Philo of Larisa

Philon von Larisa ( Greek  Φίλων Phílōn , also Philon von Larissa ; * 159/158 BC in Larisa ; † 84/83 BC in Rome ) was an ancient Greek philosopher . He belonged to the Platonic Academy in Athens , which he directed from 110/109 to 88 as a scholarch (head of the school).

Philon was the last scholarch of the "Younger Academy", which was then shaped by the authority of the famous scholar Karneades , who died in 129/128 . Karneades was the most prominent representative of the skepticism characteristic of the Younger Academy , to which his successors clung. His pupils and their pupils represented partly a radical skepticism, partly moderate variants. Philo was a moderate skeptic. He was particularly interested in questions of epistemology and ethics . In the course of the development of his thinking he came to a new approach in that he gave up the traditional strict truth criterion and thus greatly softened the skepticism. He spent the last years of his life in Rome, where Cicero was one of his listeners. His main opponent was his former student Antiochus of Askalon , who completely rejected skepticism and fought it vigorously.

Because of his innovation, Philon is sometimes referred to as the founder of a new school, the "fourth academy"; however, this term does not appear in contemporary sources.

Life

Fragment from the Academica des Philodemos , an important source for Philon's life ( Papyrus Herculanensis 1021, column 32 of the Oxford copy)

Philo was probably born in 159 or 158 BC. Born in BC. However, if the statement in a papyrus that he died at the age of 63, contrary to the probability, is not a mistake, his birth is around 147 BC. To date. He spent his childhood and youth in his hometown Larisa in Thessaly . There he received philosophy lessons from Kallikles, a student of the famous philosopher Karneades, for about eight years. Karneades, the leading exponent of academic skepticism at the time, headed the Academy in Athens until his health-related resignation from the office of Scholarchen (137/136). 134/133 Philon went to Athens, where he was a student of Kleitomachus for fourteen years , who was then the scholarch of the academy. He was then a student of the grammarist Apollodorus of Athens from about 120-118 years before he took part in the lessons of a Stoic - very likely Mnesarchus of Athens - for seven years . When Clitomachus died, Philon was elected to succeed him in 110/109.

Even under Kleitomachos, Romans from respected families had taken part in classes at the academy. Philon's listeners included the Roman politician Gaius Aurelius Cotta , who later became consul . A generally Rome-friendly attitude of the academy under Philo cannot be proven. Furthermore, Philo had numerous Greek students in Athens, whose names have been passed down.

In 88 BC First the politician Athenion and after his failure the troop leader Aristion established a tyranny in Athens . Both acted on behalf of the anti-Rome king Mithridates VI. from Pontos . To escape the reign of terror in Athens, Philo fled to Rome before the end of 88. A large number of his students probably joined him in the process. So he avoided the fighting of the First Mithridatic War , which led to the siege of Athens by the Romans. It is not known how long rudimentary school operations were maintained in the academy after Philon's escape. In March 86 Sulla's troops captured Athens.

Philo spent the few remaining years of his life as a respected philosophy teacher in Rome. His lectures were extremely popular in the educated circles of the Roman upper class. His numerous listeners included Cicero, whose philosophical development was strongly influenced by Philon's teaching, the politician Quintus Lutatius Catulus , who had been consul in 102, and his son of the same name , who was elected consul in 78.

In Rome, Philo taught rhetoric, as he did in Athens . In doing so, he deviated from the anti-rhetoric attitude that had prevailed in the academy since Plato's time.

In the winter of 87/86, Philon's former student Antiochus of Askalon, who was then in Alexandria , sharply criticized the skeptical theory of knowledge. Antiochus had already separated from the academy earlier because he had come to a principled rejection of skepticism. Now he fought against a new variant of moderate skepticism developed by Philon and spread in writing in a counter-writing Sosos , which has not survived . Herakleitos of Tire, a student of Philo living in Alexandria, defended the skeptical philosophy against the attack of Antiochus. Criticism of Philon's moderate skepticism also came from the opposite camp: Ainesidemos , a former academic who took a radically skeptical stance, opposed the softening of skepticism.

Philo died in Italy in the year 84 or early 83 in the wake of an influenza epidemic, as a papyrus rereading has shown. With him ended the epoch of the skepticism-influenced "Younger Academy", of which he was the last scholarch.

Works

All of Philo's writings are lost, except for fragments. There is a traditional title Dihaíresis tou kata philosophían lógou , which literally translates as "classification of the presentation of philosophy"; it could have been a program document or a systematic overview. A section from this that deals with the procedure for imparting ethical teachings is preserved in a paraphrase in Johannes Stobaios . What is certain is that Philo wrote a work in two books in Rome in 87, which is referred to in research as "Roman books" because its authentic title is unknown. In it he dealt with questions of epistemology .

Teaching

Since Philon's writings have not been preserved, his teaching can only be inferred from information in the works of other authors. The main source is the Academica Ciceros, who was well informed as a participant in Philon's class and also shares opposing arguments.

As with the other skeptical academics, Philon focused on epistemology and ethics . Because of the unfavorable tradition and because he has changed his views significantly over time, the determination and investigation of his doctrinal statements proves difficult. The related questions are controversially discussed in the rich research literature.

Epistemology

Older stages of development

As a student of Kleitomachos and also at the time of his election as Scholarchen, Philo was apparently a loyal follower of conventional academic skepticism, although possibly not the radical variant advocated by Kleitomachus. So he advocated - especially in the dispute with the Stoics - for the conviction that it was impossible to obtain secure philosophical knowledge. All attempts to substantiate truth criteria conclusively and to prove the correctness of a judgment with their help are doomed to failure. Therefore, as a philosopher one can discuss different opinions, but one should honestly not adopt any of them in the sense of a factual assertion. In practical life, where you have to constantly make decisions and you need criteria for them, be it permissible to decide on a certain assumption from the point of view of probability or plausibility and to adjust your behavior accordingly. From a philosophical point of view, however, such assumptions are nothing but insignificant opinions, since they cannot be proven. Therefore, the wise man renounces judgment on principle.

In Philon's time, Karneades, the most famous of the skeptics, was the main authority on epistemology. Philon had no longer been able to personally experience Karneades, who had resigned as head of the academy for health reasons in 137/136 and died in 129/128. Since Karneades had left no writings, younger academics like Philon knew his philosophy only from the partly subjectively tinged reports of his surviving students, among whom Kleitomachus and Metrodorus of Stratonikeia were the most prominent and probably the most important. Metrodorus, who taught outside the academy, represented a moderate skepticism in contrast to Kleitomachus. Both claimed to defend the authentic conception of Carnead. Metrodorus claimed that Karneades did not consider the whole of reality to be incomprehensible. Rather, he considered certain facts to be recognizable and therefore accepted a commitment to a plausible opinion in individual cases.

At a point in time that was difficult to determine, Philo took a position in the direction of the moderate direction. He probably only came forward with this view after his election as scholar, when the radicals had lost their most prominent head with the death of Clitomachus. Whether and to what extent he was influenced by Metrodoros and agreed with him is unclear and is assessed differently in research.

Last (Roman) development phase

After moving to Rome, Philo made a further serious change in his position in his “Roman Books”, which angered his former pupil Antiochus of Ascalon and prompted a violent protest. A major point of contention was the fact that, despite his changes of opinion, Philo always clung to the claim of the skeptical academics to preserve the authentic philosophy of Plato. So he saw Plato as a (moderate) skeptic. Antiochus, who opposed both moderate and radical skepticism, denied the justification of this claim; he considered himself the true heir to the Platonic tradition.

Cicero reports that Philo made novel claims in the "Roman Books" and thus surprised his friends and followers. The sources do not reveal exactly what the philosopher, who is now over seventy years old, changed course, and opinions differ widely in research. What is certain is that Philon remained a skeptic; otherwise Antiochus would not have turned against him, but would have applauded him. However, it is also certain that the change in direction resulted in a considerable reduction in skepticism and that Philo now largely granted the possibility of knowledge of objective reality. However, this was certainly not - as with Antiochus - an approximation of the Stoic epistemology, but a fundamentally different concept of knowledge.

The stoic doctrine says that knowledge is only present when there is an idea (phantasía) that can only be brought about by something according to this idea and not also by something that is not or that is different from the idea. If this is the case, then “consent” (synkatáthesis) to this idea is appropriate and an “apprehension” (katálēpsis) of the truth is possible, whereby the apprehending person is clear that it is actually real knowledge.

In contrast, Philo held on to the conviction of academic skepticism that no conception can meet this requirement. He continued to consider it impossible to grasp it in the stoic sense. In this respect he remained a skeptic. However, he had come to the conviction that a knowledge of an objective truth as such can also exist under certain circumstances if the strict stoic truth criterion is not fulfilled, according to which, apart from the recognized facts, no other is possible who also this idea - in this case as Illusion - could evoke. According to Philon's new teaching, knowledge is achievable when two conditions are met: clarity or evidence (enárgeia) and the agreement (homología) of several observations. This is the case when a plausible assumption is inherently consistent and when observations made by different observers and at different points in time agree with it. Then there is such a high degree of credibility that one can not only "follow" this idea pragmatically for everyday life, but also "agree" with it philosophically, although its inaccuracy cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty. In this way one does not grasp the facts in the sense of the Stoa, but "in accordance with the nature of things".

With this new teaching, Philo continued to oppose the stoic concept of possible absolutely certain knowledge. At the same time, however, he also rejected the principle, which stoics and skeptics had unanimously approved of until now, that all assumptions that cannot be proven to be true with absolute certainty are nothing but subjective opinions and as such are equally philosophically worthless. In doing so, he removed the fundamental barrier between what is more or less plausible and what can be called true. Antiochus therefore accused him of having abolished the criterion of distinction that enables the definition of truth by renouncing the conventional delimitation of knowledge and opinion, and thus, without wanting to, abolished the concept of truth.

Philon's new teaching actually created the epistemological basis for a return to "dogmatism". It made it possible to reintroduce doctrines with a claim to truth, albeit with the restriction that this claim could not be an absolute one. The extent to which he himself has already proclaimed such individual doctrines, also with regard to the area of ​​the imperceptible, is controversial in research. Harold Tarrant thinks that Philon's “Roman books” contained a new “dogmatic” teaching, the “orthodoxy” of his “fourth academy”.

ethics

Since Philo in his later teaching considered knowledge to be fundamentally attainable and a remaining residual uncertainty to be tolerable, the central problem of skepticism did not arise for him, how to consistently abstain from all judgments and still make, carry out and take responsibility for decisions in everyday life . Rather, he directed his attention to the question of how, as a philosopher, one leads a person who is ignorant of philosophy to insight and thus to eudaimonia (happiness). He described the work of the philosophical teacher in analogy to that of a doctor. He distinguished several steps of instruction. First of all, the philosopher shows the meaning of a virtuous philosophical life and refutes criticism of this concept, just as a doctor convinces the patient of the effectiveness of a therapy. Then he "heals" by eliminating false, harmful opinions which impair the ability to make decisions and replacing them with beneficial ones; it is about the goods and the evils. The third task is to understand the ultimate goal, eudaimonia, which is compared to the doctor's ultimate goal, health. The next lesson consists of teaching rules for the conduct of life and clarifying questions relating to the state community and its constitutional order. In medicine, prophylactic health advice corresponds to this step . The last step, the presentation of the implementation of what has been learned in everyday life, is actually superfluous for those with sufficient insight, but is added for those who need information.

reception

Cicero

Cicero, bust in the Musei Capitolini , Rome

A main feature of academic skepticism was the consistent renunciation of the search for the truth, since it was considered unattainable. Cicero, whose philosophical thinking was shaped by the last phase of the epoch of the skeptical Younger Academy, occasionally expressed himself in this sense as an epistemological pessimist. On the other hand, however, he saw the search for truth as a central concern of philosophy and took a more optimistic stance in numerous passages of his philosophical works. He justified this with his concept of approaching the truth by finding and weighing contrary arguments on an open question. This can be used to “lure out” something that is either true or comes as close as possible to the truth. Some scholars see the influence of the teaching of the late Philo behind this understanding of truth and knowledge, which is typical for Cicero and not otherwise attested. If this is the case, Philo has abandoned a basic assumption of skepticism by blurring the fundamental difference between the more or less probable and believable and the true and believing an increase in plausibility as a gradual advance towards the truth. However, there is no evidence in the sources that Philo ever gave up this fundamental distinction in skepticism. It can therefore be assumed that Cicero transformed Philon's epistemology in the sense of his own understanding of philosophy as a search for truth.

Roman Imperial Era

The reception of Philonic epistemology in the Roman Empire, like the reactions of contemporaries, reflects the position of his moderate skepticism “between the fronts”. Sextus Empiricus , a consistent exponent of Pyrrhonic skepticism, found in Philon's softening of skepticism an argument for his assertion that the academics were not real skeptics because they lacked the necessary consistency . The Middle Platonist Numenios was of the opinion that Philo had not been able to escape the need to give up unsustainable skepticism, but had only taken this step half-heartedly. The church father Augustine praised Philo because he regarded him as a follower of a "dogmatic" Platonism that was only apparently a skeptic.

The Academy's turning away from radical skepticism, prompted by Philon, was seen as a deep turning point and a new beginning during the Roman Empire. That is why Philo was called the founder of a “fourth academy” (where the founders of the “first” or “second” and “third” academies were Plato, Arkesilaos and Karneades). The term “fourth academy” is also used in modern research, although it should be noted that it is not used in contemporary authors.

Modern judgments

The modern evaluations of Philon's philosophical achievement diverge widely. John Glucker, to whom Woldemar Görler largely agrees, sees in him a conservative, colorless and insignificant thinker who was unable to point the academy in a new direction. His attempt to find a way out of the sterility of an only negative skepticism with the theses of the “Roman books” had failed. Gisela Striker is of the opinion that Philon wrongly considered himself a skeptic; at the end of his philosophical development he was, in fact, just like his opponent Antiochus, a dogmatist.

Harold Tarrant sees it differently. He thinks that Philon's “fourth academy” has developed an independent position, that it prepared the future return to Plato and thus gave the later development of Platonism a lasting impetus. Bernard Besnier also came to a positive assessment of Philon's performance. He sees in the position of the last scholar of the Younger Academy a justified consequence of the insight that the criteria theory of Carnead, if one wants to take it seriously, needs a justification and that such can be nothing more than a "dogma". Philon admitted to this. In doing so, he freed the academy from the “parasitic”, purely destructive role in which it had found itself, as long as its aim was to refute the stoic epistemology. Raymond Gélibert considers Philo a phenomenalist who has by no means given up skepticism, but rather placed it on a phenomenalist basis and thus challenged dogmatism.

Source collections

• Heinrich Dörrie (Ed.): The Platonism in antiquity , Volume 1: The historical roots of Platonism . Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, ISBN 3-7728-1153-1 , pp. 170–193, 436–453 (source texts with translation and commentary)
• Hans Joachim Mette : Philon of Larisa and Antiochus of Askalon . In: Lustrum 28/29, 1986/87, pp. 9–63 (compilation of the source texts)

literature

• Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, ISBN 0-19-815298-1
• Woldemar Görler : Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy . The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half-volume, Schwabe, Basel 1994, ISBN 3-7965-0930-4 , pp. 915-937
• Richard Goulet: Philon de Larissa . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2012, ISBN 978-2-271-07335-8 , pp. 404-438

Web links

• Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Remarks

1. ↑ Kilian Fleischer: Did Philo von Larisa die at the age of 63? In: Archives for Papyrus Research and Related Areas 63, 2017, pp. 335–366.
2. ↑ His student body with Apollodor is now secured by a new reading, in addition Kilian Fleischer: The Original Verses of Apollodorus' Chronica ("Edition, Translation and Commentary on the First Iambic Didactic Poem in the Light of New Evidence"). De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2020, ISBN 978-3-11-070338-2 , pp. 16-21.
3. ^ Enzo Puglia: Le biography di Filone e di Antioco nella Storia dell'Academia di Filodemo . In: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 130, 2000, pp. 17–28, here: 18 f. ( online ; PDF; 139 kB); Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, p. 49, note 35; Kilian Fleischer: The Original Verses of Apollodorus' Chronica ("Edition, Translation and Commentary on the First Iambic Didactic Poem in the Light of New Evidence"). De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2020, ISBN 978-3-11-070338-2 , Pp. 18-20.
4. ^ Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, pp. 60-64.
5. ^ Kilian Fleischer: The Pupils of Philo of Larissa and Philodemus' Stay in Sicily (PHerc. 1021, col. XXXIV 6-19). In: Cronache Ercolanesi 47, 2017, pp. 73–85.
6. ↑ On the question of Philon's successor in the academy see Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 917; Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, p. 1; Jean-Louis Ferrary: Philhellénisme et impérialisme , Rome 1988, p. 447 f. A successor is mentioned in the Papyrus Herculanensis 1021; see Enzo Puglia: Le biography di Filone e di Antioco nella Storia dell'Academia di Filodemo . In: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 130, 2000, pp. 17–28, here: 23–28; Kilian Fleischer: New Evidence on the Death of Philo of Larissa (PHerc. 1021, cols. 33.42-34.7). In: The Cambridge Classical Journal 63, 2017, pp. 69–81, here: 78 f .; Orazio Cappello: The School of Doubt , Leiden 2019, pp. 107-109.
7. ↑ Cicero, Brutus 306.
8. ↑ See Tobias Reinhardt: Rhetoric in the Fourth Academy . In: The Classical Quarterly 50, 2000, pp. 531-547; Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, pp. 57 f., 66, 296 ff.
9. ↑ On Ainesidemos' criticism of Philon and its dating see Woldemar Görler: Ausklang und transition . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 981–989, here: 983–985.
10. ↑ For the chronology see Tiziano Dorandi: Ricerche sulla cronologia dei filosofi ellenistici , Stuttgart 1991, pp. 17-20. On Philon's death, see Kilian Fleischer: New Evidence on the Death of Philo of Larissa (PHerc. 1021, cols. 33.42-34.7). In: The Cambridge Classical Journal 63, 2017, pp. 69–81.
11. ↑ Hypotheses about possible successors are not plausible, see Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 917.
12. ↑ Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 918; Charles Brittain expresses doubts: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, p. 71.
13. ^ Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, pp. 11, 14–17, 76–128 describes the moderate skepticism in the final phase of the Younger Academy as the “philonic / metrodoric” position. David Sedley judges similarly: The end of the Academy . In: Phronesis 25, 1980, pp. 67-75, here: 71. John Glucker: The Philonian / Metrodorians: Problems of Method in Ancient Philosophy . In: Elenchos 25, 2004, pp. 99–153, here: 103 f., 108 f., 118–133 rejects the assumption that there was a common philonic / metrodoric position and schooling.
14. ↑ See Harold Tarrant: Agreement and the Self-Evident in Philo of Larissa . In: Dionysius 5, 1981, pp. 66-97, here: 67; Jonathan Barnes : Antiochus of Ascalon . In: Miriam Griffin , Jonathan Barnes (eds.): Philosophia togata , Oxford 1989, pp. 51–96, here: 70–76.
15. ↑ Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 923 f .; on the terms enárgeia and homología see also Harold Tarrant: Agreement and the Self-Evident in Philo of Larissa . In: Dionysius 5, 1981, pp. 66-97, here: 86-88, 96 f.
16. ^ Gisela Striker: Academics fighting Academics . In: Brad Inwood , Jaap Mansfeld (ed.): Assent and argument , Leiden 1997, pp. 257–276, here: 258 f .; Jonathan Barnes: Antiochus of Ascalon . In: Miriam Griffin, Jonathan Barnes (eds.): Philosophia togata , Oxford 1989, pp. 51–96, here: 71–75.
17. ↑ Harold Tarrant: Skepticism or Platonism? , Cambridge 1985, p. 41 ff .; see. on this Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 930–932.
18. ↑ Philon's concept is reproduced in Johannes Stobaios , Eclogae 2,7; Greek text and English translation by Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, pp. 364-366 (and discussion pp. 255-262, 277-295). See also Malcolm Schofield: Academic Therapy: Philo of Larissa and Cicero's Project in the Tusculans . In: Gillian Clark, Tessa Rajak (eds.): Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World , Oxford 2002, pp. 91-109, here: 91-99.
19. ↑ Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 928–930; Heinrich Dörrie (ed.): Der Platonismus in der Antike , Vol. 1: The historical roots of Platonism , Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, pp. 178–187, 442–449, provides an annotated compilation of the sources on Philo's influence on Cicero .
20. ↑ Heinrich Dörrie (Ed.): The Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 1: The historical roots of Platonism , Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, pp. 438-442.
21. ^ Compilation of the documents in Charles Brittain: Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Skeptics , Oxford 2001, p. 348 f.
22. ^ John Glucker: Antiochus and the Late Academy , Göttingen 1978, pp. 88 f., 108 f .; Woldemar Görler: Philon from Larisa . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 4: The Hellenistic philosophy , 2nd half volume, Basel 1994, pp. 915–937, here: 933 f.
23. ^ Gisela Striker: Academics fighting Academics . In: Brad Inwood, Jaap Mansfeld (ed.): Assent and argument , Leiden 1997, pp. 257–276, here: 276.
24. ↑ Harold Tarrant: Skepticism or Platonism? , Cambridge 1985, pp. 2-6, 13, 41 ff., 133-135; see. Harold Tarrant: Agreement and the Self-Evident in Philo of Larissa . In: Dionysius 5, 1981, pp. 66-97, here: 66 f.
25. ^ Bernard Besnier: La nouvelle académie, selon le point de vue de Philon de Larisse . In: Bernard Besnier (ed.): Scepticisme et exégèse. Hommage à Camille Pernot , Fontenay 1993, pp. 85–163, here: 125.
26. ↑ Raymond Gélibert: Philon de Larissa et la fin du scepticisme académique . In: Permanence de la philosophie. Mélanges offerts à Joseph Moreau , Neuchâtel 1977, pp. 82–126, here: 122–126.

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on May 11, 2010 in this version .