Ten point program

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A ten-point program is a program of the then Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to reorganize German-German relations and to solve the German question , which he formulated in a speech to the German Bundestag on November 28, 1989. To the surprise of the rest of the world, the Allies and the GDR leadership, but also the Bundestag opposition and its coalition partner, he proposed a step-by-step plan for the unification of Germany and Europe, which is seen as a milestone for German reunification .

context

After the inner-German border had been opened on November 9, 1989, thus establishing freedom of travel for GDR citizens in the West, the future of the two German states was on the political agenda. While the Federal Government had so far refrained from making public statements, the GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow , who had just come into office and belonged to the reform wing of the SED , in his first government declaration of November 17, 1989, said that “the joint responsibility of the two German states should be supported by a contractual community ", Whereby" both German states and their relations should become important pillars for the construction and design of the common European house ". Modrow wanted to meet the demands for unification and to get a grip on the unstable situation caused by mass protests and refugee movements.

The starting point of Kohl's program was a conversation between Kohl's confidante and representative for Germany policy, Horst Teltschik , with Nikolai Portugalow on November 21, 1989 in Bonn , in which Portugalow, on behalf of Valentin Falin, explored the Federal Government's position on the future of both German states. While the official letter he brought with him did not deviate from the wording expected, Portugalow also submitted a handwritten non-paper , the content of which was sensational: “In purely theoretical terms: If the federal government were to intend to turn the question of reunification into a practical one To introduce politics, then it would be sensible to publicly reflect on the idea of ​​future membership of the two German states in the alliance. ”This“ electrified ”Teltschik because the possibility of unification in the Soviet Union was evidently being considered, and Kohl immediately informed him. At a meeting in the Chancellor's bungalow on the evening of November 23, 1989, Teltschik succeeded against the advice of Federal Minister of the Interior Rudolf Seiters that Kohl should present his program for an association in the upcoming budget deliberations of the Bundestag in the coming week in order to maintain opinion leadership on the subject gain ("orientation, demarcation and leadership function"). The key points were defined and concretized in the Chancellery in the coming days ; Uwe Kaestner developed the shape of the ten points for reasons of memorability , the term “program” was used to distinguish it from the earlier Germany plan. At the weekend Kohl discussed the submitted draft in Oggersheim with confidants such as Fritz and Erich Ramstetter and the constitutional lawyer Rupert Scholz ; his wife Hannelore Kohl recorded the changed text on her portable typewriter.

On Monday, November 27, 1989, Kohl informed the CDU presidium in general about a developed step-by-step plan for unification and outlined it in more detail at the meeting of the Union faction . The opposition factions of the SPD and the Greens , but also the faction of the coalition partner FDP, he left in the dark. Kohl gave the speech on the morning of November 28th in the Bundestag without the knowledge of the Western allies; the wording had only been communicated to the White House shortly before, although it was still at night at the time.

Falin and the top politicians of the GDR, Egon Krenz and Hans Modrow, had only sought a conversation on November 24, 1989, three days after Portugalow's meeting with Teltschik, and had given them consideration to further develop Modrow's “contractual community” in the direction of a confederation - “and that this could go on ”(according to Modrow's memory). Krenz informed the SED Politburo on November 28th and instructed Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to talk to Moscow about the confederation idea - a "sluggish, almost reluctant reaction" ( Hans-Hermann Hertle ) caused by Kohl's speech in the Bundestag on the same day was overtaken. Kohl had "stolen the initiative" and thereby converted the Soviet objective to an intermediate stage towards unity - instead of the intended blockade of a union, Falin had unwillingly accelerated the process and duped the allied East Berlin leadership. It is unclear on whose behalf Portugalow wrote the second letter and brought it with him. Gorbachev himself denied any knowledge of his own - credible to Alexander von Plato ; possibly Portugalov acted on his own, for the International Committee of the CPSU or for Falin; in any case the leadership of the Soviet Union was not united on the German question. Von Plato sees an "extremely productive mutual misinterpretation" at the meeting with Teltschik: Portugalow (incorrectly) suspected that the West German side was already well advanced in their plans for Germany, and tried to exert influence, while this was only convinced that again the plans for Germany in Moscow are already at an advanced stage and there is a need for action to be taken more quickly.

content

Of the ten program items, the first five related to the domestic German situation and the next to the European situation. The speech was “cushioned on all sides” and avoided the politically controversial word “reunification” or statements about the future eastern border (see Oder-Neisse border ) or future alliances. According to co-author Teltschik, tactical reasons were decisive for this: It was known that the advance would provoke resistance: “Not only in Moscow. So we had to design the speech in such a way that we reduce as much resistance as possible from the outset. "

Point 1 - Emergency measures of a humanitarian nature

It must be possible to enter and leave the GDR freely. This is an objective prerequisite for aid to be effective in the humanitarian and medical field.

Point 2 - Comprehensive economic aid

The Federal Republic of Germany is ready to work closely with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) economically, scientifically, technologically and culturally . To do this, however, the situation must be brought into line, for example by completely refurbishing and expanding the ailing and sparse telephone network of the GDR and all types of railway connections. Supraregional connections such as Hanover-Berlin or Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin-Paris must be resumed.

Point 3 - Expansion of the cooperation between the two countries

The Federal Republic of Germany aims at a comprehensive expansion of cooperation if a fundamental change in the political and economic system in the GDR takes place. In concrete terms, this means that the supremacy of the SED will be abolished and free, secret elections introduced, the right to opposition introduced and the state given a democratic face, political criminal law abolished and political prisoners released and the bureaucratic planned economy of the past listened to.

Point 4 - Contractual Community

First of all, a contractual community is to be aimed for. This includes a dense network of agreements and, in the near future, joint institutions. Existing or newly established commissions could take on new tasks in business, transport, environmental protection, science and technology, health or culture.

Point 5 - Creation of confederate structures

It is even conceivable to create confederative structures in order to establish a federal order in Germany. A prerequisite for such a step, however, is a democratically elected government of the GDR that is legitimized by the people. A joint government committee for constant consultation and political coordination, joint technical committees, and a joint parliamentary body are conceivable in this context. Even German unity is within reach, if this is in line with developments in the GDR.

Point 6 - Embedding the German unity process in pan-European development

The German uniform process is to be embedded in the pan-European development. The architecture of a new Germany has to fit into the European context. A united Germany is a sign of the unification of Europe .

Point 7 - EU accession of reform-oriented Eastern Bloc countries

The reform-oriented Eastern Bloc states are to join the European Community and, together with the GDR, to be introduced to the western market so that the economic and social divide in Europe can be reduced. Insofar as the states of Central and Southeastern Europe meet the necessary requirements, they are also welcome to join the Council of Europe and, in particular, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights .

Item 8 - Promotion of the CSCE process

Within this process, the respective member states should come to an agreement on human rights, economic cooperation, cultural heritage and environmental issues.

Item 9 - Disarmament and Arms Control

Overcoming the division of Europe and the division of Germany require far-reaching and rapid steps in disarmament and arms control . Above all, the nuclear potentials of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, should be reduced to a strategic minimum. Conventional armed forces in Europe are to be dismantled and chemical weapons are to be banned worldwide.

Item 10 - German unity

This policy is working towards a state of European peace in which the German people can regain their unity through free self-determination. The reunification, that is, the regaining of the national unity of Germany, remains the political goal of the federal government.

Reactions

The speech received applause, from the SPD to long-lasting CDU / CSU and FDP . Due to the element of surprise, the parliamentarians had no choice but to signal their approval. Even if Kohl did not present any changes in content to the Federal Government's already known position on the German question, the speech was received as a confirmation of the will for a rapid unification of the two German states. Karsten Voigt signaled his approval for the SPD , as did the Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) , who was not previously informed and therefore angry . The Greens, who generally spoke out against the reunification requirement in the preamble of the Basic Law , rejected Kohl's policy as a “danger to Europe” and pleaded for a permanent two-state solution. But a number of other top politicians, including Otto Graf Lambsdorff from the FDP and Willy Brandt's “grandchildren” in the SPD, above all Oskar Lafontaine , expressed criticism of Kohl's course. On December 1, 1989, the Bundestag voted on the ten-point program; CDU / CSU and FDP agreed, the SPD parliamentary group abstained because there was no statement about the eastern border.

Kohl's initiative was received with skepticism by many internationally. The US government under President George Bush agreed in principle to unification the very next day, but only if Germany remained part of the Western alliances NATO and EC , which Andreas Rödder describes as a maximum demand that is complementary to the otherwise pragmatic realpolitik of this government. The governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France rejected the program because it did not include a renunciation of the German eastern territories and there were fears that Germany might become too powerful. Mikhail Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze criticized Kohl's approach to Federal Foreign Minister Genscher on December 5, 1989 with undiplomatic sharpness and called Kohl's Ten Points an “ultimatum” and “extremely brazen interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state”; Kohl acts like an elephant in a china shop, which evokes memories of the German past. Genscher later said that Gorbachev reacted so angrily because he had been taken by surprise - after promising each other in June 1989 that they would consult each other on all important issues; from this point on he was “driven” in development.

The government of Poland asked for a say. The new GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow rejected the program as "bypassing the realities" and the sovereignty of the GDR; an association is "not on the agenda". There was also skepticism in parts of the GDR citizens' movement . In contrast, large parts of the GDR population saw the speech as a signal for rapid unity; As early as November 13, 1989, the cry at the Monday demonstrations changed from “ We are the people ” to “ We are one people ” and “ Germany, united fatherland ”.

The program of cautious, gradual approximation outlined by Kohl was overtaken by the ever faster changes within the GDR. In the first free Volkskammer election in 1990 , the alliance for Germany won , which advocated the rapid unification of the two German states, which led to the rapid implementation of unity by October 3, 1990 .

Historical classification

The historian Andreas Rödder (CDU) judges that Kohl's program “brought considerable movement” to the German question ; For him, the program ushered in the "hinge time" of reunification by placing the German question on the agenda of major politics and thus making the Bonn government responsible for a "national turnaround" from the hands of the citizens' movement. Rödder admits Kohl to instinctively grasped the development of the mood in the population of the GDR and to have concluded "an informal national coalition with the mass movement" there, which led to rapid unification.

Web links

Documents

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Hans Modrow: Government declaration on November 17, 1989. In: Glasnost.de . See also the transitional government of Hans Modrow. In: Federal Foundation for Work-Up , German Unity 1990.
  2. ↑ a b c Kristin Lenz: 25 years ago: Kohl presented ten-point program. In: Bundestag.de , November 21, 2014.
  3. ↑ Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch.links, Berlin 2009, p. 115.
  4. ↑ For a detailed description of the processes from November 23 to 27, 1989 from the point of view of the speechwriter, see Michael Mertes : On the emergence and effect of the ten-point program of November 28, 1989. A workshop report. In: Forum Politicum Jenense , Jena 2001, pp. 8–15. See also Michael Mertes in conversation with Christoph Heinemann: "It was a mood of uncertainty". In: Deutschlandfunk , November 27, 2009.
  5. ↑ a b c d Markus Lingen: Federal Chancellor Kohl presents a ten-point program in the Bundestag to gradually overcome the division of Germany and Europe. In: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung , calendar: November 28, 1989, history of the CDU.
  6. ^ Hans-Hermann Hertle , Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan: The end of the SED. The last days of the Central Committee. 5th edition. Ch. Links, Berlin 2012, p. 88 f.
  7. ↑ Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch. Links, Berlin 2009, pp. 118–121, quotation p. 121.
  8. ^ Skeptical to negative statements about the "reunification" of top politicians of the SPD, but also the CDU and the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in Andreas Rödder : Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, pp. 168-171.
  9. ↑ Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch.links, Berlin 2009, p. 126.
  10. ^ A b Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch.links, Berlin 2009, p. 126.
  11. ↑ Andreas Rödder : Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, p. 173.
  12. ↑ Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch. Links, Berlin 2009, p. 126 ; Andreas Rödder : Germany united in a fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, p. 170 f.
  13. ↑ Reaction to Kohl's ten-point plan. In: Bundesregierung.de .
  14. ↑ Andreas Rödder : Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, 150.
  15. ↑ Andreas Rödder : Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, p. 152.
  16. ↑ Alexander von Plato : The unification of Germany - a world political power game. Bush, Kohl, Gorbachev and the internal meeting minutes. 3. Edition. Ch.links, Berlin 2009, p. 125.
  17. ↑ Matthias Schlegel: The hour of the offensive. In: Der Tagesspiegel , November 28, 2009.
  18. ↑ Andreas Rödder : Germany united fatherland. The story of the reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2009, pp. 152 and 147.
  19. ^ Andreas Rödder : History of German reunification. CH Beck, Munich 2011, p. 54.