HMS Edinburgh (C16)
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The fifth HMS Edinburgh of the British Royal Navy was a 1939 overflowed from the deck light cruiser of the Town class . The cruiser was used on various scenes during World War II before it had to be abandoned and sunk in the Barents Sea in 1942 after several torpedo hits . There was a large amount of gold on board, which was recovered in a spectacular operation after the war.
technology
The Edinburgh was keeled at Swan Hunter and entered service by the Royal Navy as a light cruiser in 1939 . The ship was 187 m long, 19.3 m wide and had a water displacement of 10,000 t. Eight Parsons turbines with a total of 80,000 hp were used as propulsion, giving the ship a top speed of 32.5 knots . When cruising at 14 knots, the range was 10,000 nautical miles. The ship was armed with four triplet turrets with 152-mm rapid-fire cannons, six twin mountings with 102-mm anti-aircraft guns , which could also be used against sea targets, eight 40-mm cannons and two triplet torpedo discharge tubes of 533 mm caliber. The equipment also included two Walrus flying boats for reconnaissance tasks.
Composition of the convoy QP 11
The northern sea convoy left in the early morning of April 28, 1942. 13 cargo ships , accompanied by the destroyers Bulldog , Beagle , Beverly , Amazon , four corvettes and a trawler converted into a submarine hunter , left Murmansk with a course for Iceland . The light cruiser Edinburgh and the destroyers Foresight and Forester took over the local security . Until they passed the Soviet mine barriers, the ships were additionally reinforced by the Soviet destroyers Sokruschitelny and Kuibyshev and a British mine clearing boat .
The speed of the formation was only five knots, because you had to orientate yourself on the slowest ship.
Immediately before leaving the port , the Edinburgh was hauled into port. In a lightning-fast operation, 93 boxes were hoisted on board and taken to an empty ammunition bunker. The Soviet liaison officer Sergei Zinoviev, an employee of the Soviet military mission in Great Britain , got on board as a passenger . The boxes contained 465 gold bars with a total of 5.5 tons of gold, the payment for armaments that were delivered to the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the USA under the lending and leasing laws . But only a few initiates knew about it on board.
Course of the journey
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The journey began in bad weather. Snow flurries and fog covered the ships against possible German aerial reconnaissance and also before the eyes of German agents on neutral ships. In the afternoon, appeared for second FW-200 - maritime patrol aircraft in the sky, but quickly disappeared in the clouds and did not notice the bandage. Around 7:00 p.m. the weather improved, but now night fell and covered the bandage for eight hours. The ice border in the north and the German aerial reconnaissance from Norway dictated a narrow course along the ice border for the association.
This was known to the German submarines , which lay in wait east of Bear Island . On April 29, 1942 U 456 ran at 4:00 a.m. under the later Knight's Cross bearer Kapitänleutnant Max Teichert (born January 31, 1915 in Kiel; † May 12, 1943 on his tenth patrol in the Atlantic; he received the Knight's Cross on December 19, 1943 posthumously) from the naval base in Kirkenes . Together with six other submarines for the time being, they were supposed to attack the Allied convoy pair PQ 15 / QP 11 as a group of “ shrub knights ” .
On April 30, U 88 under Kapitänleutnant Heino Bohmann († September 12, 1942 on the third patrol of U 88 together with the entire crew in the North Sea) sighted the convoy on his first patrol and gave the radio message 0055 / at 1:10 a.m. 788 through: "Enemy convoy in sight of square 5924. Enemy steers NE course." According to the instructions at the time, U 88 had to keep in contact with the escort and send regular location reports to enable the other submarines to approach. However, only U 251 , U 436 , U 456 and U 589 from the group “Strauchritter” should succeed.
U 88 succeeded in determining the general course of the jagged convoy, and U 456 lay down in waiting position. At 5:00 the tracking transmitter failed on U 456 , which meant that a position report could not be recorded again until 5:49. QP 11 had changed course slightly. U 456 ran up to him and set out on a parallel course.
The battle
At 4:18 p.m. U 456 in square AC 5519 fired a triple fan of tubes I, II and IV at the Edinburgh from a distance of 1200 m . Because of the fogged optics, the listening device was aimed. After 80 seconds of torpedo running time, two detonations occurred . The Edinburgh was hit to starboard amidships , level with the forward funnel and stern . The ship drove another semicircle and remained lying slightly heeled to starboard . The steering system was destroyed, the drive failed, but the ship remained buoyant, but needed tug assistance. The destroyers Forester , Foresight and Kuibyshev rushed to Edinburgh . Command of the QP 11 was given to Commander Richmond on the Bulldog .
The destroyers took up the submarine pursuit, but soon had to break it off again because the ASDIC underwater detector , which was so successful in the Atlantic, did not function properly in the polar sea . Different layers of water with different temperatures and thus different densities, exacerbated by the Gulf Stream , formed inversion layers in the water, which prevented an exact location.
At the Edinburgh succeeded despite vollgelaufenem tail to set the starboard drive back in operation and eight-node direction Murmansk to "limp". In the meantime, Lieutenant Shevarnadze rushed to help with the coast guard ship Rubin . He was closest to the damaged one. In addition, the British M-boats Niger , Harrier , Gossamer and Hussar as well as a Soviet tug ran out to guide the Edinburgh with her valuable cargo to Murmansk.
The Forester and Foresight continued orbiting their flagship , had brief sonar contact, but lost it again. U 456 recorded: “10:15 pm. Two destroyers nearby. S-device and listening tracking. You have me for a short time, no wabos. After 1 hour, 1 expires, one stays nearby. Only light twilight upstairs. "
This radio message caused Admiral Nordmeer Hubert Schmundt to prepare the destroyer group “Nordmeer”, consisting of destroyers Z 7 Hermann Schoemann , Z 24 and Z 25 , in Kirkenes . Captain Schulze-Heinrichs on board Z 7 was given the order. The association ran out on May 1, 1942 at 0:30, but first to the convoy QP 11, as the Edinburgh had been temporarily lost. This departure of the destroyer group in turn noticed the Soviet defense, which then used their sea planes to protect the Edinburgh .
At 1:40 p.m. the destroyer group Nordmeer reached QP 11, which was heading west close to the ice border. The security ships immediately drew curtains of fog. At 2:07 p.m., the German destroyers Z 24 and Z 25 each fired two torpedoes in the direction of the convoy. The Soviet merchant ship Ziolkowskij succeeded in damaging it, but it did not sink but could be saved. Then the destroyer force was repulsed by the security ships. Five more attacks in the next four hours were also repulsed by British forces. The destroyer group Nordmeer gave up and withdrew.
The Edinburgh was still guarded by the two British destroyers, the Soviet had to return to Murmansk due to lack of fuel. The Rubin arrived at around 6:00 p.m. , shortly afterwards the four M-boats and the Soviet tug. A tow connection could be created, and early in the morning the formation set out for Murmansk.
However, one was warned. The sensor holder signal “j” from a submarine was received at 442 kHz (it was U 456 ). Submarine attacks were expected, but U 456 was not able to do so after the attack sea pipe failed, and the signal was intended for German pilots for orientation
On May 2 at 6:17 a.m., Z 25 suddenly saw the Edinburgh between snow showers , but also the British destroyers who were immediately rushing up to defend them. However, a snow shower blocked the view again and only Z 7 still had visual contact. However, before the torpedoes could be brought into action from 780 m away, the Edinburgh fired the first volley with its superior artillery, but it did not hit. However, the second volley hit perfectly and destroyed, among other things, the engine room of Z 7 . As a result, the ship was unable to maneuver and was slowly sinking. The crew disembarked and at 8:30 a.m. at position 72 ° N, 34 ° E (square AC 5917) blew up the wreck with a depth charge.
However, the remaining German destroyers attacked on and Z 25 scored at 7:02 PM a hit amidships on the port side of Edinburgh . The new destruction made the ship irredeemable. The remaining crew went into the lifeboats and were picked up by the M-boats. The German destroyers withdrew. At 8:52 a.m., a torpedo shot from close range sent the Edinburgh to the bottom of the Barents Sea 180 nautical miles from Murmansk at a depth of 260 meters, together with 60 seamen who had fallen during the fighting, in order not to let the valuable cargo get into enemy hands.
The Allied fleet reached the Kola Fjord on May 3rd . The German destroyers rescued parts of the crew of Z 7 , the rest of the raft floating was rescued by U 88 .
Recovery of the gold
The gold was insured with 32.32% according to the international insurance practice with "The British War Risks Insurance Office". After the insurance sum was paid out, 32.32% of the ownership was transferred to the British office. The ship was declared a war grave ("war grave") and was not allowed to be entered. The Soviet Union fully recognized this status and the resulting right of Great Britain to the inviolability of the cruiser, even though the ship was in waters claimed by the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, shortly after the end of the war, mining companies began to deal with the gold treasure, but there was still no technology with which one could work successfully in depth.
At the end of the 1960s, the Englishman Keith Jessop dealt with the project. He was an experienced deep-sea diver and worked for oil companies on drilling rigs. After extensive research and finding donors, he was able to carry out an expedition to locate the wreck in 1979. The survey of fishermen regarding underwater obstacles revealed two target areas. After 42 days the expedition had to be canceled due to lack of money.
He next succeeded in obtaining permission from the British government, which obtained the approval of the Soviet Union, to film the wreck. He sold the film rights of the further search exclusively to a television company, and with the help of other donors he went back to the search.
All position information was calculated again and the most likely spot of the sinking in the spring of 1981 with the "Dammtor", the salvage ship costing the equivalent of € 25,000 per day, was examined. On May 6, 1981, the "Dammtor" sailed to the calculated position and only a few hours later found the wreck lying on its side, which was quickly identified without any doubt. The entire search lasted only 14 days.
In September 1981 a salvage agreement with the Soviet Union for two years was signed in Moscow, which had previously been approved by Great Britain. The salvage company took all the risks, but received 45% of the gold found. The rest was shared between the USSR (67.68%) and Great Britain (32.32%). The recovery was called Operation Greyhound and it was successful.
literature
- War diary U 456. (No. 5) from April 21 to May 4, 1942, annex to Admiral Nordmeer Gkdos 1332/42
- Günter Lanitzki: Treasure divers . FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 118.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 120.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 123.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 124.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 125.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 126.
- ↑ Günter Lanitzki: Schatztaucher. FA Brockhaus Verlag, Leipzig 1986, ISBN 3-325-00066-5 , p. 128.
Southampton Group:
HMS Birmingham |
HMS Glasgow |
HMS Newcastle |
HMS Sheffield |
HMS Southampton
Gloucester Group:
HMS Gloucester |
HMS Liverpool |
HMS Manchester
Edinburgh Group:
HMS Belfast |
HMS Edinburgh