Affair over German missile experts in Egypt

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The affair over German rocket experts in Egypt was an international political dispute between 1962 and 1965, primarily between the states of Egypt , the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel . The point was that (among other things) German citizens worked on armaments projects in Egypt. In addition to aircraft construction , German experts were also involved in the development of short-range missiles , which the State of Israel felt threatened directly. These events put a strain on the relationship between the two states of the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, which were moving towards each other at that time. Particularly explosive was the fact that some of the experts were already involved in German rocket construction during the Nazi era . In both countries, but above all in Israel, the topic attracted a great deal of attention and was controversial. The federal government eventually tried different measures to remedy the problem. By 1965, when the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel first established diplomatic relations , the matter had become less and less important as the German experts gradually withdrew from Egypt.

German experts in Egypt

The first generation of German experts in Egypt

As early as the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49 , Germans hired themselves out in Arab armies and as free-men in the fight against the newly founded Israel. With a few exceptions, however, the influence and importance of these fighters remained very small. Of greater importance, however, were former members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS , who were then employed as military experts and trainers in the Arab armed forces. One example is the former General Wilhelm Fahrmbacher , who took over the training of the Egyptian army . He claimed that his activity would be tolerated by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs. A former German captain worked as an instructor in the Egyptian Navy . In total, around 50 people were employed in the military in Egypt at the beginning of the 1950s. Wilhelm Voss , general director of the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring" during the National Socialist era , built up an armaments industry of rather low capacity in Egypt . In addition to factories for small arms and ammunition, there were also “first missile designs”. Rolf Engel , a German rocket -Ingenieur and former SS - Hauptsturmführer , trying to develop a small rocket, which however turned out to be non-functional. A conversation between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the head of the Israel Mission , Felix Elieser Shinnar , shows that the Federal Government knew about the activities of the Germans in Egypt. In order to counteract these events, it passed a law in the early 1950s that forbade Germans from serving in foreign armies (except the Foreign Legion ). However, it was emphasized that a number of specialists in Egypt could not be obtained by law and that, in view of the global political situation, German experts were preferable to Soviet ones. Due to the fact that Egypt was still investing little in rocket construction at that time and that the Soviet Union was gaining greater influence in the Middle East, the problem slowly resolved itself in the mid-1950s.

The second generation of German experts in Egypt

The Egyptian President Gamal Abd el-Nasser expanded his own arms industry at the end of the 1950s in order to be less dependent on support from England and the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the Swiss front companies “MECO” and “MTP” recruited foreign technicians and scientists . German experts were involved in both aircraft and rocket technology.

In 1960 Eugen Sänger was recruited by Nasser, but after almost two months at the request of the Federal Ministry of Transport, the lectures there were to be stopped again. Singer was a prominent scientist who had built the Trauen rocket test site in competition with Peenemünde during the Second World War . After the war, he first worked in France and then returned to Germany to set up and manage the Stuttgart “Research Institute for the Physics of Jet Propulsion”. With him went his colleagues Paul Goercke and Wolfgang Pilz and two other people who, like Goercke and Pilz, had already developed Hitler's rockets. The former managing director of the institute, Heinz Krug , also played an important role: In July 1960 he founded the company “Intra-Handelsgesellschaft mbH”, whose task it was to supply the relevant production facilities in Egypt with the relevant materials. These were the more prominent figures who worked on the missile project. While the “Stuttgarter Zeitung” spoke of around 150 German specialists in August 1962, in October 1964 a total of 320 specialists with German citizenship were employed in Egypt, although it remains unclear how many of them came from the GDR . However, the fact is that the greater part of these people were involved in the manufacture of fighter jets . At times there were only about twelve German scientists and technicians in total who were involved in the development of missiles. The Foreign Office claimed in 1963 that only four of these came from the Federal Republic, six from the GDR and two from Austria. In the course of the development of this affair, the number of employees changes.

The company Willy Messerschmitt had taken on the aircraft construction . This sold the license to replicate a jet aircraft to the Egyptians. Under the direction of the former SS-Standartenführer Ferdinand Brandner , the aircraft have been assembled in Egypt since 1960. At that time, “around 200 Germans and Austrians” worked in the factories. The Germans are said to have been mainly people from the GDR. Quite a number of German companies benefited from Nasser's armaments project by supplying accessories to the military factories in Egypt. It should also be noted that the federal government held a 7% stake in Messerschmitt.

The missiles

The missiles that were built in Egypt were surface-to-surface missiles . They were given the names "El-Kahir" ("The Conqueror") and "El-Safir" ("The Conqueror"). While “the Conqueror” had a range of 560 km, the rocket of the second type only came to 280 km. This would theoretically have allowed the Egyptians to fire at any point in Israel. However, these missiles did not have an efficient control system , which is why even then - primarily on the part of the US government and in federal government circles - the military value of the weapon was considered to be very low. German technicians were not involved in the development of ABC warheads , apparently Egypt was generally not in a position to do so at the time.

Becoming aware of the project and subsequent reactions

Reactions in Israel and Germany

The public was made aware of the missile project in 1962. On July 21 of that year, four of the rockets produced were fired on a test basis in Egypt during a press conference. Two days later, on the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, a few specimens were put on display again at a military parade . Nasser spoke of a range "to the south of Beirut " to indicate that Israel was the planned target of these missiles. At the time, however, experts assumed that only mock-ups of the projectiles could be seen at the parade .

The Israeli secret service Mossad was already aware of Nasser's efforts. On August 30, 1962, Franz Böhm , the CDU member and head of the German delegation at the reparation negotiations , was informed of the situation by the Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir . With reference to the Holocaust , Meir spoke of the fact that Germans were already participating again in the planning of the “destruction of Jewish cities and Jewish lands”. She also asked the federal government to publicly distance itself from the Germans concerned and to counteract a further influx of skilled workers to Egypt by withdrawing their passports. Böhm informed the Federal Chancellor, who announced on October 16, 1962 that nothing could be done at the legislative level in this regard, but that what was going on was being kept under control. Although Böhm contradicted this in a memorandum , the federal government initially did nothing.

The whole course of the affair was marked by a very emotional debate about the German scientists and an anti-German public opinion in Israel. Due to the (unprovable) claims of the Mossad that ABC weapons were being developed in Egypt, terms such as “ final solution ” or “biological destruction” were also used. On March 20, 1963, the Knesset passed a resolution calling on the federal government to stop the work of the German experts. Furthermore, the Israeli government wrongly set the number of people with German citizenship working on the missile project too high at around 30 to 40, which the German government contradicted. In addition, the Federal Government protested against the term “weapons of destruction” used by Israel, since planes and missiles cannot be assigned to them. A spokesman for the German government declared on March 27, 1963 that Germans were not involved in the development of NBC weapons, and repeated that there was no possibility of doing anything against the specialists in Egypt. On June 28, the Bundestag unanimously passed a motion that the government should examine the drafting of a relevant law. However, there was no such thing.

Another argument of the Federal Republic was the view that German experts in Egypt are preferable to Soviet ones. The US shared this opinion, as did Nasser himself. The Egyptian government indirectly threatened to recognize the GDR if the Federal Republic seriously tried to prevent the skilled workers from carrying out their work in Egypt. The US government also warned the Israelis that they overestimated the dangerousness of the missiles.

Despite all the contradictions against the Israeli accusations, the German government agreed relatively early that the scientists should stop working if possible. In an internal meeting at the Federal Chancellery on March 26, 1963, the conclusion was reached that the problem must be tackled actively but carefully.

Among the clearly predominant anti-German voices in Israeli politics and the public on this issue, there were two people who showed understanding for Germany's behavior on the issue: On the one hand, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who warned his parliament against this, despite the The fact that Germans support Nasser in building weapons, "throwing out the baby with the bathwater", and on the other hand Israeli Agriculture Minister Moshe Dajan , who emphasized that the rocket researchers should not be equated with the German people.

Activities of the Mossad

Starting in the summer of 1962, a series of incidents occurred that can be traced back to the activities of the Israeli secret service:

  • On July 7, 1962, the charter plane of MECO founder Hassan Sayid Kamil crashed over Germany near Birgte . This had rescheduled shortly before the start, so that his wife Helene, née. Duchess of Mecklenburg (* 1924) died in the accident. One suspected a bomb as the cause.
  • A few months later, Heinz Krug disappeared under unexplained circumstances. While the police were still suspecting in 1962 that he had been forcibly taken to Egypt by the Egyptian secret service, an anonymous letter was reported in 1963 alleging that Krug was dead. In any case, the lawyer never reappeared. According to research by the journalist Ronen Bergman , Krug was kidnapped by the Israeli secret service Mossad and killed after several months of interrogation. (See also: Otto Skorzeny # Activity for the Mossad .)
  • In November of the same year a parcel bomb exploded in an Egyptian aircraft factory, killing five Egyptian workers and injuring six others.
  • In the same month Hannelore Wende, Pilz's secretary, was the victim of another letter bomb . She lost her sight in the process.
  • On February 20, 1963, an assassination attempt was carried out on Hans Kleinwächter, who produced accessories for the Egyptian missiles in his German company. He was ambushed by armed men on the way home and opened fire on him. He survived the attack unharmed.
  • The most spectacular incident was the attempted blackmailing of the children of the specialist Goercke: an anonymous caller asked the two of them to meet with him. The daughter Heidi Goercke agreed to a meeting that took place in a hotel in Basel . However, the Swiss police were informed in advance. At the meeting, Israeli agents Otto Joklik and Joseph Ben-Gal threatened the daughter that her father would be killed if she did not persuade him to return to Germany. The police, who overheard the conversation, arrested the two men shortly afterwards and charged them with attempted coercion. Joklik had initially worked in Egypt himself, but according to his own statements, he switched to Israel for reasons of conscience. A court in Switzerland found the two guilty and sentenced them to two months in prison, which they had already served with pre- trial detention. They were immediately released. The investigative authorities suspected that Joklik also played an important role in the previous secret service operations. West Germany therefore submitted an extradition request, which the Confederates rejected.

After the press had taken up the topic, the head of the secret service, Isser Harel , felt compelled to shift his countermeasures to the journalistic area and to announce that ABC weapons were being worked on in Egypt. However, he had to resign when Ben-Gurion confronted him in 1963 with the findings of the Israeli military intelligence service Aman , which assessed the danger posed by Egyptian weapons more realistically and pointed out that the missiles had no guidance systems and could not be equipped with NBC warheads. In addition, the qualifications of the scientists involved were rated as rather low. The rocket researchers Pilz and Goercke themselves, apparently startled by the events, denied any involvement in military rocket construction.

The German efforts

As early as November 1962, Böhm discussed in a memorandum to the President of the Bundestag Eugen Gerstenmaier four possibilities that the Federal Republic of Germany might have to bring the German specialists back from Egypt: He spoke of a possible exploitation of the passport system and criminal law. He contradicted Adenauer, who saw no legal options. The passport law states that a person's passport can be denied or withdrawn if this endangers the security of the Federal Republic or otherwise significantly affects Germany's interests. This situation is definitely given by the work of the rocket researchers. He went on to explain that treason might even be punishable if a scientist who was employed at a German research institute that was funded by public funds accepted a secondary job in the service of a foreign government. With regard to the said Stuttgart research institute, he also mentioned the possible introduction of corresponding contractual clauses in the employment contracts for specialists who worked in the relevant areas. He also suggested creating better job prospects and working conditions for such specialists in Germany so that they would not even be motivated to look for work abroad. The Foreign Office then announced that nothing could be done because the German scientists had moved their homes to Egypt and there was no evidence that parts and accessories for Nasser's rockets were being manufactured in Germany.

In March 1963, was SPD -Abgeordnete Heinrich pinion out a circular to his group, in which he called on them to deal with the problem of German rocket experts. In it he criticized the negative attitude of the Foreign Office. He pointed out a Swiss law that said that it was forbidden for Swiss citizens to serve in a foreign army as a punishment. He was of the opinion that the development of missiles should be equated with the service of the weapon.

In May of that year, a committee headed by Böhm submitted a draft law that required a permit for Germans to work on NBC weapons and missiles abroad. However, this could not prevail because some MPs saw, among other things, the right to freedom of movement provided for in the Basic Law impaired. The draft considered an amendment to Article 26 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that weapons may only be manufactured with the approval of the government. The federal government was then commissioned by parliament to solve the problem, which then formed an inter-ministerial committee made up of representatives from the departments of foreign affairs, internal affairs, justice, business and economic cooperation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was of the opinion that a ban on the activities of German scientists on the basis of an ordinance would be entirely possible if the international peace was disrupted within the meaning of the Foreign Trade Act. However, it was argued that there are many ways around this and that it would also be problematic to include only Egypt in the scope. As a result, they feared recognition of the GDR and negative effects on economic relations with the Arab states. Another proposal by Böhm, generally not to give permission for Germans to participate in war weapon production, also failed because of foreign policy concerns. It was also pointed out that German researchers were also working on military projects in other countries.

Overall, the federal government was anxious to get the Germans in Egypt to return. In a speech on October 15, 1964, Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard expressed his understanding for Israel's reaction and emphasized that the work of the German experts was disapproved by Germany. However, in the end the German government could not bring itself to a legislative measure, as the counter-arguments were given greater weight. The Federal Republic only achieved success after trying to induce the German missile experts to rethink their approach through lucrative offers in Germany. However, this only happened after Israel had exerted political pressure over a long period of time.

Results and termination of the affair

The differences between Ben-Gurion and the Israeli parliament finally led to his resignation on April 7, 1963. He was previously accused of keeping intelligence about the experts under lock and key in order to put an end to the Mossad's actions. He was succeeded by Levi Eschkol . As early as 1963, there was a decline in German skilled workers in Egypt who were recruited by West German companies. Nasser tried to compensate for this by recruiting new specialists for his part. He replaced the Germans with experts from Austria, Switzerland and the United States.

The German authorities forbade the poaching of labor and acted on companies that supplied the Egyptian armaments with material. The Ministry of Economic Affairs conducted investigations into several of these companies, which also contributed to this development. In March 1965 it was clear that the number of people working in Egypt had decreased significantly in the previous months. The prominent scientists were also no longer in the service of Nasser. On August 11, 1965, a spokesman for the MTP company announced that 200 Germans among the 350 or so experts wanted to return to Germany. The spokesman had apparently made himself an image of the situation in Egypt and came to the conclusion that the armaments program would have to collapse after the Germans left. The fact that the rocket development fell victim to cuts in the Egyptian state budget is said to have greatly favored this development. The crisis was practically over. The last German rocket researchers left Egypt after the Six Day War in the summer of 1967.

literature

  • Rainer A. Blasius : Business friendship instead of diplomatic relations. On Israel policy 1962/63. In: Rainer A. Blasius (Ed.): From Adenauer to Erhard. Studies on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1963. Munich 1994, pp. 145–210. (Series of Quarterly Books for Contemporary History, Vol. 68)
  • Inge Deutschkron : Israel and the Germans. The special relationship. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1983.
  • Niels Hansen : From the shadow of the catastrophe. German-Israeli relations in the era of Konrad Adenauer and David Ben-Gurion. A documented report. Droste, Düsseldorf 2002, ISBN 3-7700-1886-9 . (Research and sources on contemporary history; Vol. 38)
  • Yeshayahu A. Jelinek : Germany and Israel 1945–1965. A neurotic relationship. Oldenbourg, Munich 2004 (Studies on Contemporary History, Vol. 66).
  • Amnon Neustadt: The German-Israeli relations in the shadow of the EC Middle East policy. Frankfurt am Main 1983.
  • Jörg Seelbach: The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel as a problem in German politics since 1955. Meisenheim am Glan 1970 (Marburger Abhandlungen zur Politischen Wissenschaft Vol. 19).
  • Peter Steinmüller: Exodus from Egypt. In: VDI nachrichten , 32–33 / 2017, p. 29, here:
  • Rolf Vogel (ed.): Germany's way to Israel. A documentation. Stuttgart 1967.
  • Markus A. Weingardt: German Israel and Middle East Policy. History of a tightrope walk since 1949. Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main a. a. 2002, ISBN 3-593-37109-X .
  • Susanne Benöhr-Laqueur: In the crosshairs. Review of the book: Beate Soller-Krug and Kaj Krug: On the banks of the Nile. Our father "rocket jug" and the Mossad. Stuttgart 2018, in: http://www.hagalil.com/2018/08/causa-krug/ (August 19, 2018).

Single receipts

  1. To these people: Avedis Boghos Derounian as John R. Carlson: Arabs around Israel. Publisher of the Frankfurter Hefte 1953, continuously.
  2. a b c d e f g German rockets for Nasser. In: Der Spiegel. (1963) H. 19, pp. 56-71.
  3. Rocket Jug: Friends of the Bride. In: Der Spiegel. (1962) H. 40, pp. 48-49.
  4. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Ed.): Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. 1964. Vol. 1-2. Munich 1995 (files on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany), Doc. 276, note 17.
  5. Schwarz AAPD 1963, Doc. 188
  6. Jörg Seelbach: The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel as a problem in German politics since 1955. Meisenheim am Glan 1970 (Marburger Abhandlungen zur Politischen Wissenschaft Vol. 19), p. 110.
  7. ^ Rolf Vogel (ed.): Germany's way to Israel. A documentation. Stuttgart 1967, p. 233.
  8. Schwarz AAPD 1963, Doc. 289, note 2.
  9. ^ Rainer A. Blasius: Business friendship instead of diplomatic relations. On Israel policy 1962/63. In: Rainer A. Blasius (Ed.): From Adenauer to Erhard. Studies on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1963. Munich 1994, (series of quarterly books for contemporary history, vol. 68), p. 160.
  10. Seelbach, pp. 111-113.
  11. Schwarz AAPD 1963, Doc. 133.
  12. ↑ Murder order from the Mossad boss , Spiegel Online, January 22, 2018
  13. ^ A b Israel / Agent War: Heidi and the detectives. In: Der Spiegel. 1963, no. 13, pp. 68-70.
  14. Vogel, pp. 228-240.
  15. Blasius, pp. 174-175.
  16. ^ Amnon Neustadt: The German-Israeli relations in the shadow of the EC Middle East policy. Frankfurt am Main 1983, p. 55.
  17. Felix E. Shinnar: Report of a Commissioner. German-Israeli relations 1951–1966. Tübingen 1967, p. 138.
  18. ^ Yeshayahu A. Jelinek: Germany and Israel 1945–1965. A neurotic relationship. Munich 2004 (Studies on Contemporary History Vol. 66), p. 606.
  • Inge Deutschkron: Israel and the Germans. The special relationship. Cologne 1983.
  1. p. 202.
  2. p. 203.
  3. pp. 199-200.
  4. p. 199.
  5. p. 216.
  6. p. 207.
  7. p. 208.
  8. p. 209.
  9. p. 217.
  • Niels Hansen: From the shadow of the catastrophe. German-Israeli relations in the era of Konrad Adenauer and David Ben-Gurion. A documented report. Düsseldorf 2002. (Research and sources on contemporary history, Vol. 38)
  1. p. 638.
  2. a b c p. 642.
  3. p. 233.
  4. p. 638.
  5. a b p. 640
  6. p. 641.
  7. pp. 644-645.
  8. pp. 649-650.
  9. p. 651.
  10. p. 652.
  11. p. 654.
  12. p. 664.
  • Markus A. Weingardt: German Israel and Middle East Policy. History of a tightrope walk since 1949. Frankfurt am Main u. a. 2002.
  1. p. 138.
  2. p. 135.
  3. a b p. 139.
  4. p. 139, note 252.
  5. p. 140.
  • Yeshayahu A. Jelinek (ed.): Between morality and realpolitik. German-Israeli relations 1945–1965. A collection of documents. Gerlingen 1997. (Series of publications by the Institute for German History, Tel Aviv University, Vol. 16)
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  2. pp. 88-89.
  3. p. 89.
  4. pp. 603-604.

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