Army (General Paul von Rennenkampff ) were initiated on August 17 with the crossing of the German border, the Masurian Lakes area was to be bypassed in the north and the German garrison be cut off from Koenigsberg . The 2nd Army (General Alexander Samsonow ) was supposed to line up on August 16, to cross the border on August 19, bypass Masuria from the west and prevent the retreat of German Landwehr troops to the Vistula. The aim of the operation was to encircle the German 8th Army from both flanks.

Troop strength

In mid-August, the Russian north-western front concentrated around 22 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions as well as 1,428 guns (including 24 heavy calibers) and 54 aircraft against East Prussia , a total of around 420,000 soldiers.

At the beginning of the war, the German 8th Army (3 Army Corps and 1 Reserve Corps ) under the leadership of Colonel General von Prittwitz had 9th Infantry, 2 Landwehr and 1 Cavalry Division, 1194 artillery pieces (156 of them heavy caliber), 56 aircraft and 2 airships . Together with the Landwehr brigades and garrisons around 220,000 men. At the beginning of September the 8th Army was reinforced with two corps and a cavalry division (around 80,000 men in total).

General Prittwitz's original plan was to beat the Russian troops separately - first the 1st and then the 2nd Army. This was favored by the fact that the German 8th Army was stronger than any Russian army and General Rennenkampf had started the offensive before the intervention of Samsonov.

Course of the operation

The first phase: Gumbinnen

On August 17th, Rennenkampf's 1st Army crossed the border to a width of 70 km. On August 19, there were between Gumbinnen and Goldap the battle of gumbinnen to fight with the German I, XVII (General von Mackensen ) and parts of the 1st Reserve Corps (General von Below ).

Troop strength in the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle August 20th

Attendees infantry cavalry artillery Machine guns
Russians 63,800 9,152 380 (excluding heavy artillery) 252
German 74,400 9,780 408 (including 44 heavy artillery pieces) 224

On August 20, at 4 a.m., the counterattack of the German I. Army Corps (General von François ) against the northern flank of the Russian troops at Gumbinnen began and was initially successful. A counterattack by the Russian 20th Army Corps (General of the Infantry Smirnow ) threw the Germans back in the middle, and it wasn't until 3 p.m. that the commanding general managed to re-establish control of the thrown back 1st Army Corps. The XVII. Army corps came under heavy Russian artillery and machine gun fire and also had to withdraw. The commander of the Russian 2nd Cavalry Division, General Hussain Khan Nakhichevansky, did not intervene in the fighting for unexplained reasons. In this battle, the German 8th Army lost 14,800 men and had to withdraw the left wing to the eastern apron of Königsberg. The losses of the Russians ranged from 10,500 to 15,000 men.

When reports arrived that the Russian 2nd Army (Samsonow) had crossed the southern border west of the Masurian Lakes, Prittwitz ordered a retreat behind the Vistula. The failure at Gumbinnen forced the German army command at the end of August to move strong units from the western front to the east. The 8th Army was at the beginning of September with the Guard Reserve Corps (General von Gallwitz ), the XI. Army Corps (General von Plüskow ) and the 8th Cavalry Division reinforced. The V Army Corps was held back in Metz in anticipation of further developments in East Prussia, but then remained on the Western Front.

Regrouping of the German 8th Army after the Battle of Gumbinnen

On the same day, August 20, the Russian 2nd Army resumed the advance. General von Prittwitz wanted to avoid being surrounded and ordered his troops to withdraw deeper into East Prussia. General Rennenkampf remained inactive for two days and then did not advance towards the 2nd Army, but instead pushed his left wing towards Konigsberg. At the same time, General Samsonov changed the direction of advance of his army from north to northwest, believing that German troops would withdraw to the south. Because of this, the distance between the two Russian armies increased to more than 120 kilometers. During this time, the Russian commanders sent their orders unencrypted, and important information could be overheard by the Germans. On August 23, the Russian 15th Corps threw the German 37th Division back at Orlau and occupied Orlau and Frankenau.

Regrouping of the German troops

On August 21st the situation in the German 8th Army calmed down, the expected persecution from the Russian 1st Army did not take place. General Prittwitz worked out a new plan in which he wanted to use all troops against the 2nd Army to attack. According to this plan, the XX. Army Corps bind the Russian 2nd Army head-on, while the I. Army Corps against the right flank and the I. Reserve Corps including the XVII. Army corps were brought up against the left flank of the enemy. The main strikes should be directed against both enemy flanks. During this operation only 2.5 divisions were left in relation to the Russian 1st Army, which was not advancing any further. It was a very daring plan that could only succeed if the troops of Rennenkampf were to pursue I. and XVII. Corps would not resume. General Ludendorff wrote: " If Rennenkampf can use the success achieved at Gumbinnen and advance quickly, then this maneuver will be unthinkable ." Set surprise and advantageous position of his troops. Meanwhile, on the evening of August 22nd, Prittwitz and his chief of staff von Waldersee were dismissed and replaced by Colonel-General Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von Ludendorff , who were to implement the plan for the counterattack that had already been worked out without major changes.

With the help of the railway, the German army command was able to regroup the required troops quickly in a very short time. As a result, 11.5 German divisions and more than 700 guns were concentrated against the 2nd Armies (9.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions and 612 guns).

The second phase: Tannenberg

Advance of the 2nd (Narew) Army on August 26th

The decisive battle near Tannenberg began on August 26th . The Russian 6th Corps on the right flank of the 2nd Army was forced to stand under pressure from the German XVII. Withdraw army corps. The Russian 1st Corps, meanwhile, threw back the German 2nd Division at Usdau on the left wing , while the 1st Army Corps was pushed into defense. The next day the commander of the Russian 1st Corps was confused by false German radio messages, which led to fear of an attack on his own flank. This circumstance led to the fact that the Russian 1st Corps continued the advance, while the 13th and 15th Corps continued to advance in the middle and suddenly presented the enemy with "open flanks". After the occupation of Usdau, the German I. Army Corps took up the advance on Neidenburg and thus got into the rear of the Russian 15th Corps.

Samsonov only found out on August 27th that the Russian 1st Corps had stopped the advance. He dismissed General Artamonov as commander of the 1st Corps, but took no other countermeasures. A quick retreat would have averted the threat of encirclement. There was also the possibility of a strong counterattack to throw back the German I. Corps. However, Samsonov did not dare to violate Schilinski's orders. He not only continued the offensive, but left his headquarters on August 27th to go to the headquarters of the 15th Corps. When Schilinski recognized the dangerous situation and gave Samsonov the order to withdraw on August 28, he was no longer available. Too late, Rennenkampf received instructions to advance the troops on his left wing over Bartenstein and Bischoffsburg to support Samsonov. But the distance to the 2nd Army was too great and on September 1st troops of the 1st Army were still 50 km away from Tannenberg.

The formation of the Russian 2nd Army on August 28, 1914

On August 28, the Russian 15th Corps threw back the German 41st Division in the battle of Waplitz , which lost more than 2500 dead, around 1000 prisoners and 13 cannons. That was the 2nd Army's last tactical success. On the same day, Samsonov ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the 13th and 15th Corps on the Myshinetz- Mława line . But it was getting late. On the night of August 29th to 30th, the two corps and part of the troops of the 23rd Corps (a total of 5 divisions with incomplete composition) were enclosed east of Tannenberg in the area of ​​the forest of Kommusin. The next morning the Russian troops tried to break out with 3 columns to the south and east, but only one column was able to break out (mostly troops of the 15th and 23rd Corps). Two other columns were scattered because of the timid General Kluev, the soldiers lost their orientation and wandered under machine gun fire for several kilometers without a leader and were captured by the German troops on August 31 at 4 p.m. General Klujew himself capitulated with the largest group (around 4,000 soldiers). The 2nd Army lost around 90,000 prisoners between August 20 and 31. Several thousands of German prisoners were freed near Tannenberg on August 31, who had been captured by Russia from August 20 to 28 in the fighting near Allenstein, Orlau, Usdau and Waplitz.

The third phase: Battle of the Masurians

After the defeat of the 2nd Army, the German Army Command decided to attack the southern flank of Rennenkampff through the Masurian Lake District, where only the Russian 2nd Corps and cavalry units were located. It was planned to break through the Russian front here and get into the rear of the 1st Army and push them off against the Nyemen. Major General Ludendorff concentrated three corps and two cavalry divisions on both sides of the strait of Lötzen and four corps north of the Masurian Lakes to the Angerapp.

The Russian 1st Army found itself in a critical position. The German 8th Army was numerically superior, at the beginning of the German offensive its strength was 12 infantry and 6 Landwehr divisions without full armament. The strength of the Russian 1st Army, on the other hand, was 13 divisions, including 5 newly mobilized reserve divisions with likewise weak armament. The strength of the cavalry was 2 divisions in the 8th Army and 5 divisions in the 1st Army. The Russian superiority of cavalry was useless because large cavalry units could not be used in the Masurian Lake District. When it came to artillery, the 8th Army also had an overwhelming advantage.

In addition, the 3rd Siberian and XXII. Army corps from the fortress area Warsaw (General der Infantry Olochowski) sent to East Prussia for reinforcement. First General Schilinski decided to transfer these two corps to the Russian 2nd Army, then to the 1st Army, on September 6th the new 10th Army was formed from these units , which was later reinforced with the 1st Turkestan Corps. The first Russian reinforcements arrived in East Prussia on September 7th, and on September 11th the 10th Army was placed under the command of the Plow Infantry General . During the fighting these troops were in the process of concentration and practically did not take part in the operation.

The German 8th Army can force the Russian 1st Army to retreat behind the Angerapp by means of its southern circumferential wing, which was set up against Goldap

The German offensive began on September 6th and was not successful until September 9th. Rennkampf moved two infantry and three cavalry divisions from the center to the south flank and the XX. Corps from the north. On September 10th, Rennkampf proposed to General Schilinski to stop the retreat and to go back on the offensive against the 8th Army. Schilinski rejected this proposal and led the whole army back east to the border. In the Battle of the Masurian Lakes the Russians lost around 125,000 men, including 45,000 prisoners, the Germans lost around 40,000 men. On September 15, the East Prussian operation was over.

Consequences and losses

The numerical superiority of the Russian troops at the beginning of the operation was not used. During the operation, Russian troops won several small skirmishes but lost major battles. The Russian 10th Army under General Wassili Pflug and Rennenkampf's 1st Army were able to drive the German troops back across the border by September 25 and even keep small parts of East Prussia occupied. The East Prussian operation showed that the military skills of the commanders of battalions, regiments and divisions could not compensate for the incompetence of the high command. The East Prussian Operation, however, played an important role in the decisive battles on the Western Front ; it enabled the French troops to successfully counter-offensive in the Battle of the Marne . This was later confirmed by Marshal Joffre , David Lloyd George and other military and politicians.

The main culprit for the defeat was General Schilinsky, he poorly coordinated the actions between the armies of Rennenkampf and Samsonov and was unable to properly assess the situation. Even after Samsonov's defeat, he let the race fight go on to Koenigsberg. The successful withdrawal of the 1st Army was only due to the actions of Rennenkampf himself. General Samsonov and his corps leaders Artamonov and Kluev were primarily responsible for the encirclement and the resulting great losses. General Schilinski tried in vain to justify himself by shifting the blame for the defeat of the 2nd Army on to Rennenkampf, but his attempt was unsuccessful. He was dismissed from office and replaced by General Nikolai Russky . After the revolution, both Schilinski and Rennenkampf were shot by the Bolsheviks . General Kluev, who gave up prematurely, fled into exile in Finland in 1921 for fear of retaliation.

At the end of the Second World War there was the East Prussian Operation (1945) .

Troop bodies involved

Russian Northwest Front

Commander: General Schilinsky, Chief of Staff: General Wladimir Alexejewitsch Oranowski

1st Army General of the Infantry Paul von Rennenkampf

XX. Corps (General Vladimir Vasilyevich Smirnov )

  • 28th Infantry Division (Nikolai Alexejewitsch Lashkewitsch)
  • 29th Infantry Division (Anatoly Nikolajewitsch Rosenschild von Paulin)

III. Corps ( Nikolai Alexejewitsch Jepantschin )

  • 25th Infantry Division (Pavel Ilyich Bulgakov)
  • 27th Infantry Division (Michail Michailowitsch Adaridow)

IV Corps (General Sultan Eris Giray Khan Aliyev )

  • 30th Infantry Division (Eduard Arkadjewitsch Koljankowski)
  • 40 Infantry Division (Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Korotkjewitsch)
  • 5th Infantry Brigade (Pyotr Dmitrijewitsch Schreider)

II Corps (General of the Cavalry Sergei Mikhailovich Scheideman )

  • 26th Infantry Division (Alexander Nikolajewitsch Poetzki)
  • 43rd Infantry Division (Vladimir Alexsejewitsch Slussjarenko)
  • 72nd Reserve Division (Dmitri Dmitriewitsch Orlov)

I. Cavalry Corps (gene of the cavalry Hussein Khan Nachitschwanski )

  • 1st Guard Cavalry Division (Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Kasnakow)
  • 2nd Guard Cavalry Division ( Georgi Ottowitsch Rauch )
  • 1st Cavalry Division ( Wassili Josifowitsch Romeiko-Gurko )
  • 2nd Cavalry Division (Hussein Khan Nachitschwanski)
  • 3rd Cavalry Division (Vladimir Karlowitsch Belgard)
  • 1st Cavalry Brigade (Nikolai Aloisjewitsch Oranowski)

Reinforcements from the beginning of September XXVI. Corps ( Alexander Alexejewitsch Gerngross )

  • 53rd Reserve Division (Semyon Ivanovich Fyodorov)
  • 56th Reserve Division (Nikolai Ksenofontowitsch Boldirew)
  • 54th Reserve Division (Mikhail Grigoryevich Jerogin)

2nd Army General of the Cavalry Alexander Samsonov

I. Corps ( Leonid Konstantinowitsch Artamonow , from August 27, Dushkevich)

VI. Corps (General Alexander Blagowjetschenski, from September 12th Baluyev)

  • 4th Infantry Division (Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Komarow)
  • 16th Infantry Division (Guido Kazimirovich Richter)

XIII. Corps ( Nikolai Alexejewitsch Klujew )

  • 1st Infantry Division (Andrei Alexandrowitsch Ugrjumow)
  • 36th Infantry Division (Alexander Bogdanowitsch Preschentschi)

XV. Corps (General Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Martos )

  • 6th Infantry Division (Fedor Iwanowitsch Torklus)
  • 8th Infantry Division (Jewgeni Emiljewitsch Vietinghof)

XXIII. Corps ( Zyprian Antonowitsch Kondratowitsch )

II. Cavalry Corps

  • 4th Cavalry Division (Anton Alexandrowitsch Tolpygo)
  • 6th Cavalry Division (Vladimir Christoforowitsch Roop)
  • 15th Cavalry Division (Pavel Petrowitsch Lyubomirow)

Russian reinforcements

Set up near Warsaw at the beginning of September:

10th Army General of the Infantry Vasily Plow

  • 1st Caucasian Cossack Division
  • 57th Reserve Division
  • 68th Reserve Division

III. Siberian Corps ( Yevgeny Alexandrowitsch Radkewitsch )

  • siber. 7th division
  • siber. 8th division

I. Turkestan Corps (Mikhail Rodinowitsch Erofejew)

  • 1st Turkestan Brigade
  • 2nd Turkestan Brigade
  • 3rd Turkestan Brigade
  • 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division

XXII. Corps (General of the Infantry Alexander Baron von Brincken )

  • Finnish 1st Division
  • Finnish 2nd Division
  • 50th Infantry Division

German 8th Army

Commander: Colonel General von Prittwitz, from August 22nd. Colonel General von Hindenburg

  • Königsberg Fortress - Lieutenant General Günter von Pappritz (2nd Landwehr Brigade)
  • Graudenz Fortress - Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Unger (20th Landwehr Brigade)
  • 1st Cavalry Division - Lieutenant General Hermann Brecht
  • 3rd Reserve Division - Lieutenant General Kurt von Morgen

I. Army Corps: Lieutenant General Hermann von François

XVII. Army Corps: General of the Cavalry August von Mackensen

XX. Army Corps: General of the Infantry Friedrich von Scholtz

I. Reserve Corps: General of the Infantry Otto von Below

Landwehr Corps Goltz ( 1st Landwehr Division ) - Lieutenant General Georg von der Goltz

  • 6th Landwehr Brigade
  • 33rd Mixed Landwehr Brigade
  • 34th Mixed Landwehr Brigade
  • 37th Mixed Landwehr Brigade
  • 70th Landwehr Brigade
  • 5th Landwehr Brigade (Thorn Fortress)

Reinforcements in early September

XI. Army Corps General Otto von Plüskow

Guard Reserve Corps General of the Artillery Max von Gallwitz

See also

literature

Web links

Commons : East Prussia in World War I  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Note: Number without the 6th Army (St. Petersburg district) and the independent fortress area Warsaw
  2. ^ The directive for races fight
  3. ^ The directive for Samsonov
  4. ^ Reichsarchiv Volume 2, Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1925, pp. 358 and 370 f.
  5. ↑ Salesski KA: Поход русской армии в Восточную Пруссию в 1914 г., спасение Франции и перелом в ходе войны: новые подходы к истории Первой мировой войны . In: riss.ru . Pages 54–55. (PDF)
  6. ↑ Vladimir Letjagin. P. 25
  7. ^ East Prussian Operation (1914)
  8. ↑ Malkow, Schkundin. 20th Century Wars. Volume 1. p. 144
  9. ↑ Г.Кретинин. Триумф и трагедии двух генералов. P. 114