Russo-Persian War (1722-1723)

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Russo-Persian War 1722–1723
date 1722 to 1723
place Transcaucasia , Northern Iran
output Victory of the Russian Empire

The Russo-Persian War of 1722-1723 (also known in Russia as the Persian Campaign of Peter the Great ) was a military conflict between the Russian Empire and Persia . It was operated by the Russian tsar , who wanted to expand Russian influence to the Caspian region and the South Caucasus at the expense of Persia and to prevent the rival Ottoman Empire from gaining territories.

As a result of the war, Persia under the Safavids ceded large areas in the North and South Caucasus to Russia in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg . These included the cities of Derbent and Baku and the associated regions, as well as the provinces of Gilan , Shirvan , Māzandarān and Astarabad . These remained under Russian rule until the Treaty of Rasht (1732) and the Treaty of Ganja .

background

At the beginning of the 18th century, the Caucasus was part of the Persian Empire, the northern border of which ran along the Terek River . The Safavid dynasty , however, was in decline. Under Sultan Hosein , the central power had already lost control of the edges of the empire and no foreign policy was pursued. Tsar Peter the Great , on the other hand, was very interested in Persia and Central Asia, but above all in India. The Armenians and Georgians had offered their support to Peter the Great if he would free them from the oppression of the Muslims. After the Peace of Prut with the Ottoman Empire , the Tsar turned his attention to the Caucasus and Persia. The young officer Artemi Wolynski had been dispatched to Isfahan and made inquiries into cities, settlements, ports and rivers. Wolynski had succeeded in ensuring that Russians could henceforth trade freely in Iran and that the Persian state would ensure their security. Volynski reported to Moscow that Persia was badly governed, that the Shah's palace was only ruled by fools, that Persia was on the verge of collapse and was easy to conquer. After the Peace of Nystad in 1721, the tsar turned to his goal of annexing Persian territory along the Caspian Sea to Russia.

The pretext for attacking Persia was provided by the sack of Şamaxı by Sunni Lesgier in 1721. It was led by Daud Khan, who had long been imprisoned in the Derbent citadel. He was released because the Safavids hoped he would come to the aid of the Shah with his allies, who were threatened by Afghan invaders. Instead, Daud Khan turned against the Shiite oppression of the Sunnis and against the Persian troops. During the storming of Şamaxı , thousands of Shiite residents were killed as well as a few Russian traders and the allegedly richest Russian trader at the time, Matwei Jewreinow, suffered great losses. Wolynski reported to the tsar that Daud Khan and his allies had offered themselves to the Ottoman Empire as vassals and suggested that Persian territory be occupied and, if necessary, released again in return for compensation. In addition, there was news that the Afghans led by Mir Wais Hotak were besieging Isfahan . With the agreement of the Tsar, Russian troops gathered in Astrakhan .

The Georgian King Vakhtang VI. , who had been ill-treated by the Shah and had broken with him, sent an envoy to Peter the Great to propose joint action against Persia. The plan was for Russian troops to land on the Caspian coast with their newly built Caspian fleet and move inland from there. There should Wachtang VI. join the Russians with 30,000 Georgians and 10,000 Armenians to take joint action against Daud Khan. Meanwhile, the Russian consul in Persia, Semyon Avramov, should offer the Shah that Russia would help him subdue its enemies if he ceded some Caspian provinces to Russia in return. Avramov delivered the first part of the message to the Shah's heir, Tahmasp II , but reported to Russia that the arrogance of the Persians made it impossible to talk to them and that Tahmasp was betrayed by his followers.

Course of the campaign

In July 1722 the Russian army left Astrakhan with about 22,000 men , led by Admiral Apraxin . Later they were reinforced by land by another 22,000 cavalry and Cossacks from Tsaritsyn . On August 23, 1722 the army that had gone ashore captured Derbent in southern Dagestan . (Document is missing)

In September, a large part of the Caspian Flotilla was lost in a storm, so that it was not possible to deliver supplies. The Russian cavalry lost most of the horses due to an epidemic, and the soldiers were also unable to cope with the unfamiliar, humid climate. The tsar was forced to cease military operations and retreat to Astrakhan, leaving a strong garrison for guarding in Derbent and the newly established Fort Sviatoi Krest (Holy Cross). Watchtang VI. had to take his Georgian-Armenian army alone against Daud Khan, which failed, cost him the throne and ended his dynasty. Peter gave up his plans to conquer Şamaxı.

In the late autumn of 1722, Russian troops occupied the city of Rasht , supposedly to protect it. In February 1723 the governor of the city assured that the Persian troops could ensure security themselves and that the Russians would please leave. However, the Russians broke their promise to withdraw their troops, so they were besieged in their barracks. At the end of March 1723, the Russian troops broke out, killing more than 1000 Persian soldiers and forcing Shah Tahmasp II to negotiate. His ambassador, Ismail Beg, had to sign the humiliating Treaty of Saint Petersburg in September 1723 . It stipulated that Russia would help the Shah maintain his throne and that it would support him in the fight against rebels in Persia. In return, Russia got the cities of Derbent and Baku and the associated regions, as well as the provinces of Gilan , Shirvan , Māzandarān and Astarabad .

On the eve of the Russo-Turkish War 1735–1739 , Tsarina Anna Ioannovna returned all the conquered territories to the Persians in order to enter into an alliance with them against the Ottoman Empire.

literature

  • IV Kurukin: Persidskij pochod Petra Velikogo . Moscow, 2011.
  • Василий Потто: Кавказская война в отдельных очерках, эпизодах, легендах и биографиях. 5 volumes (Том 1: От древнейших времен до Ермолова. Том 2: Ермоловское время 1828-1829 гг. Том 3: Персидская война 1826-1828 гг. Том 4: Турецкая война. Том 5: Времена Паскевича, или Бунт Чечни. ). 1887–1889, new edition: Центрполиграф, Москва 2006, ISBN 5-9524-2104-0 (set), ( ISBN 5-9524-2105-9 (vol. 1); ISBN 5-9524-2106-7 (vol. 2 ), ISBN 5-9524-2107-5 (Vol. 3), ISBN 5-9524-2108-3 (Vol. 4), ISBN 5-9524-2109-1 (Vol. 5)).

Individual evidence

  1. Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 315 f .
  2. Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 316 f .
  3. Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 317 f .
  4. a b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 318 .