Philosophers' rule

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Plato, Roman copy of the Greek portrait of Plato by Silanion , Glyptothek Munich

The rule of the philosophers is a central element of the political philosophy of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428 / 427–348 / 347 BC). In his dialogue Politeia (“The State”), Plato takes the view that a state is only well governed when it is in the hands of philosophers. Therefore he calls for an unrestricted monopoly of power for the philosophers and explains this in detail. Theoretically, he sees two possibilities for the implementation: either the rulers become philosophers or the rule is handed over to philosophers. He sets out the details in his draft for the constitution of an ideal state ruled by philosophers.

Since Plato uses the word basileus (“ruler”) in this context , which usually denotes kings (later also emperors), modern literature often speaks of “philosopher kings”.

Plato's concept

Plato lets his teacher Socrates appear as the main interlocutor in the dialogue Politeia . In the fictional, literary dialogue, the “Platonic” Socrates represents Plato's own position, which is not identical to that of the historical philosopher Socrates.

The question of justice

The starting point of the discussion is the question of what justice is. Various possible definitions are discussed. Finally, Socrates gives the correct definition from Plato's point of view. He defines justice as the appropriate proportion between the parts of a whole . There is justice within a whole when each part only fulfills the exact function that it has according to its special nature. It is especially important that the part that is naturally capable of steering the whole thing actually takes the lead. The remaining parts willingly submit to him. When a part presumes something that is not naturally due to it and interferes in other people's responsibilities, rift, disorder and confusion result. That is injustice. If each part fulfills its specific purpose, the whole is given a harmonious character and can in turn optimally fulfill its purpose as a whole. In the cosmos, whose components a wise creator, the Demiurge , carefully arranged, this is already the case in an exemplary manner. It is incumbent on the human being to realize the optimal order among the individual elements in his area of ​​responsibility. This applies both to the relationship between the various parts of the human soul and to the relationships between citizens in the polis .

Justice as a virtue of a single person is to be developed individually in their soul. This is done by establishing the natural order among the three parts of the soul. Reason as the highest part of the soul has to take the lead. It assigns the other two parts of the soul, the courageous and the instinctual, to their roles and tasks. Similarly, in the state, justice requires a rational hierarchical structure of the state order with a three-part system of estates . The aim of this structure is that every citizen “does his own thing ” on behalf of the community: that which corresponds to his / her talents ( Idiopragie demand). As part of the stand regulations, everyone should take on the task for which they are best suited. The state structure is optimally structured when the state ensures that all citizens carry out the activities appropriate to their respective abilities and that encroachments on foreign responsibilities do not occur.

Philosophical rule as the realization of justice

The principle of the natural, appropriate and thus fair allocation of tasks has to apply in particular to the government, because the continued existence of the entire community and the well-being of the citizens depend on a sensible selection of management personnel. If management tasks are assigned according to a rational principle, someone is not qualified for a steering function because they have prevailed in a power struggle or gain influence through their wealth. But it is also not sensible to entrust the leadership to someone who has the approval of the majority, because democratic majorities are prone to error. The bulk of the uneducated citizens lack a perspective, they are easily seduced and their decisions depend on irrational motives. The leadership may only be left to the best qualified, who legitimize themselves exclusively through their competence and only have the good of the community in mind.

This is why the Platonic Socrates opposed Attic democracy with a utopian ideal state guided by the principle of justice. Analogous to the three-part structure of the soul, he divides its citizenship into three classes: the craftsman and peasant class, the class of guards and the class of rulers, which corresponds to the rational part of the soul. Every citizen needs one of the basic virtues of prudence , bravery and wisdom in order to fulfill his class-specific tasks . Prudence is the basic virtue of the lowest class, the craftsmen and peasants, bravery that of the guards, wisdom that of the rulers. The qualifications of the rulers also include the basic virtues of the other two classes.

Only the philosopher who devotes his life to wisdom is by nature called to rule. Plato formulates this idea in a central passage of the Politeia :

Unless in the states either the philosophers become kings, or those who are now called kings and rulers become genuine and thorough philosophers, and if not these two, political power and philosophy, collapse into one and all the many natures that today strive exclusively for one or the other, to be compulsorily excluded, then, my dear Glaukon , there will be no end to the evils for the states and, in my opinion, also not for humanity.

Plato justifies the unique position of the philosopher among people with the fact that the philosopher directs his attention to what is well-ordered, what always remains the same and what is reasonable: to the realm of perfect and unchangeable ideas , to which he admiringly and imitatively assimilates. In dealing with the divine and well-ordered, he himself assumes its quality, insofar as that is possible for a person.

Plato's principle of justice requires that the state form a harmonious unit, so that no political discord can arise among the citizens. Above all, this should distinguish the Platonic ideal state from the Greek states of the time, which were torn by internal conflicts. Unity presupposes that the ruled willingly submit to the rulers, since they see that this is for their own benefit.

Selection, training and motivation of the philosopher rulers

Class affiliation in the Platonic state is not hereditary, but depends on qualification. Only the most able are included in the rank of ruler. Your ability is determined and tested in a long screening process that begins in childhood. Therefore, they can only exercise ruling power at a more mature age. It is necessary that they first develop basic character traits. They have to prove their perseverance and steadfastness by not allowing danger or temptation to dissuade them from their self-control and the performance of their duties.

The future rulers attain philosophical knowledge through an educational path that requires great effort. It initially includes less important lessons in gymnastics and music, then the study of the subjects required for philosophical propaedeutics in the order arithmetic , plane geometry , spatial geometry, astronomy and harmony . Only then does training begin in dialectics , the methodical philosophical search for truth. It is essential that these studies are not merely intellectual activities. Philosophy isn't just about thinking, it's a way of life. Far-reaching consequences for the conduct of life result from the philosophical insights. The Platonic Socrates emphasizes that the organ of the soul, with which it comprehends, cannot turn to the objects of knowledge of philosophy on its own, but only together with the whole soul. The irrational parts of the soul also need a corresponding orientation. The ultimate goal of philosophical endeavors is the knowledge of the absolutely good . The ability to act sensibly, which legitimizes the philosopher's claim to power, is based on this knowledge.

According to Plato, there is no specifically male or female virtue; rather, virtue is the same for all people. There is no difference between the sexes with regard to their accessibility. Therefore all doors should be open to women in the state. In principle, nothing stands in the way of their acceptance into the ruling class.

Plato emphasizes that philosophers are by no means eager to exercise the rule due to them in a good state. Rather, they perceive political activity as an undesirable distraction from philosophy and an unwelcome burden. In a state with lots of good citizens, one would argue about not governing just as normal politicians would argue about governing. For the philosophers, governance is a sacrifice to which they have to be forced by pointing out an existing practical constraint. For Plato, this practical constraint arises from the knowledge that the individual can ultimately only secure his own good in connection with the common good. The philosopher who ensures justice in the state (i.e. the appropriate relationship of the parts to one another and to the whole) is thus following a demand of his own justice. By intervening in order, he imitates the rule of the Creator God (Demiurge). At the same time, he expresses his gratitude for the education he received from the community. In fulfilling the political tasks in the ideal state, the philosophers take turns, so that no one has to continuously deal with the state control.

The philosopher rulers, like the members of the guardian class, are privileged compared to the employed, since they do not have to worry about their livelihood. On the other hand, they are subject to restrictions that do not apply to the employed: they are prohibited from private property (community of property) and they also renounce family life because they do not marry and the children are not assigned to their parents, but are brought up together (community of women and children) . By renouncing ownership and family ties, the community is to be strengthened.

The art of the statesman

Plato also discusses the question of the qualifications of those in power in his Dialog Politikos (“The Statesman”), where he explains the tasks of the statesman with the help of the Weber parable , among other things . In analogy to weaving, he describes statecraft as a “royal weave” that provides a “fabric”. This means that the statesman recognizes the mixed characters of people with different characteristics and inclinations through examination, assigns each of them the optimal training and suitable task according to his special disposition and supervises all of them. The correct interweaving, which he ensures, means both the constructive interaction of the different natures in the state and the correct shaping and harmonization of the qualities in the souls of the individual citizens.

In the Politikos the difference between alleged and real statesmen is worked out. A real statesman does not owe his power to his wealth; Its rule is neither based on violence and arbitrariness, nor is it legitimized in compliance with the provisions of an existing constitution or in the consent of the ruled. Rather, what enables him to run a state is his knowledge of the science of the correct exercise of rule over people. His competence is comparable to that of a doctor. A doctor is not qualified as such because he is wealthy, or because ignorant patients consider him competent and therefore allow himself to be treated by him, or because he follows certain written rules, but his qualification consists solely of his expertise, thanks to which he heals. Starting from this concept, Plato draws a radical and by the standards of the time offensive consequence: He claims that the real statesman is even above the law. Laws are too rigid, no legal provision can do justice to every situation. The statesman, on the other hand, is always able to make optimal decisions based on the situation. He can therefore govern without laws or change existing laws as necessary.

An alternative state model

In his late work Nomoi ("The Laws"), Plato greatly modified the concept of the state of the Politeia , which he now regards as too utopian, and designed the model of the "second best" state, which was easier to implement. Among other things, he renounces the unrestricted monopoly of power of the philosopher rulers. In a system without such rulers who are above the law and who decide depending on the situation based on their superior wisdom, the role of the authoritative authority must fall to inflexible laws so that the state does not perish. Since rules for all conceivable cases are required in such a model, a very extensive body of law is required.

From the nomoi it emerges that Plato came to the conviction in old age that unlimited power overtaxes every human being because “not a single human nature is capable, if it manages all human affairs with unlimited power, not to be filled with arrogance and injustice. “This thought leads him to the following considerations: No man's nature is so predisposed that he not only recognizes what is beneficial for coexistence in the state community, but at the same time also has the strength and will at all times to implement his findings and do the best to do. Even if one realizes that the common good and the individual's advantage are inseparable, if one gains absolute power, he will inevitably disregard this principle. He will not be able to advance the common good primarily throughout his life. Rather, everyone endowed with unrestricted power will always be tempted to selfishness by his “mortal nature”. He will prefer his own interests, which he equates with the attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain, to what is more just and better and thus ruin himself and the state. Only if one day a person were born “by divine providence” who could acquire the required knowledge, would actually come to power and then cope with the temptation to abuse power, would he not need any laws, but could decide everything at his discretion. Such a government would be superior to being inflexible by the letter of the law. The necessary constellation is nowhere in reality given to a sufficient extent. Therefore, one has to make do with laws as the second best solution and accept their rigidity.

In the late work Nomoi , Plato declares it not only possible, but even - subject to a theoretically possible divine intervention - inevitable that the possession of absolute power corrupts a philosopher. With this he assumes an akrasia (ability to act against better knowledge) even to the best trained philosopher . The impossibility of the akrasia of the properly selected and trained philosopher ruler is, however, a prerequisite for the realization of the philosophical rule.

Program or utopia

A topic that is often discussed in the research literature is the question of the practical relevance of Plato's demand to introduce the rule of the philosophers. According to a research hypothesis, he was largely aware of the utopian character of his concept and saw it as a thought experiment, a stimulus for political philosophical reflection or a pipe dream. A prominent representative of this opinion is Hans-Georg Gadamer . The opposite view is that Plato thought an at least partial realization was possible and hoped for at least temporarily. Of the two theoretically possible paths to a philosophical state control - voluntary handover of power to philosophers or conversion of an already ruling ruler to philosophy - he seriously considered only the second. In this context, references are often made to his trips to Sicily . In Syracuse he hoped to be able to assert and test his political ideas by influencing the young tyrant Dionysius II . These efforts failed completely. For this, Plato's Seventh Letter , the authenticity of which is not certain, is an important source. In the letter, Plato's activity in Sicily is explained against the background of the philosophy of rulership.

reception

Antiquity

Aristotle exerts incoming criticism of the state ideal of Politeia . He also directly opposes the demand that a ruler should philosophize. In his opinion, the ruler should limit himself to consulting philosophers.

The Neoplatonists took up Plato's demand that a philosopher should not only look at the world of ideas in seclusion, but should also assume political responsibility. In the 3rd century, Plotinus , the founder of Neoplatonism, came up with a plan to repopulate an abandoned city in Campania . It should be governed according to Plato's ideas and be called Platonopolis. He himself wanted to move there with his students. Even in late ancient Neo-Platonism, the idea of ​​a desirable political commitment on the part of the philosopher remained alive. However, its realization was increasingly hampered by the fact that the Neoplatonists, mostly as adherents of the old religion, found themselves in a tense relationship with the state that had become Christian. The Neoplatonists also stuck to Plato's demand to allow women to rule in a state ruled by philosophers. In the early 6th century, the Christian Neoplatonist Boethius made explicit reference to Plato's concept of the rule of the philosophers in his later famous work The Consolation of Philosophy . He explained that Plato's demand had led him to pursue a political career that led him to high offices.

Early modern age

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,
portrait of Christoph Bernhard Francke , around 1700; Duke Anton Ulrich Museum , Braunschweig

The famous polymath Leibniz (1646–1716) is a staunch advocate of the decisive influence of philosophers on politics, society and the economy. This conviction is reflected in his intense political commitment. He is committed to the Platonic ideal of the unity of science and power and represents a modified version of the concept of philosopher rule. However, he did not systematically elaborate a philosophical theory of the state. Leibniz strives for an authoritarian welfare state which, ideally, is ruled by a wise ruler or, if one is lacking, guided by philosophers from the background. The philosophers and state leaders should not only deal with questions of ethics and statecraft, but also, as "naturalists" (scientists and natural philosophers ), have an understanding of the context of nature. Through the demands for rational politics and for the scientific and technical competence of the decision-makers, Leibniz's ideal of a philosophical rule takes on technocratic traits. The philosophers should come together in an international alliance, the Societas Philadelphica , act as advisers to the rulers and get hold of key political positions worldwide. The concept drafted by Leibniz but not elaborated in detail shows, like Plato's, utopian aspects and is also based on the notion of an absolutely “true knowledge”. Leibniz also basically agrees with Plato in the assessment of political reality as unreasonable and in the aim of replacing it with a rational, philosophically founded order, as well as in the idea of ​​a harmony of the estates.

In the 18th century, Christian Wolff expressly agreed to Plato's demand for philosophical rule. His state-philosophical way of thinking shows considerable resemblance to that of Plato. He considered it essential that a good ruler should philosophize. Since the replacement of the hereditary monarchy by a philosopher's kingdom was ruled out, Wolff advocated that the rulers seek advice from philosophers and that the philosophers gain significant influence on legislation.

In his work On Eternal Peace, Immanuel Kant rejects the rule of the philosophers and advocates a strict separation of philosophical activity and the exercise of power: “That kings philosophize, or that philosophers would become kings, is not to be expected, but also not to be desired: because of Possession of violence inevitably corrupts the free judgment of reason. But that kings or royal peoples (who rule themselves according to the laws of equality) do not dwindle or mute the class of philosophers, but rather let them speak publicly, is essential for both of them to illuminate their business. "

Modern

Nietzsche considered the rule of the philosophers to be a project that Plato wanted to realize. He said that Plato had tried in Sicily to do for the Greeks what Mohammed later did for the Arabs, and only happened to be unsuccessful: “A few fewer coincidences and a few more coincidences - and the world would have the Platonization of the European South experienced. "

In the 20th century, Plato's ideal of the state was instrumentalized, criticized or praised in different ways in the disputes about democracy and the non-democratic systems of rule that had been branded as totalitarian . Numerous interpreters judged the idea of ​​the rule of the philosophers from the point of view of modern issues and their own ideological and political convictions.

Karl Popper

As part of his fundamental critique of Plato's political philosophy, Karl Popper dealt with the rule of the philosophers. He dedicated two chapters to her in the first volume of his book The Open Society and Its Enemies , which appeared in 1945 and caused a sensation. Popper took up Kant's criticism. He wrote that Plato started from the question "Who should rule?" Even the attempt to regard this question as the fundamental problem of politics is wrong. Political philosophy was thereby "thoroughly confused". It is unrealistic to demand rule of the best or wisest. Rather, one always has to reckon with bad or incompetent rulers. Rulers are "morally or intellectually seldom above and often below the average". It is therefore important to create institutions that prevent bad rulers from causing too much damage. Plato's demand to equip the rulers of the philosophers with a power that is not subject to control is disastrous, since absolute power corrupts its bearer. The ideal philosopher Plato is "almost omniscient and omnipotent" and, as the ruler, a "totalitarian demigod". Plato hated every change in the state and therefore did not want the rulers to have originality and initiative. The educational system that was supposed to train the rulers' offspring was burdened with “the impossible task of choosing the best”. He "invented the middle schools and the universities" by devising the basic principle of the modern "devastating" educational system. In reality, the class order is not socially permeable, but racist. Plato believed himself to be the royal philosopher and formulated his own claim to the rule of the king in the Politeia . Bertrand Russell , who shared Popper's point of view, had a similar opinion .

Popper's interpretation has prompted numerous scholars and historians of philosophy to make critical statements. In 1953, Ronald B. Levinson published an extensive reply, in the same year an investigation by John Wild that rejected Popper's account was published. The diverse criticism of the professional world of Popper's theses is directed, among other things, against his assumptions that Plato did not want the philosophical rulers to be independent, the Politeia was intended as a political program, Plato disregarded the value of individuality and he was a forerunner of modern totalitarianism basically considered every possible change as deterioration and therefore wanted to prevent it. Leo Strauss put forward an interpretation that is radically opposite to that of Popper: He said that the Politeia was an anti-utopian work, with which Plato wanted to show the reader the unreality of utopian thought.

Thanassis Samaras accepts a considerable part of Popper's theses, but emphasizes that Popper makes the fundamental mistake of assessing the positions of Socrates and Plato unhistorically according to a modern criterion, instead of considering them against the background of the general convictions of their contemporaries and agreeing with them to compare.

Susan Sara Monoson emphasizes the ascetic character of the life of the philosopher rulers, which would not appear attractive to members of the lowest class - the mass of the population excluded from political decisions. Both rulers and ruled in such a state would regard political power as a burden rather than a good. Share in power would only be granted to those who do not aspire to it.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the idea of ​​tying political participation rights to an education-related proof of competence was taken up in a philosophical debate. In this context, the term epistocracy (English epistocracy , " rule of knowledge") is used. What is meant is a system in which the right to vote is dependent on the passing of a competence test or at least the votes of demonstrably competent citizens are weighted more heavily. Reference is also made in this debate to Plato's concept of the rule of the philosophers. Jason Brennan advocates a “moderate epistocracy” , while David Estlund, among others, who created the word epistocracy, argues against it .

literature

Remarks

  1. ↑ For the cosmic model see Plato, Timaios 89d – 90d.
  2. ↑ Plato, Politeia 443b-444d. Cf. Thomas Szlezák: Psyche - Polis - Kosmos . In: Enno Rudolph (Ed.): Polis and Kosmos , Darmstadt 1996, pp. 26–42. For details of the analogy between polis and soul see Norbert Blößner : Dialogform und Argument , Stuttgart 1997, pp. 152-213 and Otfried Höffe: On the analogy of the individual and the polis (Book II 367a-374d). In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Platon: Politeia , 3rd edition, Berlin 2011, pp. 51–69. For the connection between cosmic and human order, see Tatjana Alekniene: Kosmios kai theios . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 46, 1999, pp. 369–387.
  3. ↑ See Markus Arnold: Von der divine logic to human politics , Frankfurt am Main 1999, pp. 36–39; Christopher Bobonich : Plato's Utopia Recast , Oxford 2002, pp. 219-257.
  4. ↑ Plato, Politeia 433a-435a.
  5. ↑ Plato, Politeia 412b-414b.
  6. ↑ Plato, Politeia arm 473c-d.
  7. ↑ Plato, Politeia 500b – d.
  8. ↑ See Jacob Frederik M. Arends: Die Einheit der Polis , Leiden 1988, pp. 218–220.
  9. ↑ Plato, Politeia 412b-414b.
  10. ↑ On the educational program see Klitos Ioannides: Le roi-philosophe, spectateur et acteur d'après Plato . In: Philosophia (Athens) Vol. 13-14, 1983-1984, pp 163-188, here: 163-181.
  11. ↑ Plato, Politeia 518b-541b. Cf. on the holistic approach Thomas Alexander Szlezák: The idea of ​​the good in Plato's Politeia , Sankt Augustin 2003, pp. 35f., 104; Norbert Delhey: Περιαγωγὴ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς - Remarks on the educational theory in Plato's Πολιτεία . In: Hermes 122, 1994, pp. 44-54, here: 45-47.
  12. ↑ Plato, The Republic 517b-c.
  13. ↑ Plato, Politeia 540c.
  14. ↑ Plato, Politeia 347d.
  15. ↑ See David Sedley: Philosophy, the Forms, and the Art of Ruling . In: Giovanni RF Ferrari (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic , Cambridge 2007, pp. 256–283, here: 271–281; Thomas C. Brickhouse: The Paradox of the Philosophers' Rule . In: Apeiron 15, 1981, pp. 1-9; Christoph Jermann: Philosophy and Politics , Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1986, pp. 197–212; Stefan Schenke: The logic of the descent . In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 104, 1997, pp. 316–335.
  16. ↑ Plato, Politicus 305e-306a.
  17. ↑ See Jacob Frederik M. Arends: Survival, War and Unity of the Polis in Plato's Statesman . In: Polis 12, 1993, pp. 154-187, here: 165-179; Hans Joachim Krämer : Arete in Platon and Aristoteles , Heidelberg 1959, pp. 148–154, 164f., 172f .; Mitchell Miller: The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman , 2nd Edition, Las Vegas 2004, pp. 106-110.
  18. ↑ Plato, Statesman 292b-293e.
  19. ↑ Plato, Politicus 293a-297b.
  20. ↑ Kai Trampedach: Platon, the Academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 221–223.
  21. ↑ Plato, Laws 713c.
  22. ↑ Plato, Nomoi 875a-d.
  23. ↑ See also Christopher Bobonich: Plato's Utopia Recast , Oxford 2002, pp. 264–273.
  24. ↑ Hans-Georg Gadamer: Plato's thinking in utopias . In: Hans-Georg Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke , Volume 7, Tübingen 1991, pp. 270–289, here: 275–289; Hans-Georg Gadamer: The idea of ​​the good between Plato and Aristotle . In: Hans-Georg Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke , Volume 7, Tübingen 1991, pp. 128–227, here: 165–169.
  25. ↑ On this debate, see Malcolm Schofield : Plato. Political Philosophy , Oxford 2006, pp. 194–249; George Klosko: The Development of Plato's Political Theory , New York 1986, pp. 173-180; Kai Trampedach: Platon, the academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 278–283; Hartmut Erbse : Plato's “Politeia” and the modern anti-Platonists . In: Gymnasium 83, 1976, pp. 169–191, here: 188; Dirk Otto: The utopian state model of Plato's Politeia from the point of view of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. A contribution to the assessment of the totalitarianism accusation against Plato , Berlin 1994, pp. 217–222, 239–253.
  26. ↑ Kai Trampedach: Platon, the Academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 210–215, 263; George Klosko: The Development of Plato's Political Theory , New York 1986, pp. 174-179.
  27. ↑ See Kai Trampedach: Platon, the academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 255–277.
  28. ↑ On the view of Aristotle see Otfried Höffe: Four chapters of a history of the impact of the Politeia . In: Otfried Höffe (ed.): Platon: Politeia , 3rd edition, Berlin 2011, pp. 259-280, here: 264-271 (especially 270f.).
  29. ^ Porphyrios , Vita Plotini 12.
  30. ↑ Dominic J. O'Meara: Platonopolis , Oxford 2003, pp. 73-86.
  31. ↑ Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 1 pr. 4.5-7.
  32. ↑ For details see Werner Schneiders: Sozietätsplan und Sozialutopie bei Leibniz . In: Studia Leibnitiana 7, 1975, pp. 58-80.
  33. ↑ Christoph Böhr : Knowledge certainty and political philosophy. On Christian Wolff's postulate des philosophus regnans . In: Journal for philosophical research 36, 1982, pp. 579-598.
  34. ↑ Kant's works (Academy edition) Vol. 8, Berlin 1912, p. 369. For Kant's position see Otfried Höffe: Four chapters of a history of the impact of the Politeia . In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Platon: Politeia , 3rd edition, Berlin 2011, pp. 259–280, here: 271–275.
  35. ^ Friedrich Nietzsche: Morgenröthe 496.
  36. ↑ Melissa Lane: Plato's Progeny offers an overview . How Socrates and Plato Still Captivate the Modern Mind , London 2001, p. 97-134, Marc Schlette: Der Zauber Poppers , Duisburg 2001, p. 26-29 and Konstantin Schimert: Die Platonkritik Karl Poppers , Neuried 2003, p. 13– 40.
  37. ↑ Karl R. Popper: The open society and their enemies , Volume 1: Plato's magic , 8th edition, Tübingen 2003, pp. 144–147.
  38. ^ Karl R. Popper: The open society and its enemies , Volume 1: The Magic of Plato , 8th edition, Tübingen 2003, p. 158.
  39. ^ Karl R. Popper: The open society and its enemies , Volume 1: The magic of Plato , 8th edition, Tübingen 2003, p. 161f.
  40. ^ Karl R. Popper: The open society and its enemies , Volume 1: The magic of Plato , 8th edition, Tübingen 2003, pp. 182-185.
  41. ↑ A compilation of earlier statements is provided by Renford Bambrough (ed.): Plato, Popper and Politics , Cambridge 1967.
  42. ↑ Ronald B. Levinson: In Defense of Plato , Cambridge 1953. A relatively brief response from Popper, written in 1961, is included in later editions of the first volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies .
  43. ^ John Wild: Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law , Chicago 1953.
  44. ↑ George Klosko: The Development of Plato's Political Theory , New York 1986, pp. 166-173.
  45. ↑ Malcolm Schofield: Plato. Political Philosophy , Oxford 2006, pp. 195f., 239f .; Kai Trampedach: Platon, the academy and contemporary politics , Stuttgart 1994, pp. 278–283; Dirk Otto: The utopian state model of Plato's Politeia from the point of view of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four. A contribution to the evaluation of the totalitarianism accusation against Plato , Berlin 1994, pp. 253-255.
  46. ^ Gregory Vlastos : The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato's Republic . In: Gregory Vlastos: Studies in Greek Philosophy , Vol. 2, Princeton 1995, pp. 69-103 (cf. the differentiated statement by Lesley Brown: How Totalitarian is Plato's Republic? In: Eric Nis Ostenfeld (Ed.): Essays on Plato's Republic , Aarhus 1998, pp. 13-27); Hartmut Erbse: Plato's “Politeia” and the modern anti-Platonists . In: Gymnasium 83, 1976, pp. 169–191, here: 176–184, 188 (see, however, the criticism by Andreas Graeser : Comments on “Plato's 'Politeia' and the modern antiplatonic” . In: Gymnasium 84, 1977, Pp. 493-501); Robert W. Hall: Plato and Totalitarianism . In: Polis 7, 1988, pp. 105-114; Otfried Höffe: Four chapters of a history of the impact of the Politeia . In: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Platon: Politeia , 3rd edition, Berlin 2011, pp. 259–280, here: 277–279.
  47. ↑ Christopher CW Taylor: Plato's Totalitarianism . In: Richard Kraut (ed.): Plato's Republic. Critical Essays , Lanham 1997, pp. 31-48, here: 35f.
  48. ↑ On the interpretation of Strauss and its reception see Malcolm Schofield: Plato. Political Philosophy , Oxford 2006, pp. 196, 239 and p. 241, note 12.
  49. ↑ Thanassis Samaras: Plato on Democracy , New York 2002, pp. 77-94. See Dorothea Frede : Plato, Popper and historicism . In: Enno Rudolph (ed.): Polis and Kosmos , Darmstadt 1996, pp. 74-107, here: 102-104.
  50. ↑ Susan Sara Monoson: Plato's Democratic entanglements , Princeton 2000, pp 127-129.
  51. ^ Jason Brennan: The Right to a Competent Electorate . In: The Philosophical Quarterly 61, 2011, pp. 700-724.
  52. ↑ David M. Estlund: Democratic Authority , Princeton 2008, pp. 206-222.